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Executive Summary 
Overview 
The purpose of this study is to identify appropriate next steps for the regulators of postal 
services in the Member States of the European Union (EU) and European Economic 
Area (EEA) in light of the evolution of postal markets, best regulatory practices, and the 
ongoing transposition of the ‘Third Postal Directive’. 
In the last two decades, postal services — collection and delivery services offered by 
public and private operators — have undergone a period of rapid and fundamental 
evolution. Advances in electronic communications, information processing, and 
transportation systems have precipitated basic changes in the supply and demand for 
postal services. These market developments have been overlain by legal and 
institutional changes accompanying the creation of a single European market. 
Beginning with the Postal Directive adopted in 1997, Community legislation has sought 
to harmonise and improve postal services in the Member States. The directive requires 
Member States to regulate postal markets to ensure a universal postal service meeting 
minimum specified criteria, while at the same time embarking on a course of ‘gradual 
and controlled liberalisation' and giving basic protections to users (senders and 
addressees) of universal services. To implement these obligations, the directive 
requires Member States to establish one or more ‘national regulatory authorities’ 
(NRAs) for the postal sector. 
The Postal Directive has been amended twice. The ‘Second Postal Directive’ (the 
original Postal Directive as amended in 2002) has been transposed into national law by 
all Member States of the EU and EEA. The ‘Third Postal Directive’ (the Second Postal 
Directive as further amended in 2008) must be transposed by 31 December 2010 at the 
latest (some Member States have until 31 December 2012). The Third Postal Directive 
completes the program of liberalisation begun in the original Postal Directive by 
requiring Member States to end all postal monopolies and implement other changes 
consistent with ‘full market opening’. 
This study seeks to assist the NRAs and other regulators of postal markets — i.e., 
ministers, legislators, national competition authorities, etc. — to establish a sound basis 
for implementing the Third Postal Directive by: 
• reviewing the manner in which Member States have implemented the original Postal 
Directive and its 2002 amendment; 
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• summarizing the role of the competition authorities and general competition law in 
regulating European postal markets; 
• describing preparations and studies undertaken or planned for implementation of 
the Third Postal Directive; 
• identifying ‘best practices’ in the regulation of postal markets by postal and 
competition authorities, where ‘best’ reflects the objectives and requirements of the 
Third Postal Directive; and 
• identifying potential gains and appropriate mechanisms for cooperation among 
national regulatory authorities in order to implement the Third Postal Directive most 
efficiently and effectively. 
Overall conclusions and recommendations 
Key regulatory tasks 
In summary, we believe that, to implement the Third Postal Directive effectively, the 
Commission, Member States, and NRAs must focus first on the following six 
overarching regulatory tasks: 
• NRAs must develop accurate and appropriate regulatory accounts for postal 
services jointly produced by a postal service provider that possesses significant 
market power in the provision of universal postal services. The directive sets out 
many important tasks for the NRA. Nonetheless, development of regulatory 
accounts deserves particular emphasis. Accounting regulation is the most 
technically challenging task faced by the NRA. At the same time, accounting 
regulation serves as the foundation for the benefits foreseen for end users because 
it is critical to both ensuring universal service and achieving full market opening. 
• Member States and NRAs must periodically evaluate and adapt the best postal 
regulatory practices developed by other industrialised countries. No country or 
regulator has a monopoly on the supply of sound ideas and good practices. A wide 
range of countries and regulators have developed approaches that are worthy of 
consideration by all. At the same time, few Member States and regulators have 
developed a process for regularly evaluating and adapting the best practices of 
other countries. Such a process should be incorporated into the regulatory 
approaches of all Member States. 
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• Member States and national regulatory authorities must develop a new view of their 
role as regulators of the postal services market, one that is both broader and more 
limited. The original Postal Directive primarily emphasised ensuring universal 
service through regulation of designated ‘universal service providers’ (USPs). The 
Third Postal Directive has adopted a more balanced emphasis on three objectives: 
ensuring universal service, full market opening, and protection of users of all types 
of postal services. Member States need to ensure that NRAs broaden their focus 
accordingly. At the same time, in adopting a broader regulatory focus, national 
regulatory authorities will also need to develop a reasoned doctrine of ‘forbearance’. 
That is, postal regulators, like regulators in other sectors, should develop reasoned 
criteria that identify circumstances in which regulatory controls should not be 
exerted even though they may be available. 
• Member States and NRAs must develop analyses and procedures that will allow 
them to ensure universal service by reliance upon market forces where feasible and 
appropriate and to employ designation procedures or public procurement where 
necessary to supplement market forces, while choosing among and administering 
such mechanisms in a manner that is transparent, non-discriminatory, fair, and 
consistent with the principles of proportionality and least market distortion. In 
accordance with the Third Postal Directive and the principles of sound 
administrative practice, Member States should rely upon market forces — i.e., the 
commercial self-interest of postal service providers — to ensure universal service 
where it is feasible and appropriate to do so. Where it is not feasible and appropriate 
to rely on market forces, Member States should introduce designation procedures 
and/or public procurement contracts. Each decision with respect to ensuring 
universal service should be taken in a manner that is transparent, non-
discriminatory, fair, and consistent with the principles of proportionality and least 
market distortion. 
• Member States and NRAs must develop the analyses and procedures necessary to 
ensure that the scope of the universal service obligation is aligned with the changing 
needs of users and the evolving technical, economic, and social environment of the 
postal services market. Under the Third Postal Directive, regulators have a 
significant degree of discretion in deciding which postal services are ensured and 
regulated as universal services, provided that at a minimum universal services must 
include a basic letter post service and basic parcel post service. Regulators should 
exercise this discretion deliberately, taking into account the changing needs of the 
general public and the objectives of the directive. 
• The Commission, Member States, NRAs must ensure that postal and non-postal 
laws do not create barriers to entry that are inconsistent with the requirements or 
objectives of the Third Postal Directive. Key non-postal laws that distort postal 
markets include value-added tax and customs laws. In addition, Member States 
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must avoid introducing new legal barriers to entry, such as authorisation 
requirements that prevent genuine competition or sector-specific labour laws which 
are designed to impair new entrants. 
Key institutional tasks 
Effective and appropriate regulation of postal markets also depends upon effective and 
appropriate institutions. As Member States prepare to implement the Third Postal 
Directive, it is timely, indeed necessary, for the Member States to reconsider, and 
where appropriate, reform the institutional arrangements for regulation of the postal 
market. To this end, we believe that Member States and the Commission should focus 
on three key institutional issues. 
• Member States must allocate responsibility for the regulation of postal services 
among separate institutions in a manner that ensures objective and impartial 
policies and regulation. The first step in developing an effective institutional 
framework for regulation of postal services is an appropriate definition of the roles of 
the agencies involved. To promote objective and impartial policies and regulation in 
the postal sector, regulatory authority should be appropriately allocated among four 
separate institutions: (1) a ministry that determines public policy for the postal 
sector; (2) a ministry or agency that exercises the ownership rights of the 
government in the public postal operator, if any; (3) an independent regulator of the 
postal sector; and (4) a national competition authority. 
• Member States must specifically reconsider the role, resources, and independence 
of the national regulatory authority in light of the Third Postal Directive. As the Postal 
Directive has evolved over the last decade, the role of the postal regulatory authority 
has come into clearer focus. Amendments to the Postal Directive have increased 
reliance on the impartiality and expertise of the regulator as the guarantor of 
universal service, enforcer of fair competition, and protector of users’ rights. In 
reviewing the institutional arrangements for the NRA, Member States need to 
consider its authority, independence, and resources. The authority of the NRA 
should encompass all tasks which, according to the Postal Directive or good 
administrative practice, should be discharged transparently, non-discriminatorily, 
objectively, and proportionately. Enforcement powers should be adequate to ensure 
the effectiveness of regulatory decisions. Institutional arrangements should foster 
the independence of NRA from both public postal operators and political direction. 
At the same, Member States must ensure that NRAs have adequate financial 
resources, skilled personnel, and access to external consultants. 
• To implement the Third Postal Directive effectively, the Commission and national 
postal regulators need to develop an efficient mechanism for consultation and 
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coordination. Effective implementation of the Third Postal Directive will depend upon 
more substantive coordination between NRAs and the Commission. Enhanced 
coordination would allow NRAs to improve regulatory practices through mutual 
assistance and promulgation of best practices. Better coordination and enhanced 
cooperation will also create a more harmonised regulatory environment for 
Community postal services and thus promote development of an internal market 
and improved regulation of cross border services. To achieve better coordination 
among postal regulators, the Commission should establish an advisory group of 
independent postal regulators, a European Regulators Group for Postal Services 
(ERGP). An ERGP should be functioning well before the end of 2010, the date of 
full liberalisation. 
Evolution of the role of regulators in perspective 
More broadly, implementation of the Third Postal Directive should be informed by an 
appreciation that technological advances offer the traditional postal sector only two 
choices for the long term: reform or obsolescence. The Third Postal Directive offers the 
Community and Member States an enlightened way forward, but it is not the end of 
postal history. In our view, implementation of the Third Postal Directive should proceed 
with an appreciation of fundamental long term changes taking place in communications 
and transportation markets. To preserve the best of the long tradition of national postal 
systems in the future, Member States will need to implement the Third Postal Directive 
not with reluctance and half-measures but with an appreciation that the Third Postal 
Directive is a necessary step in a longer term effort to adapt postal markets to the — 
still unknowable — demands of twenty-first century society. 
Overview of the regulation of postal services 
This study begins by clarifying terms and concepts used to describe the regulation of 
postal services. In general, this study uses terms as defined in the Third Postal 
Directive. The term ‘postal services’, therefore, includes all public and private ‘services 
involving the clearance, sorting, transport and delivery of postal items’.  
There are many submarkets in the total postal services market. One way of describing 
these submarkets is illustrated in figure ES-1. The traditional services provided by 
public postal operators are described in this study as: basic letter post, bulk letters, 
periodicals (newspapers, magazines, etc.), direct mail (identical printed 
advertisements), non-priority letter post (not offered in all Member States), basic parcel 
post, and bulk parcels. 
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Not all postal services are ‘universal services’. Under Article 3 of the Postal Directive, a 
‘universal service’ is a postal service that is ensured and regulated by the Member 
State. The directive makes clear that express services and services for heavy weight 
parcels are not universal services. With respect to other services traditionally offered by 
public postal operators, the situation is less clear. It appears that Member States have a 
significant degree of discretion in deciding which services are ensured and regulated as 
universal services under the terms of the directive. There is disagreement among 
Member States, however, as to precisely how much flexibility the Postal Directive allows 
in defining the range of universal services. 
Based on the responses of NRAs to a survey undertaken for this study, every Member 
State ensures and regulates provision of two services as universal services: basic letter 
post and basic parcel post. Few Member States treat bulk parcels as a universal 
service. One third to one half of the Member States treat services for bulk letters, 
periodicals (newspapers, magazines, etc.), and direct mail (identical printed 
advertisements) as a universal service. In several Member States USPs and NRAs 
have different understandings of the scope of the universal service obligation. 




The Postal Directive provides for regulation of non-universal postal services as well as 
universal postal services. Regulation of non-universal services features more 
prominently in the Third Postal Directive than it does in the Second Postal Directive, 
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due partly to changes in provisions and partly to the implications of full market opening. 
The Third Postal Directive provides for regulation of universal service providers in 
instances that are not limited to provision of universal services (special tariffs, terminal 
dues, accounting). In addition, the directive provides for regulation of some elements of 
postal services by all postal service providers (user protection, access to postal 
infrastructure, statistics, etc.). 
In light of changes introduced in the Third Postal Directive, it is necessary to take 
special care in use of the term universal service provider or ‘USP’. In the Second Postal 
Directive (as in the original Postal Directive), the term ‘USP‘ referred to a postal 
operator designated as a universal service provider under Article 4. In the Third Postal 
Directive, the term ‘USP‘ appears to refer to any postal service provider that provides all 
or part of the universal service through the operation of market forces, designation, or 
public procurement pursuant to a notice provided under Article 4(1). 
Implementation of the Second Postal Directive 
This study reviews in detail how Member States have implemented provisions of the 
Second Postal Directive, taking into account clarifications introduced in the Third Postal 
Directive. Topics covered include the following: 
• the regulatory framework and allocation of responsibility for implementing the Postal 
Directive among national agencies; 
• independence, development, and tasks of the national regulatory authority; 
• definition of the universal service obligation; 
• quality of service monitoring; 
• exclusive and special rights; 
• licensing/authorisation procedures; 
• use of compensation funds to support universal service; 
• regulation of the accounts of USP(s);  
• regulation of prices for universal service; and 
• protection of users’ rights. 
Broadly speaking, in most Member States there is significant room for improvement in 
the regulation of postal services. NRAs need to be more independent of political 
authorities and reinforced in terms of resources and authority. Basic tasks such as the 
development of regulatory accounts or the specifics of the universal service obligation 
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must be addressed with greater care and technical expertise. In addition, there is 
considerable — in our view, undue — divergence among Member States in how 
requirements of the directive are interpreted. While Member States and their NRAs 
have expended considerable efforts to implement the Postal Directive effectively and 
efficiently, these efforts must be redoubled in implementing the Third Postal Directive.  
The main body of the study offers a detailed discussion of current implementation of the 
Second Postal Directive. Summary conclusions with respect to some of the most 
important topics follow. 
• The Postal Directive provides that a minimum range of regulatory functions should 
be committed to an independent regulator and not resolved by political agencies. 
Most Member States have determined most major policy issues by primary 
legislation or ministerial regulation and committed most administrative tasks to the 
NRA. There appears to be cause for concern in some Member States where a 
ministry or the Council of Ministers has a significant role in technical or competitively 
sensitive areas such as regulation of prices, accounting, cross subsidy, or the 
compensation fund. 
• In many Member States, the postal minister appoints all or most of the board of 
directors and/or the chief executive officer of the public postal operator. It appears 
questionable whether these arrangements provide an appropriate level of 
separation between regulatory and policy making authority, on the one hand, and 
ownership and control of the public postal operator, on the other. 
• In several cases, Member States need to do more to ensure institutional separation 
between the NRA, on the one hand, and agencies of government which are 
responsible for the conduct of national postal policy and the commercial success of 
the USP, on the other. 
• Financial and staff resources available to national regulatory authorities vary 
significantly among the Member States, even if comparison is limited to those with 
postal markets of comparable size. The 6 largest NRAs should be able to perform 
substantially more extensive analysis than other NRAs, although in fact some large 
market NRAs have done much better than others. In the 15 Member States with 
medium and small postal markets, well established NRAs have similar levels of 
resources. This convergence suggests that a NRA requires a basic minimum level 
of resources to do its job, including, on average, a staff of about 9 to 10 persons. 
The relatively low level of resources available to NRAs in some medium to small 
postal markets, and even more in very small markets, suggests that these NRAs 
may lack the minimum tools needed to regulate postal markets effectively. 
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• All Member States except Germany have designated the public postal operator or 
its successor as the universal service provider. Germany has maintained a high 
standard of universal postal service but not designated a universal service provider. 
• Virtually all Member States have established quality of service standards for letters 
and/or other basic letter post services, but only slightly more than half have 
established quality of service standards for basic parcel post service even though it, 
too, is considered a universal service in all Member States. Less than half of the 
Member States have established quality of service standards for bulk mail services. 
Most Member States monitor quality of service performance, but a significant 
minority do not. 
• Currently the only significant sources of financing for the net cost of the universal 
service obligation (if any) are the reserved area and direct payment to the USP. In 
those Member States that make use of one of these means of public financing 
(some do not use either), there appears to be no clear relation between the level of 
financing and the net cost of the universal service obligation, if any. In Spain and 
Italy — both Member States lacking a NRA independent of the postal ministry — 
high levels of public financing may exceed the net cost of the universal service 
obligation significantly, potentially raising a red flag under the rules governing state 
aid. 
• Today about 57 percent of the total EU/EEA postal market (by volume of letter post) 
is provided without a reserved area (or with a largely ineffective reserved area in 
Spain). There is no evidence that elimination of the reserved area has led to a 
decline in the quality of universal service; if anything, the contrary appears to be the 
case. 
• Different VAT regimes for universal service providers and other postal operators 
continue to distort postal markets. The recent (April 2009) ruling by the European 
Court of Justice in the TNT Post UK case clarifies but does not resolve this problem. 
• International postal markets continue to be distorted by a number of practices 
unique to international postal affairs. Chief among these are practices related to 
terminal dues (especially outside the REIMS area), restrictions on remail and 
ETOEs (extraterritorial office of exchanges), special customs rules for postal items 
conveyed by universal service providers, and restrictive use of IMPC (international 
mail processing centres) codes. With few exceptions, NRAs have not implemented 
the principles set out in Article 13 of the Postal Directive with regard to terminal 
dues. 
• Member States employ a variety of authorisation procedures for services within the 
universal service area. While 11 Member States require an individual license for all 
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services within the universal service area, 7 Member States, representing almost 
two thirds of the EU/EEA postal market, require an individual license only if the 
postal operator is conveying letter post items, and 6 Member States require only a 
general authorisation. In 4 Member States, it appears that universal service 
obligations have been imposed on postal operators other than designated USPs. 
Such conditions will have to be reconsidered in light of provisions introduced in the 
Third Postal Directive. Two other types of conditions are relatively rare but also raise 
questions under the Postal Directive: financial guarantees and technical expertise. 
• Separation of accounts of USPs as required by the Postal Directive remains a work 
in progress. A substantial number of NRAs — representing a majority of the EEA/EA 
postal market — were unable to affirm that they have approved the number and 
organisation of the USP’s product accounts. Few NRAs can confirm separate 
accounts for upstream and downstream services, yet it appears that some method 
of separating upstream and downstream accounts is required to implement the 
‘avoided costs’ requirements of Article 12. Overall, NRAs express only a moderate 
level of satisfaction (7.3 out of 10) with the separation of costs currently presented 
by regulatory accounts. 
• Although there are some notable exceptions, few NRAs appear able to allocate 
costs according to the four broad categories prescribed by Article 14 of the Postal 
Directive (direct costs, common costs assignable by direct analysis, common costs 
assignable by indirect linkage, unassignable common costs). Similarly, few NRAs 
appear to have developed a reasoned approach towards the allocation of delivery 
costs according to these four categories. This cannot be considered an acceptable 
implementation of the directive and reiterates the concerns noted in the 
Commission’s reports on the application of the Postal Directive and earlier 
consultant reports to the Commission (‘main developments studies’). The high level 
cost categories set out in Article 14 are only the first step in the development of 
more detailed regulatory product accounts which are the foundation of many of the 
elements of postal regulation required by the directive. On average, NRAs express 
only a moderate level of satisfaction (7.2 out of 10) with the cost allocation data 
available to them. 
• Half of the Member States do not issue a periodic statement confirming USP 
compliance with Article 14 of the Postal Directive even though this statement is 
required by the directive. 
• All Member States control tariffs for basic letter post services, and the great 
majority, but not all, Member States control tariffs for basic parcel post services. 
Member States generally regulate prices of additional postal services if the services 
are ensured as universal services, although in some cases they do not (notably in 
the case of basic parcel post). In addition, a number of Member States regulate the 
 Role of Regulators in a More Competitive Postal Market xi 
 Executive Summary 
rates of bulk postal services provided by the national USP even though these 
services are not ensured as universal services. (Note that regulated prices may not 
be cost-oriented prices if the regulator lacks complete and reliable cost data). 
• The requirement that prices of universal services must be ‘geared to cost’ is 
interpreted in fundamentally different ways by NRAs. Most NRAs consider that, in 
order to be ‘geared to cost’, the rate for each product must cover its fully allocated 
cost. On the other hand, the three largest NRAs (DE, FR, UK), representing almost 
60 percent of the EU/EEA market, consider that the minimum cost that must be 
covered by each rate should be the long run incremental or long run marginal cost, 
a standard more consistent with economic theory. 
• Price caps (regulatory limits on price changes without requiring approval of specific 
prices) are used to regulate rates of basic letter post services in 9 Member States, 
representing 62 percent of the total EU/EEA postal market. Sixteen Member States, 
representing 35 percent of the postal market, regulate basic letter post services by 
ex ante review (approval of specific prices before they can be implemented). Basic 
parcel post rates are also regulated by price caps in 7 Member States accounting 
for more than half of the postal market. Other Member States use ex ante and ex 
post (evaluation of prices according to regulatory standards after the prices have 
become effective) methods roughly equally. Rates for unreserved bulk postal 
services are less strictly regulated. In general, there appears to be a consensus 
among NRAs that forward-looking price regulation — either ex ante review or price 
caps — is appropriate for universal service products where there is no significant 
competition.  
• Half of the Member States authorise both the NRA and NCPA (national consumer 
protection authority) to enforce user protections in the postal sector. Another third 
rely solely on the NRA for user protection. Most Member States have extended user 
protection measures to all postal operators (not only the USP) within the universal 
service area. However, implementation of effective user protection procedures 
appears to be uneven. Seventeen USPs publish the annual report on handling of 
user complaints required by the Postal Directive. Eleven NRAs also issue their own 
reports on user protection procedures. 
Current Application of Competition Law 
Since 2000, there have been several significant decisions by the Commission applying 
the competition rules in the postal sector. In 2003, the Commission approved a terminal 
dues agreement among public postal operators (REIMS II) that would have otherwise 
violated restrictions on price agreements. In three cases, the Commission considered 
xii Role of Regulators in a More Competitive Postal Market  
 Executive Summary 
that a public postal operator had abused its dominant position. Two cases involved 
Deutsche Post (predatory pricing of business parcels; unlawful interception of remail) 
and one La Poste of Belgium (price discrimination used to eliminate competition). And 
in several cases, the Commission acted against measures by Member States that 
extended the monopoly of the incumbent beyond reserved services or encouraged anti-
competitive discriminatory behaviour by incumbents. 
Since decentralisation of the enforcement of competition law in 2004, NCAs have 
adopted several decisions holding that the incumbent USP abused its dominant position 
by using monopoly power to impede entry into newly liberalised markets or to enhance 
its position in markets for unaddressed items. NCAs have also condemned anti-
competitive practices used by incumbents including tying reserved and non-reserved 
products, loyalty rebates, predatory prices for non-reserved markets, and refusals to 
give access to postal networks. 
After full market opening, the role of antitrust policy is expected to increase. Antitrust 
law will support and complement sector regulation to ensure effective competition. New 
entrants are likely to rely on enforcement of antitrust provisions to resist efforts by 
incumbents to protect their markets. In other network industries, liberalisation has been 
accompanied by an increased application of antitrust policy. 
In principle, it appears preferable to have both a sector regulator (NRA) and national 
competition authority (NCA) protecting the competitiveness of postal markets. Granting 
an NRA exclusive authority to enforce the competition rules would risk regulatory 
capture. As provided by Article 22 of the Third Postal Directive, the NRA and NCA 
should consult and coordinate using such procedures as the following: (i) mechanisms, 
applicable under strict deadline, to ensure clear case allocation and division of task 
between the NCA and the NRA; (ii) reciprocal consultation when deciding cases having 
antitrust aspects; (iii) extensive exchanging information, including confidential data, 
provided that both NCA and NRA respect business secrecy and that information is 
solely used for the purpose for which it was obtained; and (iv) uniform interpretation and 
application of common terms, either used under competition law or under sector-
specific regulation. In particular, the NCA should consult the NRA when deciding a 
antitrust case in the postal sector. Consultation may relate to market definition,  
competitive assessment or choice of remedies (including behavioural remedies in 
merger reviews). 
Application of European state aid rules has been extensive in the postal sector. The 
majority of the cases relate to compensation for the provision of services of general 
interest, and most have been authorised by the Commission after only a preliminary 
examination. Although the legal framework for compensation for provision of services of 
general interest is sufficiently clear since the Altmark case of 2003 and the Commission 
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Decision and Community Framework of 2005, implementation involves difficult and 
complex cost calculations.  
After the Third Postal Directive, control of the compensation for public service will rely 
more on a net cost calculation by the NRA and less on a review of state aid by the 
Commission. Nonetheless, if compensation for the universal service obligation does not 
meet the four Altmark criteria, such compensation is a state aid that should be notified 
to the Commission unless the conditions of the 2005 decision on public service 
compensation are met. The fact that an NRA endorses a net cost calculation does not 
immunise the compensation from Commission control. If the NRA allows 
overcompensation to the USP, the Commission may declare the aid illegal under the 
state aid rules. Therefore, NRAs and the Commission should cooperate in evaluating 
the lawfulness of any compensation for the net cost of the universal service obligation. 
Preparations for the Third Postal Directive 
For most Member States, the deadline for adopting national legislation to implement the 
Third Postal Directive is 31 December 2010. For 11 Member States — Czech Republic, 
Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Romania, and 
Slovakia — the deadline is 31 December 2012. As of March 1, 2009, two Member 
States, Estonia and the Netherlands, report that they have transposed the Third Postal 
Directive into national law. Fourteen of the remaining Member States report current 
plans to transpose the directive before 2011.  
The Third Postal Directive represents a significant step in the continuing evolution of the 
Postal Directive. As such, it presents both new flexibilities and new challenges for 
Member States and their NRAs. In addition to requiring an end to the reserved area and 
full market opening, the Third Postal Directive provides three mechanisms for ensuring 
universal service: reliance on market forces, designation of universal service 
providers(s), and public procurement of services. In choosing one mechanism or a 
combination of mechanisms to ensure universal service, the directive requires Member 
States to respect ‘the principles of objectivity, transparency, non-discrimination, 
proportionality and least market distortion necessary to ensure the free provision of 
postal services in the internal market’.  
For the most part, most Member States and their NRAs have not yet focused clearly 
and analytically on new issues presented by transposition of the Third Postal Directive. 
Some potential ‘gaps’ in preparations for implementation of the Third Postal Directive 
include the following: 
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• Most NRAs have not analysed the possibility of relying upon market forces to 
ensure universal services. On the other hand, when asked to identify portions of the 
universal service for which there is a significant risk of inadequate service by the 
market forces, most NRAs identified only limited portions of the market that 
appeared to be at risk, usually services in remote or sparsely populated areas. 
Some large NRAs, including France and the United Kingdom, offered no opinion. 
Based on this impressionistic and incomplete response, it appears that reliance 
upon market forces to ensure universal service may potentially be a viable option for 
ensuring the universal service in many Member States. A notable exception to this 
pattern is Germany. Its postal law provides procedures for ensuring universal 
service that closely follow the options set out in the Third Postal Directive. Germany 
currently relies on market forces for ensuring 100 percent of the universal service, 
while at the same time providing mechanisms that will safeguard the universal 
service if market forces do not suffice. 
• Most Member States do not appear to have fully analysed how to implement 
revisions in designation procedures of Article 4 introduced by the Third Postal 
Directive. Revised Article 4 requires that the designation of USP(s) for all or part of 
the national universal service must be ‘based on the principles of transparency, non-
discrimination and proportionality’.  
• With the exception of Sweden, Member States have no experience with the public 
procurement of universal postal services. Several Member States, however, plan to 
introduce the possibility of public procurement in the foreseeable future. 
• No Member State with a reserved area has adopted an orderly phase-out schedule 
for the reserved area, but 4 of the 11 Member States which can retain the reserved 
area until the end of 2012 have indicated plans for identifying a phase-out strategy. 
• Few Member States or NRAs (with the exception of Postcomm in the UK), appear to 
have addressed — or to be planning to address — the potential barriers to entry 
posed by non-postal laws or the extent to which such laws may be inconsistent with 
the objectives of the Third Postal Directive. 
• Most Member States will need to take significant steps to open access to the postal 
infrastructure in implementing the Third Postal Directive, where necessary. Only 6 
Member States provide access to four or more of the six elements of postal 
infrastructure mentioned in new Article 11a (postcode system, address database, 
post office boxes, delivery boxes, information on change of address, re-direction 
service and return to sender). 
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• Relatively few Member States have considered the problems of interoperability, 
although there are several notable exceptions, including Sweden and Germany, and 
especially the UK NRA, Postcomm. 
• In several cases, Member States are not actively seeking to identify the needs of 
users, a necessary step in a reasoned review of the need for universal services in 
the future. 
• Few Member States which have, or plan to have, uniform rate requirements, have 
considered the effects that the Third Postal Directive will have on these 
requirements. Only the largest NRAs, notably in France and the UK, seem to be 
developing the analytical tools necessary to evaluate the implications of maintaining 
uniform rate requirements in a liberalised, multi-operator environment.  
• Most NRAs do not have well-developed views on which services the USP would 
choose to avoid in the absence of a USO. Such an evaluation is, however, central to 
determining which universal services may be ensured by reliance on market forces 
and to evaluating the net cost, if any, of the universal service obligation. 
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As noted, another facet of implementation of the Third Postal Directive will be increased 
reliance on the competition rules. Hence, the Third Postal Directive requires a new level 
of cooperation and consultation between NRAs and national competition authorities 
(NCAs). Currently, most NRAs and NCAs informally share information and consult to a 
moderate degree. In many Member States, however, it appears that there is no 
obligation for these agencies to consult or coordinate their activities. Regular 
consultations appear to occur in about one third to one half of Member States. Most 
NCAs declare that sector regulation is needed in addition to enforcement of the 
competition rules, citing, for example, the market dominance of the incumbent and the 
need to protect universal service. 
The relationships between postal regulation and competition regulation may be clarified 
by focusing on the overlapping sets of postal services defined by (i) the universal 
service obligation or lack of a USO, (ii) existence of a postal service provider with 
significant market power or, alternatively, effective competition, and (iii) the use or non-
use of designation or public procurement to ensure universal service. See figure ES-2. 
In this figure, the postal sector is divided into four quadrants. Quadrants A and B 
represent postal services ensured and regulated as universal services in accordance 
with the national universal service obligation. Quadrants C and D represent other, non-
universal postal services. Services in quadrants A and C are provided by a postal 
operator with significant market power, likely, but not necessarily, the public postal 
operator or its successor. Quadrants B and D are provided under conditions of effective 
competition.  
Quadrant A is divided into two parts. The solid red (dark) triangle represents universal 
services which are ensured by means of designation of one or more USPs and/or by 
public procurement of postal services. In the diagram, the red triangle covers only a 
portion of quadrant A and none of quadrant B because, we suggest that the best 
practice in implementing the Third Postal Directive will be to rely upon market forces as 
much as possible. 
Best regulatory practices 
Based on our review of postal regulation in the Member States, as well as consideration 
of postal regulation outside the Community and regulation of non-postal sectors in the 
Community, this study identifies 32 best practices for postal regulation. Practices are 
considered ‘best’ if, in our judgment, they are specifically required by the Third Postal 
Directive or appear necessary to a balanced attainment of the three primary objectives 
of the directive: ensuring universal service, full market opening, and user protection. 
Secondarily, in identifying best practices, we have tried to take into account the need for 
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postal regulation to (i) respond to ongoing changes in postal markets, (ii) respect 
generally accepted economic analyses of postal markets, and (iii) conform to 
Community norms respecting good administrative behaviour.  
A summary of the best practices identified in this study follows. In the main body of the 
study, the reasoning underlying each best practice is explained and specific examples 
are provided of best practices and practices of concern.  
Best practices with respect to the establishment and operation of postal NRAs 
• Primary regulatory authority should be appropriately allocated among four separate 
institutions: (1) a ministry that determines public policy for the postal sector; (2) a 
ministry or agency that exercises the ownership rights of the government in the 
public postal operator, if any; (3) an independent regulator of the postal sector; and 
(4) a national competition authority. In particular, the NRA should be entrusted with 
all tasks which, according to the directive or good administrative practice, should be 
discharged transparently, non-discriminatorily, objectively, and proportionately. 
• The NRA should be a structurally independent and impartial agency with jurisdiction 
over multiple network industries. 
• The NRA requires adequate resources to perform the tasks assigned to it in a 
competent and efficient manner. For a NRA in a medium-sized or smaller national 
postal market, the minimum level of resources needed for the basic tasks of postal 
regulation appears to be, on average, about 9 to 10 full-time persons, including 
regulators (heads of NRA), qualified legal and economic professionals, and support 
staff. In addition, for such NRAs, effective regulation will very likely require (1) a 
reasonable budget for studies by outside consultants and (2) efficient application of 
analytical techniques developed by the largest NRAs. NRAs in larger postal markets 
or with broader responsibilities (e.g., enforcement of competition rules or review of 
user complaints) will require appropriately greater resources. 
• The NRA should be authorised to collect from postal service providers such 
information it considers necessary to ensure conformity with the provisions of the 
Postal Directive and should be granted adequate means to enforce its orders, 
including authority to impose substantial fines, if necessary. 
• In judicial-type proceedings, the NRA should comply with Community norms of good 
administrative practice such as found in the European Code of Good Administrative 
Behaviour. 
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• The NRA should use open public consultations to thoroughly investigate and 
evaluate the effects of major proposed regulatory actions on affected parties, 
including postal operators, employees, users, and the general public. 
• The NRA and NCA should consult on a regular basis, and each agency should 
require a written opinion of the other before acting in a matter that affects the 
application of competition rules to the postal sector. NRAs should provide NCAs 
with detailed sector information to facilitate enforcement of the competition rules. 
Best practices with respect to striking a balance between the universal service 
obligation and full market opening 
• Universal service should be ensured by relying upon market forces where the 
Member State may, with a high degree of confidence, rely upon postal operators 
motivated by normal commercial considerations to provide universal services which 
will meet or exceed the USO set by the Member State. 
• The range of services included within the universal service obligation (USO) should 
be limited to the minimum range that is (i) demonstrably required to protect the 
general public interest in universal service and (ii) consistent with the minimum level 
of universal service required by the Postal Directive. 
• In general, Member States should not require uniform tariffs for universal services 
unless they are (i) clearly consistent with the Third Postal Directive and (ii) required 
by a demonstrated and substantial need to protect general public interests. 
• Where necessary to ensure provision of universal services meeting the 
requirements of the national USO, designation and public procurement procedures 
should be introduced where justified and administered by the NRA in a manner that 
is transparent, non-discriminatory, fairly compensatory (where appropriate), and 
consistent with the principles of proportionality and least market distortion. 
• If a postal service provider is designated as a 'universal service provider' under 
Article 4, then the specific obligations to provide universal services should be 
imposed on the postal service provider as part of the designation procedure and not 
as conditions attached to an authorisation to provide postal services issued under 
Article 9. 
• Authorisations issued under Article 9 to provide postal services within the universal 
service area should be introduced only if, and only to the extent, necessary to 
guarantee compliance with the essential requirements, ensure provision of universal 
service, or implement other provisions of the Postal Directive. Where necessary, 
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authorisations should be in the form of general authorisations applicable to all postal 
operators. 
• Conditions on authorisations issued under Article 9 for services within (or outside) 
the universal service area should be introduced only if, and to the extent that, they 
are (i) strictly consistent with the types of conditions permitted by Article 9 of the 
Postal Directive or necessary to implement other provisions of the Postal Directive 
and (ii) consistent with the principles of proportionality and least market distortion, 
taking into account the multiple objectives of the Postal Directive. 
• In general, the NRA should ensure that postal operators that provide universal 
services with significant market power maintain cost and revenue product accounts 
for (i) each universal service or other postal service provided pursuant to a 
designation or public procurement contract and (ii) each non-universal service that 
is produced jointly with a service covered by (i). 
• Where the accounts of a postal operator are regulated, the NRA should ensure that 
the direct and common costs associated with production of universal services are 
allocated to product accounts in a manner that is clear, economically valid, and 
consistent with Article 14. 
• The NRA should ensure that (i) cost accounting practices of USPs are verified at 
least annually by either the NRA or by a competent independent body retained by 
the NRA; (ii) a statement verifying the compliance of USPs with Article 14 is 
published at least annually; (iii) a summary of the regulated product accounts of 
universal services provided by a postal operator with significant market power is 
published at least annually (taking into account the need for adequate protection of 
commercially sensitive information); and (iv) a full explanation of methodology used 
in cost accounting is published at least annually. 
• Standards for access, affordability, and quality of service should reflect the minimum 
level of service that is (i) objectively required to protect the evolving public need for 
universal services and (ii) consistent with the minimum level of universal service 
required by the Directive. 
• Exceptions to the scope of universal service should be interpreted with respect to 
overall conditions prevailing in the Community as a whole and not only with respect 
to the conditions within a single Member State. 
Best practices related to ensuring the universal service 
• In general, prices for universal services provided by postal operators with significant 
market power should be regulated by the NRA using forward-looking procedures (ex 
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ante review, price caps) to ensure conformance with Article 12. Forward-looking 
procedures should normally be employed with respect to services provided by 
postal service providers where they benefit from designation or public procurement 
procedures. Where universal services are provided under conditions of effective 
competition, the NRA should normally rely upon the competitive market to ensure 
compliance with Article 12. 
• Where cross border postal items are collected and forwarded as part of the 
universal service in a Member State, the NRA in the destination Member State 
should ensure that providers of postal services with significant market power comply 
with Article 13 and otherwise provide incoming postal items with similar services at 
similar prices compared to the services offered by that operator for similar domestic 
postal items. 
• After transposition of the Third Postal Directive, Member States should ensure that 
methods of financing the net cost of universal service, if any, conform to the 
principles of proportionality and least market distortion and, in any case, create no 
greater market distortions than existed prior to transposition. 
• Member States that must end the reserved area by the end of 2012 should phase 
out the reserved area in a manner calculated to provide an orderly transition to full 
market opening while preparing the public postal operator for competition. 
Best practices related to ensuring full market opening for postal services 
• In preparation for full market opening, the NRA and NCA should cooperatively 
develop a plan to monitor and control activities which are inconsistent with the 
competition rules. 
• Where necessary to protect the interest of users or to promote effective competition, 
the NRA should ensure that, in accordance with Article 11a, transparent and non-
discriminatory access is provided for all postal service providers to elements of the 
postal infrastructure. 
• Where necessary to protect the interest of users or to promote effective competition, 
the NRA should ensure that, in accordance with Article 11a, transparent and non-
discriminatory access is provided for all postal service providers to elements of the 
international postal infrastructure and services provided within the scope of the 
international universal service, including standardised operating documents and 
their electronic equivalents, standardised codes such as IMPC codes, and other 
elements of the international postal infrastructure. 
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• Member States should apply value-added tax to public and private postal services in 
a manner that creates the least market distortion while conforming to the 
requirements of Community law. 
• Member States should apply customs laws as equally as possible to all postal 
service providers under comparable conditions consistent with the requirements of 
Community and international law. 
• The NRA should review the issues posed by a multi-operator postal market and 
ensure that, compatible with full market opening, postal operators cooperate to 
ensure maintenance of universal service and protection of the rights of users. 
• In order to facilitate full market opening, the NRA should systematically and 
transparently review all potential legal and operational barriers to entry and market 
distortions and take appropriate actions or recommend appropriate actions to 
government. 
Best practices related to protecting the rights of users 
• The NRA should ensure that information on prices, conditions of access, and the 
quality of universal services is published frequently and in a timely manner, 
consistent with appropriate protection of commercially sensitive information and 
promotion of full market opening. 
• Member States should ensure that the NRA or other competent national authority is 
empowered to provide users appropriate redress where universal service is not 
provided, and the NRA or other competent national authority should actively ensure 
that the rights of users are effectively protected. 
Cooperation Among NRAs 
Analysis of postal regulatory practices in the Member States makes clear that closer 
cooperation national postal regulators would facilitate more efficient, effective, and 
uniform implementation of the Third Postal Directive.  
The directive specifically calls for enhanced collaboration and mutual assistance among 
NRAs (Article 22(2)) and explains the goal of improved cooperation as follows: NRAs 
‘should, where necessary, cooperate with other regulatory bodies of Member States 
and with the Commission in carrying out their tasks under Directive 97/67/EC. This 
would promote the development of the internal market for postal services and help to 
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ensure the consistent application, in all Member States, of the provisions laid down by 
the Directive’ (Recital 50). 
At present in the postal sector — unlike in other regulated industries such as electronic 
communications, energy, and railways sectors — there is no organisation dedicated to 
facilitating cooperation among Community postal regulators. Nevertheless, Community 
NRAs cooperate to a limited extent through two bodies with more general missions: 
(i) the Postal Directive Committee, and (ii) CERP, the European Committee for Postal 
Regulation. Neither body is composed of NRAs or specially focused on regulatory 
issues. Both are committees of Member States. NRAs occasionally represent their 
Member States at these bodies depending on the agenda agreed by Member States.  
The key purpose of the Postal Directive Committee is to solicit the Member States’ 
views on draft measures prepared by the Commission. The Postal Directive Committee 
does not facilitate – and does not aim at facilitating – extensive and effective 
cooperation of European NRAs. CERP is an inter-governmental organisation that allows 
government officials from inside and outside the European Union to exchange views 
and cooperate on postal policy matters. While CERP is a useful forum for its purposes, 
it is not dedicated to either the requirements of the European Union or to the tasks of 
postal regulators. We conclude that CERP is not an adequate organisation to facilitate 
the specific type of NRA cooperation that the Third Postal Directive requires.  
Based on a thorough analysis of the need for NRA cooperation, and a discussion of 
possible benefits to be expected from cooperation, we recommend that postal NRAs 
should cooperate more closely with each other, and with the Commission. There are 
three important reasons why enhanced cooperation among NRAs would be beneficial: 
First, cooperation would allow NRAs to further develop regulatory practice and 
implement the Postal Directive more effectively through mutual assistance and by 
establishing best practices. This is needed most for complex technical questions such 
as control of accounting separation and emerging questions for regulating a multi-
operators market. Second, cooperation would lead to more harmonised regulatory 
practice and thus promote the development of an internal market. Third, a body of 
NRAs could facilitate coordination of the regulation of cross border mail, and advice the 
Commission in this area.  
Important areas where NRAs could coordinate include: separation of accounts, 
allocation of cost, price regulation, regulation of terminal dues and other aspects of 
cross-border mail, calculation of net costs of universal service, financing of universal 
service, access to postal infrastructure, interoperability, scope and methods for 
measuring quality of service, market statistics, and authorisation procedures. For most 
of these subjects, this study identifies clear opportunities for improving regulatory 
practice in many Member States, and areas of concern with regard to the current 
implementation of the Postal Directive. The results expected from the ERGP would 
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allow NRAs to take these opportunities (provided they have adequate staff and 
resources). 
To facilitate cooperation among NRAs, we recommend that the Commission should 
establish an advisory group of independent regulators for the postal sector. This group 
could be called ERGP, European Regulators Group for Postal Services. It should begin 
to function before the end of 2010, the date of full liberalisation prescribed by the Postal 
Directive. 

 Role of Regulators in a More Competitive Postal Market 1 
 Chapter 1: Introduction 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Purpose and outline of study 
The purpose of this study is to identify appropriate next steps for the regulators of postal 
services in the Member States of the European Union (EU) and European Economic 
Area (EEA)1 in light of the evolution of postal markets, best regulatory practices, and 
the ongoing transposition of the ‘Third Postal Directive’. 
Postal services — public and private transportation networks which regularly collect, 
convey, and deliver all types of documents and parcels — have been an integral part of 
the social and commercial infrastructure of society since the first half of the nineteenth 
century. In the last two decades, however, advances in electronic communications, 
information processing, and transportation systems have precipitated fundamental 
changes in postal markets. Expansion of direct marketing and development of just-in-
time supply chains have led to an enormous increase in the flow of direct mail, goods, 
and other parcels. At the same time, many forms of paper-based communications, 
including letters and other types of documents, are migrating to electronic 
communications. The relative role of private delivery services has expanded while the 
distinction between public and private operators has become blurred. Regional and 
global markets are increasingly important. 
In the European Union and European Economic Area, fundamental shifts in postal 
markets have been overlain by a second set of changes, the legal and institutional 
developments accompanying creation of a single European market. Beginning with the 
Postal Directive adopted in 1997, Community legislation has sought to harmonise and 
improve postal services in the Member States with particular attention to improving the 
quality of cross border intra-Community postal services. The Postal Directive obliged 
Member States to ensure provision of a basic universal postal service of specified 
quality. Member States were also required to limit the scope of services reserved for the 
public postal operator as a first step in a ‘gradual and controlled liberalisation of the 
market’. The Postal Directive further charged Member States with protecting the rights 
of users of postal services. Finally, Member States were required to establish 
independent national regulatory agencies, independent of any ministry or postal 
operator, to impartially and expertly implement these obligations.  
                                                
 1 Member States of the European Economic Area (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway) participate in 
the internal market of the European Union in return for their agreement to abide by certain Community 
legislation including, in particular, the Postal Directive. Agreement On The European Economic Area, 
OJ L1, 3 Jan 1994, p. 3, as amended, Annex XI, Article 5(d). 
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In this study, the term ‘regulators’ includes all agencies of government that adopt legal 
measures for the control of postal services. Typically, the lead agency is the national 
regulatory authority (NRA) established in response to the Postal Directive. At a 
minimum, a NRA applies the rules of law to specific factual situations. The legislator 
also controls the provision of postal services by establishing an overall regulatory 
framework and, perhaps, by determining certain elements of that framework, such as  
the scope of the reserved area or the scope of the universal service obligation. A 
minister or Council of Ministers may adopt ordinances or regulations which define 
specific rights or obligations for the postal sector. A national competition authority (NCA) 
may enforce the competition rules against certain practices of postal operators, if 
necessary. This study considers the functions of these different regulators and their 
relationships as well as the role of ‘regulators’ collectively. 
The Postal Directive of 1997 has been amended twice, in 2002 and 2008. The ‘Second 
Postal Directive’ — i.e., the original Postal Directive as amended in 2002 — has been 
transposed into national law by all Member States of the EU and EEA. Transposition of 
the ‘Third Postal Directive’ — the Second Postal Directive as amended in 2008 — is 
required by 31 December 2010 at the latest (except for some Member States which 
may postpone implementation of the directive until 31 December 2012). The Third 
Postal Directive completes the program of liberalisation begun in the original Postal 
Directive by requiring Member States to end all postal monopolies and implement other 
changes consistent with ‘full market opening’. 
This study thus comes at a transitional period in the regulation of European postal 
markets. Although all Member States have implemented the Second Postal Directive, 
their approaches vary significantly. At the same time, Member States must prepare for 
imminent implementation of the Third Postal Directive. In brief, this study seeks to assist 
the Commission and the Member States to establish a sound basis for implementing 
the Third Postal Directive by: 
• reviewing the manner in which Member States are implementing the Second 
Postal Directive (chapter 3); 
• summarizing the role of the competition authorities and general competition law 
in regulating European postal markets (chapter 4); 
• describing preparations and studies undertaken or planned in preparation for 
implementation of the Third Postal Directive (chapter 5); 
• identifying ‘best practices’ in the regulation of postal markets by postal and 
competition authorities, where ‘best’ reflects the objectives and requirements of 
the Third Postal Directive (chapter 6); and 
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• identifying potential gains and appropriate mechanisms for cooperation among 
national regulatory authorities in order to implement the Third Postal Directive 
most efficiently and effectively (chapter 7). 
The main body of this study is bracketed by a beginning chapter and an ending chapter. 
The beginning chapter (chapter 2) clarifies the terms and concepts used in this study. 
The final chapter (chapter 8) offers a short statement of concluding observations that 
attempts to draw together the many threads of analysis presented and highlight the 
most important themes. 
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1.3 Overall methodology  
This study was prepared for the European Commission, Directorate General for Internal 
Market and Services, by WIK Consult GmbH (‘WIK-Consult’), the consulting subsidiary 
of the Wissenschaftliches Institut für Infrastruktur und Kommunikationsdienste 
(Scientific Institute for Infrastructure and Communication Services), in Bad Honnef, 
Germany2 and by James I. Campbell, Jr., an independent lawyer and consultant based 
in Washington, D.C., USA.3 The project manager for this study was Alex Kalevi Dieke, 
head of the department of Postal Services and Logistics of WIK-Consult. In preparing 
this study, WIK-Consult also collaborated with Alexandre De Streel, Professor at CRID, 
and Robert Queck, Deputy Director of CRID, the Research Centre on IT and Law of the 
University of Namur, Belgium,4 who contributed analysis of the implementation of 
competition law and restrictions on the use of state aids in the postal sector. 
Research for this study was based on three primary sources of information:  
• a survey of national regulatory authorities, national competition authorities, and 
universal service providers (see next section);  
• interviews with selected officials from governments, national regulatory 
authorities, national competition authorities, universal service providers, private 
postal operators, the European Commission (Directorates General for 
Competition, Information Society and Media, Energy and Transport, and 
Taxation and Customs Union), the European Committee for Postal Regulation 
(CERP), the Federation Of European Direct And Interactive Marketing (FEDMA), 
PostEurop, the European Regulators Group (ERG), the European Regulators 
Group for Energy and Gas (ERGEG), and other associations; 
• a review of legislation, literature, and other secondary materials. 
WIK-Consult presented the objectives of the study, initial findings, and final conclusions 
in three public workshops hosted by the European Commission in Brussels on 23 
January 2009, 4 June 2009, and 22 September 2009.  
                                                
 2 See http://www.wik.org. 
 3 See http://jwww.jcampbell.com. 
 4 See http://www.fundp.ac.be/en/dro/crid. 
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1.4 Survey of national regulatory authorities, national competition 
authorities, and universal service providers 
This study is based in substantial part on a survey concerning regulatory practices 
addressed to ministry officials with postal responsibilities, national regulatory authorities 
(NRAs), national competition authorities (NRAs), and universal service providers 
(USPs) in the 27 Member States of the European Union and 3 Member States of the 
European Economic Area. The survey was conducted by means of three questionnaires 
that were posted on a password-protected site on the Internet managed by WIK-
Consult. The questionnaires were developed by WIK-Consult and James I. Campbell Jr.  
One questionnaire was addressed to each of three groups: (i) ministries/NRAs, 
(ii) national competition authorities, and (iii) USPs. Since allocation of responsibilities 
between ministries and NRAs varies among Member States, it was not possible to 
design a ‘ministry only’ or ‘NRA only’ questionnaire. In each Member State, ministries 
and NRAs divided the questions in the combined questionnaire among themselves. 
Respondents in one group were unable to view the questions addressed to another 
group. No respondent could view information provided by another respondent. 
Respondents were allowed to complete the questionnaires from the beginning of March 
to approximately the end of May 2009. In general, requests for current data were to be 
completed as of 1 March 2009.  
The questionnaires covered a broad range of legal and policy questions relating to 
implementation of the current Postal Directive and the amendments introduced by 
Directive 2008/6/EC. The questionnaires were organised by topics into ‘question 
modules’. Each question module was further divided into several ‘submodules’. 
Question modules and submodules included explanatory introductions where 
appropriate. A standard vocabulary was included with the questionnaire to ensure 
uniformity in the interpretation of key terms. All monetary figures were expressed in 
Euros using a standard table of exchange rates, also included on the questionnaire 
website. The respondents, question modules, and number of questions in each module 
(excluding requests for contact information) are summarised in Table  1-1. 
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Table  1-1 Question modules for Internet survey 
No. Question Module Number  
of Qs 
Respondent 
101 Laws 32 Ministry/NRA 
102 Regulations And Secondary Legislation 49 Ministry/NRA 
103 Regulatory Framework 45 Ministry/NRA 
121 Economic Effects Of Postal Policy 26 Ministry/NRA 
122 Reserved Area And Special Rights 37 Ministry/NRA 
123 Ensuring Universal Service 46 Ministry/NRA 
131 Future Studies And Legislation 46 Ministry/NRA 
201 National Regulatory Authority 76 Ministry/NRA 
211 Overview Of Regulated Services 84 Ministry/NRA 
221 Definition Of Universal Service 33 Ministry/NRA 
222 Quality Of Universal Service 17 Ministry/NRA 
231 Postal Infrastructure, Interoperability, And Regulatory Symmetry 40 Ministry/NRA 
241 Authorisation Of Postal Operators 88 Ministry/NRA 
251 Price Regulation Generally 50 Ministry/NRA 
252 Individual Agreements And Special Tariffs 49 Ministry/NRA 
253 Regulation Of The Accounts Of USP(s) 81 Ministry/NRA 
261 User Complaints And Redress 26 Ministry/NRA 
271 Demand For Universal Postal Services 39 Ministry/NRA 
301 Annual Statistics of The NRA 64 Ministry/NRA 
302 Annual Estimates of Competition 31 Ministry/NRA 
401 National Competition Authority 79 NCA 
501 Overview of Regulation 68 USP 
502 Access and Complaints Handling 27 USP 
503 Postal Infrastructure And Interoperability 25 USP 
505 Regulation Of The Accounts Of USP(s) 64 USP 
506 Net Cost, if any, Of the Universal Service Obligation 15 USP 
507 Demand Structure 33 USP 
510 Annual Estimates of Competition 27 USP 
 
In preparing the questionnaire, WIK-Consult tried diligently to make the questions 
simple, clear, and easy to answer. More than 60 percent of the questions required only 
a yes/no answer or selection from a drop down list. Only 20 percent of the questions 
required text answers. In many cases, respondents were able to skip inapplicable 
questions. Some questions (90 to NRAs and 26 to USPs) requested annual data or 
estimates for the years 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 (for example, information on the 
budget and staff of the NRA or number of authorisations granted postal operators). For 
each answer, the questionnaire permitted respondents to offer a short explanatory 
statement or qualification. In addition, an open-ended Additional Comments form could 
be used to amplify any response. In total, 959 questions were addressed to 
ministries/NRAs, 79 to NCAs, and 259 to USPs (excluding contact information, etc.). 
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Overall, the parties addressed by this questionnaire responded with diligence and 
generosity. The numbers of responses received from each respondent are shown in 
tables 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, and 1-5. Note that respondents could skip some questions based 
on answers to other questions so the total numbers of potential responses are not the 
same for all respondents in a given category. 
Table  1-2 Response rates by ministries and NRAs by question module (part 1) 
 101 102 103 121 122 123 131 201 211 221 
AT 30 28 38 14 9 23 17 79 26 35 
BE 32 49 48 23 34 39 41 73 68 35 
BG 32 39 47 24 26 44 42 64 30 30 
CY 32 46 46 20 36 35 37 78 11 22 
CZ 32 50 44 20 29 33 28 76 29 36 
DE 35 42 41 19 17 36 34 72 53 36 
DK 32 50 47 22 33 36 37 75 74 34 
EE 34 42 46 24 23 36 26 75 65 34 
EL 33 48 45 20 28 31 28 76 54 36 
ES 33 51 46 28 34 31 34 64 67 27 
FI 32 38 42 21 11 32 34 73 72 32 
FR 32 49 47 25 33 35 35 78 67 33 
HU 32 46 48 25 35 37 42 79 73 36 
IE 32 50 46 20 32 28 26 75 59 35 
IT 35 48 48 23 26 37 34 67 59 33 
LT 34 48 48 25 34 34 43 78 49 36 
LU 33 38 47 24 34 30 34 77 61 28 
LV 32 42 40 21 33 38 37 75 56 28 
MT 32 50 44 22 28 32 29 75 50 35 
NL 32 46 43   15 34 17 71 42 30 
PL 32 42 47 23 30 34 38 76 47 32 
PT 32 52 46 19 24 28 30 78 74 35 
RO 33 48 48 22 32 39 37 77 38 28 
SE 32 46 45 24 18 39 38 71 74 36 
SI 32 44 47 20 30 30 46 78 72 33 
SK 32 44 46 22 28 35 34 77 66 35 
UK 32 36 45 22 17 30 28 71 51 33 
IS 32 42 48 17 34 40 47 77 57 34 
NO 32 44 47 23 31 33 37 79 78 36 
No answers: LI 
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Table  1-3 Response rates by ministries and NRAs by question module (part 2) 
 222 231 241 251 252 253 261 271 301 302 
AT 8 21 73 36 34 83 10 28 214 92 
BE 20 35 78 39 52 70 24 28 258 92 
BG 18 28 68 31 35 43 27 31 222 111 
CY 15 34 74 47 51 76 19 29 247 121 
CZ 20 30 64 43 28 71 28 33 257 120 
DE 16 34 82 46 45 63 25 38 240 121 
DK 19 41 32 38 44 71 28 38 210 121 
EE 19 40 83 39 27 75 28 38 256 115 
EL 19 23 79 41 44 53 28 29 225 121 
ES 20 36 79 37 38 77 24 28 227 120 
FI 19 32 72 32 30   29       
FR 20 34 79 48 44 67 28 37 255 121 
HU 20 35 81 35 42 77 28 38 259 121 
IE 19 23 72 46 48 75 27 34 254 120 
IT 19 34 83 42 31 61 28 31 258   
LT 17 38 72 39 37 78 28 35 259 113 
LU 18 26 68 33 40 71 26 38 252 114 
LV 20 34 44 48 36 72 29 38 211 117 
MT 20 27 69 41 43 73 26 31 252 120 
NL 20 35 37 34 38 57 15   206   
PL 19 22 41 38 48 75 27 30 241 121 
PT 17 29 74 49 45 70 25 36 232 117 
RO 18 12 76 39 36 67 25 31 228 105 
SE 20 38 57 40 40 71 28 37 235 121 
SI 20 33 77 40 34 72 28 35 241 115 
SK 20 32 71 46 51 77 27 38 259 115 
UK 18 34 67 44 44 71 28 28 244 92 
IS 19 36 68 35 40 67 29 38 247 113 
NO 20 32 31 45 40 70 28 30 195   
No answers: LI 
 
Table  1-4 Number of responses by NCAs, question module 401 
 401   401 
AT 8  LT 71 
BE 70  LU 70 
BG 66  LV 74 
CY 68  MT 66 
CZ 68  NL 71 
DE 63  PL 71 
DK 65  RO 71 
ES 69  SE 71 
FI 70  SI 28 
FR 64  SK 68 
HU 71  UK 12 
IE 71  IS 69 
IT 72    
No answers: EE, EL, PT, LI, NO 
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Table  1-5 Number of responses by USPs, by question module 
 501 502 503 505 506 507 510 
BE 61 29 27 58 14 34 107 
CY 64 25 21 53 10 35 108 
CZ 62 29 23 60 11 35 107 
DE 45 29 26 41 10 24 107 
DK 16 22 9 38 10 24 108 
EE 54 28 22 55 11 34   
EL 64 25 19 51 11 28 107 
ES 51 20 25 57 12 32 107 
FI 66 28 23 56 11 36 108 
FR 47 27 26 59 15 25 79 
HU 61 28 20 54 11 35 104 
IE 56 28 25 59 15 31 108 
IT 49 27 8 54 13 35 108 
LT 61 28 22 60 11 29 107 
LU 53 27 23 55 15 36 102 
LV 55 29 22     31 107 
MT 47 28 24 54 15 24 95 
NL 70 29 27 53 15 35 108 
PL 65 27 23 55 15 33 107 
PT 66 20 26 55 11 34 108 
SE 47 18 26 56 11 36 108 
SI 56 27 26 58 11 32 108 
SK 65 28 23 55 15 35 108 
UK 42 28 27 54 14 35 79 
NO 35 28 15 52 15 32 107 
No answers: AT, BG, RO, LI, IS 
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2 Overview of the Regulation of Postal Services 
This chapter introduces concepts and terminology that are used throughout this study. 
In particular, this chapter seeks to make clear: 
• the legislative development of the Postal Directive and how the study will refer to 
various versions of the directive and amendatory directives; 
• the different segments of the postal services market and how national markets 
are weighted in this study; 
• the range of postal services ensured and regulated as universal service by the 
Member States; 
• the role of postal NRAs in the regulation of non-universal postal services; and 
• use of the term ‘universal service provider’ or ‘USP’ in this study. 
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2.1 Evolution of the EU Postal Directive 
Postal regulation in the European Union has developed and evolved over the course of 
twenty years of study, public debate, and legislative deliberations. The starting point 
was a decision by the Commission in 1988 to initiate a fundamental review of postal 
markets in light of the drive towards a unified ‘single market‘ for Community goods and 
services. After four years, the ‘Postal Green Paper’ was issued in June 1992.5 
In 1997, after five years of public consultation, the European Parliament and Council 
adopted the Postal Directive.6 The Postal Directive sought to raise and harmonise the 
quality of national postal services and to improve the then poor quality of cross border 
services. Member States were required to set universal service standards and monitor 
compliance with those standards by one or more 'universal service providers' 
designated by the Member State. An essential element of the modernisation strategy 
was ‘gradual and controlled liberalisation of the market’.7 The Postal Directive set price 
and weight limits on the scope of the reserved area and adopted the principle that the 
reserved area may be maintained only 'to the extent necessary to ensure the 
maintenance of universal service'.8  
In Directive 2002/39/EC, adopted in 2002, the Community took the next step in postal 
reform and agreed to complete liberalisation as a fundamental long term policy 
objective.9 Recital 14 declared,  
It is appropriate to provide at Community level a timetable for a gradual and 
controlled opening of the letters market to competition which allows all 
universal service providers sufficient time to put in place the further 
measures of modernisation and restructuring required to ensure their long-
term viability under the new market conditions. 
This directive set 1 January 2009 as the date for full liberalisation subject to further 
review and confirmation by the Commission. The directive also reduced the price and 
weight limits for the reservable area. Directive 2002/39/EC was an amendatory 
directive. In this study, where it is necessary or useful to distinguish between different 
                                                
 5 Green Paper on the Development of the Single Market for Postal Services, COM/1991/0476 (11 Jun 
1992) (hereafter, ‘Postal Green Paper’). 
 6 Directive 97/67/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 on common 
rules for the development of the internal market of Community postal services and the improvement of 
quality of service, OJ L15, 21 Jan 1998, p. 14 (hereafter, ‘Directive 97/67/EC’). 
 7 Directive 97/67/EC, Recital 8. 
 8 Directive 97/67/EC, Articles 7(1) to 7(3). The Postal Directive also made clear that express services 
and document exchanges could not be included in the reserved area. Directive 97/67/EC, Recitals 17 
and 18 and Article 7(4). 
 9 Directive 2002/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 June 2002 amending 
Directive 97/67/EC with regard to the further opening to competition of Community postal services, OJ 
L17, 5 Jul 2003, p. 21 (hereafter, ‘Directive 2002/39/EC’). 
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versions of the Postal Directive, the original Postal Directive as amended by Directive 
2002/39/EC will be referred to as the ’Second Postal Directive’.10 
Directive 2008/6/EC, agreed in 2008, implemented the goal of full liberalisation but gave 
Member States additional time to prepare, two or four years depending on the Member 
State.11 The effective date for Directive 2008/6/EC is 31 December 2010, except for 
11 EU Member States for which the effective date is 31 December 2012.12 Directive 
2008/6/EC not only requires an end to the reserved area in each Member State but also 
modifies other provisions of the Postal Directive to render them more compatible with a 
liberalised, multi-operator market. In particular, user protection is extended to users of 
all postal services, not only universal services. Directive 2008/6/EC was likewise an 
amendatory directive. In this study, where necessary or useful to make the distinction, 
the Second Postal Directive as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC will be referred to as 
the ’Third Postal Directive’. 
At present (mid 2009) the Community is in a period of transition from the Second Postal 
Directive to the Third Postal Directive. Although Directive 2008/6/EC has been adopted, 
the deadline for transposition of its terms into national law is 31 December 2010 (or 
2012 in the case of certain Member States). This study is therefore concerned with both 
current implementation of the Second Postal Directive and preparations for 
transposition of the Third Postal Directive. 
                                                
 10 The term ‘Second Postal Directive’ will also be considered to include the revised version of Article 21 
added by Regulation (EC) No. 1882/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 
September 2003 adapting to Council Decision 1999/468/EC the provisions relating to committees 
which assist the Commission in the exercise of its implementing powers laid down in instruments 
subject to the procedure referred to in Article 251 of the EC Treaty, OJ L284, 31 Oct 2003, p. 1. 
 11 Directive 2008/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 amending 
Directive 97/67/EC with regard to the full accomplishment of the internal market of Community postal 
services, OJ L52, 27 Feb 2008, p. 3 (hereafter, ‘Directive 2008/6/EC’). 
 12 In principle, the deadline for transposition of the Third Postal Directive by the 3 Member States of the 
EEA (IS, LI, NO) is 31 December 2010. Any amendment, including a longer implementation period, 
would require a decision by the EEA Joint Committee. See Agreement on the European Economic 
Area, OJ L1, 3 Jan 1994, p. 3, as amended, Article 98 (providing for amendment to Annex XI). 
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2.2 Postal services and products in the EU/EEA market 
In the evolution of the Postal Directive, definitions of key terms have been clarified or 
adjusted to conform to amending provisions. In this study, we shall use terms as 
explicitly or implicitly defined in the Third Postal Directive. For convenience, we shall 
also make use of common postal terms like ’letter’ and ’letter post’ that are not 
specifically defined in the Postal Directive.  
In the Third Postal Directive, postal services are ‘services involving the clearance, 
sorting, transport and delivery of postal items’.13 A ‘postal item’ is defined as 
an item addressed in the final form in which it is to be carried by the postal 
service provider. In addition to items of correspondence, such items also 
include for instance books, catalogues, newspapers, periodicals and postal 
parcels containing merchandise with or without commercial value.14 
A ‘postal service provider’ is an ‘undertaking that provides one or more postal services’. 
Thus, a postal service is a service for the collection (or ‘clearance’), sorting, 
transportation, and delivery of addressed items.15 We shall use the term ‘postal 
operator’ as synonymous with ‘postal service provider’. 
Modern postal service providers offer a variety of postal services. These might be 
represented in a simplified manner as shown in Figure  2-1. This figure is useful both for 
clarifying the use of certain terms used in this report and for explaining how we have 
analyzed the task of postal regulators.16  
                                                
 13 Third Postal Directive, Article 2(1). 
 14 Third Postal Directive, Article 2(6). 
 15 Third Postal Directive, Article 2(1a). 
 16 This figure is presented as a discussion aid. It is not intended to portray a comprehensive view of the 
postal services market or to represent perfectly the relationships between all segments of the market. 
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In this figure, the most basic service is the basic letter post located in the bottom left 
corner. Basic letter post service is a service that provides for the ‘fastest standard 
category’ (FSC) of conveyance for envelopes and other small items weighing up to 
2 kilograms. In the Postal Directive, the term ‘fastest standard category’17 is equivalent 
to what most public postal operators and mailers refer to as ‘first class’ service. The 
basic letter post is designed for the regular exchange of letter communications. In this 
study, we use letter to refer to a written communication that is individualised for the 
addressee, such as an invoice, statement of account, or personal greeting. The term 
letter is equivalent to the term ‘correspondence’ in the Postal Directive.18 In addition, 
the basic letter post conveys non-letter items, including newspapers, magazines, direct 
mail, catalogues, and small packets. The basic letter post may convey items tendered 
singly or in large quantities. 
 
                                                
 17 Third Postal Directive, Annex II. 
 18 Article 2(7) of the Third Postal Directive provides, ‘item of correspondence: a communication in written 
form on any kind of physical medium to be conveyed and delivered at the address indicated by the 
sender on the item itself or on its wrapping. Books, catalogues, newspapers and periodicals shall not 
be regarded as items of correspondence’. 
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Table  2-1 Weighting of Member States in EU/EEA postal market 
Member state LP % EU/EEA LP per cap Member state LP % EU/EEA LP per cap 
AT 3.00% 301 LT 0.10% 30 
BE 3.00%  LU 0.16% 322 
BG 0.18% 23 LV 0.12% 54 
CY 0.04% 57 MT 0.04% 105 
CZ 0.98% 94 NL 6.00% 341 
DE 20.00% 239 PL 2.00% 50 
DK 2.00% 278 PT 1.00% 110 
EE 0.12% 87 RO 0.64% 30 
EL 0.63% 56 SE 3.00% 344 
ES 6.00% 134 SI 0.41% 204 
FI 2.00% 395 SK 0.30% 55 
FR 18.00% 288 UK 22.00% 358 
HU 0.98% 98 IS 0.06% 174 
IE 0.67% 151 LI 0.01% 210 
IT 6.00% 96 NO 2.00% 357 
Note: ‘LP’ = letter post. Market shares do not sum to 100 percent because market shares in excess of 1 percent have been rounded to 
the nearest 1 percent to protect the confidentiality of WIK’s estimate of the letter post volume in Belgium, which is derived in part 
from confidential data. 
 
The second most basic service is the basic parcel post, represented as the box above 
the basic letter post. Basic parcel post is a service that provides for conveyance for 
packages tendered ‘over the counter’, either singly or in large quantities. For most 
public postal operators, the maximum weight per package for this service is 20 
kilograms, but the weight limit varies among Member States. In addition, postal 
operators, including private postal operators, may offer collection and delivery services 
for packages of heavier weights. 
Extending to the right of these basic services are additional services designed to meet 
the needs of particular mailers. The middle column represents a range of services for 
bulk shippers, i.e., substantial commercial mailers. These services tend to be 
specialised for different types of postal items and characterised by terms which require 
the mailer to subscribe to particular commitments relating to volume, price, preparation, 
or quality of service. Bulk services include bulk letters (such as statements of account), 
periodicals (items published periodically such as newspapers and magazines), and 
direct mail (advertisements, catalogues, announcements, etc.). The right hand columns 
represent services which offer distinctly different levels of service from the basic letter 
post and basic parcel post. This includes a non-priority letter post service for all types of 
letter post items; less-than-daily services (e.g., twice per week delivery of 
advertisements or statements of account); time-definite delivery services (e.g., for 
advertisements and catalogues), and express services. For heavier items, in addition to 
express services, there are a variety of time-definite and fast parcel services. 
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In this study, we shall summarise the prevalence of a specific regulatory policy among 
the Member States by summing up the sizes of the national postal markets affected. 
For example, if 7 Member States have liberalised postal services and 23 Member 
States have not we may also note that the 7 Member States account for 59 percent of 
the total EU/EEA postal market. For simplicity, and because of lack of data, we shall 
use the same weighting factors for the sizes of national postal markets for all such 
summary statements, even though in some cases it might be preferable to use parcel 
post figures instead of letter post figures or international letter post figures instead of 
domestic letter post figures.  
The weighting factors used in this study are based on estimates of the volume of 
domestic letter post items conveyed in each national postal market. These estimates 
were developed by WIK-Consult and take into account, as well as possible, the 
operations of private postal service providers as well as the national universal service 
provider. These figures reflect an estimated overall letter post volume for the EU and 
EEA combined of approximately 95 billion letter post items in 2007. The relative weights 
of the 30 Member States used in this study are shown in Table  2-1. 
This study uses terms as defined in the Third Postal Directive. The term postal services 
includes all public and private ‘services involving the clearance, sorting, transport and 
delivery of postal items’. There are many submarkets in the total postal services market. 
The traditional services provided by public postal operators are described in this study 
as: basic letter post, bulk letters, periodicals (newspapers, magazines, etc.), direct mail 
(identical printed advertisements), non-priority letter post (not offered in all Member 
States), basic parcel post, and bulk parcels.  
This study summarises the prevalence of specific regulatory policies among the 
Member States by summing up the sizes of the national postal markets affected. For 
this purpose, national postal markets are weighted according to WIK-Consult’s 
estimates of the volume of domestic letter post items conveyed by public and private 
operators in 2007. 
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2.3 Postal services ensured as universal services  
Under the Postal Directive, a universal service is a postal service that is ensured and 
regulated by the Member State and thus complies with minimum requirements laid 
down by the Postal Directive. According to Article 3, Member States must ensure that 
‘users enjoy the right to a universal service involving the permanent provision of a 
postal service of specified quality at all points in their territory at affordable prices for all 
users’. A ‘universal service’ is not merely a service that is available at all points in the 
national territory but one that government guarantees will be provided on a permanent 
basis. Moreover, under the Postal Directive, Member States must regulate certain 
aspects of a universal service. For example, delivery must be made at least five days 
per week to every home or business address.19 Prices must be ‘affordable’, ‘cost-
oriented’, ‘transparent and non-discriminatory’.20 Quality of service standards must be 
adopted and monitored by government. 
Not all postal services are universal services. The Postal Directive places two specific 
boundaries on the concept of universal service. First, the directive makes clear that 
express services cannot be considered universal services. Although not explicitly 
defined in the directive, the term ‘express service’ refers to a value-added service, 
where the extra value may take different forms and is reflected in a higher price than 
charged for basic letter post service.21 As the Commission has noted, express services 
are usually characterised by greater speed and reliability.22 A second boundary on the 
range of universal services is established by weight. According to the directive, 
universal service includes only parcels weighing up to 10 kilograms, although Member 
States may increase this limit up to 20 kilograms (most but not all Member States have 
done so).  
Within these bounds, the universal service must include a minimum range of services. 
Article 3(3) declares that Member States must ensure a universal service that provides, 
at a minimum, for the collection, sorting, transport, and distribution of (i) postal items 
weighing up to two kilograms and (ii) postal packages up to 10 kilograms, as well as 
services for registered items and insured items in both categories. As noted above, 
services for these items must be regulated so that they meet minimum criteria of 
frequency, availability, price, and quality. In combination, these several requirements 
imply that the Member States must, at a minimum, ensure and regulate basic letter post 
service and basic parcel post service as universal services. 
                                                
 19 Third Postal Directive, Article 3(3). 
 20 Third Postal Directive, Article 12. 
 21 Directive 97/67/EC, Recital 18.  
 22 See European Commission, Notice from the Commission on the application of the competition rules to 
the postal sector and on the assessment of certain State measures relating to postal services, OJ 
C29, 6 Feb 1998, p. 2, 6 (definition of ‘express mail service). 
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The Postal Directive does not require Member States to regulate every postal operator 
that provides a basic letter post service or basic parcel post service. For example, no 
Member States requires every parcel delivery service to make deliveries to every 
address five days per week. The unanimous view among Member States is that it is 
sufficient to ensure that at least one postal operator provides universal service and is 
regulated so that it complies with the requirements of the directive. For the most part, 
Member States have focused regulation on the universal services provided by a 
designated ‘universal service provider’ (designated USP), invariably the public postal 
operator or its successor. 
In addition to the two basic postal services, several other postal services could be 
considered universal services because they involve the transportation of the same 
types of items as basic letter post and parcel post and are not specifically exempted by 
the Postal Directive. All of the bulk postal services mentioned above — bulk letters, 
periodicals, direct mail, and bulk parcels — as well as non-priority letter post fall into this 
category. Does the Postal Directive require Member States to ensure provision of these 
additional services and to regulate them as universal services? To clarify the range of 
postal services required to be ensured by the Member States, this survey asked 
national regulatory authorities (NRAs) whether they interpreted the Postal Directive to 
require them to ensure and regulate each of these additional services as ‘universal 
services’. The results are summarised in Table  2-2. The survey allowed NRAs to 
choose from among five answers: ‘definitely yes’, ‘probably yes’, ‘proper interpretation 
unclear’, ‘probably no’, and ‘definitely no’. The entries in the table indicate the number of 
Member States and their collective percentage of the EU/EEA letter post market. 
Table  2-2 Overview: services required by Postal Directive (as interpreted by 
NRAs) 
 Definitely yes Probably yes Unclear or no answer Probably no Definitely no
Basic letter post service 22 (69%) 1 (0%) 6 (31%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Bulk letters 9 (27%) 5 (12%) 11 (32%) 3 (28%) 1 (1%) 
Direct mail 7 (26%) 3 (9%) 13 (34%) 3 (30%) 3 (1%) 
Periodicals 5 (23%) 3 (6%) 13 (54%) 4 (11%) 4 (6%) 
Non-priority letter post 8 (30%) 1 (1%) 16 (62%) 3 (6%) 1 (0%) 
Basic parcel post 19 (48%) 1 (0%) 8 (50%) 1 (2%) 0 (0%) 
Bulk parcels 3 (3%) 2 (6%) 16 (40%) 3 (28%) 5 (23%) 
Note: Entries in the table indicate the number of NRAs and their Member States’ collective percentage of the EU/EEA letter post market. 
 
The answers suggest that NRAs have different views and some uncertainly about the 
range of services that must be ensured as universal services as a matter of Community 
law. For example, with respect to bulk letter services, 4 NRAs (EE, ES, PL, UK) believe 
that the Postal Directive does not require these services to be ensured as universal 
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services, 3 NRAs believe the Postal Directive is unclear, and 8 NRAs did not answer 
the question.  
We also asked NRAs whether their national law does in fact ensure provision of these 
services as universal services and provide for regulation accordingly. The answers to 
these questions are summarised in Table  2-3. 
Table  2-3 Overview: services ensured as universal services 
 Basic  
letter post 





AT Yes         Yes   
BE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BG Yes     Yes Yes Yes   
CY Yes Yes No Yes No Yes  No 
CZ Yes     No No Yes   
DE Yes     Yes No Yes   
DK Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
EE Yes No No Yes No Yes No 
EL Yes Yes     Yes Yes   
ES Yes Yes No No No Yes No 
FI Yes No No No Yes Yes No 
FR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
HU Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IE Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No 
IT Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
LT Yes Yes ?? Yes Yes Yes   
LU Yes No No No   Yes No 
LV Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No 
MT Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No 
NL Yes No No No No Yes No 
PL Yes No No No Yes Yes No 
PT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
RO Yes No No No Yes Yes No 
SE Yes No No No Yes Yes No 
SI Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No 
SK Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
UK Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
IS Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
NO Yes No No No Yes Yes No 
Key to shading: light gray (red) = ensured as a universal service; medium gray (light green) = not confirmed as an ensured universal  
service by NRA; dark gray (dark green) = not ensured as a universal service. 
 
This table summarises the apparent scope of the universal service obligation as 
implemented in the EU/EEA postal market. In this table, the lightly shaded cells (red) 
indicate services which the NRA specifically indicated are ensured and regulated as 
universal services. Darkly shaded (green) cells indicate services which the NRA has 
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specifically indicated are not ensured and regulated as universal services. Medium 
shading (light green) indicates that NRA has not provided an answer. Presumably, if 
there existed a positive universal service obligation for such services, the NRA would 
have so indicated.  
From this table, it appears that every Member State ensures and regulates two services 
as universal services: basic letter post service and basic parcel post service. At the 
other extreme, only four Member States (BE, DK, PT, UK) treat bulk parcel services as 
a universal service. One third to one half of the Member States treat services for bulk 
letters and direct mail as a universal service. Only two Member States, Belgium and 
Portugal, ensure and regulate all services as ‘universal services’. 
In some cases, notably in Sweden and Norway, NRAs clarified their responses by 
indicating that the law does not require the USP to provide certain bulk postal services, 
but if the USP chooses to provide such services, then they are regulated as universal 
services. For example, in Sweden, while the USP is not required to provide a 
discounted postal service tailored to the needs of bulk mailers, if Sweden Post does 
provide such a service, then the Swedish NRA requires Sweden Post to offer the 
service throughout the national territory under the same regulatory supervision as other 
universal services. 23 In this study, we do not consider such a postal service to be a 
‘universal service’ within the universal service obligation since provision of the postal 
service is not obligatory, i.e., the service is not required by the Member State nor does 
the Member State ensure the permanent provision of the service as mandated by 
Article 3 of the Postal Directive. On other hand, as explained in the next section, we 
believe that, under the Third Postal Directive, regulation of such services may be 
appropriate, or even mandatory, even though they are not ‘universal services’. 
Finally, in this survey universal service providers were also asked to identify which 
services were ensured as universal services. Answers of the USPs are summarised in 
Table  2-4. In this table, shading indicates instances in which both the NRA and the USP 
provided answers and the answers were not the same. As this table indicates, in 
several cases, USPs and the NRAs appear to have different understandings of the 
scope of the universal service obligation. 
                                                
 23 The position of the Portuguese NRA appears to be similar. 
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Table  2-4 Overview: services ensured as universal services (USPs) 
 Basic letter 
post 





AT        
BE Yes Yes No Yes  Yes No 
BG        
CY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CZ Yes No No No No Yes No 
DE Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
DK Yes    Yes Yes  
EE Yes No No Yes No Yes No 
EL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
ES Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes  
FI Yes No No No No Yes No 
FR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
HU Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
IE Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No 
IT Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
LT Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No 
LU Yes Yes Yes Yes ?? Yes Yes 
LV Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
MT Yes No No Yes No Yes No 
NL Yes No No No No Yes No 
PL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PT Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
RO        
SE Yes No   No Yes No 
SI Yes Yes No No  Yes No 
SK Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
UK Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IS        
NO Yes No No No Yes Yes No 
Note: Service ensured as universal service? Stripes (red) up and to the right indicate USP states "yes" but NRA states "no";  
stripes (green) down and to the right indicate USP states 'no" but NRA states 'yes'. 
 
Not all postal services are ‘universal services’. Under Article 3 of the Postal Directive, a 
universal service is a postal service that is ensured and regulated by the Member State 
and complies with minimum requirements laid down by the Postal Directive. The 
directive makes clear that express services and services for heavy weight parcels are 
not universal services. With respect to the seven postal services traditionally offered by 
public postal operators, the situation is less clear. Every Member State ensures and 
regulates provision of two services as universal services: basic letter post and basic 
parcel post. Few Member States treat bulk parcels as a universal service. One third to 
one half of the Member States treat services for bulk letters, periodicals, and direct mail 
as a universal service. Only two Member States, Belgium and Portugal, regulates all 
services as ‘universal services’. In several Member States USPs and the NRAs have 
different understandings of the scope of the universal service obligation.  
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Case history  2-1: Universal service in the Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, universal services are specifically limited to single piece items and all bulk 
mail products are not considered as universal services. The Dutch postal act of 2009 defined 
universal services in similar fashion as other European postal laws and set out standard weight 
limits for universal services (two kilograms for letters, ten kilograms for parcels) and requires, 
for example, that universal services include be collected and delivered at least six days a week. 
A ministerial decree, however, limits the universal service to items posted at a single piece tariff 
(Postbesluit of 2009, Article 3.1). Consequently, all services that are posted at discounted rates, 
i.e. all bulk services, are not regulated as universal service in the Netherlands.  
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2.4 Regulation of non-universal services 
The Postal Directive also provides for the regulation of non-universal postal services in 
certain circumstances. Regulation of non-universal services is grounded in two 
perspectives. In some situations, the NRA is cast as a regulator of 'universal service 
providers', and this responsibility is not limited to universal services. In other situations, 
the NRA is established as a regulator of postal services generally. 
The Postal Directive specifically provides for regulation of universal service providers in 
several instances in terms not limited to the provision of universal services. Article 12 (in 
the Second Postal Directive and later) requires Member States to ensure that special 
tariffs offered by universal service providers meet certain conditions. Article 13 requires 
Member States to encourage their universal service providers to adhere to certain 
standards with respect to the charging of terminal dues. Article 14 requires Member 
States to ensure that the accounts of universal service providers meet certain 
requirements. Article 15 requires Member States to see that universal service providers 
prepare audited financial accounts in accordance with certain criteria.  
In other instances, the Postal Directive provides for regulation of postal services 
generally. For example, Article 11a (added by Directive 2008/6/EC) requires Member 
States to ensure transparent access to the postal infrastructure. Article 19 (after 
Directive 2002/39/EC) requires Member States to ensure that all postal operators, not 
only universal service providers, maintain certain measures to protect the rights of 
users. Article 22a (added by Directive 2008/6/EC) requires all postal service providers 
to provide certain information to the NRA. More generally, Article 22 declares that NRAs 
‘shall have as a particular task ensuring compliance with the obligations arising from 
this Directive’, and it is clear that these obligations are designed to accomplish full 
market opening and protection of users of postal services as well as the assurance of 
universal service 
Regulation of non-universal postal services features more prominently in the Third 
Postal Directive than it does in the Second Postal Directive. This is partly because the 
definition of ‘universal service provider’ is implicitly broadened in the Third Postal 
Directive (see next section) and partly because the Third Postal Directive includes 
several new provisions that address regulation of the postal services market as a whole. 
Most importantly, as the liberalisation required by the Third Postal Directive becomes 
effective, USPs will be strongly motivated to seek an increase in commercial flexibility 
by narrowing the definition of the USO so that bulk mail services are deemed non-
universal services. Where the USP enjoys significant market power in the supply of bulk 
mail services, a narrow definition of the USO may allow the USP to abuse its market 
power and undercut full market opening unless the NRA has authority to address non-
universal as well as universal services. 
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In sum, regulation of non-universal postal services features more prominently in the 
Third Postal Directive than it does the Second Postal Directive, partly due to changes in 
terms and provisions and due to the implications of full market opening. The Third 
Postal Directive provides for regulation of universal service providers in instances that 
are not limited to the provision of universal services (special tariffs, terminal dues, 
accounting). In addition, the directive provides for regulation of some elements of postal 
services generally (user protection, access to postal infrastructure, statistics, etc.). 
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2.5 USPs, national USPs, and PPOs 
In light of changes introduced in the Third Postal Directive, it is necessary to take 
special care in use of the term ‘universal service provider’ or ‘USP’.  
In the original Postal Directive, the definition of ‘universal service provider’ was: 
the public or private entity providing a universal postal service or parts 
thereof within a Member State, the identity of which has been notified to the 
Commission in accordance with Article 4.24 
In turn, Article 4 of original Postal Directive provided: 
Each Member State shall ensure that the provision of the universal service 
is guaranteed and shall notify the Commission of the steps it has taken to 
fulfil this obligation and, in particular, the identity of its universal service 
provider(s). Each Member State shall determine in accordance with 
Community law the obligations and rights assigned to the universal service 
provider(s) and shall publish them. [emphasis added] 
In the original Postal Directive, therefore, the term ‘universal service provider’ referred 
only to the postal operator identified or ‘designated’25 as the universal service provider 
in the notice to the Commission. Although Article 4 allowed for the possibility that 
Member States could designate more than one USP under Article 4, in fact, each 
Member State designated only one, the national postal administration or its corporatised 
successor. Hence, the term ‘universal service provider’ was apparently limited to postal 
operators designated under Article 4. 
In the Third Postal Directive, the definition of ‘universal service provider’ is changed 
slightly by replacing ‘entity’ with ‘postal service provider’: 
the public or private postal service provider providing a universal postal 
service or parts thereof within a Member State, the identity of which has 
been notified to the Commission in accordance with Article 4.26 
This seems an insignificant change since it is self-evident that an entity ‘providing a 
universal postal service’ is also a ‘postal service provider’. At the same time, however, 
                                                
 24 Directive 97/67/EC, Article 2(13) (emphasis added). 
 25 In the original Postal Directive, Article 4 does not use the word ‘designate’. However, the procedure by 
which Member States select a ‘universal service provider’ — no term is given in the original directive 
for this procedure — came to be known as ‘designation’. Thus, in describing this procedure in 
retrospect, Recital 23 of Directive 2008/6/EC states, ‘Directive 97/67/EC established a preference for 
the provision of the universal service through the designation of universal service providers'. 
 26 Third Postal Directive, Article 2(13) (emphasis added). 
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Article 4 is revised more significantly, casting doubt on the meaning of the term 
‘universal service provider’. In the Third Postal Directive, Article 4 provides for two 
notifications to the Commission, as follows: 
1. Each Member State shall ensure that the provision of the universal 
service is guaranteed and shall notify the Commission of the steps it has 
taken to fulfil this obligation. . . . 
2. Member States may designate one or more undertakings as universal 
service providers in order that the whole of the national territory can be 
covered. Member States may designate different undertakings to provide 
different elements of universal service and/or to cover different parts of the 
national territory. . . . 
Member States shall notify the Commission of the identity of the universal 
service provider(s) they designate. The designation of a universal service 
provider shall be subject to a periodic review and be examined against the 
conditions and principles set out in this Article. [emphasis added] 
This leaves unclear whether the term ‘universal service provider’ refers to postal service 
providers whose identity is provided in the notification under Article 4(1) or in the 
notification under Article 4(2). Article 4(2) notice plainly refers only to designated USPs. 
The Article 4(1) notice could refer to other postal service providers. Recital 23 of 
Directive 2008/6/EC makes clear that, under the Third Postal Directive, designation 
under Article 4(2) is only one of three methods by which Member States may ensure 
universal service: 
Member States may apply one or a combination of the following: the 
provision of the universal service by market forces, the designation of one or 
several undertakings to provide different elements of the universal service 
or to cover different parts of the territory and public procurement of services. 
Hence, the Article 4(1) notice must identify in some manner all postal service providers 
which the Member State relies upon to ensure universal service, whether by market 
forces, designation, or public procurement, whereas the Article 4(2) notice will be limited 
to the postal service providers who are designated under Article 4(2).  
In a nutshell, it appears that the term ‘universal service provider’ in the Third Postal 
Directive could arguably refer to either— 
• a postal service provider that provides all or part of the universal service through 
the operation of market forces, designation, or public procurement pursuant to a 
notice provided under Article 4(1) or 
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• a postal service provider that has been designated as a universal service 
provider under Article 14(2) to provide all or part of the universal service. 
In this study, we shall use the term ‘universal service provider’ in the first sense rather 
than the second when referring to regulation under the Third Postal Directive. The first 
interpretation seems to us more in keeping with the overall approach of the Third Postal 
Directive. For example, in the Third Postal Directive, Article 6 requires each Member 
State to ensure that universal service providers give users up-to-date information about 
universal services. It seems probable that Parliament and the Council expect each 
Member State to ensure the availability of this information regardless of whether it relies 
upon market forces, designation, or public procurement to ensure universal service. 
Likewise, Article 14 requires universal service providers to maintain accounts according 
to criteria that allow the NRA to ensure that prices of universal services conform to the 
criteria of Article 12. If Article 14 refers only to universal service providers designated 
under Article 4(2), then NRAs might lack adequate accounts to regulate prices of 
universal services in cases where Member States rely upon market forces or public 
procurement to ensure universal service. It seems unlikely, however, the Council and 
the Parliament intended for Member States to escape the obligation to control the prices 
of universal services in such cases.27  
Thus, in this study, the term ‘universal service provider’ or ‘USP’ will refer to any postal 
service provider that a Member State relies upon to provide universal service. If the 
discussion relates to regulation under the Second Postal Directive (now in effect), then 
the term ‘universal service provider’ will refer to the postal service provider designated 
under Article 4. However, if the discussion refers to regulation under the Third Postal 
Directive, then the term ‘universal service provider’ will refer generally to any postal 
service provider that is or may be relied upon to provide universal service by market 
forces, designation, or public procurement. Where there is ambiguity or need for 
emphasis, we will use the term ‘designated universal service provider’ or ‘designated 
USP’ to refer a postal service provider that has been designated as a universal service 
provider under Article 4 of the Second Postal Directive or Article 4(2) of the Third Postal 
Directive. 
For clarity, it also appears useful to define two closely related terms at the same time. 
We will use the term ‘national universal service provider’ or ‘national USP’ to refer to 
single postal operator that is legally obliged — normally by designation under Article 4 
— to provide all universal postal services to all points in the national territory. Nothing in 
                                                
 27 More generally, as noted in section 2.4, above, the Third Postal Directive appears to subject universal 
service providers to several obligations where they are providing non-universal postal services. If the 
term ‘universal service provider’ is limited to postal service providers designated under Article 4(2), the 
scope of such regulation is likewise limited, a seemingly unreasonable result. 
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the Postal Directive requires a Member State to establish a national USP, as opposed 
to multiple USPs, but all Member States except Germany have done so far.  
The second term is ‘public postal operator’ or PPO. We shall use the term public postal 
operator to refer to a postal service provider that is owned wholly or partly by 
government. Technically, it is not necessary for a public postal operator to be a USP. It 
is certainly not necessary for a USP to be a public postal operator. Two Member States 
(MT, NL), have sold all of the ownership in their former public postal operators so these 
Member States have USPs — indeed national USPs — but no public postal operators. 
In light of changes introduced in the Third Postal Directive, it is necessary to take 
special care in use of the term ‘universal service provider’ or ‘USP’. In the Second 
Postal Directive, the term ‘USP‘ referred to a postal operator designated as a universal 
service provider under Article 4. In the Third Postal Directive, the term ‘USP‘ appears to 
refer to any postal service provider that provides all or part of the universal service 
through the operation of market forces, designation, or public procurement pursuant to 
a notice provided under Article 4(1). 
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3 Implementation of the Second Postal Directive 
This chapter describes how Member States of the EU and EEA have implemented the 
Second Postal Directive. It also considers compliance with provisions of the Third 
Postal Directive to the extent that the Third Postal Directive merely clarifies provisions 
of the Second. This chapter addresses, in particular, strengths and weaknesses of 
different regulatory approaches with respect to the following key components of the 
Second Postal Directive: 
• the regulatory framework and allocation of responsibility for implementing the 
Postal Directive among national agencies; 
• development and tasks of the national regulatory authority; 
• definition of the universal service obligation; 
• quality of service monitoring; 
• exclusive and special rights; 
• licensing/authorisation procedures; 
• use of compensation funds to support universal service; 
• regulation of prices for universal service;  
• regulation of the accounts of USP(s); and 
• protection of users’ rights. 
This chapter, like chapter 4 (implementation of the competition rules) and chapter 5 
(preparations for implementing the Third Postal Directive), is primarily descriptive. In 
chapter 6, practices described in chapters 3 to 5 are evaluated by reference to what we 
consider to be the 'best practices' in postal regulation. 
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3.1 Regulatory framework 
In this study, the term regulatory framework refers to the system of the laws and 
governmental institutions that have been established to govern, regulate, or provide 
postal services. The laws include ‘primary legislation’ (legislation adopted by the 
parliament or highest legislative authority) and ‘secondary legislation’ (rules and 
regulation adopted by other authorities). Judicial decisions are also part of the 
regulatory framework.  
3.1.1 Postal laws and regulations 
Primary postal legislation has been undergoing substantial revision since adoption of 
the Postal Directive in 1997. In that year, the average age of primary postal legislation 
was about 15 years. At the end of 2005, it was about 5 years (EU members only). Since 
2005, many Member States, especially those who joined the European Union since 
2004, have adopted significant amendments to their postal laws. The current state of 
primary postal legislation is shown in Table  3-1. The third column indicates whether the 
Member States consider their current postal laws to be complete transpositions of the 
Third Postal Directive. 
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Table  3-1 Primary postal legislation 








AT      
BE 1992 2 No No 0 
BG 2000 8 No Yes 0 
CY 2006 0 No Yes 0 
CZ 2001 1  No Yes 0 
DE 1998 1 Yes* No  
DK 2004 1 No Yes 0 
EE 2009 1 Yes No 2 
EL 1999 0 No Yes  
ES 1999 1 No No 3 
FI   No Yes 0 
FR 2006 0 No Yes 0 
HU 2005 1 No Yes 0 
IE 1908 0 No Yes 0 
IT 2000  No No  
LT 2000  No Yes 2 
LU 2001 0 No No 1 
LV 1995 0 No Yes 0 
MT 1975 1 No Yes 0 
NL 2009 1 Yes Yes  
PL 2003 5 No Yes 0 
PT 2001 0 No Yes 0 
RO 2002 1 No Yes 1 
SE 1994 0 No Yes 0 
SI 2004 0 No No 0 
SK 2001 1 No Yes 0 
UK   ?? Yes  
IS 2003 1 No Yes 0 
NO 1998 0 No Yes 0 
* Germany noted that ‘slight amendments are necessary’ to transpose Directive 2008/6. 
?? Unknown. No information about law or practice 
 
Secondary postal legislation is more difficult to summarise. Secondary legislation may 
be adopted by a variety of legal measures including ordinances or regulations issued by 
the Council of Ministers or an individual ministry, ordinances or regulations issued by 
the NRA, legal obligations included in a license issued by the NRA, a contract between 
government and a postal operator defining conditions of service, and similar legal 
instruments. Table  3-2 shows the dates of secondary legislation dealing with key postal 
topics. 
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Table  3-2 Secondary postal legislation: dates of major measures 
















AT         
BE 2006 2006 2006 2006  2006 2006  
BG  2006 2004      
CY         
CZ 2008 2008  2008 2005 2009  2008 
DE  2000 2000 2000    2002 
DK 2005 2005 2005 2006 2005 2005  2005 
EE   2009 2009  2009   
EL  2006 2005 2005 2007 2010  2005 
ES  1999 2001 2001  2000 2001 1999 
FI         
FR 2007 2009 2009 2008  2006  2007 
HU  2005 2007 2006  2005  2005 
IE 2006 2004 2002  2003 2003  2008 
IT 2009 2008 2006  2007 2000 2001  
LT 2007 2004 2007 2005  2004  2006 
LU  2001       
LV  2006 2007   2007   
MT         
NL 2009 2009 2009 2009     
PL  2004  2004    2004 
PT 1999 2008 2008 2001 1999 2001   
RO 2007   2005  2007   
SE 1994 1994 1994 2001    2001 
SI  2004 2005 2005  2003   
SK 2004 2004 2008     2004 
UK        2008 
IS 2009 2009  2005     
NO 1997 2007  2007    2007 
 
This table suggests that most Member States have been actively revising their postal 
legislation since 2005 even though they have not yet transposed the Third Postal 
Directive. The average age of secondary postal legislation is now about four and a half 
years. It should be noted that an absence of secondary legislation does not necessarily 
demonstrate a gap in the legal framework since some topics may be completely 
specified in primary legislation. 
Since 2005, the pace of new primary postal legislation has slowed. Nonetheless, 
Member States have continued to modernise their postal legislation by revising 
secondary postal legislation. The average age of secondary postal legislation is now 
about four and a half years. 
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3.1.2 Postal authorities: Postal Ministries, USPs, NRAs, NCAs 
Traditionally, responsibility for the national postal service was vested in a single ministry 
which operated the national post office and formulated public policy towards the postal 
service, telecommunications services, and perhaps other types of infrastructure 
services. For almost all of the twentieth century, these ministries could be referred to 
generically as ‘PTTs’, i.e., as ministries for post, telephone, and telegraph. 
After two decades of intense public debate, unified exercise of governmental and 
operational authority over the postal system is no longer considered desirable or 
acceptable. In the wake of new technologies and changing business practices, 
differences between public postal services and other communications services have 
become more marked while differences between public postal services and other types 
of delivery services — private distributors of unaddressed advertisements, newspapers, 
parcels, and express services — have diminished. As personal communications have 
migrated to the telephone and email, public postal services have become more 
commercial in nature. In response, governments have given their post offices more 
flexibility in matters of commerce and governance. At the same time, increased 
concerns for efficiency and competitive fairness have motivated separation of the 
government’s regulatory responsibilities from the commercial activities of the post. The 
ideal of a ‘level playing field’ for all types of postal operators has prompted extensive re-
examination of the postal monopoly and other special rights traditionally accorded the 
public postal service.  
In place of the former PTT, there are now several government agencies which have a 
significant role in the regulation and provision of universal postal services. Although 
there are variations among Member States, government institutions that participate in 
governance of the postal sector typically include (i) a ministry responsible for postal 
policy (the ‘postal ministry’), (ii) a ‘public postal operator’ owned wholly or partly by 
government or a ‘universal service provider’ designated by government, (iii) a national 
regulatory authority with jurisdiction over the postal sector (‘NRA’), and (iv) a national 
competition authority (‘NCA’). 
In all Member States there is a ministry of government whose portfolio includes 
responsibility for development of public policy towards postal services.28 While the title 
and functions of this ministry varies among Member States, in this study we shall use 
the generic term ‘postal ministry’ to refer to this ministry. A list of postal ministries is 
presented in Table  3-3. 
                                                
 28 In Belgium there is a minister responsible for postal services but no ‘ministry’. This minister is merely 
supported by a cabinet office. 
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Table  3-3 Ministry with primary responsibility for postal services 
 Postal ministry 
AT Federal Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology 
BE Minister for Enterprises and Simplification 
BG State Agency for Information Technology and Communications 
CY Ministry of Communication and Works  
CZ Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) 
DE Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology 
DK Ministry of Transport 
EE Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications 
EL Ministry of Transport and Communications 
ES Ministry of Public Works and Transportation 
FI Ministry of Transport and Communications  
FR Ministry of Economy, Industry and Employment 
HU Ministry of Transport, Telecommunication and Energy 
IE Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources 
IT Ministry of Economic Development 
LT Ministry of Transport and Communications 
LU Ministry of Communications 
LV Ministry of Transport 
MT Ministry for Infrastructure, Transport and Communications 
NL Ministry of Economic Affairs 
PL Ministry of Infrastructure.  
PT Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications 
RO Ministry of Communications and Information Society 
SE Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications 
SI Ministry of the Economy 
SK Ministry of Transport, Posts and Telecommunications 
UK Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
IS Ministry of Communications 
NO Ministry of Transport and Communications 
 
In most Member States, the second government institution is a public postal operator 
that has been designated under Article 4 of the Second Postal Directive as the national 
universal service provider, or national USP, for the entire national territory. While the 
Second Postal Directive allows Member States to designate more than one USP, none 
have done so. In all but two cases, the national USP is also a public postal operator. 
Table  3-4 lists the current roster of national USPs and the extent of State ownership. 
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Table  3-4 National universal service provider 
 National universal service provider Legal status State ownership 
(%) 
AT Austria Post PLC 53 
BE La Poste/DePost PLC  
BG Bulgarian Posts  PLC 100 
CY Cyprus Post Govt 100 
CZ Czech Post, S. E. SOE 100 
DE [No USP designated]   
DK Post Denmark A/S PLC 75 
EE Estonian Post Ltd SOE 100 
EL Hellenic Post (ELTA) SOE 100 
ES Sociedad Estatal Correos y Telégrafos, S.A. PLC 100 
FI Itella  PLC 100 
FR La Poste Other 100 
HU Hungarian Post Company Limited Other 100 
IE An Post PLC 100 
IT Poste Italiane S.p.A. PLC 65 
LT Lithuanian Post PLC 100 
LU Entreprise des Postes et Télécommunications Luxembourg (EPT) Other 100 
LV Latvijas Pasts Other 100 
MT Maltapost p.l.c. PLC 0 
NL TNT Post BV PLC 0 
PL Polish Post SOE 100 
PT Correios de Portugal, S.A. (CTT) PLC 100 
RO Romanian Post S.A. SOE 100 
SE Posten AB PLC 100 
SI Pošta Slovenije d.o.o. PLC 100 
SK Slovenská pošta, a. s.  PLC 100 
UK Royal Mail Group Ltd. Other 100 
IS Iceland Post SOE 100 
NO Norway Post PLC 100 
Legal status: Govt = Government department; SOE = State enterprise; PLC = Public limited company; Other = Other 
 
The third agency with responsibility for postal matters is the ‘national regulatory 
authority’ or NRA. In most Member States, establishment of the postal NRA was 
prompted by adoption of the original Postal Directive in 1997. Article 22 of that directive 
required each Member State to ‘designate one or more national regulatory authorities 
for the postal sector that are legally separate from and operationally independent of the 
postal operators'. The capacity and competence of the NRAs are addressed in the next 
section and in section 3.2, below. 
A fourth agency that exercises regulatory authority over the postal sector is the national 
competition authority (NCA). In the last two decades, public postal operators have been 
subject to a substantial number of complaints under the competition rules. These cases 
have been one influence shaping postal reform. The role of the NCA at national level 
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varies from Member State to Member State. Table  3-5 lists the national competition 
authority in each Member State. All of the NRAs who answered the survey declared 
their authority to enforce the competition rules in the postal sector.  
Table  3-5 National competition authority and its role in postal sector 
 Name of NCA 
AT Federal Competition Authority 
BE Belgian Competition Authority 
BG Commission on Protection of Competition 
CY Commission for the Protection of Competition 
CZ Office for the Protection of Competition 
DE Federal Cartel Office 
DK Danish Competition Authority 
EE Estonian Competition Authority [same as NRA] 
EL Hellenic Competition Commission 
ES National Competition Commission 
FI Finnish Competition Authority 
FR French Competition Authority 
HU Hungarian Competition Authority 
IE The Competition Authority.  
IT Italian Competition Authority 
LT Competition Council of the Republic of Lithuania 
LU Competition Council 
LV Competition Council 
MT Office for Fair Competition- antitrust and mergers 
State Aid Monitoring Board- State Aid 
NL Netherlands Competition Authority 
PL Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (OCCP) 
PT Portuguese Competition Authority 
RO Romanian Competition Council 
SE Swedish Competition Authority 
SI Competition Protection Office (UVK) 
SK Antimonopoly office of the Slovak Republic 
UK The Office of Fair Trading 
IS The Competition Authority 
NO The Norwegian Competition Authority 
 
In place of the former ‘PTT’ ministry (ministry of posts, telegraphs, and 
telecommunications), there are now several government agencies which have a 
significant role in the regulation and provision of universal postal services in most 
Member States. Although there are variations among Member States, government 
institutions that are participate in governance of the postal sector typically include a 
‘postal ministry’ (ministry responsible for postal policy as part of a larger portfolio), a 
national universal service provider (national USP, usually a public postal operator 
owned wholly or partly by government), a national regulatory authority (NRA) with 
jurisdiction over the postal sector, and a national competition authority (NCA). 
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3.1.3 Allocation of regulatory authority 
In general, government may fulfil the obligations imposed by the Postal Directive by one 
of three decision making procedures: 
• measures are adopted by the parliament or by the government as a whole (e.g., 
by a council of ministers); 
• measures are adopted by a single minister (ministerial regulation); and  
• measures are adopted by an independent regulatory body (e.g., a NRA 
regulation or decision).  
The manner in which authority over the postal sector is allocated among these three 
decision making procedures is significant. Different procedures reflect different bases 
for decision. Legislation is the most cumbersome decision making process and is 
usually reserved for the most politically sensitive issues, that is, for issues which require 
the input of all significant interest groups before a decision can be made. The council of 
ministers likewise provides a broadly based and relatively inflexible forum, suited to 
decisions of a fundamentally political nature. Decisions by a single minister may be both 
political and flexible. Authorising an expert independent regulator to decide an issue, 
while not wholly free from political considerations, normally provides the most 
economically objective means of decision making. To some extent, allocation of 
authority reflects the extent to which postal policy is to be determined by political criteria 
or economic criteria. 
Article 22 of the Postal Directive provides that ‘the national regulatory authorities shall 
have as a particular task ensuring compliance with the obligations arising from this 
Directive'. This implies that a minimum range of regulatory functions must be committed 
to an independent regulator and not resolved by more political processes. The Postal 
Directive does not state which functions must be committed to the NRA. In principle, 
however, the allocation of regulatory authority over postal affairs should serve the 
overall objectives of the directive.  
In this study, we asked Member States to indicate which types of governmental 
procedures are used to determine certain key policy issues. In particular, which 
measures— 
• specify the frequency of delivery for universal services? 
• determine the maximum weight of parcels within the universal service? 
• specify the scope of the reserved area? 
• establish the requirements and conditions for general authorisations or licences? 
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• establish the procedures or requirements for a fund that shares the net cost of 
universal service obligations among providers of services and/or users?  
• require the USP to maintain prices for some or all universal services that are 
uniform throughout the national territory? and  
• define the quality of service standards which the USP must attain in the 
provision of universal service (e.g. routing time targets, minimum criteria for 
access points etc.)?  
Table  3-6 summarises how Member States discharge these key policymaking functions. 
As this table indicates, key issues of postal policy are most often resolved by primary 
legislation (A) or by regulations adopted by the government as a whole (B). That is, they 
are decided on political rather than technical grounds. What is notable are cases in 
which Member States have given independent regulators substantial discretion to 
determine the specifics of policy within a framework of legislative guidelines (D). These 
include Cyprus, Denmark, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. On the other 
hand, delegating substantial policy authority to the council of ministers (B) (e.g., DE, 
ES, HU, LV) or to a single minister (C) (e.g., EL, ES, FR, IT, NO) may suggest the 
possibility of substantial political influence on postal policy. 
One policy issue deserves particular comment, the scope of the reserved area. Under 
the Second Postal Directive, the scope of the reserved area is a technical rather than a 
political issue. Article 7(1) requires that the scope of the reserved area must be no 
larger than necessary to ensure universal service. In almost all Member States, 
however, the scope of the reserved area is determined by the legislator rather than by 
the regulator. A notable positive exception is the UK. In 2000, UK postal law delegated 
to the NRA, Postcomm, the authority to determine the extent to which competition with 
the public postal operator is consistent with ensuring the universal service. After a 
searching inquiry, Postcomm concluded in 2002 that full liberalisation should be 
permitted.29 
                                                
 29 UK, Postcomm, Promoting Effective Competition in UK Postal Services: A Decision Document (May 
2002). 
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Table  3-6 Authority determining policy decisions required by Postal Directive 
 Frequency 












AT A A A A F A AB 
BE A A A AB AB A AB 
BG D A A A F AD D 
CY AD A A AD AD AD AD 
CZ D D AB G  F D 
DE B B BF A A B B 
DK D D D D F D D 
EE A A A A AC AC AC 
EL AC AC AC ACD AC A AC 
ES AB AB A AB AB AB B 
FI A A F A F A AE 
FR AC AC A AC AC AC AC 
HU A AB A AB F F B 
IE A A A A F F D 
IT A AC AC C C C C 
LT A A A AD F A C 
LU A A A A F A C 
LV B A A ABD F A B 
MT A AC AC AC  AD AD 
NL A A F A A A A 
PL A A A A F A C 
PT A A A A A AG G 
RO ACD AD AD AD G D AD 
SE A A F AD F AD AD 
SI A A A A A A C 
SK A A A A F DE D 
UK AD AD AD AD F AD D 
IS AD A A A AC AC AB 
NO AC AC A AC A AC C 
Key: (A) Postal law includes specific criteria; (B) Regulation, decree, or ordinance of Prime Minister or Council; (C) Regulation, decree,  
or ordinance of the postal ministry; (D) NRA regulation or authorisation requirement; (E) Discretionary decision of USP; (F) Not applicable; 
(G) Other 
 
Assignment of administrative tasks required to implement the directive can be evaluated 
in the same way. In this study, we asked Member States to identify which government 
agency: 
• has primary responsibility for ensuring that the USP(s) gives users up to date 
information about universal service? 
• administers the system, if any, for granting authorisations by means of general 
authorisations or individual licences? 
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• has primary responsibility for collecting money for and making required 
payments from a fund, if any, that shares the net cost of universal service 
obligations among providers of services and/or users? 
• has primary responsibility for reviewing the prices of universal services and 
ensuring that they are affordable and geared to costs? 
• has primary responsibility for reviewing special tariffs of the USP, if any, and 
ensuring that they are transparent, non-discriminatory, and take into account 
avoided costs? 
• has primary responsibility for reviewing the accounts of USP(s) and ensuring 
that they comply with the requirements of the Postal Directive? 
• has primary responsibility for ensuring that independent performance monitoring 
of quality of service is provided? 
• has primary responsibility for ensuring that transparent, simple, and inexpensive 
procedures are drawn up by postal operators for dealing with the complaints of 
users of universal services? 
• has primary responsibility for ensuring that revenues from the reserved sector, if 
any, are not used to cross subsidise non-reserved services within the universal 
service except when strictly necessary? 
• has primary responsibility for ensuring that revenues from the reserved sector, if 
any, are not used to cross subsidise services outside the universal service? 
Answers are summarised in Table  3-7. 
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AT NRA  NRA NRA NRA  Min Post NRA NRA 
BE NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA 
BG NCA  NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA 
CY NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA 
CZ Other  NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA 
DE NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA   
DK  Min Post NRA NCA Council NRA NRA Min Post NCA 
EE NCA NCA NCA NCA NCA NCA NCA NCA NCA 
EL NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA 
ES Min Post Min Post Min Post Min Post Min Post Min Post Min Post Min Post Min Post
FI Council  NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA   
FR NRA  NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA 
HU NRA Other Min Post Min Post NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA 
IE NRA Other NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA 
IT NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA 
LT NRA Other NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA 
LU NRA  NRA NRA NRA NRA Other NRA NRA 
LV NRA  NRA NRA NRA     
MT NRA  NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA 
NL NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA   
PL NRA  NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA 
PT NRA Other NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA 
RO NRA Other NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA 
SE NRA  NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA   
SI NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA 
SK NRA  NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA 
UK NRA  NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA   
IS NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA 
NO Min Post  NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA 
Key: NRA = National regulatory authority (NRA) or staff; NCA = National competition authority (NCA); Min Post = Postal Minister or  
ministry staff; Min Other = Ministry other than the postal ministry; Court = Court of law; Council = Council of Ministers. . 
 
Almost all Member States commit almost all administrative functions to the NRA, and it 
is the exceptions that stand out. For example, in Denmark it appears that the postal 
ministry and the council have important roles in the competitively sensitive areas of 
USP account regulation, control of cross subsidy, and the compensation fund. In 
Hungary, the postal ministry regulates postal rates. 
In some Member States, the freedom of NRAs to take administrative decisions can be 
limited substantially by overly specific rules set out in legislation. One example relates 
to regulation of tariffs and accounting separation in the Netherlands. As the table above 
states, the Dutch postal regulator, OPTA, is responsible for regulating tariffs and 
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controlling separation of accounts. However, OPTA’s role in controlling accounts is very 
limited. The NRA cannot specify detailed rules for the USP's accounts because the 
postal law delegates such authority to the postal minister (‘specific rules shall be set by 
ministerial regulation with respect to the structure of the said accounts and the cost 
allocation method’).30 Similarly, specific rules for price regulation, including specification 
of a ‘reasonable return’, are determined by ministerial regulation.31  
Allocation of regulatory authority among national institutional reflects the extent to which 
postal policy is to be determined by political criteria or economic criteria. The Postal 
Directive provides that a minimum range of regulatory functions should be committed to 
an independent regulator and not resolved by more political agencies. Most Member 
States have determined most major policy issues by primary legislation or ministerial 
regulation and committed most administrative tasks to the NRA. It is the exceptions to 
this pattern that are most notable. On the positive side, the UK has delegated to the 
NRA the authority to determine the appropriate scope of the reserved area by impartial 
administrative inquiry — an approach that conforms well with the requirements of the 
Postal Directive. Less positive examples are provided by Member States (notably, 
Denmark, the Netherlands) where a ministry or the Council of Ministers has a significant 
role in technical or competitively sensitive areas such as regulation of prices, 
accounting, cross subsidy, or the compensation fund.  
                                                
 30 Netherlands Postal Act 2009, Article 22.  
 31 See Netherlands Postal Act 2009, Article 25. Although the 2009 act provides that the postal minister 
must consult with OPTA prior to issuing a regulation on price control, with respect to the fundamental 
question of the ‘reasonable return’, the minister has already adopted a regulation declaring that the 
‘reasonable return’ is the return reported by the USP in 2008. See Netherlands Postal Regulation 
2009 (Postregeling 2009), Article 14. 
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3.1.4 Rights of ownership 
In the Third Postal Directive, Article 22 is amended to clarify the high degree of 
separation required between governmental decisions and commercial decisions. The 
amended Article 22 requires separation between regulatory functions and the rights of 
ownership: ‘Member States that retain ownership or control of postal service providers 
shall ensure effective structural separation of the regulatory functions from activities 
associated with ownership or control'. This survey therefore inquired how governments 
today exercise ownership authority over their public operators. Table  3-8 summarises 
the results. 
Table  3-8 Government control of the public postal operator 















AT       
BE Council 10 5 Council 6 yr Other 
BG USP board 5 5 Min Other 3 yr Discretion 
CY Other 0    Other 
CZ Min Other      
DE   0    
DK USP board 12 6 Council 2 yr Other 
EE Other 3 0 Other   
EL Min Other 11     
ES USP board 19 19 Council   
FI USP board      
FR Council 21 7 Other 5 yr Discretion 
HU Other 7 7 Min Other 3 yr Other 
IE USP board   Min Post   
IT USP board 5 5 Min Other 3 yr Misconduct 
LT Min Post 1 1 Min Post 4 yr Discretion 
LU USP board 5 5 Council 5 yr Misconduct 
LV Min Post 4 0    
MT USP board 5 0    
NL USP board  0    
PL Min Post 4 4 Min Post None Discretion 
PT USP board 7   3 yr  
RO USP board 7 7 Min Post 2 yr Discretion 
SE USP board 10 7 Min Post 1 yr Misconduct 
SI Other 3 0  4 yr Other 
SK Min Post 5 5 Min Post  Misconduct 
UK USP board 11 11 Min Post 3 yr Misconduct 
IS USP board 7 7 Min Post None Misconduct 
NO USP board 10 6 Min Post 2 yr Discretion 
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The key feature of proprietary control is the power to appoint the top management 
authority, that is, either the board of directors or, if there is no board, the chief executive 
officer (CEO). In at least nine Member States (IE, LT, PL, RO, SE, SK, UK, IS, NO), it 
appears that the board of directors is appointed by the postal minister.32 In some 
Member States (LT, LV, PL, SK), the postal minister also appoints the CEO directly (or 
in lieu of a board in the case of Latvia). In several cases, the directors serve at the 
discretion of the postal minister or for terms of three years or less. Since the postal 
minister exercises policy making authority over the postal sector, it appears 
questionable whether these arrangements satisfy the structural separation requirement 
of the Third Postal Directive.  
In other Member States, control over the public postal operator appears to be less 
conjoined with the authority of the postal minister. An especially clean separation of 
regulatory authority and ownership authority is provided in Hungary. The Hungarian 
State Holding Company exercises ownership authority over the public postal operator 
and other entrepreneurial assets of the Hungarian State. The holding company was 
established to provide market-based management of state assets.33 An alternative 
approach is provided by France, where the board of the public postal operator is 
composed of representatives of several ministries. Outside the Community, New 
Zealand offers a well-developed model for exercising ownership rights in multiple 'state 
owned enterprises' such as New Zealand Post, which substantially separates ownership 
rights from policy making (see case history 3-1, below). Finally, the Netherlands and 
Malta have completely separated ownership from governmental authority by selling 
ownership of the public postal operator to private parties. 
In many Member States, the postal minister appoints all or most of the board of 
directors and/or the chief executive officer of the public postal operator. It appears 
questionable whether these arrangements provide sufficient separation between 
regulatory and policy making authority, on the one hand, and ownership and control of 
the public postal operator, on the other. An example of a distinct separation of 
regulatory authority and ownership authority is provided by Hungary, where ownership 
of state entrepreneurial companies is vested in a separate holding company. 
 
                                                
 32 In Sweden, the Postal Minister appoints 7 of 10 directors.  
 33 See Hungarian State Holding Company (MNV Zrt.). http://www.mnvzrt.hu/en. 
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Case history  3-1: Safeguarding proprietary rights and supervision of NZ Post Group 
(New Zealand)  
As a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE), NZ Post Group is subject to the legal provisions of the 
State-Owned Enterprises Act of 1986, which defines the nature of the government’s ownership 
of companies, the responsibilities of shareholders, the objectives governing operation of SOEs, 
and corporate accountability (role of directors, reporting requirements). Activities of NZ Post are 
also regulated by sector-specific laws. 
NZ Post has two shareholding ministers: the Minister of Finance and the Minister for State-
Enterprises. In the exercise of their duties, the ministers are assisted by the Crown Company 
Monitoring and Advisory Unit (CCMAU), a government agency administratively attached to the 
Treasury. CCMAU advises on strategic issues, investment and diversification opportunities, and 
impact of government policies. CCMAU also monitors sector trends as well as business plans 
and performance of SOEs; promotes corporate governance best practice; and assists with the 
appointment of directors to boards. 
The Ministers may authorise SOEs to act on behalf of the government in providing goods and 
services, to transfer assets and liabilities of the government to SOEs, to vest in SOEs any rights 
applying to land transferred to SOEs, and to grant leases, licences, easements, permits or 
rights of any kind. On the other hand, the government is obliged to fund any non-commercial 
activities that it wants NZ Post to carry out. The Ministers appoint the nine Directors of the 
Board of NZ Post, considering the balance of competencies and experiences, and after having 
consulted the chairman. They may also determine the amount of dividend. 
Pursuant to the State-Owned Enterprises Act, NZ Post has to follow basic principles: to be 
profitable and efficient as comparable business; to act as a good employer (good and safe 
working conditions, equal opportunities employment programme, impartial selection of persons 
for appointment, opportunities for enhancement of abilities of employees); and to exhibit a 
sense of social responsibility. In following these guidelines, the board is accountable to the 
Ministers for directing and monitoring management and affairs of NZ Post. 
The Act also commits a SOE to deliver to the Ministers a 'statement of corporate intent', 
covering the next three financial years. This statement specifies objectives, nature and scope of 
activities, ratio of shareholders’ funds to total assets, accounting policies, performance targets, 
principles in determining the dividend, information to be reported to Ministers, procedures for 
acquisition of shares, and activities to be compensated by government. The SOE is required to 
follow its statement of corporate intent. The SOE must also provide shareholding Ministers with 
an annual report of operations, audited financial statements (as well as with half-yearly reports), 
and any other information on its affairs. In addition, NZ Post has voluntarily agreed to refer to 
the Ministers its annual business plan, quarterly reports on the performance, and reports on 
other significant developments.  
In 1989, NZ Post and the government signed a Deed of Understanding. This document sets out 
the obligations of NZ Post with respect to social services, prices, and quality of service. These 
requirements are supplemented by other company-specific measures, such as director 
education and induction programmes, and compliance with integrity standards. The Deed was 
updated in 1998. 
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Case history  3-2: Separation of state ownership and policy making: The Hungarian 
State Holding Company (MNV Zrt.) 
During the 1990s and the beginning of the current decade, the Hungarian government pursued 
different sector-specific strategies with respect to the management of public assets and state-
owned enterprises. Numerous institutions were established to administer companies of national 
or strategic importance, as well as companies which serve defence and law enforcement 
purposes, manage state monopolies, or preserve national culture and traditions. In 2007, a new 
legal framework was enacted to meet several objectives: (i) to create a single approach to the 
management of national assets; (ii) to unify principles, organisation, tasks, and requirements, 
(iii) to implement effective, cost-efficient, transparent, and flexible decision-making processes 
and management procedures; and (iv) to preserve and increase the value of assets. The 
relevant provision is Act CVI of 2007 on state-owned assets (State-owned Assets Act). 
Pursuant to the State-owned Assets Act, the Hungarian State Holding Company (MNV Zrt.) was 
set up on 1 January 2008 as the legal successor of three organisations, the Hungarian 
Privatisation and State Holding Company, the Treasury Property Directorate, and the National 
Land Fund. MNV is an independent single-shareholder joint stock company, which may not be 
sold, transformed, divided, or merged. It is fully owned by the Hungarian state with 
shareholder’s rights exercised by the Minister of Finance. 
MNV is fully responsible for the management of the Hungarian state assets. Revenues and 
expenses incurred with respect to MNV’s own assets are unbundled from the accounts related 
to the management of state assets. Besides managing state assets by itself, MNV also 
concludes contracts with others to undertake the task. 
The organisational structure of MNV comprises the National State Holding Board, a Supervisory 
Board and an Audit Directorate, and the Chief Executive Officer and the management 
departments. The Minister of Finance adopts the decisions falling into the competence of the 
General Meeting. 
The National State Holding Board is the executive body. It is composed of seven members 
headed by a Chairman. Members are appointed by the President on proposal of the Prime 
Minister, with all candidates being nominated by three Ministers. The Board directs MNV, and 
exercises the rights and performs the obligations arising from the ownership of state assets. 
Decisions are based on internal proposals and reports. Moreover, MNV adopts an annual report 
and reports to the Parliament.  
Under the direction and management of the Supervisory Board, there is an Audit Directorate 
consisting of 11 members. It controls the operation of MNV and the National State Holding 
Board, in particular, and of the management of assets. 
Business management and operation are guided by the Chief Executive Officer. He serves as 
the legal representative of MNV, and is appointed and released by the Minister of Finance. 
Work is carried out by three sector-specific departments (agriculture portfolio, real property, 
corporate portfolio) plus three departments with cross-sectional tasks (legal affairs, finances, 
human resources).  
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3.2 National regulatory authorities 
National regulatory authorities are central to the transformation of the postal sector. As 
noted, Article 22 of the Postal Directive requires that Member States ‘designate one or 
more national regulatory authorities for the postal sector’ and that NRAs ‘shall have as a 
particular task ensuring compliance with the obligations arising from this Directive and 
shall, where appropriate, establish controls and specific procedures to ensure that the 
reserved services are respected’. 
3.2.1 Establishment of NRAs  
Although the Postal Directive permits Member States to establish more than one 
national regulatory authority for postal affairs, all Member States state that they have 
entrusted to a single national regulatory authority the responsibility for ensuring 
compliance with ‘all or most of the regulatory functions falling within the scope of the 
Postal Directive’.34 It is, therefore, possible to refer to the NRA in each Member State 
without ambiguity. Where it is necessary to distinguish between the agency with primary 
responsibility for regulation of postal services and other agencies with secondary 
regulatory responsibilities, the former will be called the ‘primary NRA’.  
In all but two Member States, the agency responsible for regulation of the postal sector 
is also responsible for regulating other sectors. Most Member States (24) have 
combined postal and electronic communications regulation in the same agency. In 
some Member States, the postal NRA also regulates other network industries such as 
electricity (DE, EE, LU, LV), gas (LU), rail (DE, EE, LV), or road safety (DK). The only 
Member States which limit the NRA to the postal sector are Slovakia and the United 
Kingdom, and the U.K. is reconsidering this arrangement.35 
                                                
 34 Questionnaire 103-12. 
 35  The British Parliament is presently considering a bill that would abolish its dedicated postal NRA 
(Postcomm) and extend the jurisdiction of the telecommunications NRA to include the postal sector. 
See HL 41. 
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Table  3-9 Primary national regulatory authority for postal services 





AT Austrian Regulatory Authority for Broadcasting and Telecommunications RTR B 
BE Belgian Institute for Postal Services and Telecommunications BIPT B 
BG Communications Regulation Commission  B 
CY Office of the Commissioner of Electronic Comm. and Postal Regulation OCECPR B 
CZ Czech Telecommunication Office CTU B 
DE Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecomm., Post and Railway  BNetzA BCEF 
DK Road Safety and Transport Agency, Postal Supervisory Department - A 
EE Estonian Competition Authority - BCEF 
EL Hellenic Telecommunications And Post Commission EETT BG 
ES Ministry of Public Works and Transportation  A 
FI Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority Ficora BG 
FR Regulation Authority for Electronic Communications and Posts ARCEP B 
HU National Communications Authority NHH BG 
IE Commission for Communications Regulation ComReg BG 
IT General Direction of Postal Services Regulation (Min. Eco. Dev.) DGRSP  
LT Communications Regulatory Authority RRT B 
LU Luxembourg Institute for Regulation ILR BCEG 
LV Public Utilities Commission   BCF 
MT Malta Communications Authority MCA BG 
NL Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority OPTA B 
PL The President of the Office of Electronic Communications.  UKE B 
PT National Communications Authority ANACOM B 
RO National Authority for Management and Regulation of Communications ANCOM B 
SE National Post and Telecom Agency PTS B 
SI Post and Electronic Communications Agency of the Republic of Slovenia APEK BG 
SK Postal Regulatory Office  A 
UK Postal Services Commission  Postcomm A 
IS Post And Telecom Administration PTA B 
NO Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority NPT B 
Other sectors regulated: (A) None; (B) Telecommunications; (C) Energy; (D) Water; (E) Gas; (F) Railway; (G) Other. 
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Case history  3-3: Plans for creating an independent postal regulator in Spain 
In October 2007, the Spanish legislator adopted a law on the establishment of an independent 
national regulatory authority for the postal sector to be called CNSP (Comisión Nacional del 
Sector Postal).36 As of mid-2009, the authority has not been established in practice. 
CNSP is to take over some functions from the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation 
(Ministerio de Fomento) that currently performs the tasks of the postal NRA in Spain. According 
to the law, the CNSP’s will, inter alia, resolve user complaints and conflicts between postal 
operators, issue and manage authorisations, determine conditions for downstream network 
access, monitor market development, advise the government of postal policy, determine 
annually the net cost of the universal service, and administer a compensation fund for the 
universal service (if needed). Responsibility for regulating postal tariffs, a key regulatory 
competence, will remain with the ministry. Responsibility for policy-making in the postal sector, 
including adoption of measures to guarantee the provision of the universal service will likewise 
remain in the ministry. 
The NRA will be headed by a commission of five persons serving fixed terms of six years. The 
authority will be financed from fees paid by postal operators. Contributions are planned to 
amount to 0.1881 percent of gross revenues of each postal operator, in addition to registration 
fees. For the first year of operation, the law allows for financing of CNSP from the state budget. 
The staff of the CNSP will in part be recruited from the current staff of the Ministry of Public 
Works and Transportation. 
In order to be established in practice, the government will need to appoint the commissioners 
by an ordinance to be adopted by the council of ministers, at the recommendation of the 
Minister of Public Works and Transportation. Judging from interviews with stakeholders, it 
appears to WIK-Consult that the government’s efforts to recruit adequate persons to serve as 
commissioners have so far been unsuccessful, and that this is the key obstacle to the 
establishment of the Spanish postal regulator. At present, there is no independent NRA outside 
a ministry in Spain, and therefore the requirement to establish an independent NRA — a key 
element of the Postal Directive — appears not to have been implemented in Spain.  
                                                
 36 Ley 23/2007, de 8 de octubre, de creación de la Comisión Nacional del Sector Postal. 
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3.2.2 Mission and resources of NRAs 
Table  3-10 Resources of NRAs (2008) 











per staff  
(€000) 
DE 1 - 48 30 - - - - 
ES 1 - 38 12 2 6 - - 
FR 1 1,908 14 14 - - 6 124.9 
IT 1 2,539 47 7 - - 1 53.5 
NL 1 499 - - - - 2 - 
UK 1 11,512 66 - - - 28 126.5 
AT 2 - - - - - - - 
BE 2 - 10 - 2 4 - - 
DK 2 227 5 3 - 2 - 45.3 
FI 2 - - - - - - - 
PL 2 146 11 9 4 4 18 10.9 
PT 2 1,728 19 10 6 2 11 81.1 
SE 2 734 9 9 5 2 1 80.8 
NO 2 567 3 - - - - 189.0 
CZ 3 150 6 6 - 1 - 25.0 
EL 3 780 11 11 5 2 - 70.9 
HU 3 2,681 15 14 2 2 3 173.4 
IE 3 1,499 7 5 1 1 29 152.7 
RO 3 - - - - - - - 
SI 3 286 4 4 4 - 6 67.3 
SK 3 396 17 14 3 1 1 23.1 
BG 4 491 10 10 5 2 - 49.1 
CY 4 - 3 3 2 1 - - 
EE 4 51 2 2 1 - 3 25.0 
LT 4 - 8 2 2 - - - 
LU 4 427 2 1 0 0 0 203.3 
LV 4 - 6 4 2 2 - - 
MT 4 177 3 2 - 1 19 47.8 
IS 4 80 2 2 1 1 - 40.0 
LI 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 
 
Since, under Article 22 of the Postal Directive, NRAs are required to ensure compliance 
with the obligations arising from the directive, Member States must equip NRAs with 
sufficient resources to do the job. Recital 47 of Directive 2008/6 emphasises this implied 
obligation: ‘National regulatory authorities should be provided with all necessary 
resources, in terms of staffing, expertise and financial means, for the performance of 
their tasks'. A summary of resource data reported by the NRAs for 2008 is presented in 
Table  3-10. Note that throughout this chapter, ‘NRA budget’ and ‘NRA staff’ refer to the 
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resources allocated to postal regulation, not the total staff or budget of the authorities 
(which in most cases regulate other sectors as well).  
In practice, the financial and personnel resources available to NRAs vary substantially 
among Member States. Part of this variation is due to differences in the sizes of postal 
markets. To provide a reasonable basis for comparison, we have divided the Member 
States into four groups: large postal markets (more than 5 percent of the combined 
EU/EEA domestic letter post market); medium-sized markets (1 to 5 percent); small 
markets (0.2 to 1 percent); and very small markets (0.2 percent or less). Figure  3-1 
illustrates this grouping of the Member States by size of postal market and the relative 
weight of each group in the total EU/EEA market. The relative weights for the each 
Member State are those set out in table 2—1. 













Very small (BG, CY, 
EE, LT, LU, LV, MT, 
IS, LI) - 0.8%
Small (CZ, EL, HU, 
IE, RO, SI, SK) - 4.6%
Large (DE, ES, FR, 
IT, NL, UK) - 77.3%
Medium (AT, BE, DK, FI, 
PL, PT, SE, NO) - 17.2%
 
 
Since it is easier to compare Member States graphically, Figure  3-2 to Figure  3-5 
present the total budget and total staff data from Table  3-11 by Member State group. 
Note that the ratio between the scale for the budget (left axis) and the scale for the total 
number of staff (right) is fixed so that the two bars are equal when the average budget 
per employee is €100,000. The scales for the last three figures are the same so that the 
resources available to medium, small, and very small Member State postal markets 
may be compared directly. 
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Large MS (more than 5 % of EU/EEA letter post market)
 
 



































Medium MS (1 to 5 % of EU/EEA letter post market)
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Small MS (0.2 to 1 % of EU/EEA letter post market)
 
 



































Very small MS (less than 0.2 % of EU/EEA letter post market)
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Overall, 20 of 30 NRAs have provided annual budgets for 2008 or 2007 (if 2008 data 
was unavailable). Six NRAs (BE, CY, DE, ES, LT, LV) reported personnel figures but 
indicated that separate budget figures were unavailable; one (NL) provided a budget but 
not personnel total. This incomplete response may imply a lack of formality in the 
regulatory apparatus of some Member States. Regulation of the postal sector does not 
appear to be the subject of a regular and explicit decision on resource allocation.  
Table  3-11 shows the average budgets and personnel figures for each group of NRAs 
based upon available data. These figures must be interpreted with caution since there 
are wide variations in NRA resources within each group. If one adopts the plausible 
assumption that the best-equipped NRAs in each size group are likely to have an 
adequate but not extravagant level of resources for postal regulation, then the average 
level of resources might be interpreted as the minimum level of resources towards 
which Member States should aim in each size group. Calculation of the average 
resources available to NRAs in each size group also makes possible a rough but 
plausible calculation of the total regulatory resources available in the EU/EEA region, 
using the assumption that each NRA which has not reported budget or staffing data has 
approximately the average budget and staff reported by other NRAs in its group, 







Economists Lawyers Consultants  
(% budget) 
Average exp  
per person 
1 4,114 43 16 2 6 9 102 
2 680 9 8 6 3 15 81 
3 965 10 9 3 1 8 85 
4 245 5 3 2 1 7 73 
 
In the first group there are six Member States with large postal markets (DE, ES, FR, IT, 
NL, UK).37 These Member States collectively account for more than 77 percent of the 
combined domestic letter post volume of the EU and EEA. Three of the NRAs have 
provided incomplete information on staffing and budgets so it is difficult to draw 
conclusions about this group as a whole. Clearly, the United Kingdom spends 
substantially more than any other Member State on postal regulation. Equally clearly, 
the budget for the Dutch NRA appears to be insufficient when compared to the budget 
of other large market Member States.38 What appears more telling, however, is that the 
                                                
 37 For ES and IT, budget and staff information relate to ‘NRAs’ that are not independent of the postal 
ministry (see section 3.2.2 below). 
 38 The budget Dutch NRA OPTA spends on postal regulation appears insufficient (see Figure  3-2 above. 
No information on the staff employed with regulation of postal services was available from OPTA: 
Based in an interview with OPTA, however, it appears that this staff is well below 10 persons, and 
many of these persons do not deal with postal regulation exclusively.  
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NRAs in both France and the UK have a high average expenditure per staff person 
(after excluding funds for consultants), between €125 and €200 thousand per year. This 
apparent investment in expert staff may account for the high level of regulatory 
sophistication exhibited by these NRAs. In contrast, the relatively low level of average 
expenditure in Italy (€54 thousand) — with only 7 professional staff members out of a 
total of 47 —suggests that the Italian NRA needs to consider retaining more expert staff 
to address the complexities of implementing the Third Postal Directive in a period of 
rapid economic change. 
In the second group there are eight Member States with medium-sized postal markets 
AT, BE, DK, FI, PL, PT, SE, NO). They comprise about 17 percent of the EU/EEA letter 
post. Among the NRAs that provided budget figures, the level of expenditure varies 
widely. The Portuguese NRA reports a substantial budget of €1.7 million. In contrast, 
the NRA of Poland has a budget of approximately €150,000. Average expenditure per 
staff person (after excluding funds for consultants) divides into two distinct groups. 
Three NRAs (PT, SE, NO) have a high expenditure per staff person, more than €80,000 
per person per year. Two other NRAs (DK, PL) expend about one eighth to one half as 
much. These NRAs employ 6 to 8 legal and economic experts in postal regulation 
(except for DK, which has two legal experts). 
In the third group there are seven Member States with small postal markets (CZ, EL, 
HU, IE, RO, SI, SK). Collectively, they account for 4.6 percent of the EU/EEA postal 
market. There is a substantial variation in resources within this group as well. The NRAs 
in Hungary and Ireland report annual budgets of €2.7 million €1.5 million, respectively, 
while the NRAs in Czech Republic, Greece, Slovakia, and Slovenia have budgets in the 
range of €150,000 to €800,000. On average, NRAs in this group employ approximately 
the same number of staff and spend about as much per employee as NRAs in the 
second group (medium-sized postal states), 
In the fourth group there are nine Member States with very small postal markets (BG, 
CY, EE, LT, LU, LV, MT, IS, LI). Collectively, they account for less than 0.8 percent of 
the EU/EEA letter post market. Annual budgets vary substantially, from a low of €51 
thousand (EE) to a high of €491 thousand (BG). These NRAs typically employ 2 or 3 
persons of which 1 or 2 have legal or economic expertise. Three NRAs, however, have 
exceptionally large staffs for this group: Bulgaria (10 persons), Lithuania (8), and Latvia 
(6 persons). Average expenditure per staff person is about €73,000 (due primarily to the 
high average expenditure in LU), about the same as for groups 2 and 3. 
This review naturally raises the question: what represents a reasonably adequate level 
of resources for NRAs? Since regulatory frameworks differ significantly among Member 
States, precise answers for each Member State are impossible. Nonetheless, some 
general observations may be offered. Overall, it appears that there are few 'economies 
of scale' in postal regulation. For Member States in groups 2, 3, and 4, the reasonable 
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and appropriate level of resources for a NRA does not seem to vary significantly by the 
size of the postal market. In each national postal market, the number and complexity of 
economic, legal, and policy issues posed by postal regulation seems about the same. 
Among these Member States, NRAs that seem to have a reasonably good level of 
resources (taking into both total resources and average resources per employee) 
include those of Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, and Norway. 
More subjectively, it seems to us these seven NRAs are also among the most effective 
regulators outside of group 1. If one takes these seven NRAs (all of whom reported both 
budget and staff figures) as representing, on average, a reasonably 'well-resourced' 
NRA, then, in all but the largest Member States, a plausible minimum annual budget for 
a NRA is, on average, about €1,182 and a plausible total number of total staff is 9.7 
persons. While a specific NRA might possibly do very well even with less than this level 
of resources, in general this appears to be a reasonable order-of-magnitude estimate of 
the minimum level of resources required to provide basic postal regulation in an 
average medium-sized or smaller state. Additional resources will likely be needed if the 
NRA is responsible for additional tasks such as adjudicating user complaints or 
enforcing the competition rules. 
In the six Member States with the largest postal markets, estimating a reasonable level 
of resources is more subjective. Only three NRAs (FR, IT, UK) have reported both 
budget and total staff figures. Of these, the Italian NRA must be ruled out as appropriate 
example of a well-resourced independent regulator because it is not independent of the 
postal ministry39 and expends relatively little per employee (suggesting a less highly 
trained staff). The remaining two NRAs — those of France and the UK —both have 
pioneered analyses of policy issues that NRAs in other Member States can build upon. 
However, they supported by very different levels of resources. The budget of the British 
NRA is more than six times that of the French NRA. Is the British government 
hopelessly extravagant when it comes to postal regulation or is the French government 
overly parsimonious? The best answer is probably 'neither'. Both NRAs are effective, 
but they have different functions. The British NRA has a substantially larger role in the 
development of postal policy than the French NRA. In particular, the British NRA has 
planned and overseen liberalisation of the national postal market. While it might be 
argued by some that the legislator has delegated to the British NRA more issues than is 
strictly necessary or appropriate for a NRA, it could also be argued that the French 
legislator has delegated too little authority to its NRA. On balance, for purposes of rough 
estimation, it does not seem implausible to consider that a well-resourced NRA in one 
of the six largest national postal markets should have available to it a budget and staff 
that lies halfway between the British and French models, i.e., a budget of about €6.7 
million and total staff of about 40.  
                                                
 39 See section 3.2.2, below. 
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These reflections imply that if all EU/EEA NRAs had adequate budgets and staff (on 
average), the total budget for postal regulation would be on the order of €68 million and 
total staff about 487 persons. This estimate implies the need for about a 75 percent 
increase in the expenditure on postal regulation, with substantially larger percentage 
increases in some smaller Member States. Keeping in mind, however, that NRAs are 
likely to be the primary instrument of government policy in the postal services market in 
the future and that the annual revenues in the current EU postal services market are 
about €94 billion euros,40 an annual expenditure of €68 million on postal regulation 
might be considered appropriate.  
For comparison, it may be noted that budget of the United States Postal Regulatory 
Commission in 2008 was approximately €8.9 million with a total staff of 70 persons. The 
volume of postal items in the United States is almost twice that in the EU/EEA area, but, 
on the other hand, U.S. legislation gives the postal regulator a substantially narrower 
regulatory mission (e.g., little or no authority over quality of service, user protection, and 
the services of private operators). The major difference between the U.S. and the 
EU/EEA area, however, is that the United States manages with only one national postal 
regulator rather than 30, and, as noted above, the size of the postal regulator is only 
very weakly related to the size of the postal market. 
Financial and staff resources available to national regulatory authorities vary 
significantly among the Member States, even if comparison is limited to those with 
postal markets of comparable size. To provide a reasonable basis for comparison of 
resources, Member States can be divided into four groups: 6 large postal markets 
(more than 5 percent of the combined EU/EEA domestic letter post market); 8 medium-
sized markets (1 to 5 percent); 7 small markets (0.2 to 1 percent); and 9 very small 
markets (less than 0.2 percent). Overall, there is a large gap between the resources of 
the large market NRAs and the resources of NRAs in medium and small markets. This 
difference suggests that the 6 largest NRAs are able to perform substantially more 
extensive analysis than other NRAs. A relatively low level of resources available to 
NRAs in very small markets suggests that they may lack the minimum tools needed to 
regulate postal markets effectively. Within groups of national postal markets of similar 
size, a significant difference among NRAs appears to be the large variation in budget 
per employee. NRAs which do not have a reasonable expenditure per employee may 
have difficulty attaining the level of expertise needed to provide effective regulation.  
In the 15 Member States with medium and small markets, well established NRAs 
appear to have roughly similar levels of resources. This convergence across a range of 
postal markets suggests that, on average, an adequate annual budget for all but the 
largest NRAs would be (again, roughly) about €1.2 million euros for a staff of 9 or 10 
                                                
 40 ITA Consulting and WIK-Consult, The Evolution of the European Postal Market Since 1997 (2009), 
section 3.1. 
60 Role of Regulators in a More Competitive Postal Market  
 Chapter 3: Implementation of the Second Postal Directive 
persons. For the six largest national postal markets (DE, ES, FR, IT, NL, UK), an even 
rougher calculation suggests that, on average, adequate resources would be on the 
order of €6.7 million in annual budget and a staff of 40. In total, these estimates suggest 
that Member States will need to increase their average expenditure on postal regulation 
substantially (very roughly by 75 percent) in order to provide NRAs with adequate 
resources to implement the Third Postal Directive. In addition, the apparent need for 
smaller NRAs to build upon techniques and analysis of larger NRAs implies the 
desirability of more cooperation among NRAs and a sharing of analytical resources.  
 
Case history  3-4: Mission and resources of Postcomm (United Kingdom) 
The Postal Services Commission (Postcomm) was set up by the Postal Services Act 2000. It 
has the status of an independent non-ministerial government department solely responsible for 
postal affairs. Postcomm is guided by three statutory objectives, in order of priority: to protect 
universal service, to foster competition, and to promote efficiency. Postcomm is required to give 
particular regard to the fulfilment of customers’ needs by operators. 
Referring to this objective, Postcomm performs the following tasks: license postal operators; 
specify, protect and refine universal service provision; control prices and compliance with 
quality of service standards of the dominant provider Royal Mail; ensure special tariffs; examine 
separation of accounts of Royal Mail; oversee network access agreements; deal with user 
complaints; execute market monitoring (Competitive Market Reviews, Business Customer 
Surveys); and advise the government on Post Office Networks. 
Decision-making follows a two-tier approach. General strategies and policies are determined on 
the basis of a consultation procedure, the presentation of decision documents, and the passage 
of legal notices and directions. Breach of licence conditions entails Postcomm’s enforcement 
action including financial penalties should the occasion arise. Decisions of the NRA do not need 
approval by the government, nor can the government suspend or withdraw decisions. 
Operators can lodge an appeal against decisions at the Court of Law. 
Postcomm is steered by a board of eight independent commissioners headed by a chairman, all 
appointed for a four-years-term. Daily management is run by a chief executive who also serves 
as a commissioner. The seven directorates of Postcomm (e.g. economic policy, regulatory 
finance, universal service and customer protection, market development) are chaired by 
directors. Financial resources are mainly filled up with fees collected from universal service 
providers and other postal operators. In 2008, the budget amounted to € 11.512 million, and 
total staff was 66. 
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Case history  3-5: Mission and resources of ARCEP (France) 
The Regulation Authority for Telecommunications (ART) was set up in January 1997. As a 
result of Law No. 2005-516 of 20 May 2005, which phased in competition in the postal market, 
ART’s mission was extended to include postal services, and it was renamed Regulation 
Authority for Electronic Communications and Posts (ARCEP). ARCEP intends to further 
liberalisation, fair and effective competition, and proper functioning of the markets to the benefit 
of users, to guarantee provision and financing of universal service, to encourage employment, 
innovation and competitiveness, and to consider the interest of regions. 
Within the postal sector, ARCEP’s assignments cover: licensing postal operators and 
implementing related rights and obligations; surveillance of separation and transparency of 
accounts (cost allocation rules, specifications for the accounting system and reporting format) of 
the universal service provider La Poste; regulation of universal service rates, control of the 
performance of the universal service provider and of the quality of universal service; disclosure 
of recommendations and opinions on the financing of universal service; prevention of cross-
subsidisation; settlement of disputes among operators (execution of contracts, monitoring of 
access agreements); handling user complaints; expression of opinions on draft legislation, 
decrees and regulations; submission of annual reports and accounts of activities to Parliament. 
ARCEP adopts decisions following consultations on draft decisions. Default on obligations can 
implicate orders and sanctions on universal service providers and other authorised operators. 
Some decisions may be appealed to the Paris Court of Appeal, the Council of State or the 
Administrative Tribunal. The NRA is structured in an Executive Board and eight divisions. The 
Executive Board defines the major policy directions, and adopts decisions and opinions; it is 
composed of a Chairman and six other members, holding a six-year non-renewable mandate. 
Divisions are managed and co-ordinated by a Director-General and two Deputy Director-
Generals. The Postal Regulation Division is composed of the units ‘Authorisations and 
Universal Service’ and ‘Tariffs and Accounting’ About 14.5 employees (in full time equivalents) 
work in the field of postal regulation out of a total staff of 165 (2007). The postal sector-related 
budget amounts to €1.908 million (2007) of the overall €44.66 million (2008). 
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Case history  3-6: Mission and resources of ANCOM (Romania) 
Regulation of the Romanian telecommunications and postal markets started with the 
establishment of the National Regulatory Authority for Communications (ANRC) in September 
2002. Competences were extended to information technologies in December 2006 (renaming to 
ANRCTI) and in 2007 to radio communications, audiovisual services and communications 
terminal equipment. With the inclusion of additional tasks in the fields of information 
technologies and internet domain names in September 2008 ANRCTI became the National 
Authority for Management and Regulation in Communications (ANCOM). ANCOM’s objective to 
oversee communications markets as to accomplish effective competition, protect end users’ 
rights and interests, ensure efficient use of scarce resources, encourage effective investment, 
and stimulate innovation. 
Assignments in the postal sector encompass: granting general authorisations (universal service 
providers and other operators); the right to designate universal service providers; monitoring 
compliance with universal service obligations (density of access points, number of clearances 
and deliveries) of Posta Romana; control of universal service rates (accessibility, transparency, 
cost-orientation, uniformity at national level); implementation of separation of financial 
statements and accounts of the universal service provider; observance of universal service 
quality standards; verification of the availability of information for users; dealing with user 
complaints; collection and analysis of statistical data; and publication of annual reports. 
Final decision making authority is vested in the President of ANCOM who is appointed by the 
President of the State on proposal of the government for six years. Decisions of ANCOM do not 
require prior approval by the postal ministry or other governmental institutions and cannot be 
suspended or withdrawn. Public consultation procedures ensure that the public can comment 
on proposed actions. Parties affected by a decision have the right to appeal to Court of Law. 
ANCOM is structured in eleven divisions (e.g. Legal Division, Economic Regulation Division, 
Enforcement Division, Technical Regulation Division), and in services directly subordinated to 
the President. The NRA is financed from public funds and fees for monitoring and for the use of 
numbering resources collected from market players. 
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3.2.3 Independence of NRAs 
Article 22 requires that NRAs be ‘legally separate from and operationally independent of 
the postal operators’. In an important decision in 2001, the Commission held that Article 
22 requires Member States to ensure ‘thanks to a proper separation of duties, that the 
tasks of economic and financial monitoring, on the one hand, and of supervision of [the 
USP], on the other, are carried out completely independently one of the other’.41 
Similarly, in 2002, the Commission warned France that it was not consistent with Article 
22 to vest in a single minister the responsibility for overseeing the state’s property 
interests in a public postal operator and its economic and financial performance and, at 
the same time, the responsibility for regulating the postal sector.42 Recital 47 of 
Directive 2008/6 re-emphasised the importance independence of the NRA: ’In 
accordance with the principle of separation of regulatory and operational functions, 
Member States should guarantee the independence of the national regulatory 
authorities, thereby ensuring the impartiality of their decisions’. 
The fundamental importance of impartiality and independence of the NRAs is described 
in the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour as follows: 
1. The official shall be impartial and independent. The official shall abstain 
from any arbitrary action adversely affecting members of the public, as well 
as from any preferential treatment on any grounds whatsoever. 
2. The conduct of the official shall never be guided by personal, family 
or national interest or by political pressure. The official shall not take part in 
a decision in which he or she, or any close member of his or her family, has 
a financial interest.43 
 
                                                
 41  Commission Decision 2002/344/EC of 23 October 2001, OJ L 120, 7 May 2002, p. 19, at paragraph 
29. 
 42 European Commission, ‘Postal services: the Commission asks France to reinforce the independence 
of its national regulatory authority for the postal sector’, IP/02/932 (6 Jun. 2002). 
 43 See European Ombudsman, The European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, Article 8, p. 13 
(2005). The code was approved by the European Parliament in 2001 for guidance of Community 
institutions and agencies. Nonetheless, it provides a definition of good administrative practice that is 
also applicable at Member State level. As European Ombudsman, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros notes in 
his introduction, ‘the Code has been taken on board by a number of Member States and candidate 
countries’. Ibid. 5. 
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Table  3-12 Organisation of the NRA 



















AT Ind Agency 3  5 yr Other Yes Other Yes 
BE Ind Agency 4 6 yr Council No Other Yes 
BG Ind Agency 5 6 yr Council No Misconduct Yes 
CY Ind Agency 1 6 yr Council Yes Misconduct Yes 
CZ Ind Agency 5 5 yr Council Yes Misconduct No 
DE Ind Agency 3 5 yr Other Yes Other  
DK Ind Agency 1 None Other No Misconduct No 
EE Ind Agency 1 None Min Post Yes Discretion Yes 
EL Ind Agency 9 4 yr Council Yes Misconduct No 
ES Min Off 1 None Min Post No Discretion Yes 
FI Ind Agency 1 None Council Yes Misconduct No 
FR Ind Agency 7 6 yr Other Yes Incapacity Yes 
HU Ind Agency 1 5 yr Council Yes Discretion Yes 
IE Ind Agency 3 4 yr Min Post Yes Misconduct Yes 
IT Minister  5 yr Council No Other  
LT Ind Agency 7 5 yr Other ??  No 
LU Ind Agency 3 5 yr Other Yes Misconduct No 
LV Ind Agency 5 5 yr Parl. No Other Yes 
MT Ind Agency 7 3 yr Min Post No Misconduct Yes 
NL Ind Agency 4 4 yr Min Post No Misconduct No 
PL Ind Agency 1 5 yr Council Yes  Yes 
PT Ind Agency 5 5 yr Council Yes Misconduct Yes 
RO Ind Agency 1 6 yr Other Yes Other Yes 
SE Ind Agency 8 1 yr Council No Misconduct No 
SI Ind Agency 10 5 yr Council Yes Misconduct No 
SK Ind Agency 1 6 yr Parl. No Misconduct Yes 
UK Ind Agency 8 4 yr Min Post Yes Misconduct Yes 
IS Ind Agency 1 5 yr Min Post No Misconduct No 
NO Ind Agency 1 None Min Post No Misconduct No 
Type of NRA head: Minister = A minister; Min Off = Director of an office within a ministry; Min Agency = One or more persons who are the 
head of an independent agency within a ministry; Ind Agency = One or more persons who are the head of an independent agency not within 
a ministry; ?? = Unknown. No information about law or practice; Other = Other. 
Who appoints NRA heads?: Min Post = Postal Minister or ministry staff; Min Oth = Ministry other than the postal ministry; Council = Council 
of Ministers or Prime Minister; Parl = Parliament; Other = Other. In this column, NRAs specified the 'other' bodies appointing NRA heads as 
follows. AT: 'Austrian federal government'. DK; no answer. FR: 'The president by decree after consultation of committees from the 
Parliament. Two members by decree. Two by the president of the national assembly. Two by the president of the Senate'. LT: ' The 
President'. LU: ' Grand-Duc as proposed by Communications Minister'. RO: ' The President of Romania, acting from a proposal of the 
Government'. 
 
Impartiality and independence are intangible qualities that do not necessary require — 
and are not necessarily guaranteed by — any specific organisational arrangement. 
Nonetheless, Member States can take several organisational steps to foster the 
independence and impartiality of NRAs. For example, the person or persons at the 
head of an independent NRA should be not appointed or subject to removal by a 
minister who is also responsible for overseeing the operations of a public postal 
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operator by, for example, appointing its directors or approving investments. Nor should 
the minister responsible for the public postal operator hold the purse strings of the NRA 
or exercise appeal authority over decisions of the NRA. If the state has an ownership 
interest in a public postal operator, then the regulator needs judicial-like independence 
from the government. The head of an independent NRA, or the members of a 
committee that serves as the head, should meet minimum qualifications of professional 
competence. The head or heads of the NRA should hold office for a fixed term of 
several years and enjoy legal protection against dismissal without good cause. All 
things being equal, an NRA headed by a multi-member committee — like a court 
composed of several judges — will be more stable and independent than a single chief 
regulator. Top officials of a NRA should not be permitted to work for the public postal 
operator or other interested parties immediately after serving with the NRA, lest they be 
tempted to make decisions that will benefit future employers.  
The organisation of NRAs is summarised in Table  3-12. This table should be read in 
conjunction with the following table, which summarises the government's role in 
managing the public postal operator, if any. 
In the first table, there are several possible questions about the independence and 
impartiality of the NRA. For example, in some Member States the NRA is an official 
within the postal ministry (ES, IT). Such an arrangement does not appear to meet the 
basic standard of independence required by Article 22. In several cases, NRAs do not 
have fixed terms of office of sufficient length to suggest independence, say, 3 years 
(DK, EE, ES, FI, SE, NO) or can be dismissed without cause (EE, ES, HU). In several 
cases, the heads of the NRA are appointed by the same minister that oversees the 
conduct of postal policy (EE, ES, IE, MT, NL, UK, IS, NO). In four of these countries (IE, 
UK, IS, NO), the same minister appoints both the heads of the NRA and the directors of 
the public postal operator.44 
Table  3-13 summarises responses to specific questions about the authority of the 
government to review or ‘guide’ decisions of the NRA or control its budget. As this table 
shows, NRAs in some Member States are not wholly free from guidance by the 
government (DE, NO) or government review (EL, IE, MT, PT, SK) or suspension (BE, 
EL, SI, NO) of their decisions. In several cases, the postal ministry must approve the 
budget of the NRA (EE, MT, NL, PT, SE).  
                                                
 44 See section 3.1.4 (rights of ownership), above. 
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Table  3-13 Government supervision of NRA 
 Can Govt 









NRA in same 






AT No No No No A Parl. 
BE No No Yes No E Other 
BG No No No Yes DE Parl. 
CY No No No No CDEF Parl. 
CZ No No No No A Parl. 
DE Yes No  No A Parl. 
DK No No No No A Parl. 
EE No No No No A Min Post 
EL No Yes Yes No DE Other 
ES Yes Yes  Yes A Parl. 
FI Yes No No No C Parl. 
FR No No No No A Parl. 
HU No No No No CDE Parl. 
IE No Yes No No D Other 
IT    Yes AE Parl. 
LT No No No No DE Parl. 
LU No No No No B Council 
LV No No No No F Parl. 
MT ?? Yes No No AD Min Post 
NL  No No  CD Min Post 
PL No No No No A Parl. 
PT No Yes No No CDEF Min Post 
RO No No No No DE Parl. 
SE Yes No  No AD Min Post 
SI No No Yes No CDEF Council 
SK No Yes No No A Parl. 
UK  No No  CD Min Other 
IS No No No No DE Parl. 
NO Yes No Yes No CD Parl. 
Source of NRA finances: (A) General budget of the State or government; (B) Funds from the postal ministry; (C) Fees collected from the 
National USP; (D) Fees collected from postal operators generally; (E) Fees collected from non-postal operators (e.g., telecomm); (F) 
Other; ?? = Unknown. No information about law or practice. 
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Independence and impartiality of the NRAs are central to implementation of the Second 
Postal Directive and even more so to implementation of the Third Postal Directive. In 
several cases, Member States could do more to ensure institutional separation between 
the NRA and agencies of government which are responsible for the conduct of national 
postal policy and the commercial success of the USP. Of special concern are situations 
where the NRA is an official within the postal ministry rather than an independent 
agency, where the heads of the NRA which do not have fixed terms of office or 
sufficient length to suggest independence, and where the same minister appoints both 
the heads of the NRA and the directors of the public postal operator. 
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Case history  3-7: Independence and institutional set-up of Bundesnetzagentur 
(Germany) 
The German postal regulator was established in January 1998 as the Regulatory Authority for 
Telecommunications and Post (RegTP). Taking charge of the regulation of energy networks 
and railway infrastructure in July 2005, RegTP was renamed Federal Network Agency for 
Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railway (Bundesnetzagentur, BNetzA). BNetzA 
is a separate federal authority within the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. 
Regulation aims to promote working competition and development of markets and secure the 
provision of universal service. 
In order to implement these goals in the postal sector, BNetzA is entrusted with the following 
tasks: granting licences; processing service notifications; market definition and determination of 
market dominance; approval or review of prices and terms of business; imposition of universal 
service obligations; control of universal service quality standards; implementation of separation 
of cost accounting of market dominant service providers; guarantee of access to postal services 
and infrastructure; dispute resolution and dealing with user complaints; enforcement of data 
protection and secrecy of post; monitoring postal markets. 
Decision-making rests upon collected information and investigations. Regulatory decisions are 
made by ruling chambers (except for the railway sector). Affected operators have the right to 
participate, and business representatives can be summoned. BNetzA can urge companies to 
remedy misconduct, and has the right to impose sanctions. The government is not entitled to 
interfere in single decisions. Affected parties have the opportunity to challenge decisions before 
administrative courts (telecommunications and postal matters). Administrative decisions are 
made by the President of BNetzA. 
The President and the two Vice Presidents are appointed by the Council of Ministers (of the 
federal government) for five-year terms. Authority is divided among nine departments (with the 
six units of Department 3 responsible for postal regulation) and nine ruling chambers (with 
Ruling Chamber 5 responsible for postal services). BNetzA is funded from the federal budget 
and from fees. Forty eight of about 2,500 employees (2008) are occupied with postal affairs. 
 
 Role of Regulators in a More Competitive Postal Market 69 
 Chapter 3: Implementation of the Second Postal Directive 
Case history  3-8: Independence and institutional set-up of TKKP and RTR-GmbH 
(Austria) 
Regulation of the Austrian postal market is carried out by the Board of Postal Regulation of 
Telekom-Control Commission (TKKP) and the Regulatory Authority for Broadcasting and 
Telecommunications (RTR-GmbH). Working in close co-operation, both institutions have the 
mission to ensure sustainable competition, and to achieve satisfactory provision of services at 
affordable prices. 
Telekom-Control Commission (TKK) is a regulatory panel with powers of a court which has 
overseen telecommunications since 1997 (e.g. market access, approval of prices and general 
terms of business, frequency allocation, electronic signatures). As of 1 January 2008, TKKP 
was created as a second committee within TKK and became responsible for specific matters 
related to postal services. TKKP approves tariffs and general terms of business of reserved 
services, reviews universal service tariffs not subject to approval, and takes supervisory 
measures with respect to universal service provision (e.g., service coverage, quality standards). 
Each committee consists of three members and three alternate members appointed by the 
federal government for a five-year terms. Each committee is headed by a chairperson who must 
be an appointed judge. In addition, one member of TKKP must have expertise in the field of 
postal services. TKK and TKKP are not bound by instructions but decisions can be contested 
by filing complaints with high courts. 
As successor to Telekom-Control GmbH, the government-owned company RTR-GmbH was 
established on 1 April 2001. It provides management operations for TKK and TKKP, and 
prepares decisions in all jurisdictions of TKKP. RTR-GmbH has direct responsibility for service 
notification, alternative conflict resolution and dispute settlement for retail customers 
(telecommunications and postal services). 
Complaints against decisions of RTR-GmbH can be submitted to high courts. RTR-GmbH 
consists of a Supervisory Board and two divisions (telecommunications, broadcasting) chaired 
by managing directors. The authority has approximately 100 employees. It is financed with fees 
from market participants (telecommunications and broadcasting regulation, collecting services) 
and funds from the federal budget (telecommunications, postal and broadcasting regulation; 
electronic signatures; Digitisation and Television Funds). Resources from the federal budget 
amount to € 2.75 million while contributions can total up to € 8.25 million. 
It appears that RTR-GmbH did not dispose of any permanent budget for postal regulation since 
RTR was allocated authority for the postal sector in 2008. The procedure to funding RTR’s 
postal activities is expected to change during a current legislative project. 
70 Role of Regulators in a More Competitive Postal Market  
 Chapter 3: Implementation of the Second Postal Directive 
3.2.4 Access to information and enforce orders 
The Third Postal Directive added Article 22a which requires Member States to ensure 
that the NRA has access to information from ‘postal services providers’ that may be 
necessary to (1) to ensure conformity with the provisions of, or decisions made in 
accordance with this Directive and (2) for clearly defined statistical purposes. However, 
the need to ensure access to adequate regulatory information is already implied in the 
Second Postal Directive, since effective regulation depends upon access to such 
information. Table  3-14 presents the results of a series of questions addressed to NRAs 
about their ability to obtain the information needed to regulate. 
Table  3-14 NRA authority to gather information  






NRA sets form 








Court orders sought 
since 1.1.2006  
re data? 
AT No No No No No No 
BE Yes No Yes Yes No  
BG Yes Yes Yes    
CY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
CZ No Yes Yes Yes No No 
DE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
DK Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
EE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
EL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
ES Yes No   No  
FI Yes No Yes Yes   
FR No No Yes Yes No No 
HU Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
IE Yes No  Yes  No 
IT No Yes Yes  No  
LT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
LU Yes No No Yes No No 
LV Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
MT Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
NL No Yes   No  
PL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
PT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
RO Yes Yes Yes Yes No  
SE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
SI Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
SK Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
UK Yes Yes Yes Yes No  
IS Yes Yes Yes Yes No  
NO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
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This table suggests that NRAs generally have sufficient authority to compel the 
production data needed to regulate the accounts of designated USPs. All but five NRAs 
(AT, CZ, FR, IT, NL) confirmed that they have adequate information to ensure 
compliance with Postal Directive. Most of the NRAs who responded negatively cited 
only a lack of authority to compel necessary information from postal operators other 
than designed USPs. The exceptions, therefore, are relatively minor since all Member 
States today rely upon designated USPs to ensure universal service. 
The last two columns in Table  3-14 indicate whether the NRA has taken action to 
enforce orders for information since the beginning of 2006. Ten NRAs (CY, DE, EE, EL, 
HU, LT, PL, PT, SK, NO) have levied fines for failure to comply with information 
requests. In addition, the NRA in Slovakia has sought a court order to enforce an 
information request.  
Although authority to ensure implementation of the Postal Directive is, in principle, all of 
the authority that NRAs need, we asked several closely related questions in order to 
clarify the extent of the information collection powers of the NRAs. First, we asked 
whether the NRA is able to obtain statistical information from all postal operators:45 The 
Third Postal Directive explicitly requires Member States to give such authority to NRAs, 
but most NRAs agreed that they have such authority under current law. Some, 
however, indicated that they lacked such authority (AT, BE, ES, FI, FR, IE, LU). We 
also asked whether the NRA could ‘establish the level of detail required and deadlines 
for submission’. Here the NRAs in Austria and Luxembourg indicated that they lacked 
such authority, while others (ES, IE, NL) failed to confirm it. Then we asked whether the 
NRA is authorised ‘to require the USP(s) to collect data, establish accounts, and/or 
prepare studies where such information is not normally produced but where the NRA 
considers such information required to ensure compliance with the Postal Directive and 
decisions of the NRA implementing this directive'. In short, can the NRA not only 
compel postal operators to produce information in the level of detail determined 
necessary by the NRA but also require a postal operator to develop new studies and 
data collection systems. Here again, almost all NRAs confirmed such authority.  
As discussed below, while NRAs report adequate authority to obtain necessary 
information, they often appear to lack the data required to answer key issues of 
accounting and price regulation. For example, one question asked NRAs to rate the 
sufficiency of accounting data available to them on a scale of 1 to 10.46 Only twelve 
                                                
 45 Questionnaire 201-21 (‘Are all providers of postal services legally obliged to provide the NRA with 
operational and financial information which, in the judgement of the NRA, is required to for statistical 
purposes which have been clearly defined by the NRA?’). 
 46 Questionnaire 253-70 (‘In your view, based on current knowledge, to what extent does the quality of 
available data give the NRA sufficiently reliable information to ensure conformity with the provisions 
of, or decisions made in accordance with, the Postal Directive? Please rate on a scale of 1 to 10 
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NRAs were able to answer this question, and the average level of confidence among 
those that responded was only 6.75 out of 10. Another question asked whether the NRA 
has sufficient information to determine what percent of the costs incurred by the USP(s) 
in the provision of universal services are common costs that cannot be allocated to 
specific products?47 Identification of such costs would seem to be an inevitable result of 
any basic regulatory accounting system. Yet more than one third of NRAs answered 
this question in the negative, and another third provided no answer.  
NRAs generally affirm that they possess adequate authority to require information from 
postal operators, at least from USPs, but they may not have a clear idea about what 
information is required to enforce the Postal Directive. 
3.2.5 Enforcement authority 
Since the Postal Directive provides that the NRA shall be responsible for ‘ensuring 
compliance with the obligations arising from this Directive’, it implies that NRAs should 
be vested with appropriate enforcement authority. The enforcement authority of NRAs is 
summarised in Table  3-15, above. This table refers to enforcement measures in 
addition to authority to enforce questions for information.48 
                                                                                                                                             
where 1 represents no information and 10 represents a complete set of the information needed to 
ensure full compliance with Postal Directive’). 
 47 Questionnaire 253-40 (‘For the most recently available annual accounting period, does the NRA have 
sufficient information to determine what percent of the costs incurred by the USP(s) in the provision of 
universal services may be appropriately allocated according to the provisions of Article 14(3)(b)(iii) of 
the Postal Directive (common costs that cannot be allocated)?’). 
 48 See also section 3.8.2 on authority of NRAs to order remedies for user complaints. 
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Table  3-15 Enforcement authority of NRA 
 NRA can fine operators  
for non-compliance? 
Fines since 1.1.2006 
for not compliance? 
NRA can seek court 
order? 
Court orders sought 
since 1.1.2006? 
AT No No No No 
BE Yes No   
BG Yes  No  
CY Yes Yes No No 
CZ Yes Yes No No 
DE Yes No No No 
DK Yes No Yes No 
EE Yes Yes No No 
EL Yes Yes No No 
ES Yes  Yes  
FI No  No  
FR Yes No No No 
HU Yes Yes No No 
IE No  Yes No 
IT Yes No   
LT Yes Yes Yes No 
LU Yes No No No 
LV Yes No Yes No 
MT Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NL Yes No No  
PL Yes Yes No No 
PT Yes No No No 
RO Yes Yes No  
SE Yes No No No 
SI Yes Yes No No 
SK Yes Yes No Yes 
UK Yes Yes   
IS Yes No No  
NO Yes Yes Yes No 
 
From this table it appears that almost all NRAs (except AT, IE, FI) can levy fines for 
failure to comply with orders. Several NRAs have actually used this authority since the 
start of 2006. Several NRAs (DK, ES, IE, LT, LV, MT, NO) can request a court to issue 
an order to enforce their decisions.  
NRAs appear to have reasonably adequate authority to enforce their orders by means 
of fines or court orders, although in some cases limits on the level of fines may undercut 
the effectiveness of the NRA’s orders. 
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3.2.6 Procedures, transparency, and appeals 
In evaluating ‘best practices’ among NRAs, this study must consider the procedures of 
NRAs as well as their substantive decisions. A basic objective of the Postal Directive is 
to require an appropriate level of transparency in the regulation of postal markets. To 
fulfil this objective NRAs themselves need to operate with an appropriate degree of 
transparency and due regard for the rights of affected parties. One standard for good 
administrative practice is The European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour 
(CGAB) issued by the European Ombudsman (see section 3.2.2, above). 



























AT No No No No No No No 
BE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
BG  Yes   Yes   
CY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CZ Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DE  Yes Yes Yes No   
DK Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
EE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EL  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ES ?? Other No No   Yes 
FI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FR No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HU Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IE Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
IT  No No No No  No 
LT ?? Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
LU ?? No No No No No No 
LV ?? No No No No No  
MT  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
NL  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PT  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RO No Yes No No No No No 
SE ??       
SI ?? Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
SK  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
UK ?? Yes Yes ?? Yes Yes Yes 
IS Yes No No No No No No 
NO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
?? = Unknown. No information about law or practice 
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Without attempting a comprehensive checklist of good administrative procedures, this 
survey asked NRAs to provide information on several indicators of good administrative 
practice and procedure. Their answers are summarised in Table  3-16. 
From this table it appears that most NRAs do not comply with, or are unfamiliar with, the 
European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour. The results are more mixed with 
respect to the use of selected procedures usually considered appropriate administrative 
practice. For example, several NRAs have not adopted procedures to ensure that 
affected parties and members of the general public have an opportunity to comment on 
proposed actions before the NRA takes them. Or to provide that all parties are treated 
in a non-discriminatory manner. Or to ensure that commenters have access to 
information necessary to make comments. Or to ensure decisions will restrict the rights 
of citizens as little as possible. Or that parties will be provided a written justification for 
any decision taken. While the record of NRAs overall appears commendable, there 
seems to be room for improvement, especially in the case of NRAs that answered such 
questions in the negative or failed to provide answers. 
Another element of good administrative procedure is transparency, that is, keeping the 
public informed about the rules and regulations affecting the postal sector. In the 
Information Age, public notice is almost synonymous with posting on the Internet. 
Almost all NRAs place copies of the postal laws and regulations on the Internet 
(exceptions: LU, NL). Most, but not all, also post copies of decisions taken by the NRA 
(exceptions: AT, DE, DK, EE, EL, PL, SI, SK). While most NRAs publish annual reports, 
some (DK, ES, FI, HU, IT, LU, LV, NO) do not.49  
Finally, good procedure includes a right to appeal the decision of an NRA to an impartial 
body. While the Second Postal Directive did not specifically require Member States to 
ensure a right of appeal, the Third Postal Directive does. The present status of the right 
to appeal the decision of the NRA is summarised in Table  3-17. 
                                                
 49 Questionnaire 201-36, 201-53 to 201-57. 
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Table  3-17 Appeal from NRA decisions 
 Right of appeal 
from NRA 
ensured? 









Number of NRA 
decisions 
reversed? 
AT Yes Court Yes 1 0  
BE Yes Court Yes 4  
BG Yes Court Yes   
CY Yes Court No 39  
CZ Yes Court Yes 12 2 
DE Yes Court Yes  6 
DK No     
EE Yes Court Yes 2 1 
EL Yes Court Yes   
ES Yes Court Yes   
FI Yes Court No 4  
FR Yes Court No   
HU Yes Court Yes 17 2 
IE Yes Court No 2  
IT Yes Court Yes   
LT Yes Court Yes 5 3 
LU Yes Other Yes 0 0 
LV Yes Court Yes 0 0 
MT Yes App Bd Yes 4 1 
NL Yes Court Yes 2 1 
PL Yes Court Yes 6 1 
PT Yes Court Yes 3 2 
RO Yes Court Yes 1 0 
SE Yes Court Yes 10 0 
SI Yes Court Yes 9 0 
SK Yes Court Yes 1 0 
UK Yes Court Yes 4 2 
IS Yes App Bd Yes 6 1 
NO Yes Min Post Yes 1 1 
To whom is NRA decision appealed?: Court = Court of law; Min Post = Postal Minister or ministry staff; Min Oth = Ministry other than the 
postal ministry; Council = Council of Ministers or Prime Minister; App Bd = Specialized board of appeals; Other = Other. 
 
Almost all Member States provide that a party may appeal a decision of the NRA to the 
courts. The exceptions are Denmark, which does not permit appeal; Malta and Iceland, 
which have established special boards for appeals from the NRA, and Norway, which 
provides for appeal to the postal minister (except in cases involving competitive issues, 
which are appealable to minister for public administration). The last two columns in 
Table  3-17 show the number of cases appealed and the number of cases reversed on 
appeal. From these columns, it appears that in most Member States appellate review is 
genuine and effective.  
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While the overall record of NRAs with respect to administrative procedure appears 
commendable, there seems to be significant room for improvement. Most NRAs do not 
comply with, or at are unfamiliar with, the European Code of Good Administrative 
Behaviour. In general, greater attention to sound administrative procedure seems to be 
in order. On the other hand, almost all Member States provide an effective means to 
appeal a decision of the NRA even though not specifically required by the Second 
Postal Directive.  
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3.3 Universal service obligation  
As described in chapter 2, the Postal Directive requires Member States to ensure that 
users enjoy the right to a ‘universal postal service’, i.e., a continuous, affordable, 
nationwide, postal service of specified quality. While Member States have some 
flexibility concerning which types of services are provided as part of the universal 
service, they must regulate the universal service so that certain criteria are met with 
respect to access, collection and delivery, and quality of service. Under the Second 
Postal Directive, a Member State is obliged to ensure universal service and to notify the 
Commission of the identify of one or more postal operators designated as ‘universal 
service providers’ (USPs). 
3.3.1 Designation of universal service providers 
Article 4 of the Second Postal Directive requires Member States to designate one or 
more postal operators as universal service provider(s). In 2008, all Member States 
except Germany have designated a single postal operator — the public postal operator 
or its successor — as the sole universal service provider for the entire national territory. 
Under the German postal law, the NRA is not required to designate a universal service 
provider unless it determines that ‘a universal service is not being appropriately or 
adequately provided or where there is reason to believe that such will be the case’.50 
The German NRA has not found it necessary to designate a USP for such purposes. 
All Member States except Germany have designated the public postal operator or its 
successor as the universal service provider. Germany has not designated a universal 
service provider. 
                                                
 50 Germany, Post Law, Article 13(1). 
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3.3.2 Access facilities 
The Postal Directive gives Member States substantial discretion to determine the 
appropriate level of facilities required to access to the universal service. Article 3 states 
Member States must ensure that ‘density of the points of contact and of the access 
points takes account of the needs of users'. Facilities permitting access to the postal 
system include postal outlets and public collection boxes.  
Postal outlets are ‘post offices’ operated by USP employees and ‘postal agencies’ 
operated by contractors. Table  3-18 summarises the requirements relating to the post 
offices and postal outlets. In this table, column 2 refers to the number of postal outlets 
implied by a requirement to have a certain density of access points, such as one outlet 
per town or one outlet for certain number of residents or one outlet within a certain 
distance of every household.  
Table  3-18 shows both the restrictions and flexibilities of the access requirements of the 
Postal Directive. The density of postal outlets varies substantially, from one postal outlet 
per 671 persons in Finland to one per 15,645 persons in Denmark. For those NRAs that 
answered this question, the average was one outlet per 6,383 persons.51 Most USPs 
can convert from a post office to postal agency without approval of the NRA. In some 
Member States, however, there is a minimum number of post offices that must be 
operated by the USP. In most Member States, the USP must obtain approval of the 
NRA before it can close a postal outlet or post office. 
                                                
 51 Population estimates from Eurostat for 1 January 2008 were used to calculate the figures in this 
paragraph. 
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Table  3-18 Postal outlets and offices required by USO 
 Min. number of 
postal outlets 
required 
Min. no. of 
outlets req'd 
by density 
Min. number of 
post offices 
req'd 
USP may convert 








AT   No Yes Yes 
BE 1300 1300 589  No No 
BG   Yes No Yes 
CY      
CZ   Yes No No 
DE 12000  Yes No No 
DK 350 350 Yes No No 
EE  325 Yes Yes Yes 
EL   Yes No No 
ES      
FI  7900 332 Yes No No 
FR  12000 Yes No No 
HU  3100 Yes No No 
IE  600 Yes No No 
IT     Yes 
LT  950 Yes No No 
LU      
LV      
MT 59 59 Yes No No 
NL 2000  Yes   
PL 8240 8240 8240 Yes No No 
PT   Yes No No 
RO      
SE   Yes No No 
SI  558 Yes Yes Yes 
SK   No Yes Yes 
UK     No 
IS   No Yes Yes 
NO 430 430 Yes No No 
 
Most Member States also require a minimum density of public collection boxes. While 
the requirement varies, the most common formula is to require a collection box within 
500 to 1,000 meters of each household. Only a few NRAs could translate this 
requirement into a specific number of collection boxes, usually about one collection box 
for every 600 to 1,200 persons (HU, IE, LT, SI), although Norway requires a collection 
box for every 185 persons.  
Pursuant to the access requirements of the Postal Directive, Member States require a 
minimum density of postal outlets (post offices or postal agencies) and public collection 
boxes, but requirements vary substantially among Member States. Member States 
typically allow the USP to convert a post office to a postal agency without approval of 
the NRA, but most Member States require NRA approval before closure of postal outlet. 
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3.3.3 Collection and delivery 
Table  3-19 USO delivery requirements 




























AT 5/wk 0 Yes ?? 5/wk  0 20 kg 
BE 5/wk 0 Yes No 5/wk Free 0 20 kg 
BG   No Yes  Pickup  30 kg 
CY 5/wk    5/wk Free   
CZ 5/wk 0 No No 5/wk Free 0 30 kg 
DE 6/wk 0 No No 6/wk Free 0 20 kg 
DK 6/wk 0.01 Yes Yes 5/wk Free 0.05 20 kg 
EE 5/wk 0 Yes Yes 5/wk Free 0 20 kg 
EL 5/wk 7 No No None Pickup  20 kg 
ES 5/wk 0 Yes Yes 5/wk Pickup 0 20 kg 
FI 5/wk  Yes Yes 5/wk Pickup  30 kg 
FR 6/wk  Yes Yes 6/wk Free  20 kg 
HU 5/wk 0 No No 5/wk Free 0 20 kg 
IE 5/wk 0.2 No No 5/wk Free 0.2 20 kg 
IT 6/wk 0 No No 6/wk Free 0 20 kg 
LT 5/wk 0 Yes Yes 5/wk Free  20 kg 
LU 5/wk 1 Yes ?? 5/wk Free 1 20 kg 
LV Other 0.9 Yes Yes Other Pickup  20 kg 
MT 6/wk 0 No No 6/wk Free 0 20 kg 
NL   Yes  None Free  20 kg 
PL 5/wk  Yes Yes 5/wk   20 kg 
PT 5/wk  No No 5/wk Pickup  20 kg 
RO 5/wk  Yes Yes 5/wk Pickup  20 kg 
SE 5/wk 0 Yes Yes 5/wk Pickup  20 kg 
SI 5/wk 0 Yes No 5/wk Free 0 20 kg 
SK 5/wk 0.3 No No 5/wk Pickup 0.3 20 kg 
UK 6/wk  No No 5/wk Free  20 kg 
IS 5/wk 0.125 Yes Yes 5/wk Free 0 20 kg 
NO 6/wk 1 Yes Yes 6/wk Free 0 20 kg 
Parcels: type of delivery required: Free = Parcels must be delivered without charge to addressee; Charge = Parcels must be delivered to addressee 
for appropriate charge to addressee; Pickup = Parcels required only to be held at postal outlet nearest addressee; Other = Other; ?? = Unknown. No 
information about law or practice. 
 
In contrast to flexible access requirements, collection and delivery requirements in the 
Postal Directive are specific. Each Member State is obliged to ensure at least each 
working day, not less than five working days a week, one collection and one delivery ‘to 
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the home or premises of every natural or legal person or, by way of derogation, under 
conditions at the discretion of the national regulatory authority, one delivery to 
appropriate installations’ except ‘in circumstances or geographical conditions deemed 
exceptional’.52 Table  3-19 summarises the delivery requirements in the Member States.  
As this table shows, only 7 Member States (DE, DK, FR, IT, MT, UK, NO) require 
delivery of letter post items six days per week. This is, however, the majority rule since 
these states account for almost 70 percent of the letter post volume in the EU/EEA 
postal market. Other Member States ensure five deliveries per week. Only one Member 
State, Greece, excepts a significant portion of population (7 percent) from the required 
delivery frequency, making use of the possibility to reduce standards for universal 
service in exceptional geographies (allowed under Article 3(3) of the Postal Directive). 
Most Member States permit delivery to a private box located on a public road, and 
almost half permit delivery to a neighbourhood ‘cluster box’ or centralized facility that 
includes many delivery boxes together.  
Parcel delivery is not as prevalent as letter post delivery. Only five Member States (DE, 
FR, IT, MT, NO) require delivery of parcels six days per week (46 percent of the 
EU/EEA market). In nine Member States (BG, EL, ES, FI, LV, PT, RO, SE, SK), 
14 percent of the EU/EEA market, parcels are not routinely delivered to the addressee’s 
residence but must be collected by the addressee from the nearest post office.53 
In most of the EU/EEA postal market (weighing Member States by postal volume), letter 
post items are required to be delivered six days week, although a majority of Member 
States only require five day delivery. Parcels must be delivered six days per week in 
five Member States, accounting for a little less than half of the EU/EEA market. In a 
significant portion of the market (9 Member States and 14 percent of the market), 
parcels are not routinely delivered to addressees but must be collected from the nearest 
postal outlet. 
                                                
 52 Second Postal Directive, Article 3(3). 
 53 In Slovakia, there is no legal requirement for delivery of parcels, but in urban areas parcels are usually 
delivered to the addressee, while in rural areas parcels are held at the postal outlet. 
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3.3.4 Quality of service standards and monitoring at national level 
Article 16 of the Second Postal Directive requires Member States to establish quality of 
service standards. In particular, routing time targets must be established for national 
universal postal services. Actual performance must be monitored and published. 
Independent performance monitoring shall be carried out at least once a 
year by external bodies having no links with the universal service providers 
under standardised conditions to be specified in accordance with the 
regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 21(2) and shall be 
the subject of reports published at least once a year.54 
Under Article 17, NRAs shall ensure that ‘the results are justified, and that corrective 
action is taken where necessary’. 
Table  3-20 summarises the regulation of quality of service in the Member States. The 
table is overlaid with the shading from table 2-3 that indicates whether the service is 
ensured as a universal service.55 Light gray or red shading indicates that the service is 
ensured as a universal service. Dark gray or dark green shading indicates that it is not 
ensured as a universal service. And medium gray or light green indicates that service 
was not confirmed as an ensured universal service by the NRA and therefore probably 
is not ensured as a universal service. 
Virtually all Member States set quality of service for basic letter post or at least for the 
letters in the basic letter post. Only slightly more than half of the Member States (16) set 
quality of service for basic parcel post service even though this is considered a 
universal service in all Member States. A minority of Member States set quality of 
service standards for bulk mail services, services which are not considered universal 
services in some Member States. 
In this table, discrepancies between the shading and the answers regarding quality of 
service regulation are notable. In some cases, Member States impose quality of service 
even though the service is not ensured as a universal service. For example, Sweden 
and Norway do not require their USPs to provide a discounted service for bulk letters, 
but if the USP chooses to offer this service, then the NRA regulates its quality of 
service. On the other hand, France apparently requires its USP to provide discounted 
services for bulk letters and direct mail but does not regulate the quality of service.  
                                                
 54 Second Postal Directive, Article 16. 
 55 See section 2.3 above. 
84 Role of Regulators in a More Competitive Postal Market  
 Chapter 3: Implementation of the Second Postal Directive 











AT Yes         Yes   
BE Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BG Yes     No Yes Yes   
CY               
CZ Yes         No   
DE Yes Other Other Yes   Yes   
DK Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EE Other No No No No No No 
EL Yes No No No No No   
ES Yes Yes   No   Yes Yes 
FI Yes No No No No No No 
FR Yes No No Yes No No No 
HU Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IE Yes Yes No No   No   
IT Yes Yes No No   Yes   
LT Yes No     No No   
LU Yes R/L No No   Yes No 
LV R/L R/L     R/L No No 
MT Yes   Yes     Yes   
NL Yes No No No No No No 
PL Yes       Yes Yes   
PT Yes   No Yes Yes Yes   
RO Other Yes   Other No No   
SE Other Yes No No No No No 
SI Yes Yes No No No Yes No 
SK R/L No No No R/L Yes   
UK Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
IS Yes Yes Yes No   No   
NO R/L R/L Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Key to shading: light gray (red) = ensured as a universal service; medium gray (light green) = not confirmed as an ensured universal 
service by NRA; dark gray (dark green) = not ensured as a universal service. 
 
Methods of quality of service regulation may not meet the standards of Articles 16 and 
17 in all cases. As Table  3-20 shows, while most NRAs (19) monitor quality of service of 
each universal service at least annually, 9 NRAs (DE, FI, IT, LU, LV, PL, RO, SI, SK), 
representing almost one-third of the EU/EEA postal market do not do so. Although the 
Postal Directive requires that quality of service monitoring be performed by external 
bodies having ‘no links with the universal service providers, in most cases, it appears 
that quality of service is measured by an independent consultant retained by the USP 
(‘USP cslt’). Only in a handful of cases (ES, IE, IT, LV, PL) is performance monitoring 
performed by the NRA or a consultant retained by the NRA (‘NRA cslt’). Even though 
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NRAs are responsible for ensuring the corrective is taken, it appears that several NRAs 
cannot effectively penalize the USP for failure to meet quality of service targets.56 
























AT         
BE Yes USP cslt Yes Yes Yes 5 Yes Yes 
BG Yes  Yes Yes Yes 7 No No 
CY Yes Other     Yes No 
CZ Yes USP cslt Yes Yes Yes 4 Yes No 
DE No Other Yes Yes No  No Yes 
DK Yes USP cslt Yes Yes Yes 2 No Yes 
EE Yes USP cslt No No Yes 4 Yes Yes 
EL Yes Other Yes Yes Yes 3 No Yes 
ES Yes NRA Cslt Yes Yes Yes  Yes No 
FI No USP cslt No Yes Yes 4 No Yes 
FR Yes USP cslt Yes Yes Yes 3 Yes Yes 
HU Yes USP cslt Yes Yes Yes 8 Yes Yes 
IE Yes NRA Cslt Yes Yes Yes 3 No Yes 
IT No NRA Cslt Yes No Yes 6 Yes No 
LT Yes USP cslt Yes Yes   Yes No 
LU No USP cslt  Yes No 4 No Yes 
LV No NRA ?? Yes No 3 Yes Yes 
MT Yes USP cslt Yes Yes Yes 3 Yes Yes 
NL Yes USP cslt Yes No Yes  Yes ?? 
PL No NRA Cslt Yes Yes Yes 5 No Yes 
PT Yes  Yes Yes Yes 3 Yes  
RO No USP cslt Yes No No 5 Yes No 
SE Yes USP cslt Yes No Yes 4 Yes Yes 
SI No USP cslt Yes Yes Yes 5 Yes No 
SK No USP cslt Yes Yes Yes 5 Yes Yes 
UK Yes USP cslt  No Yes 3 Yes Yes 
IS Yes USP cslt Yes Yes Yes 6 No No 
NO Yes USP cslt Yes Yes Yes 1 Yes Yes 
?? = Unknown. No information about law or practice 
 
Overall quality of service standards and results for the Member States are shown in 
Table  3-22. This table shows that, for the fastest standard category of mail, quality of 
service results for delivery the first day after posting (D+1) range from 66 percent (PL) 
                                                
 56 Only two NRAs (BG, IS) report that they cannot fine the USP and have no other remedies. However, 
in several cases the other remedies amount to no more than calling on the USP to do better (HU, LU, 
PL), complaining to the ministry (DK), or suggesting fines to the ministry (EL). See Questionnaire 222-
17. 
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to 98 percent (LU). In general, quality of service targets and results are naturally lower 
for larger Member States. By the third day after posting (D+3), more than 97 percent of 
the fastest standard category (FSC) of post mail is delivered in most Member States 
with the exception of Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. In some Member States, 
however, it should be noted that the FSC mail is only a small fraction of all letter mail, 
including Hungary (4.4 percent) and Latvia (12 percent).57 

























AT         
BE 95 93.8 97      
BG 80  95      
CY 90 76.3   97 98.5   
CZ 90 90.64       
DE 80  95      
DK 93 93.7 93 98.5 93  93  
EE 90 91.5       
EL 87 79.9   98 98.2   
ES     92 90.4   
FI         
FR 83 83.9 95      
HU 85 92.69   97 99.73   
IE 94 79   99.5 97.5   
IT 89    99    
LT 85 77  95 97 99  100 
LU 95 98.06 99 99.98     
LV 97 96.1   97 99.5 100 100 
MT 92 93.29 97 99 99 99.7   
NL 95 96.2       
PL 82 66.3 90 88.45 94 94.04   
PT 94.5 95.0  99.2  99.8  99.9 
RO 85  97      
SE 85 94.9   97 99.9   
SI 95 91.80 99.5 98.60     
SK 96.0 96.1  99.81  100.0  100.0 
UK 93 85.2    95.7   
IS 85 88   97 99   
NO 85 87.1   97    
Note: "D+1 (% FSC" refers to the percent of mail in the "fastest standard category" that is delivered on the first business day after 
posting. "D+2" refers to the second business day after posting. Etc. 
 
                                                
 57 Questionnaire 301-45. 
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Comparing quality of service and actual performance suggests that NRAs may be 
setting quality of service according to different criteria. Some NRAs set the standard 
well above actual performance. For example, for Cyprus, for FSC service, the D+1 
standard compared to actual performance is 90 percent to 76 percent; in Greece, 87 to 
80 percent; in Ireland, 94 to 79 percent; in Latvia, 85 to 77 percent; in Poland, 82 to 
66 percent; and in the United Kingdom, 93 to 85. In such cases NRAs appear to be 
using quality of service standards to stimulate better performance from the USP. In 
other Member States, the quality of service standard and actual performance are very 
close. In some cases, the quality of service standard is set well below actual 
performance as in, for example, Germany, 80 to 96 percent (2007) and Hungary, 85 to 
93 percent. Here the quality of service standard appears to reflect the NRA’s judgement 
as the basic needs of the general public. 
Virtually all Member States set quality of service for letters or for basic letter post 
services, but only slightly more than half set standards for basic parcel post service 
even though it is considered a universal service. Less than half of the Member States 
set quality of service standards for bulk mail services. Most Member States monitor 
quality of service performance, but a significant minority do not. Quality of service 
standards appear to be set for different purposes in different Member States, e.g., in 
some cases to spur the USP to better performance and in others to reflect the minimum 
needs of the general public. 
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3.3.5 Financing the net cost of the USO (if any) 
Under the Second Postal Directive, a Member State has four options for financing the 
net cost of the universal service obligation imposed on one or more USPs: (i) reserved 
area, (ii) compensation fund, (iii) public procurement, or (iv) direct compensation of the 
USP from public funds. In principle, under Community rules limiting state aid to 
commercial undertakings, financial support in whatever form may not exceed ‘what is 
necessary to cover the costs incurred in discharging the public service obligations, 
taking into account the relevant receipts and reasonable profit for discharging those 
obligations’.58 
Currently, the only significant sources of financing for the net cost of the USO appear to 
be the reserved area and direct payment to the USP. In neither case, however, does 
the benefit conferred appear to be clearly limited to the cost of the public obligation 
imposed. While most Member States have established a reserved area in favour of a 
designated USP, almost no Member State is able to demonstrate that the scope of the 
reserved area is limited to what is necessary to ensure universal service.59 Only 
3 Member States (ES, IT, PL) supported the USP in the most recent fiscal year by 
making payments to the USP. In two cases, NRAs reported that these payments 
represent a substantial percentage of the total cost of providing universal service: 
Spain, 5 percent, and Italy, 8 percent.60 In both countries, it may be noted, the NRA is 
an office within the postal ministry and not truly independent.61 The Spanish NRA has 
prepared a study that estimates the net cost of the USO to be 17 percent of the cost of 
providing universal services. The Italian NRA reports that it has not prepared a similar 
study.62  
In principle, Norway is the sole exception to this pattern. Norwegian law provides that 
the government will compensate Norway Post for the net cost of the USO calculated in 
some reasonably objective and transparent manner. According to Norwegian model, the 
net costs are due primarily to deliveries in some communities that are more frequent 
than Norway Post would provide in the absence of a universal service obligation.63 
Since compensation is to be paid Norway Post from public funds, the payment must be 
included in the government's budget each year. In fact, however, the Norwegian 
                                                
 58 See generally, European Commission, ‘Community Framework For State Aid In The Form Of Public 
Service Compensation’, OJ C297, 29 Nov 2005, p. 5, paragraph 14. 
 59 See section 3.4.1, below. 
 60 Questionnaire 123-45 and 123-46.  
 61 See 3.2.2, above. 
 62 Questionnaire 121-23. In addition, Norwegian law provides that the government will pay Norway Post 
annually for the net cost incurred in providing the universal service obligation (after deducting the 
benefits of the reserved area). Norway Post reports, however, that no payment was made in fiscal 
2006, 2007, and 2008, but payment was resumed for fiscal 2009. See section 6.4.5, below. 
 63 See Kristin Bergum, ‘Calculating the Net Cost of the USO: A Practical Example from Norway’ in 
M. Crew, P. Kleindorfer, and J. Campbell, eds. Handbook Of Worldwide Postal Reform (2008). 
Ms. Bergum is an official of Norway Post. 
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government did not pay the prescribed compensation in the fiscal years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008, although payments were resumed in fiscal 2009. 
Currently the only significant sources of financing for the net cost of the universal 
service obligation (if any) are the reserved area and direct payment to the USP. In those 
Member States that make use of one of these means of public financing (some do not 
use either), there appears to be no clear relation between the level of financing and the 
net cost of the universal service obligation, if any. In Spain and Italy — both Member 
States lacking a NRA independent of the postal ministry — high levels of public 
financing may exceed the net cost of the universal service obligation significantly, 
potentially raising a red flag under the rules governing state aid.  
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3.4 Reserved area and special rights 
This section addresses special legal privileges granted to the universal service provider. 
Article 7 of the Second Postal Directive allows Member States to establish a limited 
postal monopoly or ‘reserved area’ for the universal service provider. The Sixth VAT 
Directive exempts ‘public postal services’ from value-added tax. Acts of the Universal 
Postal Union effectively grant certain rights to universal service providers (or have been 
implemented in a manner that grants such rights). In addition, in some Member States, 
national laws regulating the placement of public collection boxes or operation of 
vehicles give special treatment to USPs.  
3.4.1 Reserved area  
Article 7(1) of the Second Postal Directive limited the scope of services that could be 
reserved for the USP. Since 1 January 2006, the reservable area for domestic and 
incoming cross-border correspondence is limited to correspondence meeting two 
conditions: (1) each item must weigh less than 50 grams and (2) the charge for each 
item must be less than two and a half times the USP’s public tariff for carriage of an 
item in the lowest weight step of the fastest standard category of service. Moreover, 
such services may be reserved only ‘to the extent necessary to ensure the maintenance 
of universal service’.  
Article 7 further provides that the reserved area may be extended in two respects. First, 
it may include direct mail falling within the same price and weight limits as 
correspondence but again, only ‘to the extent necessary to ensure the maintenance of 
universal service’. Second, the reserved area may include outgoing cross-border mail 
falling within the same price and weight limits but only ‘to the extent necessary to 
ensure the maintenance of universal service, for example, when certain sectors of 
postal activity have already been liberalised or because of the specific characteristics 
peculiar to the postal services in a Member State’. 
The Postal Directive’s repeated insistence that a reservation may be introduced only ‘to 
the extent necessary to ensure the maintenance of universal service’ implies a duty to 
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adjust the reserved area to the economic requirements of universal service. In 2007, in 
the case of International Mail Spain, the European Court of Justice emphasised the 
significance of this limitation in addressing a Spanish law that included outbound cross 
border correspondence in the reserved area. The Court declared that a Member State 
may reserve cross-border mail to the universal postal service provider  
only in so far as they establish 
– that, in the absence of such a reservation, achievement of that universal 
service would be precluded, or 
– that that reservation is necessary to enable that service to be carried out 
under economically acceptable conditions.64 
Figure  3-6 summarises the current state of the reserved area in the EU/EEA postal 
market.  
Figure  3-6 Reserved area in EU/EEA, 2009 
 
Liberalised: DE, 
EE, ES, FI, NL, SE, 
UK, 58.6%
Correspondence: 
BG, CZ, RO, SI, IS, 
2.3%
Corr. & Outbound: 
IT, 5.7%
Corr. & Direct Mail: 
BE, DK, FR, IE, LT, 
NO, 25.5%
Corr & DM & 
Outbd: CY, EL, HU, 
LU, LV, MT, PL, PT, 
SK, 5.3%




As this figure shows, there has already been substantial reduction of the reserved area. 
On 1 April 2009, 2 more Member States repealed the reserved area, Estonia and the 
Netherlands. This brings to 6 the roster of Member States with no reserved area (DE, 
                                                
 64 Case C-162/06, International Mail Spain, [2007] ECR I- 9911, paragraph 50. 
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EE, FI, NL, SE, UK). In addition, the reserved area in Spain is substantially less of a 
barrier to entry than in other Member States because it does not include intracity postal 
services. Collectively, these 7 liberalised Member States account for about 57 percent 
of the domestic letter post in the EU/EEA market. In 6 of the remaining Member States 
(BG, CZ, IT, RO, SI, IS), another 8 percent of the EU/EEA market, direct mail is outside 
the reserved area. In the remaining Member States, the reserved area is limited to 
items weighing 50 grams or less and priced at 2.5 times the public tariff for a letter of 
lowest weight step in the fastest standard category. 
Although the Postal Directive has for ten years required Member States to limit the 
reserved area ‘to the extent necessary to ensure the maintenance of universal service’, 
only one Member State with a reserved area, Portugal, reported that it had conducted a 
study to evaluate the need for a reserved area.65 Like earlier studies by the 
governments of Sweden and the United Kingdom (which have abolished the reserved 
area), the Portuguese study, prepared by Accenture and completed in 2006, supported 
liberalisation. It concluded that ‘development of competition has reached different 
stages in the various segments and that market liberalisation presents attractive 
opportunities’. 66 
Looking back over the ten years since the Postal Directive initiated a process of gradual 
market opening, three conclusions seem apparent. First, there has been no appreciable 
increase in competition in postal markets due to the introduction of the present price 
and weight limits on the reserved area (2.5 times the basic stamp price and 50 grams). 
Phasing in these price and weight limits thus had little practical effect. A monopoly over 
the conveyance of postal items within the present price and weight limits ensures such 
economies of scale for the incumbent that significant competition is infeasible. Second, 
Member States which have repealed the reserved area have so far been able to 
maintain universal service with equal or even improved quality of service. At the same 
time, incumbent postal operators have been successful in maintaining almost all of their 
market shares (90 percent or more), usually with the aid of additional commercial 
flexibility. While the future of liberalised markets is necessarily uncertain, concerns that 
liberalisation would lead to a rapid decline in universal service due to widespread 
‘cream skimming’ by new entrants have proved unfounded. Third, despite a significant 
disagreement over the political desirability of a reserved area, no substantial, 
government-endorsed defence of the reserved area has emerged in a decade despite a 
continuing legal obligation to adjust the scope of the reserved area to the requirements 
of universal service.  
                                                
 65 Questionnaire 122-9. 
 66 ‘Estudo sobre o Desenvolvimento da Concorrência no Mercado Postal Português’ (2006), See the 
summary on the internet site of the Portuguese NRA, Anacom, at http://www.anacom.pt/render.jsp? 
contentId=517701&languageId=1. 
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Since adoption of the Postal Directive in 1997, Member States have substantially 
liberalised the EU/EEA letter post market. Today, about 57 percent of the total market 
(by volume of letter post) is provided without a reserved area (or with a largely 
ineffective reserved area in Spain). There is no evidence that elimination of the 
reserved area has led to a decline in the quality of universal service; if anything, the 
contrary appears to be the case. In other Member States, reduction in price and weight 
limits for the reserved area has had only a limited effect on the reserved area as a 
barrier to entry. 
3.4.2 VAT and postal services 
Member States may effectively reserve a category of products or services for selected 
postal operators without an explicit reserved area. A special legal right that is sufficient 
to give a postal operator a competitively significant advantage over potential 
competitors may establish a barrier against new entry.  
One such legal privilege that has received much attention in the last few years is the 
exemption from value added tax (VAT) for postal services. The Sixth VAT Directive, 
dating from 1977, provides that the supply of ‘public postal services’ should be exempt 
from VAT. In practice, Member States have interpreted this phrase differently and have 
provided different exemptions for postal services.67 Figure  3-7 summarises the current 
state of VAT exemptions for postal services.  
                                                
 67 Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment, 
OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1, Article 13A(1)(a). 
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Figure  3-7 VAT treatment of postal services 
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As this figure shows, VAT treatment of postal service varies substantially among 
Member States. Six Member States (FI, LV, SE, SI, IS, NO) provide no VAT exemption 
for postal services. Three (ES, FR, LT) limit the VAT exemption to reserved or letter 
post services. Thirteen Member States (BE, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, HU, IE, LU, NL, PT, 
RO, SK), accounting for more than a third of the EU/EEA postal market, exempt all 
universal services of the USP from VAT. It must be recalled, however, that different 
Member States have different views as the range of universal services. Germany, for 
example, exempts universal services from VAT but does not exempt bulk parcel 
service, a service which is not within Germany’s definition of universal service. Four 
Member States (IT, MT, PL, UK) exempt all services of the USP from VAT including 
services that are not universal services.  
The Commission has concluded that the VAT exemption for postal services inevitably 
distorts competition among postal operators. In 2003, the Commission called upon the 
Parliament and the Council to amend the Sixth VAT Directive to equalise VAT for all 
postal operators.68 The Parliament and Council have not acted on this proposal. In 
                                                
 68 Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 77/388/EEC as Regards Value Added Tax on 
Services Provided In The Postal Sector, COM(2003) 234. The Commission concluded, ‘In the context 
of postal services, the current exemption causes a distortion between similar services supplied by the 
public operator and the private operator because only the services of the former are exempt’. Page 3. 
See also, Amended Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 77/388/EEC as Regards 
Value Added Tax on Services Provided In The Postal Sector, COM(2004) 468. 
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2006, the Commission has initiated infringement proceedings against the United 
Kingdom, Germany, and Sweden for application of VAT to postal services in a manner 
that appeared to violate the directive. In July 2007, the Commission issued a reasoned 
opinion formally requesting these Member States to modify their VAT legislation.69  
In April 2009, in the TNT Post UK case, the European Court of Justice clarified the 
effect of the exemption for postal services in the Sixth VAT Directive.70 The Court held 
that the exemption for public postal services applies to operators and not to classes of 
services.  
[P]ublic postal services within the meaning of Article 13A(1)(a) of the Sixth 
Directive must be regarded as operators, whether they are public or private 
. . . who undertake to supply postal services which meet the essential needs 
of the population and therefore, in practice, to provide all or part of the 
universal postal service in a Member State, as defined in Article 3 of 
Directive 97/67. [Para. 36 (emphasis added)] 
The Court concluded that Royal Mail was a public postal operator and TNT was not 
because of differences in the legal obligation under which each operated:  
As the facts in the main proceedings demonstrate, on account of the 
obligations described in paragraph 12 of this judgment, which are required 
under its licence and connected with its status as the universal service 
provider, an operator such as Royal Mail supplies postal services under a 
legal regime which is substantially different to that under which an operator 
such as TNT Post provides such services. [Para. 39 (emphasis added)]  
On the other hand, the Court concluded that the exemption in the Sixth Directive could 
not be interpreted to apply to all services offered by a ‘public postal operator’ but only 
those ‘postal services supplied in its capacity as the universal service provider'. Para. 
45. Specifically the exemption could not apply to ‘specific services dissociable from the 
service of public interest, including services which meet special needs of economic 
operators’ Hence, the exemption cannot apply to ‘ services supplied by the public postal 
services for which the terms have been individually negotiated’. Para 47. In sum, the 
court decided that the VAT exemption for public postal services adopted in the Sixth 
VAT Directive applies to: ‘operators, whether they are public or private, who undertake 
to provide, in a Member State, all or part of the universal postal service’.71 
                                                
 69 European Commission, IP/06/484 (10 Apr 2006), IP/07/1164 (24 Jul 2007). 
 70 TNT Post UK Ltd v. The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, Case C-357/07 (23 
Apr 2009). 
 71 Ibid., Ruling, paragraph 1. The Court’s ruling implies that, because of the Sixth VAT Directive, a 
Member State inevitably creates a market distortion by obliging a postal operator to provide universal 
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Given the distortive effects of different VAT regimes for different postal operators, this 
survey asked Member States if they were planning to modify national VAT legislation to 
provide equal treatment for all post operators.72 One Member State, the Czech 
Republic, reported plans to equalise customs treatment, while six others replied that 
there were no such plans (DK, EE, FR, HU, LU, LV, NL). Most did not answer this 
question. These answers, however, predate the Court’s ruling in TNT Post UK. It 
appears likely that Member States will have to reconsider the scope of their VAT 
exemptions for postal services in light of this ruling. 
Different VAT regimes for universal service providers and other postal operators 
continue to distort postal markets. The recent (April 2009) ruling by the European Court 
of Justice in the TNT Post UK case clarifies but does not resolve this problem. Prior to 
the recent decision, however, few Member States reported plans to equalise the 
application of VAT in the foreseeable future. 
3.4.3 Customs laws 
The Universal Postal Convention provides simplified customs documentation for use by 
universal service providers and exempts them from liability under national customs 
laws.73 The Convention does not, however, require governments to limit these 
privileges to USPs.74 Nor does the Convention make clear to what extent such customs 
privileges should be or must be accorded to the commercial shipments of the USPs. 
                                                                                                                                             
service ‘under a legal regime which is substantially different’ from the legal regime applicable to other 
operators. Under the Third Postal Directive, however, Member States must employ non-discriminatory 
procedures for designation of USPs or procurement of universal services from postal operators. 
Implications for the Court’s ruling for implementation of the Third Postal Directive are discussed later 
in this study. See section  3.4.2, below. 
 72 Questionnaire 122-25. 
 73 Article 18 of the Universal Postal Convention (2004) says that, ‘The postal administrations of the 
countries of origin and destination shall be authorised to submit items to customs control, according to 
the legislation of those countries’. Nonetheless, Regulation RL 152, adopted by the UPU’s Postal 
Operations Council, sets out simplified documentation for use by postal administrations. Article 22(3) 
declares, ‘Postal administrations shall accept no liability for customs declarations in whatever form 
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The Community Customs Code permits, but does not require, specialised customs 
procedures for ‘postal traffic’.75 Implementing regulations adopted by the Commission, 
however, provide that all ‘consignments sent by letter or parcel post’ may be cleared 
through customs using UPU documentation.76 It is understood that the Commission has 
been encouraging Member States to accept the principle of equal customs treatment of 
all postal service providers, whether public or private, since 2003.77 So far, however, 
there has been no agreement on this principle at the Community level. The Commission 
currently plans to address these issues, at least in part, in a Commission regulation 
implementing the Modernised Customs Code, which will replace the Community 
Customs Code in 2013.78 
                                                                                                                                             
these are made or for decisions taken by the Customs on examination of items submitted to customs 
control’. 
 74 The Universal Postal Convention (2004) requires signatory countries to provide certain customs 
treatment to 'postal administrations' but does prohibit them from providing similar customs treatment 
to private operators that tender similar items for customs entry under similar conditions. The Universal 
Postal Convention (2008), which becomes effective on 1 January 2010, is similar except that it 
requires certain customs treatment for 'designated operators' where 'designated operators' are 
defined as 'any governmental or non-governmental entity officially designated by the member country 
to operate postal services and to fulfil the related obligations arising out of the Acts of the Union on its 
territory'. Under the 2008 Convention, a signatory country also has the right to expand the scope of 
UPU customs treatment by naming multiple 'designated operators'. See UPU Congress, Acts of the 
24th Congress (draft versions of Constitution, Article 1.6bis and Convention, Article 18). 
 75  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs 
Code, OJ L 302, 19 Oct 1992, p. 1, as amended, Article 38(4).  
 76  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92, OJ L 253, 11 Oct 1993, p. 1, as amended, 
Articles 237 and 238. 
 77  See TAXUD 798/2003 - rev 2 (Sep. 22, 2004) and TAXUD 1842/2007. [Documents were mentioned to 
the authors by the Commission, DG TAXUD, but not made available during the study, and could 
therefore not be verified.] 
 78  The new customs code was established by Regulation (EC) No 450/2008 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 23 April 2008 laying down the Community Customs Code (Modernised Customs 
Code), OJ L145, 4 Jun 2008, p. 1. Information on current plans for implementing regulation was 
provided by DG Taxation and Customs Union. 
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Figure  3-8 Scope of UPU customs treatment for international postal services 
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Most Member States appear to provide the benefits of UPU customs treatment to some 
or all products of the USP without providing private operators similar customs treatment 
for similar products. Ten Member States (BE, BG, CZ, EE, FR, HU, IE, RO, SK, IS), 
representing one quarter of the EU/EEA market, provide special customs treatment for 
all products of the USP. Seven Member States (DE, DK, ES, LU, LV, SE, NO), 
comprising a third of the EU/EEA postal market, limit UPU customs privileges to 
universal services. Cyprus reports that it provides UPU customs treatment only to 
correspondence and direct mail. A few Member States (CY, CZ, EE, SE) state that 
postal operators other than the national USP — e.g., other national postal operators 
designated as USPs or ETOEs — may make use of UPU-defined customs procedures 
for the importation of similar postal items. No Member State seems to provide the same 
customs treatment for all postal items regardless of whether the items are imported by a 
public postal operator, universal service provider, or private operator. A substantial 
number of NRAs did not answer these questions, apparently because they do not 
review international postal practices. 
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International postal markets continue to be distorted by preferential customs rules for 
universal service providers. The Commission has been encouraging Member States to 
accept the principle of equal customs treatment of all postal service providers since 
2003, but there has been no agreement on this principle at Community level so far. The 
Commission currently plans to address these issues, at least in part, by implementing 
the Modernised Customs Code, which will replace the Community Customs Code in 
2013. Most NRAs do not appear to review international postal practices, although there 
some notable exceptions. 
3.4.4 International postal practices  
Regulations governing international postal services continue to create distortions in 
cross border postal services and substantial barriers to entry. The most significant 
problems appear to be created by terminal dues, restrictions on remail and 
extraterritorial office of exchanges (ETOEs), and codes for International Mail Processing 
Centres (IMPCs).79 
Terminal dues. ‘Terminal dues’ are the fees that public postal operators charge each 
other for the delivery of cross border mail. Historically, terminal dues were set by the 
Universal Postal Union (UPU). UPU terminal dues introduced two types of distortions 
into the exchange of international services. First, UPU terminal dues were not aligned 
with postage rates for delivery of comparable domestic mail. For most Member States, 
the result was that terminal dues discriminated in favour of foreign mailers and against 
national mailers. Second, terminal dues were available only to public postal operators, 
not to competing private operators. 
                                                
 79 The Commission, supported by the ECJ, has long maintained that cross border intra-Community 
postal services should be conducted on terms that are as open and undistorted as domestic postal 
services, if not more so. In the Postal Green Paper (1992), the Commission proposed that cross 
border services should be excluded from the reserved area and that terminal dues should be based 
on domestic postage rates. Green Paper on the Development of the Single Market for Postal 
Services, COM/1991/0476 (11 Jun 1992), pp. 195-96, 220-21 (‘The case for using inland tariffs as a 
basis for compensatory systems for mail exchanged between postal administrations rests on two 
principles: firstly the principle of having tariffs related to costs, and secondly the principle of taking 
action to avoid distortions of competition’ [p. 220]). 
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Article 13 of the Postal Directive requires Member States to ‘encourage’ their USPs to 
adopt terminal dues agreements that respect principles similar to those in effect for 
domestic mail. Specifically, terminal dues ‘shall be fixed in relation to the costs’ of 
handling and delivery and should be transparent and non-discriminatory.  
Terminal dues are also regulated under the competition rules because the Commission 
has held that a multilateral terminal dues agreement among USPs in the Member 
States is a horizontal price-fixing agreement. In 2004, however, the Commission held 
that a five-year extension of the terminal dues agreement called 'REIMS II' would be 
declared exempt from the competition rules since conditions set out in Article 81(3) 
were satisfied (after amendments to the original agreement).80 In particular, reflecting 
greater liberalisation of outgoing cross-border mail in Directive 2002/39/EC, the 
Commission required the seventeen European public postal operators party to REIMS II 
to deliver incoming cross-border mail tendered by private operators and other parties on 
the same terms as applied to other public postal operators (‘third party access’). Each 
public postal operator was likewise required to grant other public postal operators 
effective access to the generally available domestic rates in the country of delivery 
(‘level 3 access’). The Commission’s order embraced the principle that ‘terminal dues’ 
must reflect the actual cost of delivery and endorsed use of penalties to encourage 
public postal operators to meet quality of service targets for cross-border mail.81 The 
Commission’s exemption of multilateral terminal dues from the competition rules ended 
on 31 December 2006.  
In April 2008, sixteen national USPs reported agreement to a REIMS III agreement.82 
Whether or not the REIMS III agreement may be considered consistent with the 
competition rules is unclear.83 The Commission no longer gives parties to a price-fixing 
agreement an individual decision on the applicability of Article 81(3). Parties to an 
agreement that may be considered to fix prices or limit competition must make their own 
evaluation as to whether the exculpatory conditions of Article 81(3) are satisfied. The 
text of the REIMS III agreement is confidential so outside parties cannot judge its 
lawfulness. Moreover, the Third Postal Directive has changed the legal context of such 
an agreement so that what was once considered exempt under Article 81(3) might not 
                                                
 80 Commission Decision 2004/139/EC in Case No COMP/C/38.170 — REIMS II Renotification OJ L 56, 
24 February 2004, p. 76. ‘REIMS’ was originally an acronym for ‘remuneration in the exchange of 
international mails’. 
 81 Commission Decision of 23 October 2003, REIMS II Notification, OJ L56, 24 Feb 2004, p. 76. 
 82 International Post Corporation, ‘IPC Continues to Monitor Performance-Based Cross Border Mail 
Payments’ (press release 1 April 2008). The postal operator involved were the national USPs of 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. 
 83 In an interview for this study officials from DG Competition indicated that the public postal operators 
have signed a new REIMS agreement, ‘REIMS III’. These officials indicated that no action was 
planned against this agreement, in part because there were no complaints. They agreed, however, 
that it is difficult for an affected party to complain if the terms of the agreement are secret. The non-
transparency of this procedure seems inconsistent with promotion of open cross border postal market. 
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be so considered in the future.84 Based on information gathered by WIK, it appears that 
the national USPs of all Member States are parties to the REIMS III agreement except 
the national USPs of the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and United Kingdom. These four 
Member States account for about 35 percent of the total EU/EEA letter post market. 
In the last six years, it has become clear that these remedies, while salutary, have been 
incomplete. Several problems remain. First, conditions that the Commission imposed on 
the REIMS agreement are limited to public postal operators that participate in REIMS. 
Several important public postal operators have withdrawn from REIMS, including Royal 
Mail, TNT, and the Spanish Post Office. Non-REIMS post operators can and do insist 
that public postal operators in other Member States provide delivery for rates that are 
more favourable than the rates charged local mailers (or charged by destination post 
office to mailers in other Member States).85 Second, the REIMS requirements do not 
address distortions in trade to and from the EU/EEA area. For example, UPU terminal 
dues rules create distortions in commerce between the EU and the United States by 
favouring public postal operators over private operators. Third, it has proven extremely 
difficult in practice for private operators to access terminal dues. Six years after the 
Commission’s decision in REIMS II, only one private operator, IMX, has been granted 
‘third party access’ and only then after a protracted battle with postal operators and 
threats of legal action. Fourth, the REIMS agreement remains non-transparent so that 
users and the general public are unable to evaluate possible distortions created.  
One factor contributing to the continuing distortions in international postal services is the 
failure of most NRAs to implement Article 13. Only six NRAs (CY, CZ, IE, MT, PT, SK) 
from small Member States reported that they 'review or oversee the terminal dues 
charged by the USP(s) on intra-Community cross-border universal services to ensure 
they comply with the principles of the Postal Directive.86 When asked whether these 
NRA ensured that terminal dues are geared to costs, however, most of these NRAs 
could refer only to the REIMS terminal dues agreement (which applies to a small 
                                                
 84 Article 81(3) declares that prohibitions against anti-competitive agreements in Article 81(1) 'may be 
declared inapplicable' if the agreement 'contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods 
or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit, and which does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; [or] (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of 
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question'. Thus, whether or 
not an agreement qualifies under Article 81(3) requires a balancing of several factors. In the wake of 
the Third Postal Directive some of these factor may be evaluated differently. For example, since the 
scope of competition has been enlarged by elimination of reserved areas, there may be greater risk of 
'eliminating competition in respect to a substantial part of the products in question'. Then, too, 
conditions which may appeared to be ' indispensable to the attainment of these objectives' — such as 
conditions which tend to restrain or distort competition between different cross border and domestic 
mail streams — may appear less 'indispensable' after the 'free market opening' required by the Third 
Postal Directive. 
 85 Non-REIMS postal operators able to insist upon favourable rates because in the absence of a special 
arrangement they have a right to delivery rates based on UPU terminal dues rates. UPU terminal dues 
are less than comparable domestic postage in most Member States. 
 86 Questionnaire 251-42. 
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number of trading partners) or the UPU terminal dues agreements (which is not cost-
based).87 One NRA suggested that the Commission's exemption of the REIMS II 
agreement from competition rules thwarted its efforts to require more cost-based 
terminal dues. Most significantly, most NRAs did not or could not answer any questions 
relating to terminal dues and international postal services. 
Remail and ETOE restrictions. Provisions of the Universal Postal Convention permit 
Member States and/or their USPs to intercept and return ‘remail’, i.e., mail which is 
posted in one country by a sender who ‘resides’ (in some undefined sense) in another 
country.88 The UPU has also encouraged its member countries to discriminate between 
(A) cross border postal items dispatched by a public postal operator from its national 
territory and (B) cross border postal items dispatched by the same public postal 
operator from an office located outside its national territory (an ‘extraterritorial office of 
exchange’ or ETOE).89 The bottom line effect of both rules is to create an allocation of 
the cross border postal market whereby each public postal operator has a competitive 
advantage for mail originating in its national territory. 
Anti-remail activities by the USPs have been the subject of considerable litigation. In the 
GZS case, decided in 2000, the European Court of Justice rejected the practice of 
some public postal operators surcharging inbound cross border mail by more than 
enough to align delivery fees with domestic postage rates.90 In 2001, the Commission 
condemned Deutsche Post for using an unreasonably expansive definition of ‘senders 
resident in Germany’ to surcharge cross border mail tendered by the British Post 
Office.91  
IMPC codes. According to regulations of the Universal Postal Convention, international 
mail is exchanged between international mail processing centres (IMPCs). All universal 
service providers operate one or more IMPCs in their national territories. Some also 
dispatch international mail from IMPCs located outside their national territories 
(ETOEs). In addition, in a few cases, private companies have applied for and received 
IMPC status for their mail dispatch facilities. Each IMPC has a code assigned by the 
UPU. As a practical matter, an IMPC code is the key to participation in the international 
postal system in partnership with the national post offices. An IMPC will not accept a 
shipment of inbound international mail for delivery unless the mail is received from a 
facility with a proper IMPC code to which terminal dues can be charged. Airlines and 
                                                
 87 Questionnaire 251-44. See also Questionnaire 251-45 (relation of terminal dues to quality of service) 
and 251-46 (transparency of terminal dues). 
 88 Universal Postal Convention (2004), Article 27. In their answers, NRAs did not appear to know who 
has the authority to return international mail under this article. It seems probable that in such cases, 
the USP exercises this authority without supervision by the NRA. 
 89 Universal Postal Union, Beijing Congress, Resolution C44/2004. 
 90 Deutsche Post AG v. Gesellschaft für Zahlungssysteme mbH (GZS) and Citicorp Kartenservice 
GmbH, Joined Cases C-147/97 and C-148/97, [2000] ECR I-825. 
 91 See section 4.1.1.2(b), below. 
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customs officials also provide special treatment for mail shipments accompanied by 
IMPC codes. 
In 2007, the UPU decided to suspend the issuance of IMPC codes to private postal 
operators and ETOEs, and this practice continues to the present.92 The practical effect 
is a collective practice of refusing to deal with private operators and ETOEs who wish to 
tender international mail to IMPCs for delivery by public postal operators under the 
same trading terms given to those who have IMPC codes. In essence, the UPU’s 
restriction of IMPC codes is the anti-competitive counterpart of the Commission’s pro-
competitive requirement of third party access provision in the REIMS II agreement. 
International postal markets continue to be distorted by a number of practices unique to 
international postal affairs. Chief among these are practices related to terminal dues 
(especially outside the REIMS area), restrictions on remail and ETOEs (extraterritorial 
office of exchanges), and the restrictive use of IMPC (international mail processing 
centres) codes. With a few exceptions, NRAs have generally not implemented the 
principles set out in Article 13 of the Postal Directive. 
 
                                                
 92 Universal Postal Union, Nairobi Congress (2008), Document 18. 
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Case history  3-9: Customs reforms under the U.S. postal reform of 2006  
In 2006, the United States adopted a major postal reform act for first time since 1970. The 
‘Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act’ divides the postal products of the U.S. Postal 
Service into two categories, ‘market dominant’ and ‘competitive’. Market dominant products are 
those in which the Postal Service exercises ‘sufficient market power that it can effectively set the 
price of such product substantially above costs, raise prices significantly, decrease quality, or 
decrease output, without risk of losing a significant level of business to other firms offering 
similar products'. Products which are not market dominant are competitive. 
For competitive products, the 2006 act requires that, in several respects, the laws must be 
applied equally to competitive products of the Postal Service and to similar products of private 
postal operators. In regard to customs laws and other laws regulating the import and export of 
goods, the 2006 act declares: 
With respect to shipments of international mail that are competitive products . . . 
that are exported or imported by the Postal Service, the Customs Service and 
other appropriate Federal agencies shall apply the customs laws of the United 
States and all other laws relating to the importation or exportation of such 
shipments in the same manner to both shipments by the Postal Service and 
similar shipments by private companies. 
The law further obliges the Secretary of State of the United States to encourage foreign customs 
authorities to ‘make available to the Postal Service and private companies a range of non-
discriminatory customs procedures that will fully meet the needs of all types of American 
shippers’.  
These provisions were supposed to be implemented by June 2007. So far, however, U.S. 
customs authorities have resisted introduction of new customs regulations that would apply in an 
identical manner to similar shipments transported by public and private delivery services. 
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3.4.5 Other special rights 
The survey also inquired about certain other special rights that have been traditionally 
given to public postal operators. In brief, it appears that in at least 10 Member States 
(BG, CY, EL, ES, HU, IE, PL, PT, RO, UK) the USP(s) has been granted special or 
exclusive rights in respect to the placement of collection boxes on public streets.93 
In at least 3 Member States (BE, CY, EL), the USP(s) are not subject to the same 
requirements and fees as other postal operators with respect to the licensing and 
registration of vehicles (no information from AT, BG, EE, FI, IT, NL, PT, LI). On the 
other hand, only a few NRAs reported that USP(s) were not subject to the same 
requirements and fees as other postal operators with respect to the operation and 
inspection of vehicles (BE, CY, EL)94 or regulations pertaining to parking restrictions or 
vehicular operation (BE, EL). 95 
In several Member States, universal service providers continue to enjoy special rights 
with respect to the placement of public collection boxes. Special rights for USPs with 
respect to the licensing and operation of vehicles appear to be less common, but 
responses of NRAs were incomplete on these points. 
                                                
 93 Questionnaire 122-30 (no information from AT, BE, FI, SK, LI). 
 94 Questionnaire 122-31 (no information from AT, BG, EE, FI, IT, NL, PT, LI). 
 95 Questionnaire 122-33 (no information from AT, BG, CY, DE, EE, ES, FI, IT, NL, PT, NO, LI). 
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3.5 Authorisation and licensing 
Article 9 of the Postal Directive allows Member States to establish procedures for 
authorising postal service providers. The scope of permissible authorisations varies 
depending on whether the postal service being authorised is ‘within the scope of 
universal service area’ or outside the scope of universal service. ‘Within the scope of 
the universal service’ is undefined but apparently refers to postal services that compete 
with universal services. Article 9 also permits Member States to establish a 
‘compensation fund’ to compensate the USP for some of the costs incurred in providing 
universal service. Article 9 was clarified and amended in the Third Postal Directive. 
3.5.1 Authorisations within the universal service area  
Article 9 of the Second Postal Directive declares that for non-reserved services that are 
‘within the scope of the universal service’, Member States may introduce ‘authorisation 
procedures, including individual licences, to the extent necessary in order to guarantee 
compliance with the essential requirements and to safeguard the universal service'. The 
Directive provides for two types of authorisations: (1) a general authorisation and an 
individual licence. The essential difference between the two is that an individual licence 
requires the operator to obtain specific approval from regulatory authorities before 
starting operations whereas a general authorisation does not. An individual license may 
also include rights and conditions specific to the licensee (‘which gives an undertaking 
specific rights, or which subjects that undertaking’s operations to specific obligations’), 
whereas it appears that a general authorisation may not.96 
                                                
 96 The Second Postal Directive, Article 2(14) defines ‘individual licence’ to mean an authorisation which 
is granted by a national regulatory authority and which gives an undertaking specific rights, or which 
subjects that undertaking’s operations to specific obligations supplementing the general authorisation 
where applicable, where the undertaking is not entitled to exercise the rights concerned until it has 
received the decision by the national regulatory authority’ [emphasis added]. The same paragraph 
defines ‘general authorisation’ to mean ‘an authorisation, regardless of whether it is regulated by a 
class licence or under general law and regardless of whether such regulation requires registration or 
declaration procedures, which does not require the undertaking concerned to obtain an explicit 
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Within the universal service area, the Directive offers several options for authorisation of 
postal operators. A Member State may require postal operators to obtain either a 
‘general authorisation’ or an ‘individual licence’ to supply some or all services. One 
portion of the universal service area could be subject to an individual licence while 
another portion may be subject to a general authorisation (e.g., an individual license for 
carriage of letters weighing up to 1 kg. and a general authorisation for carriage of other 
types of letter post items). Alternatively a Member State may wholly refrain from 
establishing authorisation procedures.  
In practice, five approaches to authorisation of postal operators have emerged among 
the Member States. They are, in order of increasing restrictiveness: 
• no authorisation procedure; 
• general authorisation for some or all letter post services; 
• general authorisation for all services in universal service area; 
• individual licence for some or all letter post services; and 
• individual licence for all services in the universal service area. 
Table  3-23 summarises the use of these authorisation procedures among the Member 
States. The relative prevalence of different authorisation methods may be seen more 
clearly in Figure  3-9. 
                                                                                                                                             
decision by the national regulatory authority before exercising the rights stemming from the 
authorisation’ [emphasis added]. 
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Table  3-23 Authorisation procedures for service within US area 














under Art. 9? 
AT None  Cor Yes No  
BE USO >7 yr None Yes No  
BG USO  None Yes   
CY USO Other None Yes Yes Yes 
CZ None  None    
DE C/DM-1000 None Other Yes Yes Yes 
DK None  None    
EE USO 3 to 7 None Yes Yes Yes 
EL USO Other None Yes No  
ES USO None None Yes No  
FI Cor >7 yr None Yes Yes Yes 
FR Cor >7 yr None Yes Yes Yes 
HU USO None None Yes Yes Yes 
IE None  USO Yes No  
IT USO 3 to 7 None Yes No  
LT Cor None None Yes No  
LU None  Cor Yes No  
LV USO >7 yr None Yes Yes Yes 
MT USO >7 yr None Yes Yes  
NL None  USO    
PL USO Other None Yes No  
PT USO >7 yr None Yes No  
RO None  USO Yes Yes Yes 
SE LP None None Yes Yes Yes 
SI None  USO Yes No  
SK None  LP Yes No No 
UK C/DM-350 None None No   
IS Cor >7 yr None    
NO None  None    
Univ. servs. subject to licence and Univ. servs. subject to GA: Cor = All correspondence; C/DM-350 = Correspondence and direct mail up to 
350 grams; C/DM-1000 = Correspondence and direct mail up to 1000 grams; LP = Letter post items (correspondence, direct mail, 
newspapers and periodicals); USO = Universal service items (letter post items and parcels up to universal service weight limit);  
Other = Other. 
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Figure  3-9 Authorisation procedures 
 
IL letter post: DE, 
FI, FR, LT, SE, UK, 
IS, 65%
IL univ. serv.: BE, 
BG, CY, EE, EL, 
ES, HU, IT, LV, MT, 
PL, PT, 20%
No  info: LI, 0% No authorisation: CZ, DK, NO, 4%
GA letter post: AT, 
LU, SK, 3%
GA univ. servs.: IE, 
NL, RO, SI, 7%
GA = General authorisation
IL = Individual licence
 
 
Most Member States require an individual license for providers of postal services within 
the universal service area, but there are several alternative approaches as well. Twelve 
Member States (BE, BG, CY, EE, EL, ES, HU, IT, LV, MT, PL, PT) require an individual 
license for all services within the universal service area. Seven Member States (DE, FI, 
FR, LT, SE, UK, IS), representing almost two-thirds of the EU/EEA market, require an 
individual license only if the postal operator is conveying correspondence or, in some 
cases, other types of letter post items. Seven Member States require only a general 
authorisation, in some cases for the carriage of letter post items (AT, LU, SK) and in 
other cases for carriage of all universal service items (IE, NL, RO, SI). Germany is the 
only Member State that has introduced both individual licenses and general 
authorisations. In Germany, an individual license is required for carriage of 
correspondence and direct mail weighing less than 1000 grams, while a general 
authorisation is required for providing other services within the universal service area. 
Three Member States (CZ, DK, NO) have no authorisation procedures. 
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AT 1 0 1 1 1 11 1  0 
BE 1 0 10 0 10    208 
BG 1 0 10 0  0   77 
CY 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 17 
CZ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 88 
DE 0 0 1453 0 20  0   
DK 1 0 0 1 1 900 1 1 0 
EE 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 39 
EL 1 0 6 1  0 0 0 425 
ES 1 0 544 1   1  2652 
FI          
FR 1 0 21 1 0 0    
HU 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 178 
IE 1 0 0 0 0 34 0 34 34 
IT 1 0 429 0 0 0 0 0 1468 
LT 1 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 78 
LU 1 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 24 
LV 1 1 52 1 19 0 0 0 52 
MT 1 0 2 0 2 0 0  16 
NL 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
PL 1 0 6 1 1 0 1 1 179 
PT 1 0 11 1 1 0 0 0 61 
RO 1 0 0 0 0 741 1 1 779 
SE 1 0 31 1 2 0   0 
SI 1 0 0 0 0 12 1 1  
SK 1 0 0 0 1 21 0 0  
UK 1 0 18 1 13 0 0 0 0 
IS 1 1 2 1 0  1 0 1 
NO 1         
General key: US = universal service; IL = individual licence; GA = general authorisation 
 
Table  3-24 provides statistics on the number of individual licences and general 
authorisations granted in the Member States and the number of active operators 
actually providing a ‘significant level of postal services’ at the end of 2008. Numbers in 
this table should be interpreted with caution.97 In some Member States (e.g., CZ, DK, 
                                                
 97 This table has been substantially edited by WIK to correct inconsistent answers by NRAs. For 
example, in several cases, NRAs stated in answer to Q241-1 or Q241-10 that no individual licence or 
no general authorisation was required to provide service within the universal service area and then, in 
answer to Q301-12 to Q301-17 — the source for this table — that a certain number of individual 
licences or general authorisations were issued or that a certain number of postal service providers 
were actively providing a significant level of service under such authorisations. Note that in this table, 
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IT, FR, PT, RO, SI, SK), it seems that a large number of authorisations may have been 
issued, but that the number of postal service providers — other than the national USP 
— providing a significant level of services within the universal service area may be very 
few or none.98 The bottom line is that it appears that authorisation procedures based on 
individual licences are operating in practice in 6 Member States (BC, DE, ES, LV, SE, 
UK), representing about 54 percent of the EU/EEA postal market. Ireland appears to be 
the only Member State in which a general authorisation for services within the universal 
service area is operating in practice. 
The Postal Directive provides that authorisation procedures — i.e., a requirement for 
either a general authorisation or an individual license — may be introduced ‘to the 
extent necessary in order to guarantee compliance with the ‘essential requirements’ (a 
term referring to certain non-economic objectives discussed below) and to safeguard 
the universal service'.99 Accordingly, we asked NRAs in Member States where 
individual licenses were required why it was considered necessary to introduce an 
individual license rather than rely on non-postal laws, designation of the USP, market 
forces, and other mechanisms.100 Typical answers were as follows: 
• BE: Non-postal laws do not guarantee sufficiently enforcement. Licensed 
operators (operating inside USO) are obliged to participate to the financing of 
USO through a compensation fund, if activated in case the reserved area would 
not be sufficient.  
• DE: Safeguarding quality standards and nationwide provision; market review; 
compensation fund. 
• EE: Individual license requires provision of postal services at least at western 
part or at eastern part of the country or in whole country. 
                                                                                                                                             
zero indicates a positive answer by the NRA of a null quantity. A blank space indicates no answer by 
the NRA.  
 98 In Questionnaire Q301-10 to Q301-17, we asked NRAs to specify, for each of the years 2005 to 2008, 
both how many operators were authorised by individual licence or general authorisation and how 
many operators were 'actually providing a significant level of postal services'. In Denmark, the NRA 
stated that no general authorisation is required to provide services in the universal service area 
(Q241-10), that the number postal operators authorised by general authorisation in each of the years 
2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 was 900, the same for each year (Q301-15), and that the number of 
postal operators with a general authorisation actually providing a significant level of postal services 
was 1, the USP, for the years 2006, 2007, and 2008 (Q301-17). In Italy, there are undoubtedly many 
private operators, but the NRA positively states that the number of licensed operators providing a 
significant level of postal services was 0 for the years 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 (Q301-14). In 
some cases (e.g., DK, LU, RO, SI, SK,), the number of general authorisations issued to operators 
(‘GA operators authorised’) may refer to services outside the universal service area rather than inside 
the universal service area. 
 99 Second Postal Directive, Article 9(2). 
100 Questionnaire 241-7, 241-8. 
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• EL: Considered necessary in order to ensure that the universal service is 
continually and thoroughly provided. 
• ES: Ensure the provision of USP. They contribute to the USP fund. Ensure 
compliance with requirements in favour of users. 
• FR: Safety of users, staff, and the service provider’s equipment. Confidentiality 
of items of correspondence. Protection of any personal data and privacy of 
users. Technical requirements must be environment-friendly. By law, La Poste is 
designated as universal service provider in France. The other operators have 
not any universal service obligation. 
• HU: Geographical covering required by the postal legislation, quality 
requirements. Increased control is indispensable: the confidentiality of 
correspondence and the protection of the content of parcels have to be 
previously controlled. 
• MT: It is generally felt that due to the market structure of the postal market the 
licensing regime constitutes an adequate means to clearly delineate the 
products that must and can be offered within the universal services area. 
• PL: Technical and operational competence, availability of services, quality and 
performance of services. 
• SE: An individual license gives the NRA authority to supervise and make sure 
that the postal service is reliable. The postal regulation in Sweden is not precise 
or detailed; therefore, the licence terms and conditions are used to specify the 
requirements on postal operators and specifically on the USP. 
• UK: Operators must have sound arrangements, for protecting mail and 
delivering it safely. Common Operating Procedures - operators must have 
arrangements in place to facilitate the repatriation of misdirected mail to the 
correct network. 
Alternatively, we asked those who required a general authorisation why it would not be 
sufficient to rely upon other mechanisms to safeguard essential requirements and 
ensure universal service.101 In this case, the following explanations were provided: 
• DE: Market overview; postal secrecy; data protection; monitoring and enforcing 
obligations. 
                                                
101 Questionnaire 241-15. 
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• IE: Easiest way to impose obligations on service provider; provides undertaking 
not to infringe reserved area. 
• LT: Protection of the reserved area until deadlines set by the Third Postal 
Directive. 
• LU: By granting a general authorisation, the declaration sheet inherent to the 
procedure, may attract the attention of the provider to the obligations he has to 
fulfil or to respect. 
• RO: Consumers protection; necessary supervision of the NRA. 
Viewed sceptically, many of the reasons proffered by the NRAs do not seem very clear 
or convincing (and many NRAs gave no reasons at all). It is unclear what authorisation 
procedures are needed to ensure universal service if a universal service provider has 
been designated to provide universal service. Or why authorisation procedures are 
needed to safeguard the reserved area when the legislator has undoubtedly provided 
legal penalties for infringement. Or why authorisation procedures are needed to ensure 
data protection when most data is today transmitted and stored outside the postal 
system and therefore addressed in non-postal laws. To the extent that NRAs suggest 
that authorisation procedures are necessary so that the NRA can prevent postal service 
providers from engaging in unsafe, incompetent, or unwise operations, one must 
question whether such ‘management oversight’ functions are truly necessary or 
permitted by the Postal Directive. On the other hand, some justifications for imposition 
of authorisation procedures on postal service providers may be considered more 
plausible. These include ensuring confidentiality of correspondence (if not required by 
the postal statutes); protection of users (especially in multi-operator environments); 
implementation of a compensation fund (so far, rarely used); and collection of industry 
statistics.  
Overall a general authorisation seems capable of protecting appropriate public interests 
as well as an individual licence with one major exception. Unlike a general 
authorisation, an individual licence allows the NRA to attach particular USO 
requirements to the authorisation of one postal operator, the USP. This is, for example, 
the practice in the United Kingdom and Sweden. The general authorisation is 
insufficient for this purpose because, by definition, it cannot be particularised to specific 
operators.102 
Article 9 of the Postal Directive further provides that all authorisations for service within 
the universal service area — whether individual licenses or general authorisations — 
                                                
102 An authorisation for an undertakings ‘which subjects that undertaking’s operations to specific 
obligations’ is an ‘individual licence’. See Second Postal Directive, Article 2(14). 
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may be subject to certain types of conditions. The rules defining what types of 
conditions may be attached to authorisations are complicated, but they are important 
because authorisation conditions can impose substantial barriers to new entry. 
Table  3-25 Permitted conditions for authorisations within universal service area 
Second Postal Directive Third Postal Directive 
Conditions to ensure essential requirements: 
— confidentiality of correspondence; 
— security of the network as regards the transport of 
dangerous goods;  
— data protection; 
— environmental protection;  
— regional planning. 
Conditions to ensure essential requirements: 
— confidentiality of correspondence;  
— security of the network as regards the transport of 
dangerous goods;  
— data protection;  
— environmental protection;  
— regional planning. 
— respect for the terms and conditions of 
employment, social security schemes, laid down by 
law, regulation or administrative provision and/or by 
collective agreement negotiated between national 
social partners, in accordance with Community and 
national law. 
Conditions to ensure universal service: 
— universal service obligations, where appropriate; 
— requirements concerning the quality, availability, 
and performance of the relevant services, if 
necessary;  
— an obligation not to infringe the exclusive or 
special rights granted to the USP(s) for the reserved 
postal services;  
Conditions to ensure universal service:  
— universal service obligations; 
—requirements concerning the quality, availability, 
and performance of the relevant services, if 
necessary and justified;  
— an obligation to make a financial contribution to a 
compensation fund to support universal service, 
where appropriate;  
— an obligation to make a financial contribution to 
the NRA's operational costs, where appropriate; 
— an obligation to respect working conditions laid 
down by national legislation; 
 Limitations on conditions to ensure universal service 
(except for USPs designated under Article 4): 
— may not impose universal service obligations. 
— may not, with respect to the same elements of the 
universal service or parts of the national territory, 
require both universal service obligations and 
financial contributions to a compensation fund; 
— may not duplicate conditions which are applicable 
to undertakings by virtue of other, non-sector 
specific national legislation; 
— may not impose technical or operational 
conditions other than those necessary to fulfil the 
obligations of this Directive.  
Source: see Second Postal Directive, Article 9, and Third Postal Directive, Article 9. 
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The types of conditions that may be attached to authorisations for postal service 
providers operating within the universal service area are summarised in Table  3-25. In 
brief, authorisations may be subject to two categories of conditions: (i) conditions 
necessary in order to guarantee compliance with the essential requirements and (ii) 
conditions necessary to ensure provision of the universal service. In the Second Postal 
Directive, ‘essential requirements’ refers to five types of non-economic conditions. In the 
Third Postal Directive, the definition of essential requirements includes a sixth category 
of non-economic considerations (respect for terms and conditions of employment, etc.). 
In the Second Postal Directive, there are three types of conditions that may be used to 
ensure universal service. In the Third Postal Directive, there are five types of conditions 
and four limitations on use of these conditions in authorisations for postal service 
providers that are designated as USPs under Article 4. In the Third Postal Directive, 
there is an additional rule: the number of authorisations — whether by general 
authorisation or individual license — cannot be limited in number except in the case of 
postal service providers that are designated as USPs under Article 4. 
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Table  3-26 Authorisations within US area: conditions based on essential 
requirements 












AT No* No* No* No* No* No 
BE Yes** Yes** No** Yes** Yes* Yes 
BG Yes* Yes ?? Yes** Yes No 
CY Yes* Yes** * Yes* Yes* No 
CZ No* No* No* No* No* No* 
DE Yes* No* Yes* Yes* No* No 
DK       
EE No* No* No* No* No* No 
EL Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* 
ES Yes** Yes** No* Yes** No No 
FI No* No* No* No* No No 
FR Yes** No* No* Yes** Yes* No 
HU No* No* No* No* No* No* 
IE Yes Yes* No* No* No* No* 
IT Yes* Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes** No 
LT Yes* No No No No No 
LU Yes* Yes* No* No* No* No 
LV *      
MT Yes* Yes No* Yes No No* 
NL       
PL       
PT Yes* No* No* Yes* Yes* No 
RO Yes* No* No* Yes* No* No* 
SE Yes No No No No No 
SI Yes* No* No* Yes* No* No 
SK No** No No No No No 
UK No* No* Yes* No* No* No 
IS Yes** No* No** Yes** No** No 
NO       
Key: "*" indicates that essential requirement is governed, or also governed, by provisions of non-postal legislation;  
"**" indicates that the postal authorisation condition and the non-postal provisions are essentially duplicate 
 ?? = Unknown. No information about law or practice. 
 
The current situation with respect to authorisation conditions is summarised in the next 
two tables. Table  3-26 shows what conditions have been introduced to protect ‘essential 
requirements’ (as defined by both the Second and Third Postal Directives). Table  3-27 
shows what conditions have been introduced to ensure universal service. 
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AT No No No No No Yes No No No 
BE Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes 
BG No Yes No Yes No Yes No No Yes 
CY No Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
CZ No Yes No No No Yes No No No 
DE No No No No Yes  No Yes Yes 
DK          
EE Yes No No No No No No No No 
EL No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
ES No No No No No Yes No No No 
FI Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No 
FR No No No No No Yes No Yes Yes 
HU Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IE No No No No No Yes No No No 
IT No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
LT Yes No No Yes No Yes No No Yes 
LU No No No No No Yes No No No 
LV          
MT No No No Yes No Yes No No Yes 
NL          
PL          
PT No Yes No No No Yes No Yes Yes 
RO No Yes No Yes No Yes No No Yes 
SE Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Yes 
SI No No Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
SK No No No No No Yes No No Yes 
UK Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes 
IS No No No Yes No Yes No No No 
NO          
 
Table  3-26 suggests that Member States frequently include authorisation conditions that 
address essential requirements already covered in other non-postal laws. For example, 
an authorisation condition may prohibit a postal operator from transporting dangerous 
goods even though another law also prohibits or penalises the transportation of 
dangerous goods. In general, the Third Postal Directive discourages this practice 
because a postal operator should not be subject to a greater penalty — loss of the 
entire business — than other companies when the public interest being protected is the 
same in both cases. It appears, therefore, that authorisation conditions relating to 
essential requirements will have to be reconsidered as the Third Postal Directive is 
implemented. 
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Table  3-27 summarises the authorisation conditions related to ensuring universal 
service. This table suggests that such conditions are so far imposed in a relatively light-
handed manner in most Member States. The most popular condition, respect for the 
reserved area, will disappear after introduction of the Third Postal Directive. Seven 
Member States include universal service conditions (BE, EE, FI, HU, LT, SE, UK). In 
Sweden and the UK, significant universal service obligations have been imposed only 
on one operator. In three Member States (BE, EE, HU), the universal service obligation 
has been imposed on postal operators other than designated USPs. It appears that 
such conditions will have to be reconsidered when the Third Postal Directive is 
transposed.103 Two types of conditions are relatively rare but raise questions under the 
Postal Directive: financial guarantees (CY, HU) and technical expertise (BE, DE, FR, 
HU, PT). Such conditions do not seem to be permitted by the Second Postal Directive. 
Under the Third Postal Directive, such conditions are permitted only to the extent 
‘necessary to fulfil the obligations of this Directive’. Since the universal service is 
typically ensured by the operation of one or more designated USPs, it is unclear which 
obligation of the Directive justifies regulation of the technical expertise of other providers 
of postal services within the universal service area. 
Member States employ a variety of authorisation procedures for services within the 
universal service area. While 11 Member States require an individual license for all 
services within the universal service area, 7 Member States, representing almost two-
thirds of the EU/EEA market, require an individual license only if the postal operator is 
conveying letter post items, and 6 Member States require only a general authorisation. 
Overall, a general authorisation procedure seems capable of protecting the same 
interests as those protected by an individual licence procedure with one exception — 
the individual licence allows the NRA to attach universal service obligations to the 
authorisation of one postal operator, the universal service provider. In Member States 
which do not rely upon licence conditions to impose the USO, the USO is usually 
imposed in a legislative designation of the public postal operator as the USP. 
Member States and NRAs have attached several types of conditions to authorisations 
for service within the universal service area. Many include conditions that address 
essential requirements already covered in other non-postal laws. In 4 Member States, it 
appears that universal service obligations have been imposed on postal operators other 
than designated USPs. Such conditions will have to be reconsidered in light of the Third 
Postal Directive. Two other types of conditions are relatively rare but also raise 
questions under the Postal Directive: financial guarantees and technical expertise. 
                                                
103 Questionnaire 241-36. Third Postal Directive, Article 9(2) states, ‘Obligations and requirements 
referred to in the first indent and in Article 3 may only be imposed on designated universal service 
providers’. 
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3.5.2 Authorisations outside the universal service area  
Article 9 of the Postal Directive also provides for authorisation procedures for services 
outside the universal service area. It declares, ‘For non reserved services which are 
outside the scope of the universal service as defined in Article 3, Member States may 
introduce general authorisations to the extent necessary in order to guarantee 
compliance with the essential requirements'. Thus, only general authorisations, not 
individual licences, may be employed.  
The present state of authorisations for providing services outside the universal service 
area is summarised in Table  3-28. Ten Member States (CZ, DK, FI, FR, LU, NL, SE, SI, 
UK, IS), collectively representing 54 percent of the EU/EEA market, require no 
authorisation. On the other hand, 18 Member States require an authorisation and 
account for about 44 percent of the market. Of these 18 Member States, 7 (BE, BG, EL, 
ES, LV, MT, PL) require an authorisation which is called a ‘general authorisation’ but 
which does not permit the operator to begin services without receiving an explicit 
decision by the NRA. Such an authorisation must be considered as an ‘individual 
licence’ according to the definitions of the Postal Directive even if the requirements are 
relatively relaxed. Since the Postal Directive does not permit introduction of individual 
licenses for services outside the universal service area, these authorisations may need 
to be reconsidered. The remaining 11 Member States (AT, CY, DE, EE, HU, IE, IT, LT, 
PT, RO, SK) might be considered to require a ‘general authorisation’ for services 
outside the universal service area. 
The types of non-universal services most commonly subject to authorisation are parcel 
(A) and express (B) services. The conditions included with such authorisations are 
generally based on essential requirements (conditions A through F in the table). 
However, in several cases Member States have attached additional conditions relating 
to the provision of universal service or other issues (G through O). These conditions 
appear to exceed what is permitted by the Postal Directive. 
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Table  3-28 Authorisations outside US area 
 GA required? Start service 
immediately? 
Non-Univ. serv. subject 
to GA 
Conditions 
AT Yes Yes F  
BE Yes No ABE ABDEFK 
BG Yes No B ABDEGIKN 
CY Yes Yes ABCEF ABCDEKN 
CZ No    
DE Yes Yes B ADN 
DK No    
EE Yes Yes B  
EL Yes No ABCEF ABCDEFIJKO 
ES Yes No ABE ABDK 
FI No    
FR No    
HU Yes Yes AB O 
IE Yes Yes AB ABO 
IT Yes Yes ABDE ABCDEIJKMN 
LT Yes Yes AB AIKN 
LU No    
LV Yes No AB ABIKN 
MT Yes No AB  
NL No    
PL Yes No AB ABDKMN 
PT Yes Yes AB ADEGJKN 
RO Yes Yes AB ADIKN 
SE No    
SI No    
SK Yes Yes A KN 
UK No    
IS No    
NO     
Non-Univ. serv. subject to GA: (A) Parcel services for parcels outside universal service area; (B) Express or courier services; (C) Delivery 
services for unaddressed advertising; (D) Delivery services for messages transmitted electronically; (E) Mail preparation or sorting services; 
(F) Other. 
Conditions: (A) Confidentiality of correspondence; (B) Restrictions on transport of dangerous goods; (C) Respect for regulations on terms 
and conditions of employment; (D) Data protection requirements; (E) Environmental protection requirements; (F) Regional planning 
requirements; (G) Quality, availability, performance, or price standards; (H) Contribution to a compensation fund; (I) Contribution to the 
costs of the NRA; (J) Obligation to respect working conditions in national legislation; (K) Non-infringement of reserved area of USP(s); (L) 
Minimal capital or financial guarantees; (M) Technical or operational competence; (N) Reporting of statistical data; (O) Other. 
 
Since services outside the universal service area are, by definition, not required to 
ensure the universal service and were presumably provided without regulation prior to 
the Postal Directive, we asked NRAs why authorisation procedures were considered 
necessary to guarantee compliance with ‘essential requirements’ (the only permissible 
justification under the Second Postal Directive) or collection of statistics (also permitted 
under the Third Postal Directive). A sampling of responses follows: 
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• BE: General non-postal laws don't guarantee sufficiently enforcement (by 
tribunals). The NRA is explicitly competent to observe the compliance with 
specific rules essential requirements and imposes sanctions in case the postal 
legislation is not respected. 
• EE: Requirement of notification guarantees for NRA an overview of postal 
operators. This lets NRA to collect data of postal market for statistical reasons. 
• HU: Non-infringement of reserved area of USP(s). Contribution to the costs of 
the NRA. Reporting of statistical data. 
• IE: Not currently covered by general or postal laws. Achieves same objective in 
a more flexible manner. 
• IT: General authorisation allows greater control, also referring specifically to 
reserved postal services within the universal service area. 
In general, however, the Postal Directive does not seem to sanction use of authorisation 
procedures to terminate the right of a company to provide services outside the universal 
service area if the NRA finds that the company has encroached upon the reserved area 
(HU, IT) or other requirements of the postal laws (BE, IE). Rather, it would appear that 
the NRA should enforce any penalties prescribed in law for such transgressions.  
In 10 Member States, accounting for the majority of the EU/EEA postal market by 
volume, no authorisations are required for providing postal services outside the 
universal service area. In the other Member States, authorisations are usually required. 
In several cases, these authorisations appear to be ‘individual licences’ whereas only 
general authorisations are permitted by the Postal Directive. In some Member States, 
authorisations appear to include conditions that are more restrictive than permitted by 
the Postal Directive. 
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3.5.3 Authorisation procedures 
Article 9(3) of the Second Postal Directive further requires Member States to respect 
certain procedural requirements in administering general authorisations and/or 
individual licenses. Under the Second Postal Directive, Member States must ensure 
that procedures and requirements related to authorisations are transparent, non-
discriminatory, proportionate, and based on objective criteria. The Third Postal Directive 
adds that procedures and requirements be precise, unambiguous, and made public in 
advance.  
If authorisation procedures must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner, are 
Member States required to authorise all postal service providers, including the universal 
service provider designated under Article 4?104 Member States have split on this issue. 
Most Member States do not subject the universal service provider to authorisation 
procedures. However, in 10 Member States (CY, DE, EE, FI, FR, HU, LV, RO, SE, SK), 
the universal service provider is authorised under Article 9 in the same manner as other 
postal service providers. Similarly, in answer to the basic question of whether ‘the same 
authorisation procedures apply to the USP(s) as to all other postal operators?’, the 
Member States split evenly. 11 NRAs (CY, DE, EE, FI, FR, HU, LV, MT, RO, SE, SK) 
answered affirmatively and 11 (AT, BE, EL, ES, IE, IT, LT, LU, PL, PT, SI) negatively. 
Those who answer negatively generally pointed out that that the statute treats the public 
postal operator differently from other postal service providers because it is considered 
the universal service provider.105 
Member States are split fairly evenly on whether the designated universal service 
provider(s) should be subject to authorisation procedures in the same manner as other 
postal service providers. In implementing the Second Postal Directive, the majority view 
is that the universal service provider is not required to be authorised under Article 9. 
                                                
104 It seems clear that an Article 9 authorisation may be applied to USPs that are designated under Article 
4. In the Third Postal Directive, Article 9 explicitly declares, ‘Obligations and requirements referred to 
in the first indent [of Article 9(2)] may only be imposed on designated universal service providers’. 
Similarly, although less explicit, Article 9 of the Second Postal Directive states that authorisations may 
‘where appropriate, be subject to universal service obligations’. Since Article 9 may be applied to 
USPs designated under Article 4 and since Article 9 must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner, 
it appears plausible that Article 9 authorisations should must be applied in an equal manner to all 
postal service providers to which it is potentially applicable. 
105 Questionnaire 241-70, 241-71, 241-72. 
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3.5.4 Compensation fund 
In connection with authorisation procedures, the Second Postal Directive permits a 
Member State to establish a ‘compensation fund’. The Directive explains that the 
purpose of the compensation fund as follows:  
In order to ensure that the universal service is safeguarded, where a 
Member State determines that the universal service obligations, as provided 
for by this Directive, represent an unfair financial burden for the universal 
service provider, it may establish a compensation fund administered for this 
purpose by a body independent of the beneficiary or beneficiaries.  
According to the Directive, a Member State ‘may make the granting of authorisation 
subject to an obligation to make a financial contribution to that fund'. Since an 
authorisation to provide services outside the scope of the universal service may only be 
conditioned on compliance with non-economic essential requirements, it appears that 
only postal operators authorised to provide services within the scope of universal 
service can be required to contribute to the compensation fund. 
Table  3-29 summarises the current state of compensation funds in the Member States. 
In brief, 12 Member States (BE, CY, DE, EE, EL, ES, FR, IT, NL, PT, SI, IS) have 
adopted legislation authorising the creation of a compensation fund, but only two (EE, 
IT) Member States have actually established the fund. In neither case does the 
compensation fund appear to cover a significant percentage of the cost of providing 
universal service.106 No Member State has conducted an economic study that analyses 
the need for a compensation fund. 
Only Estonia and Italy have introduced a compensation fund for postal services. In 
neither case does the fund contribute significantly to supporting universal service. 
Compensation funds have been authorised but not established in 10 other Member 
States. No Member State has conducted an economic study that analyses the need for 
a compensation fund even though use of compensation fund is limited to situations 
where a Member State determined that the USO represents an unfair financial burden 
for the USP. 
 
                                                
106 The Italian NRA indicated the contribution was ‘very low (near 0%)’. The Estonian NRA did not answer 
this question. Questionnaire 241-78. 
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AT No        
BE Yes Min Post NRA No No Lic area Lic rev Yes 
BG No        
CY Yes NRA NRA No No US area  Yes 
CZ No        
DE Yes NRA NRA No No Other Lic rev Yes 
DK No        
EE Yes Min Post NRA Yes No Lic area Other Yes 
EL Yes Other NRA No  Lic area  No 
ES Yes Other Other No Yes US area US rev Yes 
FI No        
FR Yes Min Post NRA No No    
HU No   No No    
IE No        
IT Yes NRA NRA Yes Yes Lic area US rev No 
LT No        
LU No        
LV No        
MT No        
NL Yes Other NRA No     
PL         
PT Yes  Other No No    
RO No   No     
SE No        
SI Yes NRA NRA No No    
SK No   No No    
UK No        
IS Yes NRA NRA No No    
NO No        
Contributors to fund: Lic area = Postal operators providing services within a licensed area; US area = Postal operators providing  
services within the scope of universal service; All PO = Postal operators providing services within and outside the scope of universal service
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3.6 Regulation of the accounts of USPs 
Article 14 of the Postal Directive requires NRAs to regulate the accounts of ‘universal 
service providers’ but not other providers of postal services. The accounting provisions 
of Article 14 may be thought of as a two-step process. The first step is to develop a 
scheme for separation of accounts. This is, in essence, a system of boxes (or 
accounting categories) to which the costs and revenues may be assigned. In general, 
the boxes will correspond to products or groups of products, such as letter service, 
direct mail service, and parcel postal service. The basic issue presented by separation 
of accounts is, ‘Does the USP’s accounting system provide the right number and size of 
accounting boxes’? The second step is allocation of costs. Deciding how much cost 
should be assigned to each box is difficult because many types of postal costs are 
incurred as common costs. For example, if a postman walks down the street delivering 
letters, direct mail, and parcels to a series of addresses, how much of the postman’s 
salary should be assigned to the box of costs associated with letters? With direct mail? 
With parcels? The next two sections review how Member States have implemented 
provisions of the Postal Directive requiring separation of accounts and allocation of 
costs. Additional sections address more technical accounting issues. 
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3.6.1 Separation of accounts 
In the Second Postal Directive, Article 14(2) sets out the principles for separation of the 
accounts of the universal service provider(s) as follows: 
The universal service providers shall keep separate accounts within their 
internal accounting systems at least for each of the services within the 
reserved sector on the one hand and for the non-reserved services on the 
other. The accounts for the non-reserved services should clearly distinguish 
between services which are part of the universal service and services which 
are not. Such internal accounting systems shall operate on the basis of 
consistently applied and objectively justifiable cost accounting principles. 
Article 14 thus requires three separations of accounts. The first separation is between 
the accounts for all universal services collectively, on the one hand, and the accounts 
for all non-universal services collectively, on the other. The second separation is 
between all reserved services collectively and all non-reserved universal services 
collectively. The third separation requires separate accounts for each of the reserved 
services. 
The obligations of Article 12 serve by implication to extend the accounting separation 
required by Article 14. Article 12 requires that ‘for each of the services forming part of 
the provision of the universal service’ prices must be geared to costs and non-
discriminatory. In addition, under the Second Postal Directive, cross subsidisation of 
non-reserved universal services from revenues earned from reserved services is 
generally barred. To ensure that each universal service is geared to cost, non-
discriminatory, and free of cross-subsidy, it seems necessary for the NRA to review cost 
and revenue data for each non-reserved universal service, not merely for all non-
reserved universal services collectively as required by Article 14.107 In this manner, 
Article 12 implies that the USP must maintain separate accounts for each universal 
service subject to price control. 
In addition, Article 12 establishes specific criteria for the rates of ‘individual agreements’ 
and ‘special tariffs’. The NRA must ensure that such rates are cost-based and non-
discriminatory. Hence, the NRA needs accounts for such services. Then, too, Article 12 
requires that special tariffs ‘take account of the avoided costs, as compared to the 
standard service’. This obligation likewise implies a need for separate accounts, in this 
                                                
107 Article 12 of the Second Postal Directive required the NRA to control ‘cross-subsidisation of universal 
services outside the reserved sector out of revenues from services in the reserved sector’. In the Third 
Postal Directive, this provision is omitted so Member States can decide how best to monitor cross-
subsidies. See Directive 2008/6/EC, Recital 40. 
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case, accounts that separate the costs of upstream services from the costs of 
downstream services. 
Finally, although not explicitly required in the Second Postal Directive, implementation 
of Articles 12 and 14 would seem to require the USP to report appropriate accounting 
data to the NRA on a regular basis. Otherwise, the NRA cannot know when rates 
become misaligned with costs due to changes in costs.  
Table  3-30 Regulation of USP(s) accounts generally 
 Did NRA approve 
system of accts? 
Year first 
approved 




Frequency of cost 
reports to NRA? 
AT Yes 2005 ?? ?? Other 
BE Yes 2001 Yes Yes 1/yr 
BG Yes 2009  Yes  
CY Yes 2009 No Yes 1/yr 
CZ Yes 2007 No Yes 1/yr 
DE Yes  No No Other 
DK No  No Yes None 
EE Yes 2007 No Yes 4/yr 
EL Yes 2000   1/yr 
ES Yes 2005 No Yes 1/yr 
FI      
FR Yes 2007 No No 1/yr 
HU Yes 2005 No No 1/yr 
IE Yes 2001 No No 1/yr 
IT No  No  1/yr 
LT Yes 2004 Yes Yes 1/yr 
LU Yes 2005 No Yes None 
LV Yes 2008 No Yes 1/yr 
MT Yes 2005 Yes Yes 1/yr 
NL No     
PL No  Yes Yes 1/yr 
PT Yes 1998 No Yes 2/yr 
RO No  Yes Yes 1/yr 
SE No  No No 1/yr 
SI Yes 2007 No Yes 1/yr 
SK Yes 2003 No Yes 2/yr 
UK No  Yes Yes 1/yr 
IS No  No Yes 1/yr 
NO Yes 1998 No  1/yr 
?? = Unknown. No information about law or practice 
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Table  3-30 provides an overview of accounting regulation by Member States. At the 
outset, it may be noted that 8 NRAs (DK, IT, NL, PL, RO, SE, UK, IS) have not 
‘established or explicitly approved’ the system of accounts used by the USP(s).108 
Seven more NRAs only approved the system of accounts in the last couple of years 
(BG, CY, CZ, EE, FR, LV, SI). Relatively few NRAs (6) consulted their colleagues 
before establishing accounting regulations. Those that did consult with their colleagues 
mentioned the accounting systems of Ireland, France, Netherlands, Sweden, the UK as 
useful models, as well as the CERP report on accounting practices.109 Broadly 
speaking, this table suggests that the efforts of NRAs to ‘ensure that the accounting of 
the universal service providers is conducted in accordance with the provisions of [Article 
14]’ remain a work in progress which has benefited from limited consultation among 
NRAs. 
Opinions varied, however, about the usefulness of a more coordinated approach in the 
future. A distinct majority of NRAs (18 out of 23 that answered) believe that a 
standardised system of accounts would be useful. Those that supported a more uniform 
approach to accounting mentioned110 such reasons as the following: 
• CY: If the same accounting treatment is universally applicable, then it will be 
possible to compare the various service providers within Europe under the same 
terms. 
• CZ: Unified rules would be useful; lack of practical experience. 
• DK: Would make it easier to benchmark costs and efficiency of the USPs in EU. 
• LT: It will be very helpful for the NRA in discussion with universal postal 
operator. 
• LU: This would allow, without any doubt, better price comparisons and 
benchmarking among all member states. 
• SI: Because of higher transparency and possibility of benchmark. 
• UK: Comparability between countries of USP providers and unit costs. 
On the other hand, those who did not think a more standardised approach to accounting 
would be useful included some of the NRAs with the most sophisticated accounting 
systems: 
                                                
108 Questionnaire 253-3. 
109 Questionnaire 253-7. 
110 Questionnaire 253-9. 
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• DE: not useful, because of (i) differentiated administrational and operational 
procedures; (ii) strong differentiated market-situations (degree of liberalisation, 
market environment, business-strategies, [etc.] 
• FR: Too complex to implement because too much differences between 
countries. 
• IE: Accounts must reflect they way the operator conducts its business; accounts 
can only be standardised [as] operations / products [are] standardised. 
• SE: Country specific differences and varying quality of accounting and cost 
accounting system would probably make it impossible. 
Table  3-31 Separation of accounts generally 
























AT No 2008  No ?? 1 8 
BE Yes 2001 296 No  1321 8 
BG  2003 1 Yes 2003 6  
CY Yes ?? na Yes ??  ?? 
CZ Yes 2001 1 Yes 2007 14 10 
DE No 2000 na No    
DK No 2006 1 Yes ??   
EE Yes 2006 1 Yes 2006 15 10 
EL  2001 14 Yes 2001 18  
ES Yes 2004 13 Yes 2005 15 7 
FI        
FR Yes 2006 8 No  12  
HU Yes 2004 4 Yes 2004 3 5 
IE Yes 2009 32 Yes 2009 66 7 
IT Yes <1998 7 Yes <1998 11  
LT Yes 2004 12 Yes 2004 148 7 
LU No 2003 5 Yes 2003 7 5 
LV No 2008 na No   7 
MT Yes 2005 3 No  9 7 
NL No 2001 na No    
PL No 2004 12 No   6 
PT No <1998 14 Yes 1999 36  
RO No 2008 2 Yes 2008 152  
SE No 2004 na No   # 
SI Yes 2007 6 Yes 2007 23 8 
SK Yes 2003 10 Yes 2003 96 7 
UK No 2005  Yes ??  4 
IS No 1998 2 Yes 2006   
NO Yes 1998 0 No  0 10 
?? = Unknown. No information about law or practice 
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A summary of the state of accounting separation is set out in Table  3-31. Again, it may 
be noted that 12 NRAs (AT, DE, DK, LU, LV, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, UK, IS) — 
representing 58 percent of the EEA/EA letter post market — were unable to affirm that 
they have approved the number and organisation of the USP’s product accounts. In 
Member States with a reserved area, some NRAs (BG, CZ, DK, EE) accepted 
consolidation of all reserved services into a single account. In other Member States, 
accounts for reserved services were reported in as many as 32 (IE) or even 296 (BE) 
separate accounts. Even after allowing for differences among Member States, this 
range suggests substantially different approaches to implementing the Directive. Most 
NRAs also reported that USPs submit separate accounts for each universal service 
outside the reserved area. However, 10 NRAs (AT, BE, DE, FR, LV, MT, NL, PL, SE, 
NO), accounting for 56 percent of the total market, do not require product accounts for 
unreserved universal services. In the case of Germany and Sweden, where there is no 
reserved area, the result is the NRA has no product accounts at all. The Danish NRA 
likewise seems to receive no product accounts but relies instead on review by an 
independent auditor.111 
In those Member States — one-third to one-half of EU/EEA countries — that ensure the 
provision of bulk mail products as a universal service,112 the requirement that prices 
must be based on costs appears to imply a more detailed separation of accounts for 
services provided under individual agreements or subject to special tariffs. Each 
individual agreement is, arguably, a separate universal service product. Hence, we 
asked whether cost accounts are maintained for each individual agreement or, perhaps, 
for all individual agreements collectively. Each special tariff is, by definition, a tariff for a 
service that provides less than the full range of features provided in a corresponding 
‘standard service’. The term ‘standard service’ refers to ‘the complete range of features 
offered for the clearance, transport, sorting and delivery of individual postal items’. In 
the Second Postal Directive, Article 12 requires that the special tariff ‘shall’ take into 
account the ‘avoided costs’ which are incurred in providing the standard service but not 
incurred in the partial service offered under the special tariff. In the Third Postal 
Directive, the ‘shall’ is changed to ‘should’ and moved to a recital (Directive 2008/6/EC 
Recital 39). In either case, where a special tariff is offered, it appears necessary to 
separate the costs of the corresponding standard service into upstream and 
downstream components in order to identify the ‘avoided costs’. Hence, we asked 
whether the NRA required the accounts of ‘standard services’ to be divided into 
upstream and downstream components.  
                                                
111 The Danish regulator noted, ‘NRA does not receive (or require) info regarding specific allocation of 
costs to different services, functions or proportion of costs allocated by the different criteria. 
Statements from the independent auditors secure USP compliance'. Questionnaire 253-15. 
112 See section 2.3,, above. 
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Table  3-32 Accounts for individual agreements (IAs) and special tariffs (STs) 

























AT  Yes All IAs ?? Yes ??  ?? 
BE LDP Yes Each IA Yes Yes No   
BG  Yes None  Yes No   
CY LP No None Yes Yes Yes  ?? 
CZ  No   No    
DE  Yes None No Yes No   
DK LP ?? None No Yes No   
EE  Yes None No Yes No 0  
EL LD  None   Yes  2001 
ES  Yes None No Yes No 28  
FI         
FR LD Yes  No Yes Yes 5 2006 
HU LDP Yes None No Yes No   
IE LD No   Yes Yes 66 2009 
IT LD No   No    
LT L No   Yes Yes 6 2004 
LU  ?? None No Yes No   
LV L No   No    
MT D ?? None No No    
NL  Yes None No Yes No   
PL  Yes None No Yes No   
PT LDP    Yes No   
RO  Yes None  Yes No   
SE  Yes All IAs Yes Yes No   
SI L No   Yes Yes 4 2007 
SK LD Yes All IAs No Yes No   
UK LDP ?? None No ?? No 0  
IS LD Yes None Yes Yes No   
NO  No   No    
Bulk services within USO: L = bulk letters; D = direct mail; P = bulk parcels. 
IA: cost-based price req'd?: Each IA = Yes, for each individual agreement; All IAs = Yes, for all individual agreements collectively; 
None = No, no cost and revenue accounts for individual agreements; ?? = Unknown. No information about law or practice. 
 
Answers to these questions are summarised in Table  3-32. In this table, the first column 
identifies bulk mail services — bulk letters (L), direct mail (D), or bulk parcels (P) — 
which were identified by the NRA as ensured and regulated as universal services.113 
From Table  3-32 it appears that at least 16 Member States, representing about 55 
percent of the EU/EEA letter post market, regulate one or more bulk mail services (bulk 
letters, direct mail, periodicals, bulk parcels) as universal services. In five of these (BE, 
                                                
113 See section 2.3, above. In some cases, the NRAs did not indicate whether or not a particular postal 
service was ensured as a universal service.  
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FR, HU, SK, IS), the NRA reports that the USP(s) make use of individual agreements. 
Nonetheless, only two of these NRAs (BE, SK) have separate accounts for individual 
agreements, either individually or collectively. In the Member States which include one 
or more bulk services in the USO, 11 NRAs (BE, CY, DK, FR, HU, IE, LT, PT, SI, SK, 
IS) report that their USPs make use of special tariffs. Only 6 NRAs, however (CY, EL, 
FR, IE, LT, SI) report separate accounts for upstream and downstream components. 
The final column in Table  3-31 reports the assessments of the NRAs regarding the 
sufficiency of the separation of accounts by USP(s). The question addressed to the 
NRAs was, ‘To what extent does the separation of accounts provided by the current 
system of accounts give the NRA sufficient information to ensure conformity with the 
provisions of, or decisions made in accordance with, the Postal Directive?’ NRAs were 
asked to express their answer as number on a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 represents no 
information and 10 represents a complete set of the information needed to ensure full 
compliance with Postal Directive. Of the 16 NRAs who answered this question, 3 NRAs 
(CZ, EE, and NO) expressed complete satisfaction with the quality of the separation of 
accounts (10 of 10). The average level of satisfaction was 7.3 of 10.114 
Implementation of the separation of accounts of USPs required by the Postal Directive 
remains a work in progress. A substantial number of NRAs — representing a majority of 
the EEA/EA letter post market — were unable to affirm that they have approved the 
number and organisation of the USP’s product accounts. In those Member States with a 
reserved area, some NRAs accept consolidation of all reserved services into a single 
account, which appears at variance with the directive. Overall, even after allowing for 
differences among Member States, the range in accounting practices suggests that 
NRAs have adopted substantially different approaches to implementing the directive. In 
those Member States that regulate bulk mail services as universal services, few NRAs 
can confirm separate accounts for upstream and downstream services, yet it appears 
that some method of separating upstream and downstream accounts is required to 
implement the ‘avoided costs’ requirements of Article 12. Overall, NRAs express only a 
moderate level of satisfaction (7.3 out of 10) with the separation of costs currently 
presented by regulatory accounts. 
                                                
114 Average excludes assessments from NRAs who requested that their evaluations be kept confidential. 
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3.6.2 Allocation of costs generally 
Allocation of costs lies at the heart of accounting regulation under the Postal Directive. 
Without a reliable and accurate allocation of costs, accounting regulation is essentially 
an empty exercise.  
In the Second Postal Directive, Article 14(3) sets out the principles for the allocation of 
costs as follows: 
(a) costs which can be directly assigned to a particular service shall be so 
assigned; 
(b) common costs, that is costs which cannot be directly assigned to a 
particular service, shall be allocated as follows: 
(i) whenever possible, common costs shall be allocated on the 
basis of direct analysis of the origin of the costs themselves; 
(ii) when direct analysis is not possible, common cost categories 
shall be allocated on the basis of an indirect linkage to another 
cost category or group of cost categories for which a direct 
assignment or allocation is possible; the indirect linkage shall be 
based on comparable cost structures;  
(iii) when neither direct nor indirect measures of cost allocation can 
be found, the cost category shall be allocated on the basis of a 
general allocator computed by using the ratio of all expenses 
directly or indirectly assigned or allocated, on the one hand, to 
each of the reserved services and, on the other hand, to the 
other services. 
In brief, paragraphs 3(a), 3(b)(i), and 3(b)(ii) require the assignment of costs to each 
particular service so far as it is possible to do so by direct or indirect means. Paragraph 
3(b)(iii) requires the allocation of the unassignable common or ‘overhead’ costs to each 
particular service based on the proportion of assigned costs. 
Table  3-33 summarises the capacity of NRAs to allocate costs according the overall 
schema established by Article 14(3). Almost all NRAs report that they have approved 
the cost allocation system of the USP. Nonetheless, most NRAs appear unable to 
allocate costs according to the four broad categories prescribed by the Directive. Nine 
NRAs (CZ, EE, HU, MT, PL, PT, SK, NO), collectively representing about 10 percent of 
the EU/EEA market, seem to have sufficient data to distinguish between direct costs, 
134 Role of Regulators in a More Competitive Postal Market  
 Chapter 3: Implementation of the Second Postal Directive 
assignable common costs (i.e., (b)(i) or (b)(ii) separately or collectively), and 
unassignable common costs, at least roughly.115 The Belgian NRA reports that all 
assignable costs are direct costs, a singular position. Three other NRAs (AT, DE, SI), 
report that they can make at least calculations but did not provide any additional 
information. 




















AT Yes Yes 2005 [Yes] [Yes] [Yes] [??] 
BE Yes Yes 2001 90 [No] [No] 10 
BG    [] [] [] [] 
CY ?? Yes ?? [No] [No] [No] [No] 
CZ Yes Yes 2007 8 65 15 12 
DE Yes Yes  [Yes] [No] [No] [Yes] 
DK Yes No  [No] [No] [No] [No] 
EE Yes Yes 2004 5 [No] [No] 2 
EL Yes Yes 2001 [] [] [] [] 
ES Yes Yes 2005 [No] [No] [No] [No] 
FI        
FR Yes Yes 2008 [] [] [] [] 
HU Yes Yes 2006 0.7 80.1 18.3 0.9 
IE Yes Yes 2001 [No] [No] [No] [No] 
IT Yes No  [No] [No] [No] [No] 
LT Yes Yes 2003 [??] [??] [??] [??] 
LU Yes Yes 2005 [No] [No] [No] [No] 
LV Yes Yes 2003 [No] [No] [No] [No] 
MT Yes Yes 2005 7 [No] [No] 10 
NL  No  [No] [No] [No] [No] 
PL Yes Yes 2004 5.4 67.9 6.8 19.9 
PT Yes Yes 1998 # [No] # # 
RO Yes No  [No] [No] [No] [No] 
SE Yes Yes ?? # # # # 
SI Yes Yes 2008 [Yes] [Yes] [??] [??] 
SK Yes Yes 2003 0 6 77 17 
UK ?? No  [No] [No] [No] [No] 
IS Yes No  [No] [No] [No] [No] 
NO Yes Yes 1998 79 [No] [No] 6 
Note: "direct" costs refer to costs directly assigned under Art. 14 (2)(a) of the Second Postal Directive, and (b)(i), (b)(ii), and (b)(iii) costs 
refer to common costs allocated under the corresponding paragraphs of Art. 14(2)(b). 
Cols 4 to 7: if no figure is presented, the bracketed note indicates whether the NRA has sufficient information to determine the figure. 
?? = Unknown. No information about law or practice. 
 
                                                
115 Three NRAs (EE, MT, NO) report that they cannot distinguish between (b)(i) and (b)(ii) costs but can 
provide a collective figure. 
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In the Third Postal Directive, Article 14(3)(b) is amended by adding a fourth paragraph 
that addresses the allocation of common costs between universal service and non-
universal services. It provides as follows: 
(iv) common costs, which are necessary for the provision of both universal 
services and non-universal services, shall be allocated appropriately; 
the same cost drivers must be applied to both universal services and 
non-universal services. 
Although Member States are not obliged to implement the Third Postal Directive until 
the beginning of 2011, Member States were nonetheless implicitly obliged under the 
Second Postal Directive to adopt a reasonable approach towards the division of 
common costs between universal and non-universal services. 
Table  3-34 Allocation of costs generally (II) 
 NRA review of cost 




of US (% total)
Common costs of 
non-US (% total) 
Adequacy of cost 
allocation data 
AT Yes Yes   8 
BE Yes Yes 10 10 7 
BG      
CY No    ?? 
CZ   14 12 10 
DE Yes Yes   8 
DK No    ?? 
EE Yes Yes 93 96 10 
EL      
ES Yes Yes   6 
FI      
FR      
HU Yes Yes 99.3 98.06 5 
IE Yes Yes 30.8 30.8 7 
IT No     
LT Yes Yes   7 
LU Yes ??   ?? 
LV No    7 
MT Yes Yes 90 18 7 
NL No     
PL Yes Yes   6 
PT Yes Yes    
RO No     
SE Yes Yes # # # 
SI No    8 
SK Yes Yes 100 100 7 
UK Yes ?? 12 12 3 
IS No    7 
NO No  25 75 10 
?? = Unknown. No information about law or practice 
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Table  3-34 summarises the current manner of allocating common costs between 
universal and non-universal services. This table seems to indicate that those NRAs that 
can implement the first three paragraphs of Article (3)(b) will be able to extend 
implementation to paragraph (iv). On closer inspection, however, appears that even for 
these NRAs improvements in cost allocation will be needed. For example, it does not 
seem plausible that the percentage of common costs for universal service and non-
universal service will be exactly the same. 
The final column of Table  3-34 reports the answers of NRA for an evaluation of the 
sufficiency of the cost allocation information. Specifically, the question addressed to 
NRAs was, ‘to what extent does the allocation of costs provided by the current system 
of accounts give the NRA sufficient information to ensure conformity with the provisions 
of, or decisions made in accordance with, the Postal Directive?’ Of the 17 NRAs that 
answered this question, 3 NRAs (CZ, EE, and NO) expressed complete satisfaction 
with the quality of the cost allocation (10 of 10), as they did with the cost separation 
scheme. The average level of satisfaction was 7.2 of 10, although if NRAs were 
weighted by the size of their letter post markets, the weighted average would be 5.9 of 
10.116 
Although there are some notable exceptions, few NRAs appear able allocate costs 
according to the four broad categories prescribed by Article 14 of the Postal Directive 
and those that are able to do account for only a small percentage of the EU/EEA postal 
market. Fragmentary data suggests that NRAs are adopting significantly different 
approaches to cost allocation. On average, NRAs express a moderate level of 
satisfaction (7.2 out of 10) with the cost allocation data available to them. 
                                                
116 Averages exclude assessments from NRAs who requested that their evaluations be kept confidential. 
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3.6.3 Allocation of delivery costs 
To understand better how NRAs are allocating costs, we asked more detailed questions 
about the allocation of the costs associated with delivery. Allocation of delivery costs is 
particularly important because delivery (as opposed to other activities such as 
collection, sorting, and transportation) represents the largest fraction of total costs and 
includes a substantial percentage of common costs. It appears that some Member 
States have introduced elements of long run incremental costing into their 
implementation of Article 14. In allocating costs of delivery, they have concluded that 
common costs may be or should be allocated to specific products by taking into account 
not the actual number of deliveries per week provided for each product but the number 
of the deliveries per week required by factors such as service commitments,117 the 
actual needs of mailers, and/or the threat of competitive entry. Other NRAs suggest that 
common costs of delivery should be, or are required by the Directive to be, allocated to 
specific products based upon either the actual number of deliveries per week or, 
alternatively, on the minimum number of deliveries per week required for the universal 
service by Article 3(3). The following table summarises responses of NRAs to questions 
relating to the allocation of delivery costs. 
Table  3-35 suggests that about one third of NRAs can state with some confidence the 
percentage of costs incurred in delivery, about 50 percent. Of these, 3 NRAs (CZ, FR, 
SK) appear able to apply the cost allocation scheme set out in Article 14.  
The eighth column in this table reports the answer to a fundamental question, ‘Are the 
common costs of delivery allocated to different universal service products based upon 
the number of days per week that each product is actually delivered?’ Eleven of the 
13 NRAs that answered this question stated that common costs are not allocated 
according to the actual delivery frequency. The survey then asked whether the Postal 
Directive required allocation of delivery costs according the number of days per week 
that each product is actually delivered? The response to this question was more 
uncertain. Three NRAs (EE, ES, HU) say, ‘no”, while 3 NRAs (FR, LV, PL) indicated 
that the allocation of delivery costs should be based on no less than minimum number 
of days per week required by law. 
Allocation of delivery costs is an especially difficult technical task, but it also so central 
to effective implementation of Article 14. With some notable exceptions, few NRAs 
appear to have developed a reasoned approach towards the application of Article 14 to 
the allocation of delivery costs.  
 
                                                
117 Fewer deliveries per week are required, for example, if the service commitment is delivery within three 
days of posting rather than delivery the day after posting. 
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Table  3-35 Allocation of delivery costs 






























AT Yes       ?? ?? 
BE          
BG          
CY No       ?? ?? 
CZ Yes 50  78 10 12  No  
DE          
DK No         
EE No        No 
EL          
ES Yes 58.38     46.20 No No 
FI          
FR Yes 49  22 78 0 60 No No* 
HU Yes 45.07  95.07   7.12 No No 
IE Yes 36     40.6 No  
IT No         
LT Yes 47      No ??* 
LU No       ??  
LV No       Yes No* 
MT No       No * 
NL No       ??  
PL ??       No No* 
PT Yes #     # No  
RO Yes 38      No ?? 
SE Yes # #  #  # Yes # 
SI No       ??  
SK Yes 46 0 5 95 0 6 No  
UK Yes 45     19   
IS No         
NO No         
Note: "direct" costs refer to costs directly assigned under Art. 14 (2)(a) of the Postal Directive, and (b)(i), (b)(ii), and (b)(iii) costs refer to 
common costs allocated under the corresponding paragraphs of Art. 14(2)(b). 
Actual del. freq. req’d: "*" indicates a position that the Directive requires at least the minimum lawful frequency of delivery as the basis for 
cost allocation. 
?? = Unknown. No information about law or practice. 
 
 Role of Regulators in a More Competitive Postal Market 139 
 Chapter 3: Implementation of the Second Postal Directive 
3.6.4 Data quality 
Cost data about postal operations is necessarily collected by means of sampling 
systems and cost models. The quality of the data collections systems must be reviewed 
periodically to ensure that final information is accurate. Fifteen NRAs (AT, DE, EE, ES, 
FR, HU, IE, LT, LV, PL, PT, SE, SK, UK, NO), accounting for about three-quarters of 
the EU/EEA letter post market, reported that they had conducted a ‘formal review of the 
quality and reliability of the data collection systems’. Nine NRAS (FR, IE, LT, LV, PL, 
SE, SK, NO) have done so in the last two years. We asked the NRAs to assess the 
quality of data on a scale of 1 to 10: ‘to what extent does the quality of available data 
give the NRA sufficiently reliable information to ensure conformity with the provisions of, 
or decisions made in accordance with, the Postal Directive?’ Two NRAs (EE, NO) rated 
the quality of data to be completely sufficient for purposes of implementing the Directive 
(10 of 10). The average assessment among the 14 NRAs was 6.9 of 10 (weighted 
average, 6.1).118 
Fifteen NRAs, accounting for about three-quarters of the EU/EEA letter post market, 
have reviewed the quality of the data systems of the USP. NRAs report moderate 
satisfaction (6.9 out of 10) with the quality of data systems. 
                                                
118 Average excludes assessments from NRAs who requested that their evaluations be kept confidential. 
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3.6.5 Verification and publication of regulatory accounts 
Article 14(5) of the Postal Directive states, ‘National regulatory authorities shall ensure 
that compliance with one of the cost accounting systems described in paragraphs 3 or 4 
is verified by a competent body which is independent of the universal service provider. 
Member States shall ensure that a statement concerning compliance is published 
periodically’. Member State implementation of this provision is summarised in Table 
 3-36. 
Table  3-36 Transparency of accounts regulation 


































AT Yes 2005 Other No ?? No No Yes 2008 
BE Yes 2007  No  No Yes Yes 2007 
BG          
CY No ??  No  Yes No No  
CZ Yes 2007 Other Yes 2008 No Yes Yes 2007 
DE Yes   No  No No Yes 2008 
DK Yes 2008 NRA CPA No 2006 Yes Yes Yes 2008 
EE No 2007  Yes 2007 No No Yes ?? 
EL Yes  USP CPA No  No  Yes  
ES Yes 2006 NRA CPA No  No No Yes 2007 
FI          
FR Yes 2007 USP CPA   No Yes Yes 2007 
HU Yes 2007 NRA No  No No Yes 2007 
IE Yes 2007 USP CPA No  No Yes Yes 2007 
IT Yes 2007 USP CPA No  No No Yes 2007 
LT Yes 2007 Other Yes 2007 Yes No Yes 2007 
LU ?? 2004  No  No No Yes 2007 
LV Yes 2006 NRA No  Yes Yes Yes 2006 
MT Yes 2008 USP CPA No  No No Yes 2008 
NL  2007 USP CPA  2006 No  Yes 2007 
PL Yes 2007 NRA CPA Yes 2008 No No Yes 2007 
PT Yes 2006 NRA CPA Yes 2006 No No Yes 2007 
RO Yes 2007 USP CPA No  No No Yes  
SE Yes 2007 NRA Yes 2007 No No Yes 2008 
SI Yes 2007  Yes 2007 No No Yes <1998 
SK Yes 2007 NRA CPA Yes 2007 No No Yes 2007 
UK ?? ??  No  No No Yes 2008 
IS No     Yes No Yes 2008 
NO Yes 2007 NRA Yes 2007 Yes Yes Yes 2007 
Note: "SOC" = statement of compliance required by Postal Directive Article 14(5). 
Body reviewing USP accts: NRA = National regulatory authority (NRA) or staff; NRA CPA = Professional accounting firm employed by NRA; 
USP CPA = Professional accounting firm employed by USP; USP = Audit unit of the USP; Other = Other; ?? = Unknown. No information about 
law or practice. 
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Almost all Member States provide for review of the cost accounting system of a USP by 
an independent body. However, three NRAs (CY, EE, IS) state that no independent 
body reviews the accounts of the USP, and two (LU, UK) state that they do not know if 
such a review is provided. In 9 Member States (DK, ES, HU, LV, PL, PT, SE, SK, NO), 
accounting for about one third of the EU/EEA postal market, the independent reviewing 
body is the NRA or an accounting firm retained by the NRA. In 7 Member States (EL, 
FR, IE, IT, MT, NL, RO), the auditor is an accounting firm retained by the USP, so its 
independence may be open to question. 
Nine NRAs (CZ, EE, LT, PL, PT, SE, SI, SK, NO) periodically issue the ‘statement of 
compliance’ required by Article 14(5), but they account for only 9 percent of the EU/EEA 
postal market. At least 15 NRAs do not issue the required statement of compliance, and 
they account for almost two-thirds of the market. The Danish NRA reports that the 
Danish USP is required to publish a statement of compliance issued by independent 
auditors retained by the NRA.119 
The Directive does not require publication of a summary of the regulatory accounts of 
the USP. Nonetheless, such information could enable users and citizens to evaluate 
better the efficiency of different services (both relative to one another and to the 
services of other USPs) and the potential for unfair discrimination. By comparing such 
information year to year, users and citizens will be able to assess improvements and 
changes in the universal service over time. This information may also help users and 
citizens evaluate the performance of the NRA, both absolutely and relative to other 
NRAs. Despite lack of direction from the Directive, 6 NRAs declared they do publish a 
summary of regulatory accounts (CY, DK, LT, LV, IS, NO). 
Similarly, the Directive does not require NRAs to publish the details of the cost 
allocation system used to evaluate the accounts of the USP. Publication of this 
methodology — which would not include any cost data — could likewise help the public 
understand the nature of regulatory supervision. Seven NRAs (BE, CZ, DK, FR, IE, LV, 
NO) publish this information. 
                                                
119 Questionnaire 253-77. 
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NRAs can do better in monitoring USP accounts and informing the public about 
accounting regulation. While almost all NRAs provide for review of the cost accounting 
system of a USP by an independent body, in some cases the auditor is an accounting 
firm retained by the USP so its independence may be open to question. Half of the 
Member States do not issue a periodic statement confirming USP compliance with 
Article 14 of the Postal Directive even though this statement is required by the directive. 
Seemingly good practices — such as publication of a summary of the regulatory 
accounts and publication of the details of the cost allocation system — while not 
required by the Directive are implemented by several NRAs, and there is no apparent 
reason why other NRAs should not do so. 
3.6.6 Publication of audited financial accounts 
Article 15 of Postal Directive requires publication of periodic financial reports by the 
USP. The USP’s financial accounts must be reviewed by an independent auditor, and 
they must be published in accordance with the Community and national legislation 
applicable to commercial undertakings. As shown in Table  3-36, almost all NRAs 
confirmed that the USP does in fact publish its financial accounts in accordance with 
this provision.120 
Virtually all USPs publish audited financial statements as required by Article 15 of the 
Postal Directive. 
                                                
120 Questionnaire 253-70. No answers from AT, BG, FI, NL, LI. 
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3.7 Regulation of prices and terminal dues  
Article 12 of the Postal Directive lays down criteria for the regulation of the prices of 
universal services. Article 13 applies similar principles to ‘terminal dues’, i.e., the 
charges that USP in one Member State charges to a USP for the delivery of cross 
border intra-Community mail. Article 12 of the Second Postal Directive was revised in 
significant respects by the Third Postal Directive. 
3.7.1 Scope of price regulation 
Article 12 of the Second Postal Directive provides that ‘Member States shall take steps 
to ensure that the tariffs for each of the services forming part of the provision of the 
universal service comply with’ several criteria such as cost-orientation, affordability, 
transparency, and non-discrimination.  
Table  3-37 provides an overview of the scope of rate regulation by Member States. The 
table is overlaid with the shading from table 2-3 that indicates whether the service is 
ensured as a universal service.121 Light gray or red shading indicates that the service is 
ensured as a universal service. Dark gray or dark green shading indicates that it is not 
ensured as a universal service. And medium gray or light green indicates that service 
was not confirmed as an ensured universal service by the NRA and therefore probably 
is not ensured as a universal service. 
As this table shows, all Member States regulate tariffs for basic letter post service 
except Latvia.122 Twenty-four Member States, accounting for 92 percent of the EU/EEA 
postal market, also control prices for basic parcel post service, while 5 Member States 
(CY, DK, LV, NL, IS) apparently do not.123 In addition, rates for services for bulk mail 
service and non-priority letter post service may or may not be regulated. Twenty-two 
                                                
121 See section 2.3, above. 
122 Questionnaire 211-5. 
123 Failure to answer by two NRAs (NL, RO) while confirming price regulation of other postal services 
appears to imply an absence of control over prices of basic parcel post service. 
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NRAs regulate rates for bulk letters (89 percent of the EU/EEA letter post market); 14 
NRAs regulate rates for direct mail (79 percent); 12 NRAs regulate rates for 
newspapers and periodic publications (53 percent); and 8 NRAs regulate rates for bulk 
parcels (56 percent).124 Rates for non-priority letter post service, which is not offered in 
all Member States, are regulated by 15 NRAs (58 percent).  
Table  3-37 Overview: regulation of rates 
 Basic letter 
post 





AT Yes         Yes   
BE Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
BG Yes     No Yes Yes   
CY Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No 
CZ Yes         Yes   
DE Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
DK Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 
EE Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
EL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
ES Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
FI Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No 
FR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
HU Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IE Yes Yes Yes No   Yes   
IT Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes   
LT Yes Yes     Yes Yes   
LU Yes Yes No ??   Yes ?? 
LV No No       No No 
MT Yes   Yes Yes   Yes   
NL Yes  No No No No   No 
PL Yes       Yes Yes   
PT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RO Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes    
SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SI Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No 
SK Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes   
UK Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
IS Yes Yes No No   No   
NO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Key to shading: light gray (red) = ensured as a universal service; medium gray (light green) = not confirmed as an ensured  
universal service by NRA; dark gray (dark green) = not ensured as a universal service. 
?? = Unknown. No information about law or practice. 
 
In some cases, it may be noted, NRAs fail to regulate the rates of services considered 
to be universal services (shaded light grey or red). This seems to be inconsistent with 
Article 12. The most prominent example is the failure to control rates for basic parcel 
post service just noted. In addition, Latvia declares that bulk letter service is ensured as 
                                                
124 In several cases, NRAs which responded some questions did not respond to others even though, 
presumably, an NRA which knows whether or it regulates bulk letter post rates also knows whether or 
not it regulates bulk parcel rates. Hence, the non-answers probably indicate a lack of price regulation. 
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a universal service but does not regulate the prices. Three NRAs (BG, EE, IS) report 
that the periodicals service is ensured as a universal service but do not ensure that the 
prices of that service meet the requirements of Article 12. The Danish NRA declares 
that bulk parcel service is a universal service but does not control its tariffs. 
As noted in chapter 2, the Postal Directive may also imply the necessity or desirability of 
regulating tariffs of non-universal services under certain circumstances, especially 
where the postal operator is the USP.125 Under current practice, 8 NRAs (DE, EE, ES, 
FI, LU, RO, SE, NO), accounting for 34 percent of the EU/EEA market, report regulation 
of tariffs for bulk mail services even though such services are not ensured as universal 
service by the government. Similarly, 4 NRAs (DE, DK, SE, NO) control rates of non-
universal direct mail rates; 3 NRAs (RO, SE, NO) control rates of non-universal 
periodical mail rates; and 6 NRAs (BE, EE, ES, HU, PT, UK) control rates of non-
universal bulk parcel rates. In all cases, it appears the regulation of rates is limited to 
the rates of the national USP. 
All Member States control tariffs for basic letter post service, and the great majority, but 
not all, Member States control tariffs for basic parcel post service. Member States 
generally regulate prices of additional postal services if the services are ensured as 
universal services, although in some cases they do not (notably in the case of basic 
parcel post). In addition, in a number of cases, Member States regulate the rates of bulk 
postal services which are provided by the national USP but not ensured as universal 
services. 
                                                
125 See section 2.4, above. 
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3.7.2 Cost-oriented, transparent, and affordable rates 
Article 12 of the Second Postal Directive provides that for each of the services forming 
part of the provision of the universal service prices must be ‘geared to costs’, 
‘transparent and non-discriminatory’, and ‘affordable’. These standards imply a broad 
range of price controls. Rate controls on postal services are usually forward-looking in 
the sense that they are set before the USP changes prices. If the USP is required to 
obtain approval of the NRA before each price change, the method of control is usually 
referred to as ‘ex ante’ regulation. If the NRA adopts a rule that allows the USP to 
change prices provided they remain below a certain specific limit (which may be 
expressed as a mathematical formula, often allowed relating to more general price 
indices), the price control is called a ‘price cap’. In addition, NRAs may apply price 
controls after prices have been changed. That is, an NRA may rely upon investigations 
of prices already in effect and determine whether they are inconsistent with legal norms. 
Such price controls are usually referred to as ‘ex post’ regulation.  
The most fundamental universal service is basic letter post service. In trying to 
understand how Member States regulate postal rates, the survey began by asking how 
NRAs control basic letter post rates and what other rates are regulated at the same 
time. Table  3-38 summarises the answers. 
All NRAs except the Finnish NRA rely upon forward looking price controls — either ex 
ante approval or price cap — for regulating the tariffs for basic letter post service.126 
Most NRAs regulate prices for other postal services at the same time. Several NRAs 
(CY, EL, IE, MT, UK), however, feel that they did not have sufficient cost and revenue 
information to establish all prices or price caps accurately.127 Despite high public 
interest in basic letter post rates, only 11 NRAs (DE, HU, IE, IT, LT, MT, PL, PT, SK, 
UK) solicited public comment before reviewing the last rate change. Eleven NRAs (DE, 
FR, HU, IE, MT, PL, PT, SI, SK, UK, NO) issued a reasoned decision explaining its 
review of rates. Two NRAs (IT, LT) solicited public comment but did not issue a 
reasoned opinion, while three NRAs (FR, SI, NO) gave a reasoned opinion but did not 
solicit public comment. 
                                                
126 In some cases, the forward-looking control is limited to a subset of the basic letter post. For greater 
detail on methods of price regulation see section 3.7.4, below. The answers of the Latvian NRA with 
respect to price regulation are incomplete and unclear but it appears that price cap regulation is 
employed, at least for basic letter post. See Questionnaire 251-2, 251-31, 251-32. 
127 The NRA of the Netherlands noted that this information was ‘not applicable’ to its regulation. 
Questionnaire 251-2. 
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Table  3-38 Forward-looking price control procedures 
 Ex ante/ price 
cap control 



















AT Yes 2009 2009  ??   
BE Yes 2008 2007 E Yes No No 
BG Yes 2009 2009     
CY Yes 2009 2003  No No No 
CZ Yes 2008 2005 E Yes No No 
DE Yes 2009 2008 B Yes Yes Yes 
DK Yes 2008 2007 ABC Yes No No 
EE Yes 2009 2009     
EL Yes 2008 2007 ABCDE No No No 
ES Yes 2009 2009 AG Yes No No 
FI No 2009 2009     
FR Yes 2009 2008 ABCE Yes No Yes 
HU Yes 2008 2007 ABCG Yes Yes Yes 
IE Yes 2007 2005 AB No Yes Yes 
IT Yes 2006 2003 AC Yes Yes No 
LT Yes 2007 1999 ACEF Yes Yes No 
LU Yes 2005 2003   No No 
LV Yes 2009 2008   Yes No 
MT Yes 2006 2009 AB No Yes Yes 
NL Yes 2009 2009 EG ??   
PL Yes 2008 2009 CE Yes Yes Yes 
PT Yes 2008 2008 BCE Yes Yes Yes 
RO Yes 2009 2007  Yes No No 
SE Yes 2009 2009     
SI Yes 2008 2006 ADE Yes No Yes 
SK Yes 2007 2009 ABCEFG Yes Yes Yes 
UK Yes 2008 2009 ABCDE No Yes Yes 
IS Yes 2009 2009     
NO Yes 2008 2007  Yes No Yes 
Other rates controlled at same time as basic letter post: (A) bulk letters; (B) direct mail; (C) non-priority letter post; (D) periodicals;  
(E) basic parcel post; (F) bulk parcels; (G) other; ?? = Unknown. No information about law or practice. 
 
To ensure that prices of universal services are cost-oriented, NRAs must begin by 
answering the question, which costs? What standard or benchmark does the NRA rely 
upon for the purpose of evaluating the appropriateness of changes in the prices of 
universal services?’ Historical costs of the USP? Projected future costs? Or some other 
measure of cost? Moreover, to ensure that the price of each universal service is geared 
to costs, it appears necessary for the NRA to determine the costs and revenues for 
each service. Costs and revenues depend in turn on the expected volume of mail for 
each service. In addition, a vigilant regulator might require the USP to reduce its unit 
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costs over time, i.e., improve its productivity. Table  3-39 summarises the practices of 
NRAs in relating prices to costs. 




























AT Yes Fut. cost ?? ??  Yes Yes ?? 
BE No     Yes Yes No 
BG Yes Past cost Yes Yes  Yes Yes No 
CY Yes Past cost Yes Yes FAC Yes Yes No 
CZ Yes Past cost No  FAC Yes Yes No 
DE Yes Fut. cost No Yes LRIC Yes Yes Yes 
DK No     Yes Yes No 
EE Yes Past cost Yes Yes FAC Yes Yes Yes 
EL Yes Fut. cost No No FAC Yes Yes No 
ES Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes No 
FI No     Yes Yes No 
FR Yes Past cost Yes Yes LRIC Yes Yes No 
HU No     Yes Yes No 
IE Yes Fut. cost Yes Yes FAC Yes Yes No 
IT Yes Past cost Yes Yes  Yes Yes No 
LT Yes Past cost Yes Yes FAC Yes Yes No 
LU No     Yes Yes No 
LV Yes Fut. cost Yes Yes FAC Yes Yes No 
MT Yes   Yes  Yes Yes No 
NL No     Yes Yes No 
PL Yes Fut. cost No No  Yes Yes Yes 
PT Yes Other Yes Yes Other Yes Yes Yes 
RO Yes Fut. cost Yes Yes FAC Yes Yes No 
SE Yes Past cost Yes Yes  Yes No No 
SI Yes Past cost Yes Yes FAC Yes Yes Yes 
SK Yes Past cost Yes Yes FAC Yes Yes Yes 
UK Yes Fut. cost Yes Yes LRMC Yes Yes No 
IS Yes Past cost Yes Yes FAC Yes Yes No 
NO Yes Past cost Yes Yes FAC Yes Yes No 
Type of costs used: Past cost = Historical costs of USP(s) plus appropriate increase; Fut. cost = Estimate of probable future costs of 
USP(s); Other = Other; ?? = Unknown. No information about law or practice. 
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At the outset, it appears that 6 NRAs (BE, DK, FI, HU, LU, NL), collectively representing 
about 14 percent of the EU/EEA letter post market, do not use cost data to regulate 
rates of universal services.128 On the other hand, other NRAs seem to take a fairly 
detailed look at cost and revenue data in their review of new rates. Most NRAs (12) 
base their decisions on historical cost data but a substantial minority of 8 NRAs (AT, 
DE, EL, IE, LV, PL, RO, UK), representing almost half of the EU/EEA market, attempt 
the more difficult exercise of estimating future costs. Almost all NRAs try to verify future 
revenues as well as costs for each product.  
Most NRAs consider that for a tariff to be ‘geared to cost’ it must cover fully allocated 
cost. This would appear to be the implication of Article 14(3). On the other hand, the 
three largest NRAs (DE, FR, UK), accounting for almost 60 percent of the EU/EEA 
market, consider that the minimum cost that must be covered by each rate is the long 
run incremental or long run marginal cost. Most economists would suggest that this is 
the standard most consistent with the public interest.129  
The definition of ‘affordability’ as a standard for postage rates has proved elusive for 
most NRAs. Six NRAs (DE, EE, PL, PT, SI, SK) report a definition of ‘affordability’. The 
most elaborate answer is the German. Affordable rates are rates that meet one of two 
tests: (1) not greater than the real price payable on 31 December 1997 or (2) not 
greater than the price justified by the cost of efficient service (where a postal operator is 
obliged to provide service). The Portuguese NRA considers that cost-orientation 
ensures affordability. The Estonian and Slovenian NRAs define affordability as 
accessible or affordable for all users, which is not very enlightening. The Polish NRA 
relates affordability to the minimum wage in an unspecified manner.130 
                                                
128 Questionnaire 251-12. Specifically, the question asked, ‘Overall, in order to evaluate a proposed 
change in the prices of universal services or to establish price caps, does the NRA rely primarily upon 
an analysis of either (A) the historic costs of the USP (adding an appropriate allowance for cost 
increases) or (B) an explicit estimate of future costs of the USP(s)?’. 
129 The Portuguese NRA seems to use long run marginal cost as well. See answer to Q251-17 
(‘Operational costs (based on Fully Allocated Costs according to Directive Art 14 (2), excluding, e.g., 
overheads)’). In section 6.3.9, below, we suggest a possible ‘best practice’ approach that could help to 
reconcile these different perspectives. 
130 Questionnaire 251-23. 
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Article 12 of the Postal Directive requires Member States to ensure that the tariff for 
each universal service is ‘geared to costs’, ‘transparent and non-discriminatory’, and 
‘affordable’. With the exception of Finland, all NRAs rely on forward looking price 
controls — either ex ante review or price caps — to regulate the tariffs for basic letter 
post service. Most regulate rates for other services at the same time. Despite the high 
public interest in basic letter post rates, less than half of the NRAs solicit public 
comment in reviewing rate changes or issue a reasoned decision explaining their rate 
decisions. Although the directive requires that prices should be based on costs, 6 NRAs 
do not appear to base rate regulation on cost data. The remaining NRAs appear to take 
a fairly detailed look at cost and revenue data in their review of rates although some 
NRAs feel that they did not have adequate data in reviewing rates. Most NRAs consider 
that, in order to be ‘geared to cost’, the rate for each product must cover its fully 
allocated cost. On the other hand, the three largest NRAs (DE, FR, UK), representing 
almost 60 percent of the EU/EEA market, consider that the minimum cost that must be 
covered by each rate should be the long run incremental or long run marginal cost, a 
standard more consistent with economic theory. Only a handful of NRAs have 
attempted to define ‘affordability’; none of these definitions appears to be clearly and 
objectively related to the ability of a person to afford to make use of universal postal 
services. 
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3.7.3 Uniform rates 
By way of a limited exception to the principle of cost-based pricing, Article 12 of the 
Second Postal Directive allows a Member State to require that a postage rate be 
applied uniformly throughout the national territory. In the Third Postal Directive, this 
exception is limited to tariffs for single-piece items and tariffs required ‘to protect general 
public interests, such as access to culture, ensuring participation in a democratic 
society (freedom of press) or regional and social cohesion’.131 
Table  3-40 Overview: required uniform rates 
 Basic  
letter post 





AT Yes         Yes   
BE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BG Yes     No Yes Yes   
CY               
CZ No         No   
DE No No No No   No No 
DK Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
EE R/L R/L No No No Yes Yes 
EL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
ES Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
FI Yes No No No No No No 
FR Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
HU No No No No No No No 
IE No No No No   No   
IT Yes No Yes Yes   Yes   
LT Yes Yes     Yes Yes   
LU Yes Yes R/L Yes   Yes ?? 
LV R/L R/L R/L   R/L No No 
MT Yes   Yes Yes   Yes   
NL Yes No No No No Yes No 
PL Yes       Yes Yes   
PT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No  
RO Yes Yes   Yes   Yes   
SE Yes No No No Yes Yes No 
SI Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No 
SK No No No No No No   
UK Yes Other Other   Yes Yes Yes 
IS Yes Yes Yes Yes   No   
NO R/L R/L R/L No R/L No No 
Key to shading: light gray (red) = ensured as a universal service; medium gray (light green) = not confirmed as an ensured universal  
service by NRA; dark gray (dark green) = not ensured as a universal service; ?? = Unknown. No information about law or practice. 
 
Table  3-40 summarises the practice of uniform rate requirements among the Member 
States. The table is overlaid with the shading from table 2-3 that indicates whether the 
                                                
131 Directive 2008/6/EC, Recital 38. For additional discussion, see section 5.6.2, below. 
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service is ensured as a universal service.132 Light gray or red shading indicates that the 
service is ensured as a universal service. Dark gray or dark green shading indicates 
that it is not ensured as a universal service. And medium gray or light green indicates 
that service was not confirmed as an ensured universal service by the NRA and 
therefore probably is not ensured as a universal service. 
As this table shows, 23 Member States representing 77 percent of the EU/EEA market 
require uniform national tariffs for basic letter post items (in EE, LV, NO, limited to items 
within the reserved area), and 18 Member States, representing 72 percent of the 
market, require uniform rates for basic parcel post items. On the other hand, 5 Member 
States (CZ, DE, HU, IE, SK), representing almost one quarter of the EU/EEA postal 
market, do not require uniform tariffs for basic letter post service, even though the USPs 
may provide uniform tariffs voluntarily. Ten Member States (CZ, DE, FI, HU, IE, LV, PT, 
SK, IS, NO), accounting for slightly more than one quarter of the market, do not require 
uniform tariffs for basic parcel post service. Most Member States (exceptions: FI, HU, 
SK) that ensure provision of a non-priority letter post require uniform tariffs.  
For the bulk mail services, Member States are fairly evenly divided on the requirement 
for uniform tariffs. With respect to bulk letter services, 11 Member States (BE, DK, EL, 
ES, FR, LT, LU, PT, RO, SI, IS) require uniform tariffs for all items and 3 Member 
States (EE, LV, NO) require uniform tariffs for reserved items, altogether about one third 
of the EU/EEA postal market. Nine Member States (DE, FI, HU, IE, IT, NL, SE, SK), 
accounting for more than one third of the EU/EEA market, do not. For direct mail 
service, 12 Member States (BE, DK, EL, ES, FR, IT, LU, LV, MT, PT, IS, NO) require 
uniform tariffs and 9 Member States (DE, EE, FI, HU, IE, NL, SE, SI, SK) do not. The 
UK requires uniform tariffs only for the most basic bulk mail services, which constitute 
about one quarter of bulk letters and direct mail in that country. Ten Member States 
(BE, DK, EL, IT, LU, MT, PT, RO, SI, IS) require uniform tariffs for periodicals and 
4 Member States (BE, EE, ES, UK) for bulk parcels.  
Most Member States require a uniform national tariffs for basic letter post service (23 
Member States) and basic parcel post service (18 Member States). Most Member 
States that ensure provision of a non-priority letter post as a universal service also 
require uniform tariffs for this service. Member States are split fairly evenly on whether 
to require uniform tariffs for bulk letter and direct mail services. Only a minority of 
Member States require uniform tariffs for periodicals or bulk parcels.  
                                                
132 See section 2.3, above. 
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3.7.4 Methods of rate regulation 
The Postal Directive offers no guidance on the method to be used to regulate prices of 
universal services. Economists customarily recognise three basic approaches. The first 
is ‘ex ante’ regulation, according to which the USP must receive specific approval of the 
NRA before it can change prices. The second is ‘price cap’ regulation, which permits 
the USP to change prices without specific prior approval provided the prices remain 
below a pre-approved level or formula. The third type of regulation is ‘ex post’ 
regulation, which allows the USP to change prices without prior consent but which also 
allows the NRA to modify prices if, after investigation, it appears that the prices are 
inconsistent with statutory or regulatory standards (e.g., ‘cost-based’ or ‘affordable’ or 
not ‘abusive’). A Member State may choose to regulate some universal services by one 
method and other universal services by another method. 
Table  3-41 summarises the methods of price regulation employed by NRAs. As in other 
overview tables, the table is overlaid with the shading from table 2-3 that indicates 
whether the service is ensured as a universal service.133 
Table  3-41 shows that NRAs use a wide variety of price regulation methods. In terms of 
volume, the majority rule is price caps. Nine NRAs (BE, DE, DK, EE, IT, NL, PT, SE, 
UK) impose price caps on rates for basic letter post items, at least when those items are 
within a reserved or licensed area or below a certain weight (DK, 50 grams; SE, 500 
grams). In Germany, price cap controls apply only to non-bulk letter post items and only 
if the postal operator has a market dominant position.134 Collectively, Member States 
with price caps account for 62 percent of the EU/EEA postal market. Sixteen NRAs (AT, 
BG, EL, ES, FR, HU, IE, LT, LU, MT, PL, RO, SI, SK, IS, NO) require ex ante approval 
of rates for basic letter post items, at least for reserved items.135 Collectively, these 
Member States account for about 35 percent of the EU/EEA letter post market. Finland 
chooses to regulate rates for basic letter post by ex post review only. 
                                                
133 See section 2.3, above. 
134 German Post Law, Article 19 (‘All rates charged by a licensee in a market for postal services subject 
to licence shall require approval by the Regulatory Authority, provided the licensee has a dominant 
position in the relevant market. Sentence 1 shall not apply to rates payable for conveyance services 
involving a minimum mailing volume of 50 letter post items’). 
135 In addition, in the Czech Republic, ex ante approval is required for ‘five selected most important 
services’ within the basic letter post service. Otherwise ex post review is employed. Questionnaire 
211-6. 
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Table  3-41 Overview: method of price regulation 
 Basic letter 
post 





AT EA-rl/EP         EP   
BE PC PC-rl PC-rl   PC-rl PC Other 
BG EA       EA EA   
CY               
CZ Other             
DE PC-md/EP EP-md EP-md     EP-md EP-md 
DK PC-50 PC-50 PC-50   PC-50     
EE PC EP-rl       PC EP 
EL EA EA EA EA EA EA   
ES EA-rl/PC EA-rl/PC       PC PC 
FI EP EP     EP EP   
FR EA-rl/PC EA-rl/PC EA-rl/PC EA EA-rl/PC PC   
HU EA-rl/PC EA-rl EA-rl EP EA-rl EP EP 
IE EA-rl/EP EA-rl/EP EA-rl/EP     EP   
IT PC PC PC PC   PC   
LT EA EP     EA EA   
LU EA Other       EA   
LV               
MT EA   EA EA   EA   
NL PC             
PL EA       EA EA   
PT PC-rl/EA PC-rl/EA PC-rl/EA EA PC-rl/EA EA EA 
RO EA EA     EA EA   
SE PC-50/EP EP EP EP EP EP EP 
SI EA EA   EA   EA   
SK EA EA EA   EA EA   
UK PC PC-md/EP PC   PC PC PC 
IS EA-rl/EP EA-rl/EP           
NO EA-rl/PC EA-rl/PC EA-rl/PC PC PC PC   
Key to all columns: EA = Ex ante for all items in this service category; PC = Price cap for all items in this service category; EP = Ex post 
for all items in this service category; EA-rl/PC = Ex ante for items in reserved or licensed area, otherwise price cap; EA-rl/EP = Ex ante 
for items in reserved or licensed area, otherwise ex post; PC-rl/EP = Price cap for items in reserved or licensed area, otherwise ex post; 
EA-md/PC = Ex ante where there operator has dominant position, otherwise price cap; EA-md/EP = Ex ante where there operator has 
dominant position, otherwise ex post; PCmd/EP = Price cap where there operator has dominant position, otherwise ex post;  
PC-50 = Price cap for items weighing up to 50 grams; PC-rl/EA = Price cap for items in reserved or licensed area; otherwise ex ante; 
PC-rl = Price cap for items in reserved or licensed area only; EP-md = Ex post where there operator has dominant position; EA-rl = Ex 
ante for items in reserved or licensed area; EP-rl = Ex post for items in reserved or licensed area; PC-500/EP = Price cap for items 
weighing up to 500 grams; otherwise ex post; Other = Other . 
Key to shading: light gray (red) = ensured as a universal service; medium gray (light green) = not confirmed as an ensured universal 
service by NRA; dark gray (dark green) = not ensured as a universal service. 
 
With respect to basic parcel post items, 7 NRAs (BE, EE, ES, FR, IT, UK, NO), 
accounting for about 57 of the EU/EEA market, impose price caps. Ten NRAs (BG, EL, 
LT, LU, MT, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK), representing about 6 percent of the EU/EEA market, 
require ex ante approval of rates. Seven NRAS (AT, CZ, DE, FI, HU, IE, SE), about 30 
percent of the market, review single-piece parcel rates ex post. 
Rates for unreserved bulk postal services are less strictly regulated. Nine Member 
States (EL, ES, FR, IT, PT, RO, SI, SK, NO), comprising about 35 percent of the 
EU/EEA postal market, regulate unreserved bulk letter service by ex ante or price cap 
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methods. Bulk parcel rates are generally unregulated except for a price cap system in 
Spain. 
As part of this survey, we invited NRAs to summarise their views on when ex ante price 
regulation is most appropriate.136 Some answered that ex ante price regulation is 
always appropriate for universal services. For example: 
• EE: All universal services should have ex ante price regulation. This guarantees 
equal prices to all users and all over the country. 
• IE: In principle ex ante rate cases are the only effective way of controlling such 
prices, although there may be some timing/resource issues in a liberalised 
market. 
• PL: All types of universal services should be regulated by means of ex ante price 
regulation to ensure the prices are affordable, cost-oriented, transparent and 
non-discriminatory. 
Other NRAs (BE, DK) replied that ex ante regulation should never be used. Still 
other NRAs declared that ex ante regulation should be used when the USP has a 
market dominant position or monopoly power: 
• DE: Single piece letters of the incumbent (market dominant operator) subject to 
ex-ante regulation. 
• HU: Domestic reserved area. 
• PT: The reserved services and services for which the operator has a dominant 
position, in order to avoid that it uses the revenues from the reserved area to 
finance the provision of other services under competition and to protect 
consumers. 
• SI: Reserved area and services with no or low level of competition. 
• UK: Services where the incumbent is found to have significant market power. 
Here ex post regulation would allow the incumbent time to engage in anti-
competitive behaviour and increase market uncertainty. 
Similarly, we asked NRAs to advise on the most appropriate use of price cap 
regulation.137 Answers to this question tend to complement the views expressed on ex 
ante regulation: 
                                                
136 Questionnaire 251-24 (‘Based on your experience, please describe briefly what types of universal 
services are most appropriately regulated by means of ex ante price regulation and why’). 
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• DK: Single piece letter post. We don't expect any significant competition in the 
single letter market. 
• IT: Price cap method allows [the NRA] to improve the USP efficiency. At present 
in Italy all universal services are regulated by means of ex ante price regulation 
using price cap mechanism. 
• SE: Price cap is most appropriate for services that are used by consumers 
(stamped, single piece, overnight delivery) to protect them from unjustified price 
increase. This is a safety mechanism on top of the cost orientation. 
• SI: Services with low or middle level of competition. 
The French NRA stated that all universal services should be regulated by forward-
looking regulatory mechanism but expressed no view on when the ex ante or price cap 
method is to be preferred. 
What seems to emerge from this review is a consensus among NRAs that forward-
looking price regulation should be applied to universal service products where there is 
no significant competition. NRAs hold different views about the relative merits of ex ante 
versus price cap methods. NRAs also differ on whether forward-looking price regulation 
is also appropriate for universal service products where the USPs faces significant 
competition. 
Price caps are used to regulate rates of basic letter post services in 9 Member States, 
representing 62 percent of the total EU/EEA postal market. Sixteen Member States, 
representing 35 percent of the postal market, regulate basic letter post services by ex 
ante review. Finland relies on ex post review. Three Member States either do not 
regulate basic letter post rates or did not answer. Basic parcel post rates are also 
regulated by price caps in 7 Member States accounting for more than half of the postal 
market. Other Member States use ex ante and ex post methods roughly equally. Rates 
for unreserved bulk postal services are less strictly regulated, in part because these 
services are not ensured as universal services in some Member States. In general, 
there appears to be a consensus among NRAs that forward-looking price regulation — 
either ex ante review or price caps — is appropriate for universal service products 
where there is no significant competition. NRAs differ on whether forward-looking price 
regulation is appropriate for universal service products where the USPs faces significant 
competition.  
                                                                                                                                             
137 Questionnaire 251-25 (‘Based on your experience, please describe briefly what types of universal 
services are most appropriately regulated by means of price cap regulation and why’). Although the 
questionnaire defined its use of the terms ‘ex ante’ and ‘price cap’ regulation, it is clear from the 
answers that several NRAs did not understand this distinction. On other hand, most NRAs did make 
this distinction in their answers. 
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3.7.5 Individual agreements and special tariffs 
Article 12 of the Second Postal Directive provides that ‘the application of a uniform tariff 
does not exclude the right of the universal service provider(s) to conclude individual 
agreements on prices with customers’. Article 12 thus recognises that USPs may 
conclude individual agreements with users and limits the authority of Member States to 
require uniform tariffs in individual agreements. The directive does not otherwise define 
the term ‘individual agreement’. 
Article 12 also provides for ‘special tariffs’. The Second Postal Directive indicates that 
‘special tariffs’ include prices offered to ‘businesses, bulk mailers or consolidators of 
mail from different customers’ for something less than the complete range of features 
covered by the standard tariff. In general, special tariffs must conform to the same 
principles as tariffs for universal services generally. Specifically, special tariffs for large 
businesses or for companies that consolidate the mail of smaller firms should ‘take 
account of the avoided costs, as compared to the standard service’ and ‘shall apply 
equally both as between different third parties and as between third parties and 
universal service providers supplying equivalent services'. Moreover, special tariffs must 
be made available to ‘private customers who post under similar conditions’. 
Individual agreements and special tariffs are apparently a large factor in the overall 
supply of postal services. In Member States which regulate bulk letters and direct mail 
as universal services, the requirements of Article 12 necessitate an extra measure of 
regulatory attention. 
The first issue presented by individual agreements is definitional. Are ‘individual 
agreements’ different from ‘special tariffs’? Does the Postal Directive require or allow 
NRAs to regulate individual agreements differently than special tariffs? The great 
majority of NRAs (23) view individual agreements as equivalent to special tariffs. Five 
NRAs (AT, BE, ES, FR, SK), however, consider individual agreements to be something 
different. They explained the distinctions as follows:138 
• BE: Individual agreements or conventional agreements signed between the USP 
and a customer in function of certain conditions; specials tariffs are publicly 
available and show discounts as a function of certain specific criteria. 
• ES: Special tariffs are public discount schemes; there are no special tariffs in 
Spain, but there are many individual tariffs that involve similar discounts. 
• FR: Individual agreements were concluded between parties at a price 
determined during commercial negotiations; special tariffs are included within 
                                                
138 Questionnaire 252-1, 252-2. 
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the offer list provided by the postal operator, depend on the degree of 
concentration and preparation of mail. 
• SK: Special tariffs take account [of] the avoided costs; individual agreements are 
for the "highest TOP" clients and take account [of and grant a] bonus for long 
term co-operation. 
NRAs do not appear well-informed about individual agreements. Only the Belgian NRA 
reports it has access to all individual agreements. Eight NRAs (AT, ES, FR, HU, IE, LV, 
PL, SK) declare that they do not have access to individual agreements, even though 
four of these (AT, ES, FR, SK) declare that they ensure individual agreements are 
transparent. Seven NRAs (AT, BE, ES, FR, NL, SK) report that individual agreements 
are equally available to similarly situated mailers, while three NRAs (LV, NL, PL) report 
that they are not, which would appear to be discriminatory. 
How important are individual agreements? The French NRA estimates that they 
account for about 3 percent of correspondence. The estimate of the Slovakian NRA is 
21 percent. The Spanish NRA estimates that 87 percent of correspondence within the 
reserved area is transmitted by individual agreement.139  
Special tariffs are better understood and more common. Special tariffs appear to be 
offered by almost all USPs (exceptions: CZ, EE, ES, IT, LV, MT). Seventeen NRAs, 
representing 80 percent of the EU/EEA postal market, report that they have ‘complete 
and up to date’ information on all special tariffs.140 However, only 8 NRAs (BE, DE, FR, 
IT, LT, PT, SK, UK) declare that they can calculate avoided costs, the basic 
requirement of Article 12 (these 8 NRAs, however, account for 70 percent of the postal 
market). It should be noted that the term ‘avoided costs’ has been interpreted differently 
by different NRAs. Three NRAs (DE, LT, SK) interpret ‘avoided costs’ to refer to the full 
retail price minus the costs saved by virtue of the downstream access. Three NRAs (IE, 
IT, UK) interpret ‘avoided costs’ to refer to the end to end cost minus the costs 
saved.141  
Tables 3-43, 3-44, and 3-45 summarise the regulation of the special tariffs for bulk 
letters, direct mail, and bulk parcels, respectively. In each table, the first column 
indicates whether the NRA reports that the bulk service is ensured as a universal 
service.142 From these tables, it appears that special tariffs are an important element of 
the EU/EEA postal market. Although estimates of market share are incomplete, the 
weighted averages of the available data suggest that about 78 percent of letter mail and 
                                                
139 Questionnaire 252-5. The Belgian NRA states that the scope of individual agreements is confidential. 
140 Questionnaire 252-14 (BE, BG, CY, DE, EL, FR, HU, IE, IT, LT, PL, PT, SE, SI, SK, UK, NO). 
141 Questionnaire 252-16. For a discussion of this issue, see UK Postcomm, ‘Promoting Effective 
Competition In UK Postal Services Through Downstream Access’ (2004).  
142 See section 2.3, above. 
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99 percent of direct mail is conveyed under special tariffs. The importance of special 
tariffs in the bulk parcel market cannot be estimated for lack of data. 

































AT          
BE Yes Yes  ABCDEF # L/P L/P L/P L/P 
BG  Yes 48 ABCDEF 51  L/P   
CY  Yes 29 AB  L L/P No No 
CZ  No        
DE  Yes 26 ABCEF  L L L L 
DK Yes Yes    L L L L 
EE No         
EL Yes Yes 14.5 ABCF 89 L L L L 
ES No   A      
FI No ??        
FR Yes Yes 86 ABDE 60 L/P L/P L/P L/P 
HU Yes Yes 24.2 ABCG 87.2 L L L/P L/P 
IE Yes Yes 25.4 ABCEFG 25 L/P L/P L/P L/P 
IT Yes Yes  BCDEF      
LT Yes Yes 38 ABCEF  L/P L/P P P 
LU No Yes 19 ABCEF 80 ?? L ?? ?? 
LV Yes No        
MT No No    L L L  
NL No No    No L/P No L 
PL No Yes    L L No No 
PT Yes Yes 21 ABG  L/P L/P L L 
RO No Yes 35 ABF  L L   
SE No Yes 23 ABF 73 L/P L/P L/P L/P 
SI Yes Yes 2 AB 22.53 L/P L/P   
SK Yes Yes 18 ABCE 70 P P P P 
UK Yes Yes 34 ABCDF 87 L L L/P L/P 
IS Yes Yes 30 ABE 80 L/P L/P L/P L/P 
NO No Yes  ABFG  L L/P L/P L/P 
Criteria for special tariff: (A) Volume of mailing; (B) Presorting and bundling of mail; (C) Suitability for mechanised sorting and handling;  
(D) Lack of errors or omissions in addressing; (E) Standard sizes or packaging (e.g. standard envelope, flat, parcel); (F) Transport to a  
sorting centre or office near addressee; (G) Other. 
ST based on avoided costs?: L/P = Required by law and verified in practice; P = Not required by law but verified in practice; L = Required 
by law but not verified in practice; No = Not required by law or verified in practice; ?? = Unknown. No information about law or practice;  
Other = Other. 
 
Special tariffs for bulk letters are employed in 21 Member States, representing 
82 percent of the total EU/EEA postal market. Eighteen NRAs report that adherence to 
the avoided cost rule of Article 12 is required by law, but only 8 of these NRAs (BE, FR, 
IE, LT, PT, SE, SI, IS), representing 27 percent of the postal market, confirm that 
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compliance has also been verified in practice. Similarly, 21 NRAs report that rate 
transparency is required by law, but only 12 NRAs have verified the practice. The 
requirement in Article 12 that special tariffs must be made available to other postal 
operators on equal terms is apparently required by law in only 13 Member States 
(nonetheless, representing 79 percent of the postal market), and compliance has been 
verified by 8 NRAs (BE, FR, HU, IE, SE, UK, IS, NO), representing 50 percent of the 
postal market. 




































AT          
BE Yes Yes  ABCDEF # L/P L/P L/P L/P 
BG  Yes 48 ABCDEF   L/P   
CY  Yes 29 AB  L P No No 
CZ          
DE  Yes 8 ABCEF  L L L L 
DK No Yes    L L L L 
EE No         
EL Yes Yes 25.0 ABCF 84.5 L L L L 
ES No    100     
FI No         
FR Yes Yes  ABDEF  L/P L/P L/P L/P 
HU Yes Yes 24.2 ABC 100 L L/P L/P L/P 
IE Yes Yes 43.7 ABFG 100 L/P L/P L/P L/P 
IT Yes         
LT ?? ??        
LU No Yes 19 ABCEF  ?? ?? ?? ?? 
LV No No        
MT Yes No    L L L  
NL No         
PL No Yes    L L L L 
PT Yes Yes 18 AG  L/P L/P L L 
RO No Yes 35 ABF  L L   
SE No Yes 18 ABF 100 L/P L/P L/P L/P 
SI No ??        
SK Yes Yes 16 AB 80 P P P P 
UK Yes Yes 34 ABCDF  L L L/P L/P 
IS Yes Yes 30 ACE  L/P L/P L/P L/P 
NO No Yes  ABFG  L L L/P L/P 
Criteria for special tariff: (A) Volume of mailing; (B) Presorting and bundling of mail; (C) Suitability for mechanised sorting and handling;  
(D) Lack of errors or omissions in addressing; (E) Standard sizes or packaging (e.g. standard envelope, flat, parcel); (F) Transport to a  
sorting centre or office near addressee; (G) Other. 
ST based on avoided costs?: L/P = Required by law and verified in practice; P = Not required by law but verified in practice; L = Required 
by law but not verified in practice; No = Not required by law or verified in practice; ?? = Unknown. No information about law or practice;  
Other = Other. 
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Special tariffs for direct mail are employed in 18 Member States, representing 
76 percent of the total EU/EEA postal market. Sixteen NRAs report that adherence to 
the avoided cost rule of Article 12 is required by law, and 6 of these NRAs (BE, FR, IE, 
PT, SE, IS), representing 27 percent of the postal market, confirm that it has also been 
verified in practice. Sixteen Member States require rate transparency by law, and half 
have verified this in practice. Thirteen Member States require that special tariffs be 
made available to postal operators, and 8 NRAs (BE, FR, HU, IE, SE, UK, IS, NO), 
representing 50 percent of the EU/EEA postal market, have verified in practice. 































AT          
BE Yes Yes  A # L/P L/P L/P L/P 
BG  Yes 35 ABCDF   L/P   
CY  Yes 29 A  L/P L/P No No 
CZ          
DE  Yes  ACE  No No No No 
DK Yes Yes    L L L L 
EE No         
EL  Yes 30 ABF  L L L L 
ES No     L L L L 
FI No         
FR No         
HU Yes No   0     
IE No No   0 L L L L 
IT No         
LT  No        
LU No Yes 50       
LV No No        
MT No No     L L L 
NL No         
PL No Yes    L L L P 
PT Yes Yes 15 A  L/P L/P Other Other 
RO No No        
SE No Yes  AF      
SI No No        
SK No Yes  AB 75 P P P P 
UK Yes Yes 34 ABCEF 65 L L L/P L/P 
IS No No        
NO No No        
Criteria for special tariff: (A) Volume of mailing; (B) Presorting and bundling of mail; (C) Suitability for mechanised sorting and handling; (D) Lack of 
errors or omissions in addressing; (E) Standard sizes or packaging (e.g. standard envelope, flat, parcel); (F) Transport to a sorting centre or office 
near addressee; (G) Other. 
ST based on avoided costs?: L/P = Required by law and verified in practice; P = Not required by law but verified in practice; L = Required by law but 
not verified in practice; No = Not required by law or verified in practice; ?? = Unknown. No information about law or practice; Other = Other. 
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Special tariffs for bulk parcels are reported in only 12 Member States, representing 
54 percent of the EU/EEA postal market. Nine NRAs report that adherence to the 
avoided cost rule of Article 12 is required by law, but only 3 of these NRAs (BE, CY, 
PT), representing 4 percent of the postal market, confirm that it has also been verified in 
practice. Eleven Member State require rate transparency by law, and four have verified 
this in practice. Seven Member States require that special tariffs be made available to 
postal operators, and 2 NRAs (BE, UK), representing 25 percent of the EU/EEA postal 
market, have verified in practice. 
Postal services provided under special tariffs are an important component of the 
EU/EEA postal services market, accounting for the conveyance of perhaps three 
quarters of all letters and direct mail items. Not all USPs offer bulk mail services, but 
bulk mail tariffs are available to large mailers in approximately half to three quarters of 
the EU/EEA postal market if national markets are weighted by volume. For bulk letters 
and direct mail, the requirements of Article 12 have generally been translated into 
national law, but implementation has been verified by NRAs in only about one-third to 
one half of the Member States. For bulk parcel services, adherence to the requirements 
of Article 12, both in law and in practice, has been more sporadic. 
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Case history  3-10: Access to information on special tariffs in Germany  
According to the German Postal Act, rates for non-bulk (less than 50 items) letter post services 
charged by a licensee who has a dominant position in the market require prior approval by the 
BNetzA, the German NRA. There is an exception for rates for network access, which shall be 
subject to approval by the BNetzA only when the incidental services are included by the 
licensee in its General Terms and Conditions.  
To ensure compliance with the legal provisions and to prevent anti-competitive behaviour, 
BNetzA may require the submission of contracts. However, according to the German law, 
BNetzA may require submission of contracts and other information only for the approval of rates 
related to network access. In such case, transparency is necessary to enable the BNetzA to 
examine whether the rates of providing network access are reasonable and competitive.  
Acting under this provision, in 1999 BNetzA requested Deutsche Post to submit all of its access 
agreements with competitors, customers and subsidiaries and other associations. Deutsche 
Post asked the administrative court to block this request. Deutsche Post argued that the 
requested contracts are not access agreements, since they did not contain elements of pure 
transport service. In fact, Deutsche Post argued, the requested contracts pertained only to 
preparatory work which did not constitute postal conveyance. 
Acting on an appeal from the lower courts, in January 2008 the Higher Administrative Court in 
Münster rejected Deutsche Post’s position in all respects. The court stated that BNetzA has the 
right to request information about access agreements because of the need to ensure their 
compliance with law. The court further concluded that the requested contracts could be 
considered access agreements because the term ‘mail-transportation’ not only includes the 
pure act of transportation but also the whole supply chain from the addresser to the addressee.  
The Federal Administrative Court of Germany has recently upheld this ruling. After a lengthy 
legal proceedings Deutsche Post has been required to provide BNetzA all the requested 
contracts on network access. 
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3.7.6 Rate investigations 
As an additional indicator of the vigour of price regulation, this survey requested NRAs 
to report the number of formal rate proceedings. While the extensive judicial and policy 
proceedings of the British regulator, Postcomm, are well known, the objective of this 
portion of the survey was to obtain a complete census of substantial public proceedings 
by the NRAs.  
To do so, the survey attempted to draw a clear distinction between (A) proceedings in 
which the NRA solicits one or more rounds of public comments and supplements the 
public input with reports from expert consultants where appropriate and (B) informal or 
non-public administrative proceedings in which the NRA adopts a decision without a 
public proceeding. In an earlier study by WIK, we asked NRAs to state the ‘number of 
formal NRA investigations begun in respect to tariffs for generally applicable postal 
services’ without defining the term ‘formal NRA investigation’.143 Since the answers 
ranged from 0 to 443 per year, it seemed evident that NRAs were interpreting the term 
‘formal NRA investigation’ in very different ways, so much so that statistical analysis 
was impossible. 
In this survey, the questionnaire sought to explain the idea of a formal regulatory 
proceedings with the following introductory instruction:  
This submodule [unit of the questionnaire] seeks information on the 
regulatory caseload of the NRA. This submodule is divided into two types of 
cases: ‘judicial’ and ‘policy’ cases. A ‘judicial’ type case is one in which the 
NRA determines how the law or regulations apply to specific parties, for 
example, deciding whether a proposed rate is lawful or whether an 
individual license should be granted or a complaint about cross-subsidy is 
justified. A mere registration by a postal operator pursuant to a general 
authorisation procedure is not a formal judicial type case. A ‘policy’ type 
case is one in which the NRA investigates a general matter of policy that 
may or may not be later embodied in a new or modified regulation, for 
example, an investigation into the proper scope of the universal service 
obligation or the best way to phase out the reserved area or the most 
appropriate form of a general authorisation procedure. This submodule asks 
for the number for ‘formal’ or significant cases. While administrative 
procedures vary from Member State to Member State, in general a formal 
‘judicial’ type proceeding will involve giving affected parties a right to 
participate and respond to factual claims by opposing parties and a right to 
appeal an adverse decision to an independent body. A formal ‘policy’ 
                                                
143 WIK, Main Developments in the Postal Sector (2004-2006). 
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investigation may involve a fact gathering process — perhaps focussed on a 
report by NRA staff or by an independent consultant — and one or more 
requests for comments from affected parties and the general public.144 
This approach has likewise failed to identify for NRAs the concept of a formal regulatory 
proceeding. Hence, no meaningful analysis of regulatory rate proceedings is possible. 
Our survey failed to elicit meaningful data on the numbers and types of regulatory rate 
proceedings. This negative result appears to demonstrate an absence of a common 
understanding of what constitutes a ‘case’ or proceeding before the NRA. The 
Commission or NRAs may therefore wish to consider a more standardised approach to 
defining the notion of a regulatory proceeding in order to allow better comparison of the 
work of different NRAs. 
                                                
144 Questionnaire, introduction to question module 301(D). 
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3.7.7 Terminal dues and cross border mail 
Article 13 of Postal Directive requires Member States to ‘encourage’ their USPs to 
adopt terminal dues agreements that respect principles similar to those in effect for 
domestic mail. Specifically, terminal dues — what a USP charges another USP for 
delivering incoming cross-border mail — ’shall be fixed in relation to the costs’ of 
handling and delivery and shall be transparent and non-discriminatory. Article 13 also 
adds that for cross-border mail ‘remuneration shall be related to the quality of service 
achieved’. 
Five NRAs States (CY, CZ, IE, MT, PT), collectively representing less than 4 percent of 
the EU/EEA postal market, report that they regulate terminal dues. All stated that they 
ensured that terminal dues are cost-based, related to quality, transparent, and non-
discriminatory. 
With a few notable exceptions, few NRAs have tried to implement the principles of the 
Postal Directive to the terminal dues applied to cross border mail even though 
seemingly required to do so by Article 13. 
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3.8 Protection of users 
Article 19 of Postal Directive provides for protection of the rights of users — meaning 
both senders and addressees — of postal services. In the Second Postal Directive, this 
protection pertains primarily to users of USPs but it could be extended to users of other 
postal services. In the Third Postal Directive, users of all types of postal services are 
more clearly embraced. 
3.8.1 Establishment of user protection regulation 
Article 19 of the Second Postal Directive requires Member States to ensure that 
‘transparent, simple and inexpensive’ procedures for user protection in both single 
provider and multi-operator environments: 
Member States shall ensure that transparent, simple and inexpensive 
procedures are drawn up for dealing with users' complaints, particularly in 
cases involving loss, theft, damage or non-compliance with service quality 
standards (including procedures for determining where responsibility lies in 
cases where more than one operator is involved). 
In the Second Postal Directive, user protection was focused on the services of 
designated USPs. Member States were obliged to adopt user protection measures for 
those benefiting from universal services provided by USPs under Article 4. In addition, a 
Member State could extend user protection to two related groups of persons: (i) 
persons benefiting from postal services within the universal service area but provided 
by other postal operators and (ii) persons benefiting from postal services outside the 
universal service area but provided by designated USPs. 
In the Third Postal Directive, the concept of user protection has been extended to users 
of all postal services. The key change is in the definition of ‘user”. In the Second 
Directive, a ‘user” is a person ‘benefiting from universal service provision as a sender or 
an addressee’. In the Third Directive, a ‘user’ is a person ‘benefiting from postal service 
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provision as a sender or an addressee’.145 Correspondingly, Article 19 is revised to 
refer to ‘all postal service providers’: 
Member States shall ensure that transparent, simple and inexpensive 
procedures are made available by all postal service providers for dealing 
with postal users' complaints, particularly in cases involving loss, theft, 
damage or non-compliance with service quality standards (including 
procedures for determining where responsibility lies in cases where more 
than one operator is involved). . . . 
The current status of user protection regulation in the Member States is summarised in 
Table  3-45. From this table, it appears that half of the Member States (BG, CY, EE, EL, 
FR, HU, IE, IT, LV, MT, PT, SE, SI, UK, IS), representing just over half of the total EU/ 
EEA postal market, authorise both the NRA and NCPA to enforce user protections in 
the postal sector. Another one third of Member States (BE, CZ, DE, DK, ES, LT, PL, 
SK, NO) rely solely on the NRA. Only Finland relies solely on the NCPA. Three Member 
States (LU, NL, RO) appear to lack any mechanism to provide user protections. Most 
Member States (21 countries or 87 percent of the market) have extended user 
protection measures to all postal operators within the universal service area.  
Half of the Member States authorise both the NRA and NCPA (national consumer 
protection authority) to enforce user protections in the postal sector, while another third 
rely solely on the NRA. Only Finland relies solely on the NCPA. Three Member States 
appear to lack any mechanism to provide user protections. Most Member States have 
extended user protection measures to all postal operators within the universal service 
area. 
 
                                                
145 Second Postal Directive, Article 2(17); Third Postal Directive, Article 2(17). 
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Table  3-45 Regulation of user protection procedures 



























AT         
BE Post law NRA Yes Yes  No Yes Ombud 
BG Both Both Yes Yes Yes*  Yes NRA 
CY Both Both  Yes Yes* Yes   
CZ Post law NRA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes NRA 
DE  NRA Yes Yes No Yes Yes NRA 
DK Both NRA Yes No Yes No Yes NRA 
EE Both Both Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes NRA 
EL Both Both Yes Yes No Yes Yes NRA 
ES Both NRA Yes Yes   Yes Multi 
FI Both NCPA Yes Yes No No Yes NCPA 
FR Both Both Yes Yes Yes No Yes Ombud 
HU Both Both Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes NRA 
IE Both Both Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Ombud 
IT Both Both Yes No Yes No Yes Min Post 
LT Post law NRA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes NRA 
LU None Neither ?? Yes Yes No Yes NRA 
LV Both Both Yes Yes Yes* Yes Yes NRA 
MT Both Both Yes Yes Yes  Yes Multi 
NL       No None 
PL Post law NRA  Yes Yes Yes Yes Multi 
PT Both Both Yes Yes Yes   Multi 
RO  Neither No No Yes No No  
SE Both Both Yes Yes Yes No Yes Ombud 
SI Both Both Yes No Yes Yes Yes NRA 
SK Both NRA Yes Yes Yes  Yes NRA 
UK Both Both Yes No Yes No Yes Ombud 
IS Both Both No Yes No No Yes NRA 
NO Post law NRA No No No  Yes NRA 
USP(s) req'd to issue ann. rept: “*” indicates report on USP’s handling of complaints issued by NRA rather than USP. 
Agency reviewing operator: NRA = National regulatory authority (NRA) or staff; NCPA = National consumer protection authority (NCPA); 
Ombud = Ombudsman or similar agency for public complaints; Min Post = Postal Minister or ministry staff; Users Grp = Postal users group 
sponsored by government; Multi = Multiple government agencies; Other = Other. 
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Case history  3-11: The Consumer Committee of ARCEP (France) 
Protection of user interests in the electronic communications and postal sectors is an area of 
increasing concern to ARCEP. The regulator controls affordability and quality of universal 
service. In particular the Consumer Relations Department keeps users informed, provides 
consumers with clarifications on offers resulting from regulatory decisions, and assists users in 
dispute settlements with companies. ARCEP has held meetings with consumer and user 
associations on specific issues of topical interest.  
To extend and formalise these meetings, on 17 December 2007, ARCEP created the 
Consumer Committee as a permanent working structure in order to discuss all user-related 
issues related to regulation of electronic communications and postal markets. ARCEP seeks to 
strengthen the dialogue between stakeholders, to understand consumers’ points of view, to 
explain ARCEP’s work, to identify problems, to prepare decision-making, to facilitate the flow of 
information between its members, and to provide associations with details on ARCEP’s 
decisions and on market monitoring. 
In addition to serving as a bridge between ARCEP and eleven consumer and user associations, 
the Consumer Committee coordinates with institutions responsible for direct relations with 
consumers in the electronic communications and postal sectors, such as the Directorate-
General for Fair Trade, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control (Direction Générale de la 
Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Répression des Fraudes), the Ministry of 
Economics, Industry and Employment (Ministère de l’Économie, de l’Industrie et de l’Emploi), 
the National Consumer Institute (Institut National de la Consommation), and the Electronic 
Communications Mediator (Médiateur des Communications Électroniques). Where appropriate, 
representatives of companies, such as the Mediator of La Poste (Médiateur du Groupe La 
Poste), are also invited to attend. Other institutions occupying with consumer protection in the 
communications sectors, such as the National Consumer Agency (Conseil National de la 
Consommation), the Committee Devoted to Abusive Contractual Clauses (Commission des 
Clauses Abusives), the roundtables organised by the Secretary of State for Consumer Affairs, 
or the courts, continue to act in parallel to the Consumer Committee. 
The Consumer Committee meets once a year in a plenary session to review the work of the 
preceding year and to set the agenda for the forthcoming one; the first plenary session occurred 
on 9 June 2008. Meetings covering postal market issues convene biannually, focussing on 
definite subjects and topics of current relevance. At the first three meetings — in March and 
September of 2008 and April of 2009 — the focus was mainly on general terms of sale of La 
Poste, quality of universal service (transparency, establishment of quality indicators, handling of 
lost parcels and forwarding), accessibility to mailboxes in buildings, and sending small items at 
the letter tariff. Specific work of the Consumer Committee is performed in groups and 
subgroups. 
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3.8.2 Remedies for users 
The Second Postal Directive provides that Member States shall ‘enable disputes to be 
settled fairly and promptly with provision, where warranted, for a system of 
reimbursement and/or compensation’. Member States are obliged to ensure that users 
who do not get satisfaction from the USP can appeal to a ‘competent national authority’. 
Table  3-46 User protection: remedies and redress 


























AT         
BE  No No No Yes None Yes  
BG Yes Yes No No Yes None Yes Yes 
CY No No No      
CZ No Yes No No Yes S Yes Yes 
DE No No No No Yes S   
DK No Yes Yes No Yes M+S Yes Yes 
EE Yes Yes No Yes Yes None Yes Yes 
EL Yes Yes  Yes Yes M+S Yes Yes 
ES Yes Yes No No  M+S Yes Yes 
FI No Yes Yes No Yes  Yes ?? 
FR Yes Yes No No Yes None Yes Yes 
HU Yes Yes Yes No Yes S Yes Yes 
IE Yes Yes Yes No ?? M+S No  
IT Yes Yes No No Yes M+S Yes Yes 
LT Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes M+S Yes Yes 
LU Yes Yes No No Yes None ??  
LV Yes Yes No No Yes None Yes Yes 
MT Yes Yes Yes  ?? M Yes Yes 
NL No  No      
PL Yes Yes No No Yes M+S Yes Yes 
PT No Yes  No Yes No Ans Yes Yes 
RO No Yes No No   Yes Yes 
SE Yes Yes Yes No ?? Other Yes Yes 
SI Yes Yes Yes No Yes  Yes Yes 
SK Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes None Yes Yes 
UK Yes Yes ?? Yes Yes M+S Yes Yes 
IS Yes Yes No No No M Yes Yes 
NO Yes Yes Yes No Yes None Yes Yes 
Note: 'CNA' = 'competent national authority' referenced in Postal Directive, Article 19. 
Remedies by CNA?: M = Monetary damages; S = Services with comply with USO; M+S = Both monetary damages and services that 
comply with USO; None = No remedy; Other = Other; ?? = Unknown. No information about law or practice. 
 
In the Third Postal Directive, these provisions are continued without change. In addition, 
however, the Third Postal Directive provides that ‘Member States shall also encourage 
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the development of independent out-of-court schemes for the resolution of disputes 
between postal service providers and users’. 
In most Member States (19), the NRA or NCPA must approve user protection 
procedures of the USP although this is not the case in at least 8 Member States (CY, 
CZ, DE, DK, FI, NL, PT, RO) (see Table  3-46). 
Table  3-46 summarises remedies available to users. The Postal Directive requires that 
USPs provide a system of reimbursement and/or compensation ‘where warranted’, and 
most Member States have done so (exceptions: BE, CY, DE).146 Only five Member 
States (EE, EL, LT, SK, UK) have addressed the issue of protecting users in multi-
operator environment.  
Almost all Member States that have introduced user protections have appointed a 
‘competent national authority’ to review users’ complaints that have not been 
satisfactory resolved by the USP. In most cases, this is the NRA. In 5 Member States 
(BE, FR, IE, SE, UK), it is the ombudsman or a similar consumer complaint body. In 
four Member States (ES, MT, PL, PT), the user has more than one option for appeal. A 
forum for appeal does not, however, ensure the user a remedy. Only 10 Member 
States, (DK, EL, ES, IE, IT, LT, MT, PL, UK, IS), authorise the competent national 
authority to award monetary damages where justified. In 5 Member State (CZ, DE, HU, 
MT, IS), the competent national authority can require future changes in service to 
ensure fulfilment of the USO. In virtually all Member States, however, the user can take 
a further appeal from the competent national authority to the courts if he or she is not 
satisfied.  
The European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) has approved a standard, EN 
14012, for measurement of complaints and redress. Ten Member States (DK, FI, HU, 
IE, LT, MT, SE, SI, SK, NO) reportedly comply with this standard, although they 
represent only 11 percent of the EU/EEA market. Fifteen Member States (BE, BG, CY, 
CZ, DE, EE, ES, FR, IT, LU, LV, NL, PL, RO, IS), representing 63 percent of the postal 
market, do not comply with EN 14012. 
                                                
146 The Dutch USP provides compensation only for registered items. Questionnaire 261-9. 
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Implementation of effective user protection procedures appears to be uneven. In about 
two thirds of Member States, the NRA or NCPA must approve user protection 
procedures of the USP. Most, but not all, Member States ensure that there is a system 
of reimbursement and/or compensation for users. Only five Member States have 
addressed the issue of protecting users in multi-operator environment. Almost all 
Member States have appointed a ‘competent national authority’ that can review the 
USP’s handling of users complaints. In most cases, this is the NRA, but in 5 Member 
States it is the ombudsman or a similar consumer complaint body. In only 13 Member 
States can the competent national authority award monetary damages and/or require 
future changes in service. In virtually all Member States, the user can take a further 
appeal from the competent national authority to the courts. Most Member States do not 
comply with a CEN standard for measurement of complaints and redress. 
3.8.3 Publication of user protection data 
The Second Postal Directive requires USPs to publish data on the handling of user 
complaints. The Third Postal Directive added the possibility of requiring similar reports 
from other postal service providers. In the Third Postal Directive, this provision reads: 
In accordance with Article 16, Member States shall ensure that the universal 
service providers and, wherever appropriate, undertakings providing 
services within the scope of the universal service, publish, together with the 
annual report on the monitoring of their performance, information on the 
number of complaints and the manner in which they have been dealt with. 
As shown in Table  3-45, in 20 Member States, the USP issues the annual report on 
user protection required by Article 19. In at least 5 Member States (DE, EL, FI, IS, NO), 
it appears that the USP does not do so. In addition, 11 NRAS (CY, CZ, DE, EE, EL, HU, 
IE, LT, LV, PL, SI) issue their own reports on their review of user complaints and 
subsequent appeals to the courts, if any.  
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Table  3-47 User protection by NRA, 2008 
 Number of 
complaints to 
USP(s) 
 Complaints  




reviewed by CNA 





on review (%) 
AT        
BE    12,506 *  73.0 
BG 2,828 * 15.8     
CY 5  0.1 1  20.0  
CZ 23,488  24.0 540  2.3 90.0 
DE    1,026    
DK 56,379  37.1 300  0.5 3.0 
EE 107 * 0.9 6 *  50.0 
EL    80    
ES        
FI        
FR 1,103,370  60.2 2,688 * 0.2  
HU 9,999  10.2 109  1.1 9.2 
IE 31,546 * 47.4     
IT 68,604  12.0 630  0.9 75.4 
LT 38  0.4    6.0 
LU 410 * 2.6     
LV 1,108  9.1 16  1.4  
MT 5,953  138.3 19  0.3 63.0 
NL        
PL 251,642  132.4 112  0.0  
PT 64,939  55.7     
RO        
SE 82,657  26.2     
SI 3,410  8.2 10  0.3 60.0 
SK 26,665  89.1 11  0.0 54.0 
UK 1,260,790  57.6     
IS        
NO        
Note: "*" indicates 2007 data. ‘= 'competent national authority' referenced in Postal Directive, Article 19. Letter post volume from 2007 is 
used for calculation of complaints per million. 
 
Recent complaint data is set out in Table  3-47. Because quality of service, and 
therefore the cause for complaint, will vary from USP to USP, it is not self-evident how 
to interpret this table without further investigation. Nonetheless, by selecting one 
Member State as a plausible benchmark, it is possible to make some tentative relative 
judgements. For example, if one assumes that the Swedish USP is relatively capable 
and that the Swedish NRA has probably ensured the existence of a relatively simple 
and transparent complaint procedure, then 26 complaints per million letter post items 
could be taken a minimum indication of a simple and easy-to-use complaint procedure. 
Any higher rate of complaints would also be consistent with a simple and easy-to-use 
complaint procedure. A lower rate of complaints would suggest either that the complaint 
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procedure is not as simple and easy-to-use as in Sweden or that the USP is 
significantly more capable than the Swedish USP (or perhaps the existence of cultural 
factors that discourage complaints). Of course, one could select another Member State 
as the benchmark. Nonetheless, by such reasoning, it appears that in a number of 
Member States (e.g., DK, FR, IE, MT, PL, PT, SE, SK) ‘transparent, simple and 
inexpensive procedures’ have in fact been developed dealing for with users’ complaints. 
In addition, the relatively high rate of appeals agreed by the NRAs suggests that NRAs 
are serving as effective appellate boards in a number of Member States (e.g., BE, CZ, 
IT, MT, SI, SK). 
Seventeen USPs publish the annual report on handling of user complaints required by 
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4 Application of Competition Law and State Aid Provisions in the 
Postal Sector  
This chapter reviews the application of general competition law and state aid rules in 
the postal sector.  
• Section 4.1 presents and discusses recent competition cases that were decided 
by the European Commission as well as by national competition authorities in 
the Member States.  
• Section 4.2 in turn discusses how the European Commission has applied the 
state aid rules of the EC Treaty to the postal sector.  
4.1 Application of antitrust to the postal sector 
4.1.1 Cases decided by the European Commission 
This section summarises key decisions of the European Commission relative to the 
application of competition law in the postal sector since 2000.147  
                                                
147 The cut off date of the review of cases is 2000. We do not discuss explicitly the 1998 Postal Notice 
that aims to explain the approach of the Commission on the application of all branches of competition 
law (antitrust and State aids) to the postal sector. This Notice was relevant to all the cases we analyse 
in this section: Notice from the Commission of 1998 on the application of the competition rules to the 
postal sector and on the assessment of certain State measures relating to postal services, O.J. 1998 
C 39/2. Briefly, the most important pre-2000 cases were as follows: Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission, 
1983 ECR 873 (first case to apply competition rules to the post office); Case C-320/91, Corbeau, 
[1993] ECR, I-2533 (first decision on scope of the postal monopoly; held monopoly may not include 
services that are not dissociable from universal service). Although the 1988 complaint of the 
International Courier Conference, Case IV/32.791-Remail, was ultimately dismissed by the 
Commission in 1995, this case precipitated both the Postal Green Paper, which led to the Postal 
Directive of 1997, and the Reims terminal dues agreements, discussed below. See James I. Campbell 
Jr., “Remail: Catalyst for Liberalizing European Postal Markets.” In Liberalisation of Postal Markets: 
Papers Presented at the 6th Königswinter Seminar, eds. Gabriele Kulenkampff and Hilke Smit. WIK 
Proceedings Vol. 7. Bad Honnef, Germany: WIK, 2002. A very important pre-2000 merger decision 
was Commission Decision of 26 June 1998, Case No. IV/M.1168 - DHL/Deutsche Post, which paved 
the way for the creation of Deustche Post A.G. 
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4.1.1.1 Article 81 cases (Agreements or concerted practices) 
(a) REIMS II Renewal (2003)148 
In 1999, the Commission exempted for the period between 1 April 1999 and 
31 December 2001 the REIMS II agreement between 16 European postal operators 
(including the incumbent postal operators of all EU-15 Member States other than the 
Netherlands, and the PPOs of Norway and Iceland) on terminal dues, i.e. the 
remuneration for the costs of delivering cross-border mail in the country of destination. 
Historically, this remuneration did not reflect the costs of delivering such mail and 
caused distortions of mail traffic. The agreement aimed at introducing prices that reflect 
more properly the actual cost structures, in line with the principles introduced by the 
First Postal Directive. Given that there was not enough reliable information on the costs 
incurred by the parties concerned as most of them were still in the process of setting up 
proper cost accounting systems, the agreement has been considered indispensable for 
attaining the objectives pursued in the short term.149 
In practice, the REIMS II agreement led to substantial improvements in the quality of 
cross-border mail services and to prices which reflected more properly the actual cost of 
delivering incoming cross-border mail.  
In 2003, the Commission adopted a new decision granting 17 European postal 
operators a further five-year exemption (until the end of 2006) with respect to the 
system of terminal dues.150 The decision furthermore required that new entrants on the 
recently liberalised markets for outgoing cross-border mail would be able to enjoy the 
same terms for the delivery of incoming cross border mail as the REIMS II parties. 
After the expiry of the said decision, the exemption was not further renewed as the 
system of application of Article 81 has been fundamentally reformed in May 2004.151 
The ex-ante exemption system that could only be given by the European Commission 
under Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty has been replaced by an ex post analysis that 
could be performed by the Commission, but also the NCAs and national courts. 
Therefore, the postal operators should no longer request an ex ante exemption of their 
agreement from the Commission, but should assess themselves if the agreement is 
fulfilling the conditions of Article 81.3. If not, their agreement may be condemned by the 
Commission, the NCAs or national courts.  
                                                
148 Commission Decision of 23 October 2003, Case 38.170 REIMS II renotification, O.J. 2004 L56/76. 
149 Commission Decision of 15 September 1999, Case 36.748 REIMS II, O.J. 1999 L275/17. 
150 Commission Decision of 23 October 2003, Case 38.170 REIMS II renotification, O.J. 2004 L56/76. 
151 Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty, O.J. 2003 L 1/1, Arts 1 and 2. 
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4.1.1.2 Article 82 cases (Abuses of dominant position)152 
(a) United Parcel Service v. Deutsche Post AG I (2001)153 
In 1994, United Parcel Service, a private operator in the business parcel sector active in 
Germany lodged a complaint with the Commission, alleging that Deutsche Post was 
using revenues from its profitable letter-mail monopoly to finance a strategy of below-
cost selling in business parcel services, which were open to competition. 
In its first formal decision in the postal sector under Article 82 of the EC Treaty, the 
Commission condemned Deutsche Post AG (DPAG) for two separate abuses of 
dominant position: 
(1) Predatory pricing in the market for business parcel services. For the first time in the 
postal sector, a Commission's decision sets forth a standard for measuring those 
"cross-subsidies" between the monopoly area and competitive activities that result in 
predatory prices in the latter: any service provided by the beneficiary of a monopoly in 
open competition has to cover at least the additional or incremental cost incurred in 
branching out into the competitive sector. The Commission considered that any cost 
coverage below this level is predatory pricing. In this case, the investigation revealed 
that DPAG, for a period of five years, did not cover the costs incremental to providing 
the delivery service for mail-order parcels, hence was charging a predatory price.  
The reason why no fine was imposed for this abuse was that the economic cost 
concepts used to identify predation were not sufficiently developed at the time the 
abuse occurred. Furthermore, DPAG was tackling the issue in a satisfactory way as it 
undertook vis-à-vis the Commission to create a separate company to supply business 
parcel services (NewCo). This new entity was free to procure the "inputs" necessary for 
its services (such inputs include, e.g., sorting, transport and delivery services) either 
from DPAG or from third parties or produce these "inputs" itself. Should the separate 
entity choose to purchase the "inputs" from DPAG, the latter has to provide the entity all 
goods and services at market prices. In addition DPAG has undertaken that all "inputs" 
it supplies to the separate entity would be supplied to Newco's competitors at the same 
price and under the same conditions. Thus, DPAG has no incentive to charge prices 
below "market" prices when selling "inputs" to the separate entity. 
                                                
152 See the overview by Derenne and Stockford (2000), „Abuse of Market Power in Postal Services: 
Lessons from the Commission’s Decisional Practice and Court of Justice“ in Geradin, The 
Liberalization of Postal Services in the European Union, Kluwer, 2000, 139. 
153 Commission Decision 2001/354 of 20 March 2001, Case 35.141 Deutsche Post AG, O.J. 2001 
L125/27. 
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(2) Fidelity rebates granted to all major customers in the mail-order business. The 
Commission's investigation revealed that from 1974 through October 2000, DPAG gave 
substantial discounts to its large mail order customers on the condition that the 
customer sent its entire mail-order parcel business or at least a sizeable proportion 
thereof via DPAG. The fidelity rebate scheme essentially precluded any private 
competitor from reaching the "critical mass" (estimated at an annual turnover of 100 
million parcels) to successfully enter the German mail-order delivery market. This was 
borne out by the fact that between 1990 through 1999 DPAG had a stable volume-
based share of the mail-order parcel market exceeding 85%.  
In light of the fact that fidelity rebates given by an undertaking in a dominant position 
have repeatedly been condemned by the Community courts and given the long duration 
of the scheme in the case at issue, the Commission considered that a fine of 24 million 
Euro was appropriate for this second abuse. 
(b) British Post Office v. Deutsche Post II (2001)154 
In 1998, the public postal operator of the UK, the British Post Office, filed a complaint 
with the Commission which alleged that Deutsche Post had frequently intercepted, 
surcharged and delayed international mail from the UK arriving in Germany. The 
dispute stemmed from a fundamental disagreement how to identify the sender of 
international mailings. On the one hand, Deutsche Post argued that any incoming 
international mail containing a reference to Germany usually in the form of a German 
reply address had to be considered as having a German sender, regardless of where 
the mail was produced or posted. Under the allegation that mailings of this type were in 
fact circumvented domestic mail (so-called A-B-A remail), Deutsche Post intercepted 
the mailings and refused to deliver the letters to its addressees unless the full domestic 
tariff applicable in Germany was paid. This refusal of Deutsche Post resulted in long 
delays, up to several weeks. On the other hand, Post Office argued that all outgoing 
mail produced and posted in the UK had to be processed like international mail, 
regardless of its contents.  
The Commission's investigation revealed that the disputed mailings did not have 
German senders. The mailings were produced and posted in the UK, or alternatively, 
produced in Sweden or in the Netherlands and posted to Germany via the UK. The mail 
was thus not circumvented domestic mail and had to been treated as normal 
international mail when entering Germany from the UK. The Commission found that 
Deutsche Post abused its dominant position in the German market for the delivery of 
international mail in four ways. 
                                                
154 Commission Decision 2001/892 of 25 July 2001, Case 36.915 Deutsche Post AG — Interception of 
cross-border mail, O.J. 2001 L331/40. 
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(1) Deutsche Post discriminated between different customers; 
(2) refused to supply its delivery service unless an unjustified surcharge was paid; 
(3) the price charged for the service was excessive; 
(4) the behaviour of Deutsche Post limited the development of the German market 
for the delivery of international mail and of the UK market for international mail 
bound for Germany.  
During the course of the proceedings, Deutsche Post gave a commitment to no longer 
intercept, surcharge or delay international mail of the type concerned by this case. 
Deutsche Post undertook to deliver all mailings without delay even in cases where there 
were doubts whether the mail was actually circumvented domestic mail (i.e. genuine A-
B-A remail). Surcharge claims if they were justified have to be made after the delivery of 
the mail.  
For years, the behaviour of Deutsche Post had consistently been condoned by German 
courts, although in posterior judgements Deutsche Post's treatment of incoming 
international mail had been criticised. Furthermore, at the time when the majority of the 
interceptions took place there was no Community case law that concerned international 
mail services. The legal situation was therefore unclear. The commitment by Deutsche 
Post avoided further delays of mailings and facilitated the detection of further possible 
infringements. On that basis, the Commission imposed only a symbolic fine of € 1,000 
on Deutsche Post.  
(c) Hays v. La Poste Belge (2001)155 
In April 2000, Hays plc., a private operator in postal services based in the United 
Kingdom, lodged a complaint with the Commission alleging that La Poste was trying to 
eliminate the Hays document exchange network, which it had been operating in 
Belgium since 1982. La Poste and Hays were competing in providing B2B services to 
insurance companies in Belgium. B2B mail services were offered only to a closed group 
of subscribers for the mutual exchange of business-related documents. B2B mail 
services offered overnight delivery and time-certain pick-up and delivery, and therefore 
differed significantly from the general letter mail services covered by the monopoly.  
The Commission found that La Poste unilaterally terminated the preferential tariffs that 
the insurance companies enjoyed previously when sending their general letter mail 
                                                
155 Commission Decision 2002/180 of 5 December 2001, Case 37.859 De Post-La Poste, O.J. 2002 
L61/32. 
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within days after Hays' customers had indicated that they were not interested in the new 
B2B mail service offered by La Poste. Moreover, La Poste let stand the termination, 
notified on 30 October 1998, of the preferential tariff until the federation of insurance 
companies, on 27 January 2000, subscribed to the new B2B service. Following the 
installation of a new management team, La Poste abolished the tying practice by 
discontinuing the B2B mail service on 27 June 2001.  
By tying the tariff reduction in the reserved area to the subscription of its non-reserved 
B2B service, La Poste made it impossible for Hays to compete on a level playing field 
because it could not offer a similar advantage. As La Poste was exploiting the financial 
resources of the monopoly it enjoyed in general letter mail in order to leverage its 
dominant position there into the separate and distinct market for B2B services, the 
Commission imposed a fine of € 2,5 million. 
4.1.1.3 Article 86 cases (Member States measures)156 
(a) Consorzio Risposta+1 v. Italy (2000)157 
An Italian legislative decree of 1999 reserved to the incumbent the provision in Italy of 
new postal services offering added value elements, in particular a guarantee that items 
created electronically arrive at a predetermined date or time, thus preventing private 
suppliers from offering the full range of hybrid mail services.  
                                                
156 Note also that in Case C-340/99 TNT Traco v Poste Italiane and Others [2001] ECR I-4109, the Court 
of Justice held that Article 82 of the EC Treaty, read in conjunction with Article 86, precludes 
legislation of a Member State which grants a private-law undertaking the exclusive right to operate the 
universal postal service from making the right of any other economic operator to provide an express 
mail service not forming part of the universal service subject to payment of postal dues equivalent to 
the postage charge normally payable to the undertaking responsible for the universal service, unless it 
can be shown that the proceeds of such payment are necessary to enable the undertaking to operate 
the universal postal service in economically acceptable conditions and that the undertaking is required 
to pay the same dues when itself providing an express mail service not forming part of the universal 
service.  
In Joined Cases C-147/97 and C6148/97 Deutsche Post v GZS and Citicorp [2000] ECR I-825, the 
Court of Justice held that in the absence of an agreement between the postal services of the Member 
States concerned fixing terminal dues in relation to the actual costs of processing and delivering 
incoming trans-border mail, it is not contrary to Article 86 of the EC Treaty, read in conjunction with 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 49 of the EC Treaty, for a body such as Deutsche Post AG to 
exercise the right provided for by Article 25(3) of the Universal Postal Convention, in the version 
adopted on 14 December 1989, to charge, in the cases referred to in the second sentence of Article 
25(1) and Article 25(2) thereof, internal postage on items of mail posted in large quantities with the 
postal services of a Member State other than the Member State to which that body belongs. On the 
other hand, the exercise of such a right is contrary to Article 86(1) of the Treaty, read in conjunction 
with Article 82 thereof, in so far as the result is that such a body may demand the entire internal 
postage applicable in the Member State to which it belongs without deducting the terminal dues 
corresponding to those items of mail paid by the abovementioned postal services.  
157 Commission Decision 2001/176 of 21 December 2000, Case 37.721 Provision of certain new postal 
services with a guaranteed day- or time-certain delivery in Italy, O.J. 2001 L53/69. 
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Delivery at a predetermined date or time was a separate market from traditional delivery 
services (universal service). There were therefore no grounds for reserving it for a 
universal service provider which did not offer that service. Furthermore, in order to offer 
remittance at a predetermined date or time, the incumbent operator would have to set 
up a completely separate sorting and distribution service. The investment entailed far 
outweighed any income likely to be generated by that niche market. It would have 
hardly had been economically viable for the incumbent operator to invest the necessary 
resources in order to enter a market with a minimal return. The SMEs which had 
created the necessary infrastructure for services of this type might have been forced to 
cease operating. No Member State apart from Italy had reserved the delivery phase of 
hybrid mail at a predetermined date or time for the incumbent operator. 
The Commission adopted a decision establishing that the Italian law was incompatible 
with Article 86(1) of the Treaty, read in conjunction with Article 82. The decision, which 
was designed to create the necessary legal certainty for private operators, obliged the 
Italian Government to make clear that remittance at a predetermined date or time was 
not one of the reserved services. 
In 2001, the Italian Government complied with this obligation by adopting a ministerial 
circular stating that all operators providing day- or time-certain deliveries as part of a 
new hybrid electronic mail service would be granted a general authorisation to provide 
these services in Italy.158 
(b) Snelpd v. France (2001)159 
This Decision was the result of proceedings initiated by the Commission at the end of 
1998 at the request of the SNELPD, a trade association representing the majority of 
French mail-preparation firms. La Poste was present on the mail-preparation market 
alongside private firms in that it offered services to businesses itself or via some of its 
subsidiaries. Since the bulk of mail flows handled by mail-preparation firms were 
covered by the postal monopoly, they had to do business with La Poste. However, it 
was La Poste which defined the financial and technical conditions on which mail-
preparation firms might have access to its network. It was consequently confronted with 
a conflict of interests, i.e. in a situation in which it was tempted to discriminate against 
competitors of the La Poste group by, for example, amending its tariffs at will, defining 
technical standards in such a way as to eliminate certain mail-preparation firms or 
applying them differently to different firms. 
                                                
158 IP/01/1057 of 24 July 2001. 
159  Commission Decision 2002/344 of 23 October 2001, Case 37.133 Snelpd / France, O.J. 2002 
L120/19. 
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The French State monitored La Poste's activities and French legislation provided for 
only partial scrutiny of the conditions which La Poste applied to mail-preparation firms. 
Moreover, this scrutiny was the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance, which was also 
responsible for safeguarding the State's financial interests in the public postal operator, 
a fact which might have affected its impartiality.  
In the Commission's view, this conflict of interests encouraged La Poste to abuse its 
dominant position. Since French legislation did not provide for sufficiently effective or 
independent monitoring to neutralise this conflict of interest, the Commission took the 
view that the French State has contravened Article 86(1), read in conjunction with 
Article 82, of the Treaty. During the proceedings, the French authorities announced their 
intention to create an ombudsman responsible for the universal postal service who 
would have the power to issue public and reasoned opinions and to intervene in 
relations between La Poste and its customers and partners.  
(c) BdKEP v. Germany and Deutsche Post AG (2004)160 
The Commission ruled against certain provisions in Germany’s postal regulatory 
framework which barred commercial mail preparation firms from earning discounts for 
handing over pre-sorted letters at Deutsche Post AG’s (DPAG) sorting centres. The 
incriminated provisions induced DPAG to discriminate against mail preparation firms: 
whilst large senders were allowed to feed self-prepared mail directly into sorting centres 
and were granted discounts for doing so, commercial firms were barred from discounts 
for mail preparation.  
The decision was adopted pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty. The Commission 
found that the German government had failed to demonstrate that the discriminatory 
tariffs were justified on the basis of Article 86(2) and recalled that intermediaries should 
be able to freely choose from amongst available access points to the public postal 
network.  
(d) Slovakian postal law (2008) 
In Slovakia, the delivery of hybrid mail items was open to competition and several 
private companies were active on that market. However on February 2008 the Slovak 
Republic adopted an amendment to its postal law, reserving the delivery of hybrid mail 
to the incumbent postal operator, Slovenská Pošta. Since the entry into force of that 
amendment in April 2008, the delivery of hybrid mail had been re-monopolised to the 
                                                
160 Commission Decision of 20 October 2004, Case 38.745, BdKEP. 
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benefit of Slovenská Pošta. Private operators were prevented from exercising their 
activity in this field and, as a consequence, incurred losses that endangered their 
viability.  
The Commission decided that amendments to Slovakia's postal legislation infringed 
Article 86 of the EC Treaty, read in conjunction with Article 82.161 As of December 
2008, Slovakia had not yet informed the Commission of any measures taken to comply 
with the decision, the Commission opened an infringement proceeding by sending a 
letter of formal notice, which is the first step in infringement proceedings under Article 
226 of the EC Treaty.162 
4.1.1.4 Merger cases163 
This part presents merger cases since 2000 in which remedies have been imposed.164 
(a) The Post Office/TPG/SPPL (2001)165 
TPO (The Post Office), TPG and SPPL were the national public postal operators 
(PPOs) of the UK, the Netherlands and Singapore respectively. The companies planned 
to set up two joint ventures named Delta (active worldwide, except in the Asian Pacific 
region) and NewCo (in the Asia Pacific region), which were to be active in the provision 
of outbound cross-border mail services and, to a limited extent, outbound cross-border 
parcel services.  
Whilst the two joint ventures generally appeared to be pro-competitive, the Commission 
identified possible competition problems in the UK and the Netherlands because of the 
                                                
161 Commission Decision of 7 October 2008, Case 39.562 Slovakian postal legislation relating to hybrid 
mail services, O.J. 2008 C322/10. 
162  IP/08/1997 of 17 December 2008. 
163 For an overview of the first merger cases, see Art, „Merger Control in the Postal Sector“, in Geradin, 
The Liberalization of Postal Services in the European Union, Kluwer, 2000, 139. 
164 In Case T-175/99 UPS Europe v Commission [2002] ECR II-1915, the Court of Justice considered 
that: the acquisition by Deutsche Post of_22.498% of the shares of DHL could raise problems in the 
light of the competition rules if the funds used by the undertaking holding the monopoly derived from 
excessive or discriminatory prices or from other unfair practices in its reserved market. In such a 
situation, where there are grounds for suspecting an infringement of Article 82 EC, it is necessary to 
examine the source of the funds used for the acquisition in question in order to determine whether that 
acquisition stems from an abuse of a dominant position. However in this case, the Court considered 
that proof that the funds used for the acquisition were generated by abusive pricing practices of the 
buyer in the reserved area was not established.  
165 Commission Decision of 13 March 2001, Case M.1915 pursuant Article 8(2) of Regulation 4064/89. 
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possible elimination of competition between the businesses being contributed to Delta 
and the respective parent companies, TPG in the Netherlands and TPO in the UK.  
Following a Phase II investigation, the Commission concluded that the concentration did 
not lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position in the UK. While the 
parties had relatively high market shares in the market for outbound cross-border 
business mail, there were a number of other players in the market with significant 
shares, including consolidators166 and third country PPOs. The Commission observed 
that entry barriers into the UK market were relatively low, as shown by the emergence 
in the 2000s of several competitors including Deutsche Post and La Poste of France. 
Such presence of consolidators facilitated entry because access to one consolidator 
provided access to the mail of many business customers. The UK market also 
appeared to be relatively transparent, as TPOs prices and rebates were all publicly 
available, which reduced the risk that TPO could have behaved in a discriminatory 
manner.  
By contrast, the Phase II investigation confirmed the Commission's concerns in relation 
to the market for outbound cross-border business mail in the Netherlands. At the time of 
the investigation, there were fewer operators in the Dutch market than in the UK market, 
and they were all relatively small. With the exception of the UK Post Office (TPO), which 
had been able to obtain a significant part of outbound traffic destined to the UK, none of 
the foreign PPOs active in the Netherlands, including Deutsche Post, had achieved 
sizeable market shares. Because of the lack of transparency in the Dutch market, TPG 
could have favoured Delta, therefore further aggravating the competitive situation facing 
other operators. The concentration had, therefore, the effect of eliminating competition 
between the dominant player, TPG, and the most successful entrant into the Dutch 
market, TPO. 
To remedy these concerns, the parties committed to divest the business that was 
undertaken by TNT International Mail in the Netherlands (the part of TPG in the 
Netherlands that was originally intended to be contributed to the Delta joint venture). 
The success of the remedy depended to a large extent on the characteristics of the 
purchaser, in particular whether it would have been able to generate sufficient volumes 
and have access to a cost efficient network such that it would have been able to sell its 
outbound cross border mail services at prices that are comparable to those which TNT 
International Mail Netherlands was currently able to offer. In the light of this, the parties 
proposed an up-front buyer solution and committed themselves not to complete the 
notified concentration until a binding sale and purchase agreement had been reached 
with a buyer approved by the Commission.  
                                                
166 Consolidators are companies which collect mail and subsequently negotiate special rates with PPOs 
or with local delivery companies in order to distribute the "consolidated" mail in the country of 
destination. 
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(b) Posten AB/Post Danmark AS (2009)167 
Posten was wholly-owned by the Kingdom of Sweden. It was active in Sweden in the 
field of postal services (mail and parcels) and in mail preparation services (printing and 
enveloping) through its subsidiary Strålfors. Post Danmark (PDK) was owned by the 
Kingdom of Denmark and CVC (a private equity and investment advisory firm), and was 
mainly active in Denmark in the field of postal services (mail and parcels). Both 
companies decided to merge. 
While the Swedish postal market has been fully liberalised since 1993, the Danish 
market has not yet been liberalised. The Commission therefore carefully considered the 
potential effects of the merger on the upcoming liberalisation of the Danish postal 
market, which must take place before 2011 according to the Postal Directive. The 
Commission's investigations showed that liberalisation of the Danish mail market was 
not at risk, as the proposed merger was unlikely to increase barriers to entry or 
expansion, or impede competition in the Danish mail market. 
However, the activities of Posten and Post Danmark overlapped horizontally in the 
provision of parcel delivery services in Denmark, affecting a number of parcel markets. 
In addition, a conglomerate relationship existed in Denmark between the provision of 
printing and enveloping services by Strålfors, a subsidiary of Posten, and mail 
distribution services by Post Danmark. Thus, the Commission's market investigation 
showed that the proposed transaction, as initially notified, raised horizontal competition 
concerns with respect to the domestic standard business to business (B2B) parcel 
delivery services market in Denmark. 
To remedy these concerns, the parties committed to divest assets and customer 
contracts covering their overlap in the domestic standard B2B parcel delivery services 
market in Denmark. 
                                                
167 Commission Decision of 21 April 2009 pursuant to the Article 6(2) of Regulation 139/2004. 
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4.1.2 Cases by national competition authorities (NCAs) 
Our survey of NCAs has requested each NCA to list the three most important 
competition cases decided by each NCA, or by national courts since January 2004, if 
any. NCAs were asked to provide a brief description of these cases. The full results of 
this research are presented in table 4-2 below. For some Member States where no 
information was available from NCAs, the table was amended by desk research.168  
Table  4-1 Summary of national competition cases dealing with abuse of 
dominant positions since 2004 
Type of practice Practice condemned by NCAs in  
Loyalty rebates or tying AT, DK, ES, FR, HU, LT 
Discrimination (between consolidators and bulk senders, 
or between different bulk senders) 
DE, DK, ES, FR, IT, LV, SI 
Predatory pricing or cross-subsidisation ES, SI 
Anti-competitive agreement HU 
Note: Entries in the table are based on survey responses from NCAs, and analysis of press reports. This may not represent a complete 
summary of national competition cases. 
 
Table  4-1 above presents the main issues addressed by those NCA that have identified 
and condemned abuse of market power. We have seen four major types of abuse that 
NCAs have acted against in the period 2004-2009:169  
• Some NCAs found that incumbents abused dominant positions by granting 
fidelity rebates to customers. Typical examples of fidelity rebates are discounts 
that are granted only if a customer uses the same postal operator for a long 
period, or rebates that are granted only if a customer sends a minimum specified 
share (or all) of its volume via the incumbent. Other abusive practice is to tie 
reserved and un-reserved services. An example for tying is a discount for 
dominant (or reserved) services that is granted only if the customer also 
purchases more competitive services (such as delivery of unaddressed items, 
direct mail, or magazines) from the incumbent.  
• Anti-competitive, discriminatory practices were found by some NCAs. In some 
cases, e.g. in Denmark, these practices resulted apparently from lack of 
transparency in the dominant operator’s pricing, and discretionary prices offered 
to different customers. In other cases, such as in Germany and Spain, 
                                                
168 For a summary of earlier competition cases, see WIK-Consult (2006), Main developments in the 
European postal sector (2004-2006), Appendix A-2.  
169 Where NCAs have provided information on cases decided prior to 2004, these cases are included in 
the table in the appendix (even though our survey had not specifically requested such information). 
However, these pre-2004 cases were not considered in preparing the table on this page.  
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incumbent operators had applied different tariffs to consolidators and bulk 
senders until NCAs clarified that this practice was not compliant with competition 
law.170  
• In light of the significant share of common costs in postal operations, and a 
general lack of transparency about postal costs (see section 3.6), finding 
evidence of predatory prices, or cross-subsidies appears very difficult. 
Nevertheless, a few NCAs have determined such below-cost pricing and acted 
against it.  
• Finally, NCAs can possibly act against anti-competitive agreements (cartels), 
and the Hungarian NCAs has apparently adopted a decision in this regard. 
However, this practice does not appear as a major area of concern in the postal 
sector as the relevant geographical markets have largely remained the national 
territories, and incumbents continue to enjoy dominant positions in these 
markets.  
Not surprisingly, many of the cases decided by NCAs occurred in countries where 
entrants have actually started to compete with the incumbent operators (AT, DE, DK, 
ES, SE).  
It should be noted that in Sweden, where postal markets were effectively liberalised as 
early as 1993, the competition authority and national courts had scrutinised alleged 
discriminatory pricing before 2004 (and these cases are thus not reported in the table 
above). As early as in the 1990s, a series of major cases were decided by different 
courts in Sweden. By the time, Sweden Post planned to introduce zonal prices such 
that different prices would be charged according to zones, i.e. areas where the letters 
are to be delivered. Competitors to Sweden Post complained that the cheapest zone 
was almost identical to the area where they were offering service to compete with the 
incumbent. The discussion was whether the zonal prices indeed reflected cost 
differences, or were used by Sweden Post primarily to undercut their competitors’ prices 
in the limited areas where there was any competition. In 1998, the courts finally agreed 
to a revised pricing scheme, with two different zone.171  
 
                                                
170 In the German case, this discrimination between consolidators and bulk senders was not introduces 
by the incumbent in the first place but resulted from NRA decisions on downstream access)  
171 For a detailed discussion of the Swedish case, see Wetter, Carl and Olle Rislund (1999): 
Geographical pricing in the postal sector. The Swedish zone price case, in: European Competition 
Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 4, p.240-4; and Zauner, Martin (2008): “Wettbewerbspolitische Beurteilung 
von Rabattsystemen im Postmarkt”, WIK discussion paper no. 306. p. 39f.  
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Table  4-2 List of cases decided by national competition authorities (most significant cases in the postal sector since 2004) 
Country Case NCA Parties involved  Main subject/comments 
AT 26 KT 29 (2005) Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde 
(Kartellgericht)  
Redmail / Österreichische 
Post AG 
Abuse of dominant position condemned: Loyalty rebates for newspapers and magazines 
Österreichische Post AG abused its dominant position in the market for daily delivery of daily newspapers 
as well as in the market for the delivery of weekly and monthly newspapers by granting the lowest 
charges for the delivery of newspapers in the years 2002 to 2006 only to publishers which in none of 
these years asked for less newspaper deliveries than 90% of the deliveries they had asked for in the year 
2001.  
The decision was confirmed by the Supreme court of justice in 2006.  
[Description prepared by WIK-Consult based on press releases.] 
BE None Direction générale de la 
concurrence 
  
BG None Commission on Protection of 
Competition 
Bulgarian Post The only case concerned a decision, issued by the NRA, in which the authority obliged the Bulgarian Post 
to enter into a contract with another postal operator for mutual access to the network. The case was left 
without consideration by the NCA due to expiration of the time for appealing. 
CY None Commission for the Protection 
of Competition 
  
CZ None Office for the Protection of 
Competition 
  
DE B9-55/03 of  
11th February 2005 
Federal Cartel Office 
(Bundeskartellamt) 
Deniz Intelligente Dienst-
leistungen, Bremen; PIN 
intelligente Diestleistungen 
AG; IHK Gesellschaft für 
Informationsverarbeitung 
mbH; Bundesverband 
Internationaler Expess- und 
Kurierdienste e.V. („BIEK“) / 
Deutsche Post AG 
Abuse of dominant position condemned: Discrimination between consolidators and bulk senders  
The complainants accused DP AG of refusing to grant consolidators feeding in postal items below the 
weight and price restrictions indicated in its exclusive licence access to partial services provided by DP 
AG and discounts for services provided by the consolidators themselves under § 28 (1) of the Postal Act 
(“access discounts”). Consolidators are postal service providers which collect postal items from various 
senders, render certain services within the letter conveyance chain themselves and then feed in these 
letter post items into DP AG’s distribution chain. The services provided by DP AG are classified as 
“access services” and account for the remaining part of the conveyance chain after the services provided 
by the postal service provider (consolidator). The fee charged by DP AG for its conveyance service is 
based on the standard postage charge for the respective letter post items minus the “access discount”. 
However, the discount is only granted if certain minimum mailing volumes are fed into the conveyance 
chain. The consolidators collect letter post items from several (smaller) senders in order to achieve the 
minimum volumes required for the award of a discount. In this way the consolidators can offer end 
customers (senders) a reduction in postage charges if they only use a proportion of the discounts to cover 
their costs and, where possible, keep this as profit. 
DP AG’s action constituted a breach of § 20 GWB (Prohibition of Discrimination) and Art. 82 EC.  
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DP AG was prohibited from denying companies with a postal licence under § 51 (1) sentence 2 no. 5 of 
the Postal Act and which feed in consolidated and presorted post items from several senders into DP 
AG’s sorting centres (consolidators) access to partial services under § 28 (1) of the Postal Act and 
discounts for the services they render themselves (“partial service discounts”) for mail items below the 
weight and price limits indicated in its exclusive licence (§ 51 (1) sentence 1 of the Postal Act) whereas at 
the same time granting senders (“bulk senders”) access to partial services and partial discounts 
irrespective of the weight and price limits stated in the exclusive licence and granting consolidators 
access and discounts for feeding in mail exceeding the weight and price limits of the exclusive licence.  
DE VI – Kart 3/05 (V) Düsseldorf Higher Regional 
Court 
Bundeskartellamt / Deutsche 
Post AG 
Appeal removed 
DP AG appealed against the Bundeskartellamt’s prohibition decision at the Düsseldorf Higher Regional 
Court and applied to have the suspensive effect of the objection restored. In its decision of 13 April 2005 
(VI – Kart 3/05 (V)) the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court had rejected the application for restoration of 
the suspensive effect of the appeal with the result that DP AG had to grant access to partial services until 
the decision in the main issue. For the decision to be taken in the main issue it was of great importance 
how § 51 (1) sentences 1 and 2 No. 5 of the Postal Act were to be interpreted in consideration of the 
requirements of Directive 97/67/EC on common rules for the development of the internal market of 
Community postal services and the improvement of quality of service and how the relevant requirements 
of the Directive itself were to be interpreted. At issue was the question, in particular, whether DP AG is 
obliged under the exclusive licence clause of § 51 (1) sentence 1 of the Postal Act to grant competitors 
non-discriminatory access to partial services. The Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court had suspended the 
proceedings in the main issue because the Cologne Administrative Court had submitted a similar question 
to the European Court of Justice on the interpretation of Article 234 EC in several proceedings. In its 
ruling of 6 March 2008 (joined cases C-287/06 to C-292/06 – “Vedat Deniz decision”) the European Court 
of Justice decided that the Directive 97/67/EC is to interpreted such that businesses which consolidate, on 
a commercial basis and in their own name, postal items from various senders cannot be denied special 
tariffs which the national universal postal service provider grants within the scope of its exclusive licence 
to business customers for the deposit of minimum quantities of pre-sorted mail at its sorting offices. As a 
consequence, on 25 April 2008 DP AG withdrew its appeal against the Bundeskartellamt’s prohibition 
decision. The Bundeskartellamt’s decision is therefore legally valid. 




The Bundeskartellamt had prohibited DP AG from acquiring a 24.8 % participation in trans-o-flex because 
the merger would have strengthened DP AG’s dominant position. The Federal Court of Justice confirmed 
the Bundeskartellamt's prohibition decision because the merger would have secured DP AG's dominant 
position vis à vis any prospective future competition by a further competitor and would have thus 
strengthened the current market position of the dominant company. 
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DK Various cases Konkurrencestyrelsen Post Danmark A/S / 
Forbruger-Kontakt /  
Bring CityMail Denmark A/S  
Abuse of dominant position condemned: Discrimination and loyalty rebates  
According to press releases by the Danish NCA, the authority took at least three decisions to condemn 
abuse of dominant position by Post Danmark.  
1) Based on a complaint by Forbruger-Kontakt, a provider of delivery services for unaddressed mail and 
publications in Denmark, the NCA has reviewed the pricing practice of Post Danmark in the market for 
unaddressed items and local weekly publications. In a decision taken in September 2004, the NCA 
decided that Post Danmark had violated competition law by using discriminatory prices and loyalty 
rebates in 2003 and 2004. This decision was upheld by the Competition Appeals Board and the High 
Court of Eastern Denmark and is currently pending at the Supreme Court. According to press articles, 
there was a fine imposed by the High Court of Eastern Denmark, but no reliable information on fines was 
available from the Danish NCA for this study.172 Based on the same complaint by Forbruger-Kontakt, the 
NCA determined in a decision taken in November 2004 that Post Danmark had not abused its dominant 
position by engaging in predatory pricing in 2003 and 2004.173 
2) Based on a different complaint by Forbruger-Kontakt, the NCA has reviewed the pricing practice of 
Post Danmark in the market for clearing, sorting, transport and delivery of magazine mail in Denmark. In 
August 2007, the NCA determined that Post Danmark had abused its dominant position, as Post 
Danmark’s prices and rebates for magazine mail were found to be loyalty enhancing, anti-competitive and 
discriminating without being cost substantiated by Post Danmark. It appears that a primary concern was a 
lack of transparency in Post Danmark’s prices as the firm had offered its customers different price lists 
and rebates to its customers, without a justification based on costs. Post Danmark was ordered to 
rearrange its pricing. No information on possible fines was available for this study. the situation. This 
decision was not appealed.174 
3) Based on a complaint by Bring CityMail, the NCA has reviewed Post Danmark‘s rebates for direct mail. 
In June 2009, the NCA decided that these rebates are loyalty enhancing and anti-competitive and ordered 
Post Danmark to bring this infringement to an end. No information on possible fines was available for this 
study.175 
EE None Estonian Competition 
Authority 
  
                                                
172 See Konkurrencestyrelsen press notes 2004-09-29: Post Danmark Abuse of dominant position (discriminating prices); and 2009-06-24: The Danish Competition Council’s 
decision of  
24 June 2009 on Post Danmark’s Rebate System for Direct Mail. 
173 See Konkurrencestyrelsen press note 2004-11-24: Post Danmark did not abuse a dominant position by predatory pricing. 
174 See Konkurrencestyrelsen press notes 2007-08-30: Post Denmark has abused its dominant position in the market for magazine mail; and 2009-06-24: The Danish Competition  
Council’s decision of 24 June 2009 on Post Danmark’s Rebate System for Direct Mail. 
175 See Konkurrencestyrelsen press note 2009-06-24: The Danish Competition Council’s decision of 24 June 2009 on Post Danmark’s Rebate System for Direct Mail. 
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EL None Hellenic Competition 
Commission 
 Information according to NRA (EETT) 
ES Nº TDC 568/03 
Asempre-Corres 
National Competition 
Commission / Decisions 
confirmed by Spanish Court 
Asempre (Postal undertakings 
Association) / Correos y 
Telégrafos Sae (National 
Universal Services Provider) 
Abuse of dominant position condemned: Tying  
Tying of liberalised postal services with reserved postal services, by rebates and exclusive clauses in 
agreements for supplying postal services between Correos and some banks. Mentioned practises were 
an infringement of Article 6 from the Spanish Competition Law and of Artice 82 from the CE Treaty  
ES Nº TDC 584/04 
Prensa -Correos 
National Competition 
Commission / Decisions 
confirmed by Spanish Court 
Asociatión de Prensa 
Profesional (APP) / Correos y 
Telégrafos Sae 
Abuse of dominant position condemned: Discrimination  
Discrimination between publishers made by Correos on its agreement to supply postal services. The 
mentioned practises were an infringement of Article 6 from the Spanish Competition Law. 






Asempre / Correos y 
Telégrafos Sae 
Abuse of dominant position: Predatory pricing 
Procedure started with a complaint on predatory prices. Commitments decision dealt with Correos 
commitments to apply always prices above cost to its big clients. 
FI None Finish Competition Authority   
FR Decision no. 05-D-
63, 17 November 
2005 
French Competition Authority Syndicat national des 
entreprises de logistique de 
publicité directe (National 
Association of Direct 
Advertising Logistics 
Companies, or SNELPD) 
asked the Autorité to 
investigate; the Autorité then 
proceeded ex officio / La 
Poste 
Abuse of dominant position condemned: Discrimination  
La Poste was not offering "general tariff" and "specific tariff" rates in bulk mail contracts consistently 
throughout France. However, the NCA found that La Poste acted negligently in responding to the problem 
rather than deliberately promoting a discriminatory price scheme and thus limited the fine to one million 
Euros. 
FR Decision no. 4-D-65, 
30 Nov. 2004 
French Competition Authority Autorité / La Poste Abuse of dominant position condemned: Loyalty rebate  
The legality of certain rebates provided by La Poste with important clients. The Autorité found that certain 
clients were still receiving tied loyalty rebates despite prior advice by the Autorité that these practices 
were illegal. 
The Autorité reduced the fine in accordance with the negotiated settlement procedure set forth in Art. L. 
464-2 of the Commercial Code. 
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FR Decision no. 09-D-
09, 26 Feb. 2009 
French Competition Authority Stamper's, a private operator 
authorised by ARCEP to offer 
regional mail delivery 
Services / La Poste 
Abuse of dominant position: Complaint rejected  
Whether La Poste's insistence that clients wishing to change service providers change their address to 
add a post office box constituted an abuse of its dominant position designed to drive competitors from the 
market The Autorité declined to apply interim measures because it found that the addition of a post office 
box was the only way to ensure effective operation of a collection and delivery service provided by a third 
party.  
FR Decision no. 
05/24993, March 26, 
2008 
La Cour d'appel de Paris (the 
Paris Court of Appeals), 
Chambre 5, section A 
15 mail routing companies / La 
Poste 
Abuse of dominant position: Complaint rejected  
The routers engaged la Poste's civil responsibility for private damages due to la Poste's alleged abuse of 
its dominant position and discriminatory price practices in not granting the routers discounted commercial 
contracts of the nature that it provides to its bulk mail clients. The result was no abuse of a dominant 
position under Art. 82 ECT because 1) no discriminatory effects for consumers; 2) routers are not 
considered "clients" of la Poste; rather, they are intermediaries in postal operations as they have no 
control over demand and 3) bulk mail clients and routers are not active within the same market, and thus 
are not in competition. 
FR Decision no. 186227 
186356, 29 Sept. 
1999 
Le Conseil d'Etat (France's 
highest administrative court) 
Request made by the 
Association of scientific and 
cultural press publishers 
(SPCS) to the Conseil d'Etat 
to modify certain provisions in 
the Postal and 
Telecommunications Code 
that were introduced by a 
proposed bill. 
Anticompetitive practice: Complaint rejected  
The SPCS alleged that certain provisions in the Code according postal discounts to press publishers 
providing news of a "general" or "political" nature were susceptible to encouraging cartels.  
Result: 1) the principle of equality with regard to public service does not oppose treating parties differently 
if said parties are in different situations; and 2) the provisions in question do not promote cartels because 
they don't directly place benefiting parties in a situation contrary to competition legislation. 
HU Vj-174/2005 Magyar 
Posta Zrt. 




A company which is in the 
market of producing postal 
items / Magyar Posta Zrt. 
Abuse of dominant position condemned: Tying and rebates  
The rebate scheme of Magyar Posta (MP) was investigated, This case illustrated the complementary 
characters of competition law and sector specific regulation. Both NCA and NRA investigated the rebated 
scheme of MP without interfering. NCA and NRA consulted each other about the scopes of their 
investigations at the beginning, so that the NRA focussed on controlling complying with regulation (e.g. 
rules on the transparency of the rebate scheme), and NCA focussed on the competitive effects of the 
rebate scheme.  
The NCA defined the loyalty rebates in line with the European case law, and applied (to some extent) an 
effect-based approach (stating that a rebate which could be held loyalty rebate, is not necessary lawful, if 
the size of the rebate is very low). The NCA also stated that rebates which link competitive (producing 
postal items) and reserved markets (delivery of basic letters ) could breach competition law (leverage of 
dominant position). 
The NCA in its decision dealt also with a rather regulatory subject (but only from competition policy point 
of view): the issue of providing reserved postal services by the employee leasing (due to a legal gap NRA 
could not properly tackle this issue then). 
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Magyar Lapterjeszto Zrt / 
Magyar Posta Zrt. 
Anti-competitive agreement  
The 2 companies agreed not to attack each others markets. The NCA established infringement on the 
basis of Hungarian and European competition law both. A fine of EUR 1 890 000 was imposed on each of 
the two undertakings. 
HU Vj-167/2001 Hungarian Competition 
Authority 
A company which is in the 
market of producing postal 
items / Magyar Posta Zrt 
Abuse of dominant position condemned: Tying and rebates  
The case focussed on the rebate which linked competitive and non competitive markets. Magyar Posta 
Zrt infringed the competition rules because it gave higher discount (from the postal delivery price) 
whenever the item to be delivered (generally invoices) was created by itself. 
Seem to be a similar case than above. As this decision dated back of 2001 should be mentioned above? 
IE No information The Competition Authority   
IS No information Icelandic Competition 
Authority 
  
IT N. A365, POSTA 
ELETTRONICA 
IBRIDA 
Italian Competition Authority TNT Post and others / Poste 
Italiane S.p.A. and its 
subsidiary Postel S.p.A.  
Abuse of dominant position condemned: Discrimination  
Abuse of dominant position in the market for delivery of hybrid e-mail by giving preference to its subsidiary 
Postel, thereby foreclosing a market which had been opened to competitors that print and put mail into 
envelopes for large companies. The Italian Competition Authority decided that the Italian Post Office had 
abused its dominant position. The Authority imposed a fine of €1.6 million on Poste Italiane. 




Italian Competition Authority Associazione Imprese Servizi 
Postali (AISP); Consorzio 
Proposte 2000; 
Federazione Imprese di 
Servizi; Associazione delle 
Agenzie di Recapito Espresso 
/ Poste Italiane S.p.A. 
Abuse of dominant position condemned: Discrimination  
The sub-contracting agreements stipulated with competitors were evidence of a concerted strategy to 
reinforce and extend its dominant position in already liberalised services and in those that are to be 
liberalised. The Italian Competition Authority decided to accept and render binding the commitments 
proposed by Poste Italiane because they remove the anticompetitive stance. 
LT  Competition Council of the 
Republic of Lithuania 
UAB BMK. / AB Lietuvos 
paštas 
Abuse of dominant position condemned: Tying  
The AB Lietuvos paštas had a dominant position in the universal postal services market (thus it was a 
dominant in the invoices delivering market) and has abused it in the invoices printing and enveloping 
market.  
LU None Competition Inspectorate, 
Ministry of Economics and 
Foreign Trade 
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LV  Competition Council Subscription office "Diena" / 
Post of Latvia 
Abuse of dominant position condemned: Discrimination 
Latvia Post was obliged to stop the practice to arrange such provisions in the market of subscription and 
delivery of newspapers and magazines (S&D) that restrict and distort competition.  
LV No.A42428306 The Administrative District 
court 
Post of Latvia / Competition 
Council of Latvia 
NCA Decision confirmed in appeal 
Post of Latvia argued that the Competition Council of Latvia wrongly distinguished S&D market from retail 
market; disagreed with the geographic market -whole Latvia arguing that the applicant (competing 
company) operated only in some regions in Latvia). abusive practice - marketing campaign prior to the 
coming subscription year - "Subscribe cheaper in Post".  
The Court confirmed that the CC has rightly defined the relevant market and accordingly the dominant 
position of the Post in this market. The Court confirmed that the Competition Council of Latvia has rightly 
established abuse of dominant position by undertaking marketing campaign "Subscribe cheaper by Post" 
. Establishment of the economic advantage on the account of other competitors, thereby harming them, 
amounts to abuse of market power. 
MT None Office of Fair Competition   
NL 5994/Koninklijke 




Koninklijke TNT Post - Cendris 
BSC 
Merger approved 
Merger of Royal TNT/ Cendris was approved. 
NL 6576/ Deutsche Post 
– Selekt Mail 
Netherlands Competition 
Authority 
Deutsche Post – Selekt Mail Merger approved 
Merger of Deutsche Post / SelektMail was approved. 




Keizer (natural person)/ TPG 
Post 
Abuse of dominant position: complaint rejected 
A compliant regarding tariffs of the use of P.O. Boxes was rejected: in an earlier investigation the 
Netherlands Competition Authority concluded that TNT does not abuse its dominant position through the 
tariffs of P.O. Boxes . 
NO No information Konkurransetilsynet   
PL No information Office of Competition and 
Consumer Protection (UOKIK)
  
PT No information Autoridade da Concorrencia   




SC RTC Holding BV / SC 
CURIERO SA 
Merger approved 
Economic concentration realised by SC RTC Holding BV through achieving the sole control over SC 
CURIERO SA and over the undertakings controlled by the latter, respectively S.C. CURIERO EXPRESS 
SRL and S.C. CURIERO SPEDITION SRL 
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Deutsche Post AG / S.C. 
Cargus International SRL 
Merger approved 
Competition Council authorises the economic concentration realised by Deutsche Post AG through S.C. 
Cargus Expres Curier SRL - a new local subsidiary conceived to be DPAG’s vehicle for this economic 
concentration, through achieving the sole control over S.C. CARGUS International SRL, observing that 
although the notified economic concentration operation falls within the scope of the Law, there are no 
serious doubts as regards the compatibility with normal competitive environment. 
SE Merger between 




Posten AB / Strålfors AB Merger approved 
The Competition Authority took no action on Posten's acquisition of Strålfors. This was partly based on 
the voluntary undertakings made by Posten during the investigation, which were also linked to a financial 
penalty of SEK 100 million by Stockholm District Court.  
SE Various cases Swedish Competition 
Authority 
Bring CityMail / Posten Abuse of dominant position: Complaint rejected 
Complaint by Bring CityMail that Posten AB abused its dominant position concerning zone-related pricing 
on bulk mail. The Competition authority rejected that complaint as it was not possible to prove abuse  
SI Decision 306-
35/2005-98 of 28 




UVK Euromedia / Slovenian Post 
(ex officio case) 
Abuse of dominant position: Cross-subsidisation and discrimination 
The complainant is a competitor to the Slovenian Post on the market for the delivery of unaddressed mail 
items. The investigation related to an alleged abuse of a dominant position by the Slovenian Post (also 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty) / cross-subsidisation of delivery of unaddressed mail from income of reserved 
area / Discrimination in providing services for different customers. UVK adopted commitments of 
Slovenian Post that are regularly (annually) monitored and assessed and which addressed main concerns 
identified during the procedure. 
SK None Antimonopoly Office of the 
Slovak Republic 
  
UK None The Office of Fair Trading   
Unless mentioned otherwise, case descriptions in this tables are based on input received from NCAs in response to the questionnaire survey (Text edited slightly). In this survey, NCAs were asked to 
describe briefly the three most significant cases adopted by the NCA or a court applying EU or national competition rules to the postal sector since 1 January 2004. For a summary of earlier competition 
cases, see WIK-Consult (2006), Main developments in the European postal sector (2004-2006), Appendix A-2. 
 
 
198 Role of Regulators in a More Competitive Postal Market  
 Chapter 4: Application of Competition Law and State Aid Provisions in the Postal Sector 
4.1.3 Conclusions on the application of antitrust law 
This overview of the cases since 2000 shows that the application of antitrust policy to 
the Postal sector has been important at the European176 and at the national level. 
- Regarding anti-competitive agreements (Article 81 type of cases), there are very 
few decisions after 2000, the most important one being the REIMS II renewal in 
2003 until 2008. Given the new system of application of Article 81(3) of the EC 
Treaty, the exemption has not been extended further. 
- Most of the cases related to abuse of dominant position (Article 82 type of 
cases). In 2000, three important decisions were adopted by the European 
Commission against the German and the Belgian incumbents. Since the 
decentralisation of competition law in 2004, the NCAs have taken over by 
adopting several infringement decisions. In most of these cases, the incumbent 
postal operator relies on its monopoly or super dominant position in the 
traditional markets (in many countries still being reserved markets) to impede 
entry to markets that are progressively open to competition and slow down the 
liberalisation provided by the Postal Directive, or to build up its presence in the 
market for delivery of unaddressed items (which never was reserved in most 
Member States). To do so, several strategies have been used by the 
incumbents: tying the reserved and non-reserved services, giving loyalty rebates 
or charging predatory prices on non-reserved markets, or refusing to give 
access to their postal networks.  
- Regarding Member States measures that unduly favour the incumbents (Article 
86 type of cases), the Commission has acted against in several instances where 
national laws that extend the monopoly of the incumbent beyond reserved 
services, or that encourage anti-competitive discriminatory behaviours by the 
incumbents. 
- Finally regarding merger cases, few have led to remedies, although some have 
led to behavioural remedies in the 1990s (equal access and limitation in time of 
exclusive access, separate accounts) and structural remedies (divestiture) more 
recently. 
                                                
176 For an analysis of the Commission cases in the literature, see Baratta, Buiges, Fehrenbach, 
Johansson, Lüder (2001), „The Application of EC Competition Rules in the Postal Sector“, Paper 
presented at the Second IDEI Conference; Geradin and Henry (2004), „Regulatory and Competition 
Law Remedies in the Postal Sector“, in Geradin (ed), Remedies in Network Industries, Intersentia; 
Geradin (2006),“Enhancing competition in the postal sector: can we do away with sector-specific 
regulation?“, paper presented at the 14th Conference on Postal and Delivery Economics.  
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With the full liberalisation of the sector in 2011/2013, we expect the application of 
antitrust policy to increase for at least two reasons. First, antitrust law will support and 
complement sector regulation to ensure that effective competition increases in the 
sector. Second, as more competitors are expected to enter in the sector, they will rely 
increasingly on antitrust provisions to ensure that their entry is not unduly impeded by 
the incumbents. Indeed, the experience of the liberalisation in other network industries, 
such as electronic communications show that liberalisation has been accompanied by 
an increased application of antitrust policy.177 In some cases, regulatory issues have 
generated new competition law theories such as margin squeezes178 and access to 
essential facilities. In other cases, competition law has been used to change the 
structure of a market (so-called “regulatory antitrust”) and achieve regulatory purposes 
by correcting the inadequacy of sector-specific regulation.179 
Therefore, it is important to reflect upon an appropriate design that ensures an efficient 
application of antitrust and the best relationship between competition law and sector-
specific regulation.180 Our suggestions are based on the experience in the Member 
States in the postal sector and on the experiences in other sectors. In principle, it is 
preferable to have two authorities, one in charge of competition law in general, the 
NCA, and one in charge of sector regulation, the NRA (possibly with concurrent power 
to apply competition law in the postal sector).181 Such structure reduces the risk of 
regulatory capture of the public authorities by the industry for at least two reasons: first, 
authorities having a broad horizontal portfolio of activities, such as competition 
authorities, are less prone to capture by a specific industry. Second, it is more difficult 
and resources intensive to capture two authorities instead of one. 
Two major conclusions on the efficient application of antitrust, and the best relationship 
between competition law and sector-specific regulation emerge from our analysis in this 
                                                
177 See de Streel (2004) “Remedies in the European Electronic Communications Sector”, in Geradin (ed), 
Remedies in Network Industries: EC Competition Law vs. Sector-Specific Regulation, Intersentia, 67; 
Garzaniti (2009)Telecommunications, Broadcasting and the Internet: EU Competition Law and 
Regulation, 3rd edition, Sweet & Maxwell, Chapter VIII. 
178 See Case 37.351 Deutsche Telekom, Case 38.784 Telefonica. 
179 See for instance Case 35.337 Atlas GlobalOne, Case 36.559 BiB/Open, Case M.1439 Telia/Telenor, 
case M.2803 Telia/Sonera. This approach has been implicitly endorsed by the Court of First Instance 
in the electricity sector in Case T-87/05 Energias de Portugal v Commission [2005] ECR II-3745, 
para.91. 
180 It is important to note that in European law, competition law always applies, even when sector-specific 
regulation has been applied. In other words, the application of sector regulation does not render 
competition law inapplicable: Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom v Commission [2008] E.C.R. II-477, 
para.113 in the electronic communications sector. 
181 There is an extensive literature on the issue: International Competition Network, Working Group on 
Telecommunications Services (Report to the Fifth Annual Conference in Cape Town, 2006); OECD, 
Relationship between Regulators and Competition Authorities, (1999) DAFFE/CLP(99)8; UNCTAD, 
‘Best practices for defining respective competences and settling of cases, which involve joint action by 
competition authorities and regulatory bodies’, (2006) TD/B/COM.2/CLP/44/Rev2; Barros and 
Hoernig, Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is best? (2004) 
CEPR Discussion Paper 4541.  
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section: First, competition authorities and postal regulators should cooperate with each 
other182 and with the Commission. Second, forum shopping, risk of contradictory 
decision, delay, and additional compliance costs, should be avoided by respecting the 
following principles:183 
(1) There should be clear mechanisms for case allocation and the division of tasks 
between the NCA and the NRA, strict deadlines for case allocation;  
(2) NRAs and NCAs should be obliged to consult mutually when deciding cases 
that have antitrust aspects. In particular, the NCAs or the Commission should 
consult the NRAs deciding a antitrust case in the postal sector. This consultation 
may relate to market definition, competitive assessment or choice of remedies. 
Going further, we can imagine that, to clear a merger, the NCA or the 
Commission impose behavioural remedies, whose compliance would be 
controlled by the NRAs.184 
(3) The should be extensive exchange of information, including confidential 
information, provided that both NCA and NRA respect business secrecy and 
that information is solely used for the purpose for which it was obtained. 
(4) Common terms used either under competition law or under sector-specific 
regulation should be interpreted and applied uniformly. 
In addition as required by Article 11 of Regulation 1/2003, the NCAs of the different 
Member States should cooperate among themselves and with the Commission among 
the European Competition Network on postal issues. 
                                                
182 This cooperation is required by Article 22(1) of the Postal Directive. At the national level, see for 
instance in the United-Kingdom, the MoU between Postcomm and OFT of 13 December 2004; or in 
the Netherlands, the OPTA/NMa Cooperation Protocol of 24 June 2004. 
183 Our suggestions are based on the assumption that the independence and the expertise of the NRAs 
are ensured effectively.  
184 This has been the case in the ICT sector in Case M.2876, Newscorp/Telepiu, Commission Decision of 
2 April 2003, para.259. 
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4.2 Application of state aid rules to the postal sector  
This section summarises the major state aid decisions adopted by the European 
Commission in the postal sector since 2000.185 To ease the reading, we divide the 
cases in three categories, although they may sometimes overlap: (1) cases related to 
the provision of the services of general economic interest or public service, (2) cases 
related to the financial activities of the postal incumbents, and (3) cases related to other 
issues such as pension schemes. 
4.2.1 Cases related to the Services of General Economic Interest 
Most of the cases reviewed relate to the provision of a service of general interest. In 
that matter, the issue whether a compensation for public service constitutes a state aid 
has evolved in the case law of the Court of Justice and the practice of the Commission. 
Before 2003, it was considered that a funding that merely compensates for the net cost 
of the public service was not a state aid. The situation has changed substantially on 24 
July 2003 with the Altmark case.186 In this case, the Court established that a public 
compensation does not constitute a state aid (hence should not be notified to the 
Commission) when it fulfils four cumulative conditions: 
(1) The recipient undertaking is actually required to discharge public service 
obligations and those obligations have been clearly defined; 
(2) The parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated have been 
established beforehand in an objective and transparent manner; 
(3) The compensation does not exceed the net costs (with a reasonable profit) 
incurred in discharging the public service obligations;  
                                                
185 We review all the cases mentioned in the current Commission state aid register (containing cases as 
of 1 January 2000) under the NACE code H.53 Postal and courier activities. 
186 Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesell-
schaft Altmark GmbH, and Oberbundesanwalt beim Bundesverwaltungsgericht [2003] ECR I-7747. 
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(4) The level of compensation needed has been determined in a public procurement 
procedure, or on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical 
undertaking, well run.  
As those conditions are restrictive, the Commission complemented such legal 
framework in November 2005. In the Decision 2005/842,187 the Commission 
established that a compensation is a state aid but is compatible with the Treaty 
according to Article 86(2) EC and should not be notified to the Commission if (1) the 
recipient undertaking is actually required to discharge public service obligations, and 
(2) the compensation does not exceed the net costs (with a reasonable profit) incurred 
in discharging the public service obligations (by the firm in charge and not necessarily 
by a typical efficient firm). This regime applies only for the annual compensation of less 
than 30 million EUR granted to undertakings with an average annual turnover of less 
than 100 million EUR during the two preceding financial years in which the service of 
general interest is assigned. 
As those ceilings are often exceeded, the Commission adopted an additional 
Community Framework in November 2005, which has been heavily relied upon in the 
recent postal decisions.188 In this Framework, the Commission established that a 
compensation is a state aid that has to be notified to the Commission but that may be 
compatible with the Treaty according to Article 86(2) EC when (1) the recipient 
undertaking is actually required to discharge public service obligations, and (2) the 
compensation does not exceed the net costs (with a reasonable profit) incurred in 
discharging the public service obligations. Note that under this Community framework, it 
is for the Member States to define the scope of the public service which they wish to 
entrust to an undertaking (within the limitations of Article 86 of the Treaty). The role of 
the Commission is merely to check that the compensation provided for carrying out the 
public service task does not exceed the additional costs of providing these services. 
On that basis, the Commission adopted major decisions in cases regarding Germany, 
Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
                                                
187 Commission Decision 2005/842 of 28 November 2005 on the application of Article 86(2) of the EC 
Treaty to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings 
entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest, O.J. [2005] L 312/ 67. 
188 Community framework of 28 November 2005 for State aid in the form of public service compensation, 
O.J. [2005] C 297/4, and the Commission staff Working Document of 20 November 2007, FAQs, 
SEC(2007) 1516. 
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4.2.1.1 Germany 
In 2002, the European Commission decided that a compensation of € 572 million 
received by Deutsche Post AG (DPAG) to finance its public service mission was an 
illegal state aid and had been used to finance an aggressive pricing policy intended to 
undercut private rivals in the parcel sector between 1994 and 1998. This behaviour 
breached the principle according to which companies that receive State funding for 
services of general interest cannot use these resources to subsidise activities open to 
competition. In order to remedy this distortion, the Commission condemned the German 
authorities to recover the amount of State support used to undercut parcel 
competitors.189  
On appeal by Deutsche Post, the Court of First Instance annulled the Commission 
Decision in July 2008 because the Commission had not shown to the requisite legal 
standard that the transfer payments (made by DBP Telekom) conferred an advantage 
on DPAG as the Commission did not check whether the transfer payments exceeded 
the amount of DPAG’s uncontested net additional costs of the public service.190 
In the meanwhile, private competitors filed complaints alleging that DPAG had gained 
significantly higher financial benefits from the public compensation received than what it 
had to repay according to the 2002 Decision. In addition they brought new allegations 
that DPAG had used the public service compensation to expand its commercial 
activities and to sell services too cheaply to its subsidiaries DHL and Postbank. 
Thus the Commission investigates all public measures, such as transfers of public 
money and tariff income, which were granted since 1989 in favour of DPAG, and its 
predecessor DBP POSTDIENST, to determine whether DPAG was indeed 
overcompensated beyond the incompatible aid previously recovered. This Commission 
investigation therefore complements and extends its 2002 decision.191 In this context, 
the Commission has sent information injunction to Germany.192 
                                                
189 Commission Decision of 19 June 2002, OJ 2002 L247/27. 
190 Case T-266/02, Deutsche Post v Commission [2008] not yet reported. 
191 Commission Decision of 12 September 2007, Case C36/2007 (ex NN25/2007), pursuant to the 
Art.4(4) of Regulation 1999/659: decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure. 
192 Decision of the Commission of 30 October 2008, pursuant to the Art. 10(3) of Regulation 1999/659: 
information injunction. 
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4.2.1.2 Italy 
Over the period 2000-2005 Poste Italiane received €2.4 billion compensation for 
discharging the universal postal service obligations entrusted to it. 
As the compensation granted by the Italian authorities was not in line with the Altmark 
conditions, notably the fourth one in that Poste Italiane was not chosen pursuant to a 
public procurement procedure, this state intervention constituted state aid. However, 
Poste Italiane’s net costs for delivering its universal postal service obligations exceeded 
the financial support granted by Italy over the period 2000-2005. Therefore, the 
Commission decided that the aid was compatible to the Treaty under Article 86(2), 
according to 2005 Community Framework.193 
Later over the period 2006-2008 Poste Italiane received another €1.1 billion 
compensation for discharging the universal postal service obligations. 
Again, the compensation was not in line with the Altmark conditions and thus 
constituted a state aid. However the Commission's investigation revealed that Poste 
Italiane’s net costs for delivering the universal postal service obligations from 2006 to 
2008 exceeded the financial support granted by Italy over this period. Thus, the 
Commission decided that the aid was compatible to the Treaty under Article 86(2), 
according to 2005 Community Framework.194 
4.2.1.3 Sweden 
The Swedish Government required Posten AB to supply basic payment and cash 
facilities services for the two years 2006-2007 throughout Sweden. In exchange, the 
Swedish Government compensated Posten AB for the commercially unviable parts of 
SKS AB's basic cashier services network, up to a maximum of SKR 400 million each 
year. The Commission had previously authorised a similar scheme for the period 2002-
2005. 
The measure constituted a state aid as it implied a transfer of state resources, granted 
an economic advantage to Posten AB and potentially distorted competition and intra-EU 
trade. However, the state compensation was designed to be limited to the net public 
service cost of maintaining the commercially unviable parts of the basic cashier services 
network and sufficient ex-ante and ex-post mechanisms were in place to prevent any 
overcompensation of the net cost of the service of general economic interest. Thus, the 
                                                
193 Commission Decision of 29 September 2006, Case N51/2006, pursuant to the Article 4(3) Regulation 
659/1999. 
194 Commission Decision of 30 April 2008, Case NN24/2008, pursuant to the Article 4(3) Regulation 
659/1999. 
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Commission decided that the aid was compatible with Treaty state pursuant to the 2005 
Community framework for state aid in the form of public service compensation.195 
4.2.1.4 United Kingdom 
Transformation Programme of the Post Office (2007) 
In July 2007, the UK notified a series of measures in favour of Post Office Limited (POL) 
to take effect between 1 April 2008 and 31 March 2011 of £634 million. They included 
£150 million per year to cover the specific costs of operating the parts of the network 
which were inherently loss-making. Certain additional funding included in the financial 
year 2008/2009 reflected certain specific costs to arise that year, including costs for the 
closure of some post offices as part of a transformation programme. Moreover, a loan 
facility between the UK Government and Post Office Limited provided funding up to a 
limit of £1.15 billion, allowing Post Office Limited to finance the provision of basic cash 
services by post offices, in particular to more vulnerable groups in society. This 
measure was originally authorised in 2003.  
As the compensation provided for carrying out the public service task did not exceed 
the additional costs of providing these services, the Commission authorised the funding 
under the 2005 Community Framework.196 
Debt payment funding to Post Office (2007) 
In December 2006, the UK notified its intention to extend by a further year a measure 
previously authorised by the Commission in 2003,197 under which the losses incurred 
by the network of post offices in providing public services were covered by Government 
funds. The amount notified for the financial year beginning 1 April 2007 was 
£313 million. 
The compensation measures were designed not to exceed the minimum necessary for 
Post Office Limited to continue providing the public services entrusted to it. Thus, the 
Commission considered that the aid was compatible with the EC Treaty pursuant to the 
2005 Community framework for state aid in the form of public service compensation. 198 
                                                
195 Commission Decision of 23 November 2006, Case N642/2005. 
196 Commission Decision of 28 November 2007, Case N388/2007, pursuant to the Article 4(3) of 
Regulation 1999/659 : not to raise objection. 
197 See infra, Commission Decision of 27 May 2003, Case N784/2002. 
198 Commission Decision of 7 March 2007, Case N822/2006, pursuant to the Article 4(3) of Regulation 
1999/659 decision not raise objection. 
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Rural Network Support (2006) 
The UK Government compensated, up to maximum £150 million annually, POL for the 
public service costs related to the requirement of maintaining rural counters which were 
structurally loss-making in order to safeguard rural communities’ local access to 
essential services.  
The measure constituted a state aid as it implied a transfer of state resources, granted 
an economic advantage to POL, and potentially distorted competition and intra-EU 
trade. However, the compensation was designed not to exceed the net public service 
cost of maintaining structurally loss-making counters and sufficient ex-ante and ex-post 
mechanisms were in place to prevent any overcompensation of the net cost of the 
public service. Thus the Commission decided that the aid was compatible with EC 
Treaty rules on state aid pursuant to the 2005 Community framework.199 
Debt repayment, rural network support and loan for working capital (2003) 
The UK government notified several compensations to POL: 
(1) A compensation for the net public service cost of rural counter coverage. As the 
Government required POL to keep open 8,600 rural post offices, it compensated 
POL annually for the related net public service costs and this within a 
£150 million ceiling. The rural network support compensation was designed not 
to exceed the net additional public service cost of maintaining structurally loss-
making counters. 
(2) Means to POL to back its debt to Royal Mail Group which had financed POL's 
balance-sheet deficits up to 31 March 2002, dispensing a total £726 million in 
this respect. In the financial year 2006/7, the Government provided payment up 
to £574 million to ensure that POL was able to meet its debts in full. The 
Government payments were the minimum necessary to keep POL going so that 
it could continue providing its public services. This minimum funding itself was 
reduced by the positive revenue contribution derived from competitive activities. 
(3) A rolling working capital loan for over-the-counter cash payments. This capital 
loan up to a ceiling of £1,150 million in 2004/5 was meant to fund the basic 
postal account. A self-regulating mechanism had been designed to ensure that 
the rolling working capital loan was the minimum necessary to enable the 
provision of a basic postal account. 
All those three measures complemented earlier measures that the Commission 
approved in 2002. On 12 March 2002, the Commission approved the funding of a basic 
                                                
199 Commission Decision of 22 February 2006, Case N166/2005, pursuant to the article 4(3) of 
Regulation 1999/659 : decision not to raise objection. 
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postal account to credit social benefits and from which cash can be withdrawn at post 
office counters for those benefits holders who do not want to open an account with a 
bank.200 On 18 September 2002, the Commission approved minimum funding 
necessary for POL to close 3,000 urban counters no longer required under the 2000 UK 
Postal Services Act.201 
The three measures constituted a transfer of State resources, granted an advantage to 
POL in the form of a loan and payments and potentially distorted competition and intra-
community trade. However, as long as the Government loan and payments only 
compensated POL for the net additional cost of the public tasks it was entrusted with, 
no real advantage was conferred on POL. The Commission verified that there were 
sufficient a priori and a posteriori mechanisms in place to prevent any 
overcompensation of the net additional cost of the public service. A system of "ring-
fencing" prevented any double Government compensation. The UK Government had 
committed itself to recovering any potential overcompensation as shown by separate 
accounts. As the issue was decided before the Almark case, the Commission 
considered, according to the case-law and the practice at the time, that the measures 
did not constitute State aid.202  
                                                
200 Commission Decision 13 February 2002, Case N514/2001, pursuant to the Art 4(3) of Regulation 
1999/659: Decision not to raise objections. 
201 Commission Decision of 18 September 2002, Case N252/2002, pursuant to the Art. 4(2) of Regulation 
1999/659: decision does not constitute state aid. 
202 Commission Decision of 27 May 2003, Case N784/2002, pursuant to the Article 4(2) of Regulation 
1999/659 Decision does not constitute aid, O.J. 2009 L64/4. 
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4.2.2 Cases related to the financial activities of the postal incumbents 
4.2.2.1 France: Creation of Banque Postale203 
The Commission approved the transfer of the banking and financial business of the 
French Post Office (La Poste) to its subsidiary, Banque Postale. The Commission found 
that the operation as such did not confer an economic advantage on Banque Postale. 
The French authorities had entered into commitments ensuring this outcome. 
4.2.2.2 Italy: Poste Italiane - BancoPosta 
‘Poste Italiane’ is the universal postal service provider in Italy. It also exercises financial 
activities through an integrated business division named 'Bancoposta'. Poste Italiane 
was legally obliged to deposit the funds collected from customers’ current accounts with 
the Italian Treasury.  
The Commission's investigation revealed that the interest rates paid by the Treasury to 
Poste Italiane from 2005 onwards are higher than what would have been obtained from 
a private borrower and than what Poste Italiane would have obtained if it had been free 
to invest the money on the market. The Commission concluded that these higher 
interest rates, which did not conform to market conditions, provided an economic 
advantage in favour of Poste Italiane and distorted competition and trade within the 
Single Market. The Commission declared the aid unlawful under EC Treaty state aid 
rules. As Italy did not notify the scheme to the Commission before its implementation, 
the aid unlawfully granted had to be recovered from Poste Italiane.204 
In 2007, the Italian budgetary law abolished the legal obligation to deposit the funds 
collected on postal current accounts of private customers with the Treasury and 
provided that these funds were invested by Poste Italiane in euro area government 
bonds. The interest paid for these bonds did not contain any state aid as they did not 
entail any selective advantage. 
                                                
203 Commission Decision of 21 December 2005, Case N 531/2005. The associated issues, not directly 
linked to the transfer, such as the special right to distribute the "livret A" (a tax-free savings account 
for which La Poste has enjoyed a special distribution right since 1881), the unlimited state guarantee 
granted to La Poste and the welfare schemes for La Poste employees reassigned to Banque Postale, 
have been examined separately. 
204 Commission Decision 2009/178 of 16 July 2008, case C42/2006 (ex NN52/2006), pursuant to the 
Article 7(5) and 14(1) of Regulation 659/1999: negative decision with recovery, O.J. 2009 L64/4. 
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4.2.2.3 Italy: Poste Italiane – Postal Savings 
‘Poste Italiane’ is remunerated for distributing postal savings products, i.e. (1) postal 
savings books and (2) postal bonds on behalf of 'Cassa Depositi e Prestiti', a state-
controlled financial body, whose mission is to foster the development of public 
investment, local utility infrastructure works and major public works of national interest.  
(1) The collection of postal savings through 'Poste Italiane' on behalf of 'Cassa 
Depositi e Prestiti' has been qualified as a Service of General Economic Interest 
since October 2004. This means that Poste Italiane was entitled to receive 
remuneration for the distribution of postal saving books as compensation for the 
provision of this public service obligation. This remuneration was in line with the 
Altmark conditions, in particular Poste Italiane’s remuneration was equal to the 
one a private investor would have paid. As it also met the other ‘Altmark’ criteria, 
the remuneration for the distribution of the postal saving books since 2005 did 
not constitute state aid.  
Over the period 2000-2004, the collection of postal savings was not qualified as 
a Service of General Economic Interest. However, the remuneration paid to 
'Poste Italiane' also conformed to market conditions and did not confer any 
economic advantage to the company. Therefore, the remuneration for the 
distribution of postal saving books between 2000 and 2004 did not constitute 
state aid either. 
(2) However, the Commission was concerned that the remuneration for the 
distribution of postal bonds might be higher than the one a private investor 
would have paid (and therefore might not conform to market conditions). This 
higher remuneration could have conferred an economic advantage to 'Poste 
Italiane' and so potentially distort competition in violation of the EC Treaty’s state 
aid rules. Therefore, the Commission opened a formal investigation.205 After a 
thorough analysis and on the basis of extensive research conducted by an 
independent expert, the Commission concluded that remuneration for the 
distribution of postal bonds was in line with the respective remuneration for the 
distribution of comparable financial products on the markets. 
As regards the period 2004 to 2006, the Commission considered that the 
remuneration paid by Italy to 'Poste Italiane' for the distribution of postal bonds 
met the criteria established by the Altmark judgement. In particular, the 
Commission found that the benchmark of market remuneration was an 
appropriate estimate of the level of costs that a typical efficiently run undertaking 
                                                
205 Commission Decision of 22 November 2006, Case C49/2006 (ex NN65/2006). 
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within the same sector would incur, taking into account receipts and a 
reasonable profit from discharging the obligations. The Commission therefore 
concluded that it did not constitute state aid.  
As regards the period between 2000 and 2004, the collection of postal savings 
was not qualified as a Service of General Economic Interest. The Commission 
found that during that period the remuneration paid to 'Poste Italiane' for 
distributing postal bonds was market conform and conferred no economic 
advantage to the company. Therefore, it did not entail state aid either.  
However, according to the 2005 Community framework for state aid in the form 
of public service compensation, where an undertaking is entrusted with the 
operation of public services and also operates in other markets, the undertaking 
must have separate accounts for the different activities so that the absence of 
overcompensation can be checked. As ‘Poste Italiane’ had no appropriate 
separation between the costs and receipts related to postal savings and those 
associated with other services, the Commission has reminded Italy of this 
obligation.206 
                                                
206 Commission Decision of 21 October 2008, Case C49/2006, pursuant to the Article 4(2) of Regulation 
659/1999: decision does not constitute aid. 
 Role of Regulators in a More Competitive Postal Market 211 
 Chapter 4: Application of Competition Law and State Aid Provisions in the Postal Sector 
4.2.3 Cases related to other issues 
4.2.3.1 Belgium: Capital injection  
In 2003, the Commission examined six measures linked to the performance of public 
service tasks entrusted to the Belgian Post Office that could have involved state aid:  
Three measures did not constitute aid since either no advantage had been conferred or 
no transfer of state resources had taken place: (1) Exemption from corporate tax 
stemming from the fact that La Poste/De Post was an independent public enterprise 
and a limited company governed by public law since 2000. However, this exemption did 
not lead to any transfer of state resources since the Post Office had registered 
accumulated losses over the period under consideration. (2) Government guarantee to 
back its loans, which was not automatically activated. However the guarantee did not 
confer any advantage since no loan had been issued. (3) A provision for pensions was 
cancelled for rights acquired between 1972 and 1992. This placed La Poste/De Post in 
a similar position to that of a normal commercial enterprise. 
However, three measures could have constituted a State aid: (1) Exemption from 
property tax on its real-estate assets used in the public service; (2) Overcompensation 
for its public service tasks during the first management agreement; (3) Two non-notified 
capital injections made in 1997.  
These overcompensations were then compared with the undercompensations for the 
net additional cost of the public service over the period 1992-2002 that resulted from the 
non-reimbursement of the net additional costs of public financial services and the 
limitation of the compensation for the provision of other public services. This revealed 
that the net present value of the additional cost of the public service was greater than 
the notified capital injection. No advantage had therefore been conferred on the Belgian 
Post Office, hence according to the case-law before Altmark, the Commission 
considered in July 2003, that none of these measures involved state aid.207 
On appeal from Deutsche Post and DHL International, competitors from La Poste, the 
Court of First Instance annulled the Commission Decision in February 2009.208 The 
Court concluded that there existed a body of objective and consistent evidence – 
deriving from the excessive length of the preliminary examination procedure (more than 
7 months), from the documents which reveal the scope and complexity of the 
examination to be carried out and from the partially incomplete and insufficient content 
                                                
207 Commission Decision of 23 July 2003, Case N763/2002, pursuant Art.4(2) of Regulation 659/1999: 
decision does not constitute aid. 
208 Case T-388/03, Deutsche Post and DHL v Commission [2009] not yet reported. 
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of the contested decision – which showed that the Commission adopted the decision 
not to raise objections in spite of the existence of serious difficulties. Instead the 
Commission should have opened a formal investigation. 
Complying with this judgement, the Commission opened a formal investigation in July 
2009.209 
4.2.3.2 France: Unlimited State guarantee for La Poste 
Following on from the Commission’s decision of December 2005 on the transfer of the 
banking and financial business of La Poste to its subsidiary, La Banque Postale, the 
Commission examined the unlimited guarantee enjoyed by La Poste. This guarantee 
allowed La Poste to obtain finance on more favourable terms, giving it an advantage 
over its competitors and thus distorting competition on a market which was in the 
process of being liberalised. The guarantee was unlimited in terms of duration and 
amount and was provided free of charge. Moreover, it covered both universal service 
activities and commercial activities. It meant that La Poste was not subject to the 
insolvency and bankruptcy procedures provided for under ordinary law. In addition, in 
the event of financial failure of the post office, the state could be held responsible in last 
resort for its rights and obligations. This guarantee stemmed from its status as a legal 
entity governed by public law.  
As the aid was incompatible with the Treaty, the Commission sent France a 
recommendation that it should end the unlimited guarantee.210 As the subsequent 
negotiations with France did not convince the Commission that the French proposals 
amounted to terminating La Poste's guarantee, the Commission opened the formal 
investigation procedure against France.211 
4.2.3.3 France: Reform of the retirement pensions 
Under a 1990 law, La Poste was to finance in full the pensions paid by the State to its 
civil servants by way of a repayment to the State of the amounts paid out. This method 
of financing was a departure from the ordinary arrangement. Unlike an ordinary 
employer in a pay-as-you-go system, La Poste did not pay the levy that releases 
employers from any additional commitment for retirement pensions, but it had to ensure 
that the pension scheme for its civil servants was in balance. 
                                                
209 Commission Decision of 13 July 2009, Case C20/2009 (ex N763/2002) pursuant to the Article 4(4) of 
Regulation 659/1999: decision to initiate the formal investigation. 
210 Commission Decision of 4 October 2006, Case E15/2005. 
211 Commission Decision of 29 November 2007, Case C56/2007 (ex C49/2007) pursuant to the Article 
4(4) of Regulation 659: decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure 
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By 1998, the balancing payment borne by La Poste had reached the ceiling of La 
Poste's "employer's" contribution for 1997. The proportion of the pensions paid by the 
State and not covered either by La Poste's "employer's" contribution or by the pension 
contributions paid by the civil servants still had to be borne by the State. 
The 2006 reform, finalising La Poste's transition to the status of an ordinary competitor, 
provided for the operator to pay an "employer's" contribution at a competitive rate, 
releasing it from all other payment obligations. The contribution was calculated in such 
a way as to make the level of social security contributions and tax payable on salaries 
paid by La Poste the same as that borne by other companies in the transport 
(mail/parcels) and banking sectors under the ordinary social security arrangements. 
The Commission came to the conclusion that the 1998 ceiling and the 2006 reform 
constituted state aid. However, the measures did not go beyond what was strictly 
necessary to establish a level playing field in respect of social security contributions and 
tax. They were important steps in adapting the enterprise to the gradual liberalisation 
that started in 1998, with a view to full liberalisation. Moreover, the measures brought to 
an end a distortion of competition that was unfair to La Poste. The Commission's 
investigation accordingly concluded that the 1998 ceiling and the 2006 reform were 
compatible with the common market. The Commission authorised the aid subject to 
conditions to ensure that La Poste and its competitors were placed on an equal footing 
as regards social security contributions and tax. 212 
4.2.3.4 Poland: Unlimited State guarantee  
In Poland, Poczta Polska enjoyed an unlimited state guarantee that stemmed from its 
legal status, exempting it from the insolvency and bankruptcy procedures provided for 
under ordinary law. In addition, in the event of a financial failure of Poczta Polska, the 
state could have been held responsible in the last resort for its rights and obligations. 
This situation was tantamount to a state guarantee that was unlimited in amount and in 
duration and covered all of Poczta Polska's liabilities. The unlimited guarantee enabled 
Poczta Polska to obtain finance under more favourable conditions than its competitors 
and therefore distorted competition in a market which is in the process of being 
liberalised.  
The Commission indicated to Poland that the unlimited guarantee for Poczta Polska 
resulting from its legal statute constituted state aid, which was incompatible with the EC 
                                                
212 Commission Decision of 10 October 2007, Case C43/2006 (ex N410/2006), pursuant to the Art. 7(4) 
Regulation 1999/659: Conditional Decision. 
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Treaty state aid rules. Consequently, Poland accepted to abolish this guarantee by 30 
June 2008.213 
4.2.3.5 United Kingdom: Reform of the retirement pensions and other issues 
The Commission's investigation found that three loan measures granted in 2001, 2003 
(extended in 2007) and 2007, totalling £1.7 billion were free of state aid because they 
were granted on commercial terms. 
However, the Commission could not reach the same conclusion concerning a fourth 
measure, under which the UK Government released £850 million from reserves of 
Royal Mail which were under specific state control for the creation of an escrow account 
in favour of its pension scheme, extending the period over which it could address its 
large pensions deficit. However, in view of the size of the historic pensions liabilities of 
Royal Mail, some of which were built up when the business had a letters monopoly, the 
Commission concluded that any aid contained in the pension measure was compatible 
with Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty.  
The reasoning followed by the Commission to authorise the pensions measure had 
some parallels with a decision approving aid granted by France to "La Poste" in respect 
of its pensions liabilities, although there were also important differences, arising from 
the different pensions systems which apply more generally in the two Member 
States.214  
                                                
213 Commission Decision of 24 April 2007, Case E12/2005, pursuant to the Art.18 of Regulation 
1999/659: proposal of appropriate measure. 
214 Commission Decision of 8 April 2009, Case C7/2007 (ex NN82/2006), pursuant to the Art.7(3) of 
Regulation 1999/659: positive decision. 
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4.2.4 Conclusions on the application of state aid law 
With the overview of the cases, we see that the application of European state aid rules 
has been extensive in the postal sector recently. The majority of the cases relate to the 
compensation for the provision of services of general interest, and most of these have 
been authorised by the Commission solely after a preliminary examination. However, 
that does not mean that the state aid rules are not important or that they are so lax that 
they are nearly always respected. In several cases, the Member States had to change 
their scheme to get the aid approved. 
Regarding the cases related to the compensation for the provision of services of 
general interest, the legal framework is sufficiently clear since the Altmark case of 2003 
and the Commission Decision and Community Framework of 2005. However, we see 
that its implementation, which involves complex calculation of the cost for the provision 
of the public service, is difficult.  
In the future, the nature of the control on the compensation for public service will 
change radically going from a Commission State aid control towards a NRA net cost 
calculation. Hence the past case-law may have little relevance for the future 
implementation of the Postal Directive.  
(1) The first difference between the past and the future is that the previous State aid 
control applied to traditional postal operators that were not all modernised and 
efficiently run, whereas the future universal service cost calculation will apply to 
modernised, and hopefully efficient, postal operators.  
(2) The second difference is that State aid was applied exclusively by the 
Commission with little interaction with the NRAs, whereas the universal service 
cost calculation will be applied by the NRAs according to the guidance given in 
Annex I of the Postal Directive. Thus, it may be expected that the main 
controllers of over-compensation in postal public service will now be the NRAs. 
However if the net cost of universal service is compensated and does not meet the four 
Altmark criteria, such compensation is a State aid that should be notified to the 
Commission (unless the conditions of the 2005 Decision on public service 
compensation are met). The fact that an NRA endorses a net cost calculation does not 
immune the public compensation from a Commission control. If the NRA has been 
mistaken and allows an overcompensation to the universal serve provider, the 
Commission may declare the aid illegal under the Treaty State aid rules (that prevails 
over the Postal Directive according to the hierarchy in EU law). The Commission may 
also open a infringement proceedings against the Member State whose NRA has 
allowed for over-compensation.  
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Therefore, we suggest that the NRAs cooperate closely with the Commission when 
performing the net cost calculation under Article 7 of the Postal Directive. Reciprocally, 
the Commission should cooperate closely with the NRAs (provided their expertise and 
independence are sufficiently guaranteed) when performing its state aid control. We 
also suggest that the NRAs notify systematically to the Commission the calculation of 
the cost of the universal service.215  
Finally as discussed in section 7.3 of this report, we suggest that NRAs exchange 
among themselves best practices on the application of the guidance on calculating the 
net cost of the universal service, and in particular on the application of the principles of 
transparency, non-discrimination, proportionality, but also efficiency. 
 
                                                
215 As it is the case in electronic communications, see Universal Service Directive 2002/22, Art.12 and 
Liberalisation Directive 2002/77, Art.7(2). 
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5 Preparations for the Third Postal Directive 
This chapter reviews how the Member States are preparing to implement the Third 
Postal Directive, that is, the Second Postal Directive as further amended by the 
Directive 2008/6/EC. Elements of the Third Postal Directive which were essentially 
clarifications of the Second Postal Directive were considered in chapter 3. This chapter 
addresses regulatory issues that were revised or especially emphasised in the Third 
Postal Directive: 
• new flexibility for Member States in ensuring universal service; 
• repeal of the reserved area and other steps needed to ensure full market 
opening; 
• regulation of a multi-operator environment; 
• revised relationship between postal regulation and competition regulation; and 
• the appropriate national definition of the universal service obligation in light of 
revisions in the directive’s provisions for ensuring and financing the universal 
service and changing market conditions. 
In some cases, Member States have already addressed these issues. In most cases, 
they still need to do so. The chapter begins by surveying the current state of 
transposition of the Third Postal Directive. 
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5.1 Transposition of the Third Postal Directive 
For most Member States, the deadline for adopting national legislation to implement the 
Third Postal Directive is 31 December 2010. For 11 Member States (CZ, CY, EL, HU, 
LT, LV, LU, MT, PL, RO, SK) the deadline is 31 December 2012. As noted in section 
2.1, above, for the 3 Member States of the EEA (IS, LI, NO), the deadline for 
transposition of the Third Postal Directive is 31 December 2010. Any amendment, 
including a longer implementation period, would require a decision by the EEA Joint 
Committee. 
As this report was being prepared, two Member States, Estonia, and the Netherlands, 
reported that they had completed transposition of the Third Postal Directive into national 
law, with an effective date of 1 April 2009. Eighteen Member States report plans to 
transpose the directive before 1 January 2011.216 No plans have been reported for 
several Member States. Table  5-1 provides an overview of current plans for 
transposition of the Third Postal Directive. 
Table  5-1 Plans for transposition of Directive 2008/6 
Time period Percent Count Countries 
Transposition complete 5.7% 2 EE, NL 
2009 - second half 25.0% 4 AT, LV*, SI, UK 
2010 - first half 42.9% 4 DE, FR, SE 
2010 - second half 21.3% 10 BE, BG, DK, ES, FI, IE, IT, PT, RO*, IS** 
2011 or later 4.2% 6 CY*, CZ*, HU*, LT*, LU*, PL* 
No information 1.0% 4  EL*, MT*, SK*, LI**, NO**  
Note: SK is planning major new postal legislation in 2009, but it will not transpose Directive 2008/6 at this occasion. 
* Deadline for transposition is 31 December 2012.  
**  In principle, the deadline for transposition of the Third Postal Directive by the 3 Member States of the EEA (IS, LI, NO) is 31 
 December 2010. Any amendment, including a longer implementation period, would require a decision by the EEA Joint Committee. 
 
Two Member States, Estonia and the Netherlands, report that they have transposed the 
Third Postal Directive into national law. Fourteen of the remaining Member States report 
current plans to transpose the directive before 2011.  
                                                
216 As this report is being finished, legislative projects are reportedly underway or just completed in 
several countries, including Austria, Belgium, France, Latvia, and Slovenia. Details of these projects 
were unavailable as of the writing of this report. As a practical matter, information in this report is 
current to 1 March 2009, although we have included references to later information where possible 
(e.g., the Dutch postal law effective 1 April 2009 and the decision of the European Court of Justice in 
the TNT Post UK case on 23 April 2009).  
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5.2 Ensuring universal service 
5.2.1 Three options for ensuring universal service 
The Third Postal Directive expands the options for ensuring universal service. In the 
original Postal Directive (and maintained by the Second Postal Directive), the sole 
regulatory instrument for ensuring universal service was a universal service provider 
designated under Article 4. Under the Third Postal Directive, the Member State will 
ensure universal service by relying upon one or a combination of three regulatory 
mechanisms: reliance on market forces, designation of one or more universal service 
providers (USPs), and public procurement of postal services.  
Recital 23 of Directive 2008/6/EC summarises this three-pronged approach for ensuring 
universal service as follows: 
Directive 97/67/EC established a preference for the provision of the 
universal service through the designation of universal service providers. 
Member States may require that the universal service be provided 
throughout the whole of the national territory. Greater competition and 
choice means that Member States should be given further flexibility to 
determine the most efficient and appropriate mechanism to guarantee the 
availability of the universal service, while respecting the principles of 
objectivity, transparency, non-discrimination, proportionality and least 
market distortion necessary to ensure the free provision of postal services in 
the internal market. Member States may apply one or a combination of the 
following: the provision of the universal service by market forces, the 
designation of one or several undertakings to provide different elements of 
the universal service or to cover different parts of the territory and public 
procurement of services. [emphasis added] 
Recital 23 also indicates that Member States are to determine the ‘most efficient and 
appropriate’ mechanism or combination of mechanisms for ensuring universal service. 
The recital declares that Member States must respect ‘the principles of objectivity, 
transparency, non-discrimination, proportionality and least market distortion necessary 
to ensure the free provision of postal services in the internal market’. Recital 23 thus 
requires Member States to follow precisely the same regulatory principles in ensuring 
universal postal service as prescribed in the ‘Competition Directive’ for ensuring 
universal electronic communications service.217 
                                                
217 Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for electronic 
communications networks and services, OJ L249, 17 Sep 2002, p. 21 (‘Any national scheme pursuant 
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Table  5-2 summarises how Member States are preparing to approach the options for 
ensuring universal service set out in the Third Postal Directive. 
To ensure fidelity to the principles of objectivity, transparency, non-discrimination, 
proportionality and least market distortion, it appears necessary for Member States to 
make a reasoned choice among these three mechanisms for ensuring universal 
service. In particular, the principles of proportionality and least market distortion require 
a Member State to refrain from introducing regulatory constraints greater than 
necessary to achieve the public objectives sought. Since reliance upon market forces 
requires the least regulatory intervention, the Third Postal Directive strongly implies that 
Member States should not secure universal service by designation or public 
procurement unless market forces cannot be reasonably relied upon.  
Given the emphasis on the options available for ensuring universal service in the Third 
Postal Directive, we asked governments if they had prepared a study which ‘identifies 
which approach . . . will most appropriately guarantee the availability of the universal 
service’. Two NRAs (EL, NL) reported that they had prepared such a study, while 
26 NRAs replied that they had not done so. The Greek study, however, was apparently 
a market analysis of the national postal market.218 The Dutch analysis was undertaken 
by parliament in the course of adopting a new postal law. The new Dutch law seemingly 
directs the Minister to ensure universal service by designation of one or more 
USP(s).219 It is unknown whether the Dutch legislator seriously considered reliance on 
market forces or public procurement to ensure any or all of the universal service. Eight 
NRAs (BG, CY, ES, HU, IT, LT, LV, IS) report plans to study the options for ensuring 
universal service.  
                                                                                                                                             
to Directive 2002/22/EC, serving to share the net cost of the provision of universal service obligations 
shall be based on objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria and shall be consistent with 
the principle of proportionality and of least market distortion’). 
218 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, ‘Market Analysis Of The Greek Market And 4 European Postal Markets’ 
(May 2008).  
219 Netherlands, Post Law 2009. Article 15(1) states, ‘On the basis of a transparent selection procedure, 
Our Minister shall appoint a Postal Conveyance Company to operate the Universal Postal Service or 
part thereof for an indefinite period of time’. Article 14(4) states, ‘4. The appointment shall not be 
withdrawn before a Postal Conveyance Company has been appointed to provide the Universal Postal 
Service or the specific part that is to be withdrawn to which the appointment relates'. Article 18(1), 
states, ‘1. A Universal Postal Service Provider shall operate the Universal Postal Service within the 
Netherlands and from or to areas outside the Netherlands’. 
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Table  5-2 Analysis of alternative approaches for ensuring USO 


























AT         
BE No No  No   No  
BG No Yes 2010H1 No   No 2011+ 
CY No Yes     No  
CZ No   No  5   
DE No   No  100 Yes  
DK No No  No   No 2010H2 
EE No No  No   No  
EL Yes   No   No  
ES No Yes  No   No  
FI No   No   No  
FR No No  No   No  
HU No Yes 2010H2 No  0 No  
IE No No  No 0 0   
IT No Yes 2009H2 No  1.5 No  
LT No Yes 2011+ No   No  
LU No No  No   No  
LV No Yes 2011+ No   No  
MT No   No   No  
NL Yes No  No     
PL No   No   No 2011+ 
PT No   No  0 No  
RO No ??  No   No 2011+ 
SE No No  No  0 Yes  
SI No   No 0 0   
SK No No  No  0 No  
UK No ??     No 2009H2 
IS No Yes 2010H1 No   No 2011+ 
NO No   No   No  
 
Similarly, we asked NRAs whether their government had prepared a study that 
identifies potential ‘services at risk’, that is, elements of universal service and groups of 
users that for which there is a ‘significant risk that a minimum level of universal services 
will not be provided by market forces’. Such a study would at least reveal what portions 
of the market could be safely left to market forces, although it would not permit a 
reasoned choice between designation of one or more USPs and public procurement. 
Virtually all NRAs reported positively that no such study had been undertaken.220  
                                                
220 Questionnaire 123-6. 
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Overall, then, Member States and their NRAs do not appear to have focused clearly 
and analytically on how to select among the three mechanisms for ensuring universal 
service set out in the Third Postal Directive.221 
Since the manner of effectively ensuring universal service is a critical issue under the 
Third Postal Directive, we probed these issues further by questioning NRAs about 
actual practice and current views. When asked whether their Member States in fact 
relied upon market forces to ensure any of the universal service, 3 NRAs responded 
affirmatively. Two reported relying upon market forces to secure a minor portion of the 
universal service: the Czech Republic (5 percent) and Italy (1.5 percent). Germany 
stated it relied upon market forces to ensure 100 percent of the universal service.  
When asked whether, based on current knowledge, NRAs could identify elements of 
universal service that would likely not be provided by market forces to the extent 
required by the USO, NRAs usually pointed to very limited portions of the 
market.222The following answers were typical of the 22 NRAs who suggested that 
elements of the universal service would likely not be provided by market forces. 
• BE: The administrative registered items, some sort of packets; regions with low 
density population. 
• DK: Small islands with few inhabitants. 
• ES: Unprofitable areas, in particular, areas with low population density, e.g. in 
rural areas. 
• HU: We suppose that the market forces shall not provide [universal services] in 
the territories, where the density of the population is very low. 
• IT: Elements of universal service: letters and parcels single piece; parts of 
national territory: remote areas. 
• PL: In rural areas postal items might be delivered less that 5 times a week; also, 
the number of post offices in those areas would probably decrease. 
                                                
221 For example, the Swedish NRA notes, “The Swedish postal market was liberalised 15 years ago and 
the Swedish government chose to ensure the US through designating Posten AB as a USP (former 
monopolist)’. Questionnaire 123-6. 
222 Questionnaire 123-11 asked, ‘Based upon your current knowledge of the postal market, please 
describe briefly for which elements of universal service and/or PARTS of the national territory, if any, it 
appears likely that a minimum level of universal services will NOT be provided by market forces?’. 
Questionnaire 123-12 asked, ‘Approximately what percent of all postal items transmitted in the 
universal service are included in this portion of the postal market?’. 
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• NO: Mail distribution and collection in rural areas (at an affordable price). 
Norway Post states that 5 percent of the households will have mail service just 
3 days a week, 15 percent will have a service just 5 days a week. 
Only two NRAs (CY, RO) suggested that little or none of the universal service can be 
ensured by reliance on market forces. In contrast, three NRAs (DE, IE, LU) suggested 
that there were no elements of universal service, or parts of the national territories, that 
would likely receive inadequate service by reliance on market forces.223 Some NRAs, 
including the NRAs of France and the United Kingdom, offered no opinion on the scope 
of service that might be provided by market forces. 
We also asked whether there were users or groups of users who would face a 
significant risk of unsatisfactory service by market forces.224 In response, NRAs 
generally noted again the possibility that residents of rural or remote areas might not 
receive minimum universal service. The Belgian NRA specifically identified consumers 
living in rural areas who are sending mail to other consumers in rural areas. The 
Swedish NRA pointed to a small number of elder persons who live in rural areas. They 
currently receive ‘extended postal delivery’ which the Swedish government purchases 
through public procurement procedures. 
Because of the possibility of overlap between ‘elements of universal service’ at risk if 
served by market forces and ‘users or groups’ at risk, we asked NRAs to estimate what 
percent of all postal items in the universal service would be at risk of inadequate 
universal service if served by market forces. NRAs were generally unable to provide 
such estimates, however.225 
The outstanding exception to this overall pattern is Germany. The German postal law of 
1997 conforms well to the three-pronged approach set out in Recital 23 of the Directive 
2008/6. The German law provides, in essence, that universal service will be ensured by 
market forces unless the NRA determines that it is ‘not being appropriately or 
adequately provided or where there is reason to believe that such will be the case'.226 
Where market forces appear to be inadequate, the German NRA is obliged to ensure 
universal service either by designating a postal operator to provide the necessary 
service or by arranging for such services through public procurement. Where a postal 
                                                
223 The German NRA stated, ‘All elements/parts are provided by market-forces’. The Irish NRA stated, 
‘None. As the current designated USP provides services in excess of the minimum required’. 
224 Questionnaire 123-13 asked, ‘Based upon your current knowledge of the postal market, please 
describe briefly for which users or groups of users, if any, there appears to be a significant risk that a 
minimum level of universal services will NOT be provided by market forces?’. Questionnaire 123-14 
asked, ‘Approximately what percent of all postal items transmitted in the universal service are affected 
by this risk?’. 
225 Questionnaire 123-15. Exceptionally, the Irish and Slovenian NRAs estimated that 0 percent of postal 
items were subject to a significant risk of inadequate service by market forces. 
226 German Post Law (1997), Article 13(1). See also Articles 14 and 15. 
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operator has been designated to provide universal service, it is entitled to compensation 
of net costs, if any, from the NRA. The German procedures thus ensure that universal 
service will be provided by making a reasoned choice from among the three 
approaches set out in the Third Postal Directive. To date, the German NRA has not 
ensured any universal service by designation or procurement. The German NRA 
therefore declares that 100 percent of the universal service is currently ensured by 
market forces. 
Member States and their NRAs do not appear to have focused clearly and analytically 
on the three mechanisms for ensuring universal service set out in the Third Postal 
Directive: market forces, designation of one or more universal service providers, and 
public procurement of services. With the exception of the German NRA, most NRAs 
either declared that their Member States do not rely on market forces to ensure 
universal service for a significant portion of the universal service or failed to address the 
possibility of relying upon market forces. On the other hand, when asked to identify 
portions of the universal service for which there was a significant risk of inadequate 
service by the market forces, most NRAs identified (qualitatively, not quantitatively) only 
limited portions of the market that appeared to be at risk, usually services in remote or 
sparsely populated areas. Some large NRAs, including France and the United Kingdom, 
offered no opinion. Based on this impressionistic and incomplete response, it appears 
that reliance upon market forces to ensure universal service may potentially be a viable 
option for ensuring the universal service in many Member States. A notable exception 
to this pattern is Germany. Its postal law provides procedures for ensuring universal 
service that closely follow the options set out in the Third Postal Directive. Hence, the 
German NRA can state definitively that Germany currently relies on market forces for 
ensuring 100 percent of the universal service. 
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5.2.2 Designation of USP(s) 
Where a Member State chooses to rely in whole or in part on designation of one or 
more USPs, the Third Postal Directive requires a more objective and transparent 
procedure than required by the Second Postal Directive. Revised Article 4 states that: 
Member States may designate one or more undertakings as universal 
service providers in order that the whole of the national territory can be 
covered. Member States may designate different undertakings to provide 
different elements of universal service and/or to cover different parts of the 
national territory. When they do so, they shall determine in accordance with 
Community law the obligations and rights assigned to them and shall 
publish these obligations and rights. In particular, Member States shall take 
measures to ensure that the conditions under which universal services are 
entrusted are based on the principles of transparency, non-discrimination 
and proportionality, thereby guaranteeing the continuity of the universal 
service provision, by taking into account the important role it plays in social 
and territorial cohesion. [emphasis added] 
Recital 23 of Directive 2008/6/EC reiterates and clarifies the need for a transparent and 
non-discriminatory designation procedure: 
In the event that a Member State decides to designate one or more 
undertakings for the provision of the universal service, or for the provision of 
the various components of the universal service, it must be ensured that 
quality requirements pertaining to the universal service are imposed in a 
transparent and proportionate manner on the universal service providers. 
Where a Member State designates more than one undertaking, it should 
ensure that there is no overlap in the universal service obligations. 
[emphasis added] 
Thus, under the Third Postal Directive Member States may designate different 
undertakings to provide different elements of universal service and/or to cover different 
parts of the national territory’, but they must make such designations based upon 
‘principles of transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality'. Before designating 
universal service providers, NRAs will need to consider whether designation of a USP 
for a portion or all of the national territory is a necessary or ‘proportionate’ step in 
ensuring universal service and whether one postal operator is better suited to this task 
than another. 
Table  5-3 summarises the readiness of Member States to apply the designation 
procedures of the Third Postal Directive. 
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Table  5-3 Designation of USP(s) and the standards of the Third Directive 






























AT         
BE Yes Yes No Yes ? No  1 
BG No Yes No ? No  100 1 
CY No ? ? ? ? ?  1 
CZ Yes  No Yes No No 100 1 
DE Yes  Yes  No Yes 0 0 
DK No Yes     100 1 
EE Yes  No No No No  1 
EL No ?    No 99 1 
ES No        
FI No Yes       
FR Yes  No Yes No No 100 1 
HU No ?    ? 100 1 
IE         
IT No Yes       
LT  Yes       
LU No ??       
LV No Yes       
MT No Yes     100 1 
NL Yes  Yes Yes No No 100 1 
PL No Yes      1 
PT No      99.1  
RO Yes  Yes Yes Yes   1 
SE Yes  Yes No Yes No 90 1 
SI No Yes       
SK No Yes       
UK         
IS No Yes       
NO No ?       
 
As the first column of this table indicates, 8 Member States (BE, CZ, DE, EE, FR, NL, 
RO, SE), accounting for just over half of the EU/EEA letter post market, report that they 
have adopted designation procedures that comply with the Third Postal Directive. Some 
of these assessments may be open to question, however. For example, the Belgian 
NRA reports that Belgian law complies with the designation procedures of the Third 
Postal Directive, yet designation of the Belgian public postal operator as the USP was 
by legislation, not by an impartial administrative process. Although the Belgian NRA 
estimates that market forces would provide adequate universal service for up to 
85 percent of postal items227 the Belgian legislator has designated the public postal 
                                                
227 Questionnaire 123-12. 
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operator as the universal service for the entire national territory. Moreover, Belgian law 
does not allow the possibility of designating more than postal operator as USP. 
Similarly, the French postal law states unequivocally that, ‘La Poste shall provide the 
universal postal service’.228 Such designation procedures do not appear to be ‘based 
on the principles of transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality’. These 
examples illustrate Member States may not fully appreciate the revisions in Article 4 
introduced by the Third Postal Directive.  
The additional requirements of Article 4 in the Third Postal Directive do not appear to be 
satisfied by any designation procedure that (i) relies on a legislative determination, (ii) 
precludes multiple designations, or (iii) includes within the scope of the designation 
services which can be adequately ensured by market forces. In view of the full market 
opening introduced by the Third Postal Directive, designation cannot be assigned in an 
indiscriminate or objectively disproportional manner because designation confers rights 
and obligations which distort competition. The recent TNT Post UK case offers one 
example of a competitively significant benefit conferred by designation (exemption from 
VAT).229 Under the Third Postal Directive, therefore, it appears that designation 
procedures will have to be employed in a manner that is non-discriminatory and 
proportional to objective need. Current German postal law appears to offer one example 
of how the revised version of Article 4 can be implemented. 
The objective justification for designating a single universal service provider for the 
entire national territory is a particularly interesting issue. As noted above, most NRAs 
(with a few exceptions) believe that only a relatively minor portion of the national 
territory is unlikely to receive adequate universal service by market forces. No Member 
State has prepared an analysis that identifies which portions of the national territory are 
under significant risk of losing service under market forces. Two Member States (RO, 
SE) agreed that current procedures provide for designation of a USP in portions of the 
national territory for which there is ‘no significant risk that market forces will fail to 
provide’ universal service. Under the revised version of Article 4 in the Third Postal 
Directive, it appears that designation of a postal service provider as the USP for the 
entire national territory will require a more transparent and objective basis. 
Another issue presented by designation is the possibility that designation may distort a 
liberalised postal market by imposing an unfair burden on the designated USP. We 
therefore asked whether designation procedures ensure that a postal operator is fully 
compensated if it has been designated to provide universal services and incurs a net 
cost in doing so. Five NRAs (BE, CZ, FR, NL, RO) declared that their designation 
                                                
228 France, Code Des Postes et Des Communications Electroniques, Article L2 (‘La Poste est le 
prestataire du service universel postal’). 
229 TNT Post UK Ltd v. The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, Case C-357/07 
(23 Apr 2009). 
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procedures provided full compensation for designated USPs.230 However, since none 
of these NRAs appear to have calculated the net cost of the USO,231 these declarations 
may be interpreted as statements of principle rather than as specific financial 
commitments. As noted above, one NRA, the Norwegian NRA, has calculated a 
substantial net cost for the USO, 9 percent of the cost of universal service, and done so 
in a manner that appears consistent with the Third Postal Directive. Yet the Norwegian 
designation procedure may not ensure that the USP is fully compensated for the net 
cost of the USO.232 Where a designation imposes a significant burden on the USP, the 
principle of non-discrimination would seem to imply appropriate compensation for the 
net cost of the obligation imposed.233 Otherwise, the designated postal operator may 
be disadvantaged in comparison with other postal operators. 
Most Member States do not appear to have fully analysed how to implement revisions 
in the designation procedures of Article 4 introduced by the Third Postal Directive. 
Revised Article 4 requires that the designation of USP(s) must be ‘based on the 
principles of transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality’. These requirements 
may require a significant modification of current designation procedures. 
 
5.2.3 Public procurement 
As noted, the Third Postal Directive introduces the possibility of ensuring universal 
service by public procurement. So far, Member States have little experience with public 
procurement of universal services. Two NRAs (DE, SE) have the authority to use public 
procurement procedures. The German NRA has not had occasion to do so. The 
Swedish NRA uses public procurement for extended postal delivery service and free 
                                                
230 Questionnaire 123-21. The Swedish NRA indicated that it assumed that there is no significant net cost 
incurred in the provision of universal service. 
231 Questionnaire 121-23. 
232 See section 3.3.5, above. 
233 Questionnaire 123-20. 
 Role of Regulators in a More Competitive Postal Market 229 
 Chapter 5: Preparations for the Third Postal Directive 
delivery and dispatch of items in braille.234 Six NRAs (BG, DK, MT, RO, UK, IS) 
indicated that their Member States would introduce the possibility of public procurement 
procedures in the future.235 
With the exception of Sweden, Member States have no experience with the public 
procurement of universal postal services. Several Member States, however, plan to 
introduce the possibility of public procurement in the foreseeable future. 
 
                                                
234 Sweden, Förordning (2007:951) med instruktion för Post- och Telestyrelsen, (Ordinance on 
instructions for The Swedish Postal and Telecom Agency). Available: 
http://www.riksdagen.se/Webbnav/ index.aspx? nid=3911&bet=2007:951. 
235 Questionnaire 123-42 
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Case history 5-1: Public procurement of universal services in Germany 
At present, Germany is the only Member State where postal legislation relies on market forces 
to provide universal service and introduces public procurement as a mechanism to ensure 
universal service where the market fails to deliver. This case history outlines how the German 
postal act ensures universal service.  
Until 1998 German NRA (BNetzA) was authorised by the German postal act to take measures 
to ensure the universal service, if not provided voluntarily by postal service operators. Between 
2002 and 2008, following a change in government, the universal service obligation was solely 
imposed on Deutsche Post by the German Postal Act. Since full opening of the postal market 
on 1 January 2008, there is no obligation on any postal service operator. At present, the 
incumbent Deutsche Post provides universal service voluntarily. Any dominant operators (at 
present: Deutsche Post) that intends to discontinue provision of universal service or to provide 
such services on less favourable terms than specified in the postal act, must notify BNetzA six 
month prior to cutting down universal service. 
If the universal service is not being adequately provided or if there is reason to believe that such 
will be the case, BNetzA, as a first step, has to publish a statement in its Official Gazette,. As a 
second step, dominant postal service operators can be obliged by BNetzA within one month to 
provide the specified universal service gap, provided that no postal operator volunteers to 
provide the gap without compensation. If a postal operator that is to be obliged to provide the 
universal service gap provides sufficient evidence that it would suffer financially losses as a 
result of this obligation, this operator could require compensation. In this case, BNetzA shall call 
for tenders to provide the universal service gap as a third step. However, BNetzA may abstain 
from public procurement if it does not appear appropriate. In a public procurement, the most 
efficient and reliable bidder that requests the least financial compensation should be selected. 
This mechanism to ensure universal service appears consistent with the requirements of the 
Third Postal Directive. The procurement procedure must be based on the principles of 
transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality, thereby guaranteeing the continuity of the 
universal service provision. 
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5.3 Phasing out the reserved area and other special rights 
5.3.1 Reserved area  
The Third Postal Directive requires 10 Member States (AT, BE, BG, DK, ES, FR, IE, IT, 
PT, SI) with a reserved area to terminate the reserved area by 31 December 2010. This 
deadline is extended by two years for 11 Member States (CY, CZ, EL, HU, LT, LU, LV, 
MT, PL, RO, SK).236 To date, most countries in and out of the EU which have repealed 
their postal monopoly laws have phased out the reserved area in stages extending over 
several years.237 The Postal Directive itself has required a phased reduction in the 
scope of the reserved area since 1998. In adopting Directive 2008/6/EC, the Parliament 
and Council delayed termination of the reserved area beyond what was contemplated in 
Directive 2002/39/EC so that ‘Member States could avail themselves of the opportunity 
offered by the transposition period, and the substantial time necessary for the 
introduction of effective competition, in order to proceed with further modernisation and 
restructuring of the universal service providers as necessary’.238  
The two- to four-year delay in terminating the reserved area raises the question whether 
Member States have taken advantage of the extra time to phase out the reserved area 
in a manner calculated to help the incumbent universal service provider make the 
transition to a liberalised environment. There are several ways this could be 
accomplished. The price and weight limits of the reserved area could be reduced 
further. The monopoly over cross border mail and direct mail could be eliminated in 
advance of the monopoly over domestic letters. Specialised services, such as same day 
service, could be exempted from the reserved area (as in Germany) or bulk mail 
services (as in the United Kingdom). 
Despite the availability of examples of phasing out strategies from other Member 
States, none of 24 Member States with a reserved area seems to have developed ‘a 
sound strategy for phasing out of the reserved area in a manner that prepares the 
USP(s) for competition while ensuring universal service’. At this stage (mid 2009), such 
a plan only seems feasible for the 11 Member States that have until the end of 2012 to 
end the reserved area. In these Member States, 4 NRAs (BG, CY, EL, LV) indicate that 
a study identifying an orderly phase-out strategy either has been done or is being 
planned. For the most part, however, it appears that Member States will likely terminate 
the existing reserved area abruptly when required to do so by the Third Postal Directive.  
                                                
236 The deadline for the 3 EEA Member States (LI, IS, NO) will determined by the EEA Joint Committee. 
See section 2.1, above. 
237 The most notable exception to the rule is Sweden, which abolished the postal monopoly in single step 
in 1993. 
238 Directive 2008/6/EC, Recital 12. 
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No Member State with a reserved area has adopted an orderly phase-out schedule for 
the reserved area, but 4 of the 11 Member States which can retain the reserved area 
until the end of 2012 indicated plans for identifying a phase-out strategy. 
5.3.2 Other special rights 
The fundamental objective of the Third Postal Directive is not to terminate the reserved 
area in a merely formal sense but to facilitate a ‘complete market-opening [that] will help 
to expand the overall size of the postal markets [and] contribute to maintaining 
sustainable and quality employment within universal service providers as well as 
facilitate the creation of new jobs in other operators, new entrants and associated 
economic sectors’.239 This broad objective implies that, in planning for full market 
opening, Member States need to reexamine non-postal laws which may create barriers 
to entry in postal market by granting the universal service provider special legal rights 
compared to the rights of other postal operators. In the past four areas have raised 
particular concerns: 
• value-added taxes which include tax exemptions for products of the USP;240  
• customs laws which provide special treatment for products of the USP;241 
• terminal dues, IMPCs, and other international postal regulations;242  
• regulations which give the universal service provider special rights with respect 
to the location of public collection boxes and special privileges with respect to 
the operation of vehicles.243 
A similar, more recent concern is sector-specific labour laws for the postal sector which 
appear designed to impair new entrants by imposing on the entire sector the inflexible 
                                                
239 Directive 2008/6/EC, Recital 16. 
240 See section 3.4.2, above. 
241 See section 3.4.3, above. 
242 See section 3.4.4, above. 
243 See section 3.4.5, above. 
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working conditions adopted by public postal operators. Of course, all postal operators 
must comply with general labour regulations applicable in their Member States including 
regulations governing employment conditions, working conditions, relationships 
between employers and employees, and must respect minimum wages (in those 
Member States where minimum wage laws exist). However, a sector-specific law that 
applies only to a narrow class of employees is different from a general labour law. For 
example, a law that applies only to employees who provide postal services for letter 
post items effectively determines the conditions of competition for a single company 
since, by virtue of the state's intervention in the market, the vast majority of such 
employees are the employees of the national USP. Hence, a Member State must be 
especially vigilant to ensure that sector-specific labour laws relating to the postal 
services market do not have the intent or effect of restraining competition.244 
Overall, Member States do not appear to have focused on the need to adjust non-postal 
laws to accomplish the market-opening objectives of the Third Postal Directive. Only 
one Member State (CZ) reported that it is planning legislation to equalise the application 
of VAT to all postal operators. Only 2 Member States (EL, ES) indicated that they were 
planning to revise the rules with respect to international postal services, placement of 
collection boxes, or vehicular regulation.245 A notable exception is the UK NRA, 
Postcomm. In series of public inquiries between 2004 and 2007, Postcomm 
comprehensively surveyed the legal privileges of Royal Mail and recommended 
appropriate changes to government.246 
With the exception of Postcomm in the UK, few Member States or NRAs appear to have 
addressed — or to be planning to address — the potential barriers to entry posed by 
non-postal laws or the extent to which such laws may be inconsistent with the 
objectives of the Third Postal Directive. 
 
                                                
244 The Postal Directive does not affect labour law generally. See Directive 2008/6/EC, Recital 53. For a 
discussion of the misuse of sector-specific minimum wage laws in Germany, see Dieke, Alex and Ralf 
Wojtek, 'Competition, Wages and Politics in the Delivery Sector: The Case of Postal Minimum Wages 
in Germany', in M.A. Crew, P.R. Kleindorfer, and J.I. Campbell Jr., eds., Handbook of Worldwide 
Postal Reform (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008). 
245 Questionnaire 122-25 and 122-26 (VAT) and 122-35 to 122-37 (international postal services, 
collection boxes, vehicular registration). Note that this survey was substantially completed prior to the 
decision of the European Court of Justice in the TNT Post UK case. TNT Post UK Ltd v. The 
Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, Case C-357/07 (23 Apr 2009). This decision 
may prompt further changes in national VAT laws.  
246 See Postcomm, ‘Competitive Market Review: Tackling Barriers To Entry In Postal Services, Final 
Decisions And Recommendations’ (Apr. 2006). 
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Case history  5-2: Postcomm study of special rights  
In January 2004 Postcomm published a consultation document, ‘A Review of Royal Mail’s 
Special Privileges’, which outlined ten privileges granted Royal Mail.  
At the course of its consultation, Postcomm concluded that the most significant privilege was 
Royal Mail’s exemption from VAT. Postcomm considered this privilege to be a clear distortion of 
competition in postal services and unnecessary for the provision of universal services. 
Postcomm also concluded that certain historical privileges were inappropriate and should be 
abolished. These privileges were: (1) Royal Mail’s authority to require the owner or operator of 
a ship or aircraft to carry mail-bags; (2) legislative prohibition against harbour authorities 
obstructing universal service mail carried by Royal Mail to collect harbour duties; and (3) Royal 
Mail’s authority to purchase by power of eminent domain (i.e., for compel owners to sell) any 
property required for provision of a universal service.  
Postcomm’s preliminary view was that there were some convincing reasons to retain some 
privileges which are needed to provide universal services and do not distort competition. These 
privileges were: (1) customs clearance procedural exemptions; (2) immunity from prosecution; 
(3) placing of public collection boxes; and (4) classification of Royal Mail as a private carrier.  
The final privilege of Royal Mail considered was the exemption from traffic regulations. 
Postcomm concluded that these should be modified to minimise distortion of competition. 
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5.4 Regulations for a multi-operator market 
Repeal of the reserved area will permit — or in some Member States has permitted — 
development of a multi-operator postal market. In an open postal market, governments 
and NRAs need to consider the extent to which regulation should foster cooperation 
and interoperability among postal operators. Under the Third Postal Directive, a 
Member State may choose to rely upon market forces, designation of universal service 
providers, public procurement, or a combination of these mechanisms, to ensure 
universal service. A Member State could consider several, or many, postal operators to 
be universal service providers.247 In a multi-operator environment, fairness and 
efficiency imply that regulation should treat all postal operators similarly in objectively 
similar circumstances. 
5.4.1 Access to postal infrastructure 
Article 11a, added by the Third Postal Directive, requires Member States to give all 
postal operators access to ‘elements of postal infrastructure’, that is, facilities and 
information resources used in providing postal services. Article 11a states: 
Whenever necessary to protect the interest of users and/or to promote 
effective competition, and in the light of national conditions and national 
legislation, Member States shall ensure that transparent, nondiscriminatory 
access conditions are available to elements of postal infrastructure or 
services provided within the scope of the universal service, such as 
postcode system, address database, post office boxes, delivery boxes, 
information on change of address, re-direction service and return to sender 
service. This provision shall be without prejudice to the right of Member 
States to adopt measures to ensure access to the postal network under 
transparent, proportional and non-discriminatory conditions 
                                                
247 See section 2.5, above, for a discussion of the term ‘universal service provider’. 
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Six elements of postal infrastructure are listed as examples: postcodes, address 
database, post office boxes, delivery boxes, change of address database, and 
redirection and return services. 
Table  5-4 Access to postal infrastructure ensured by Member States 
Type of access Member States Number % EU/EEA 
market 
Access to post codes BG, CZ, EE, FR, HU, LT, MT, NL, SE, UK 10 51.4% 
Access to address database DE, DK, EE, FR, MT, SE, UK 7 64.8% 
Access to post office boxes DE, EE, FR, HU, IT, LT, MT, SE 8 48.1% 
Access to delivery boxes BE, BG, DK, EE, ES, FR, HU, IE, IT, LT, MT, PL, 
PT, SE, SK, UK, IS 
17 65.5% 
Access to change of address 
database 
DE, EE, FR, SE 4 41.3% 
Access to USP return 
services 
BG, DE, EE, FR, LT 5 38.4% 
Require downstream access 
to USP 
BE, DE, DK, EE, ES, HU, SI, UK 8 53.9% 
Equalise downstream access 
for all 
DK, IT, LT, NL, PL, UK 6 36.8% 
 
Table  5-4 summarises the current state of various types of access to the postal 
infrastructure. The first six categories of access are those listed in Article 11a. The last 
two lines in this table indicate whether the NRA has authority to compel two other types 
of access: access to downstream facilities of the USP and equalisation of access to 
downstream facilities. The difference is that, in the first case, the NRA may require the 
USP to grant access even though the USP has not provided similar access to any other 
party. Mandatory access might be necessary where, for example, a postal operator 
serves a limited area and needs to access a USP for delivery of postal items out of his 
service area. In the second case, the NRA would merely require the USP to provide 
equal access to all parties if the USP has granted downstream access to one party. For 
example, the NRA might require a USP to give other postal operators the same 
downstream access conditions already provided favoured customers. Authority to 
equalise downstream access is required by the Second Postal Directive;248 authority to 
mandate downstream access is not. 
                                                
248 In addition to this sector-specific rule included in Article 12 of the Postal Directive, this obligation to 
equalise downstream access may as well be required under competition law as downstream access is 
typically provided by dominant operators. Indeed, non-discriminatory downstream access was 
enforced in Germany by a decision of the national competition authority in 2005 and later confirmed 
by the European Court of Justice. See Bundeskartellamt, decision B 9-55/03 of 11 February 2005, 
and Judgement of the European Court of Justice (First Chamber) of 6 March 2008 in joined cases C-
287/06 to C-292/06 (‘Vedat Deniz decision’). 
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Table  5-4 shows that most Member States will need to take significant steps to open 
access to the postal infrastructure in implementing the Third Postal Directive. With 
respect to most elements of the postal infrastructure, only 4 to 17 Member States 
provide the access that Article 11a requires where necessary. Only 6 Member States 
(DE, EE, FR, LT, MT, SE) provide access to four or more of the six elements of postal 
infrastructure mentioned in Article 11a. 
NRAs also have limited authority over downstream access. Only 12 NRAs can require 
the USP to equalise downstream access even though equal access is required by the 
Second Postal Directive.249 Eight NRAs can compel an unwilling USP to provide 
downstream access under some conditions. In a seemingly reasonable limitation of 
such authority, the German NRA’s authority to equalise or require downstream access 
is limited to market dominant postal operators.250 
Most Member States will need to take significant steps to open access to the postal 
infrastructure in implementing the Third Postal Directive, where necessary. With respect 
to most elements of the postal infrastructure, only 4 to 17 Member States provide the 
access required by Article 11a. Only 6 Member States provide access to four or more of 
the six elements of postal infrastructure mentioned in Article 11a. Only about half of the 
NRAs have authority to require dominant postal operators to provide downstream 
access to consolidators and private operators on the same terms as offered to large 
customers, even though such authority is required by the Second Postal Directive. 
                                                
249 In Table  5-4 above, the option 'require downstream access to USP' logically includes the next option, 
“equalise downstream access for all', since a NRA that can mandate downstream access can 
presumably mandate access on equal terms. In sum, 12 NRAs have authority to equalise downstream 
access, and 8 of these can also mandate access. 
250 It is unclear whether small postal operators need or desire access to the USP on terms other than 
those provided by the public tariffs. In Germany, for example, where there are many small local 
competitors to Deutsche Post, it appears that access via the public tariff is sufficient for the purposes 
of those local operators. Downstream access is used primarily by specialised consolidators, not by 
delivery firms. 
238 Role of Regulators in a More Competitive Postal Market  
 Chapter 5: Preparations for the Third Postal Directive 
5.4.2 Interoperability and the multi-operator environment 
‘Interoperability’ refers to the ability of multiple postal operators to work together to 
provide a universal service that is, if not completely ‘seamless’, at least workable and 
convenient from the perspective of both senders and recipients of postal items. The 
original Postal Directive emphasised the importance of interoperability between national 
USPs,  
Whereas progress in the interconnection of postal networks and the 
interests of users require that technical standardisation be encouraged; 
whereas technical standardisation is indispensable for the promotion of 
interoperability between national networks and for an efficient Community 
universal service.251 
The Third Postal Directive further highlights the importance of interoperability among 
postal operators at the national level in a liberalised multi-operator environment. 
In an environment where several postal undertakings provide services 
within the universal service area, it is appropriate to require all Member 
States to assess whether some elements of the postal infrastructure or 
certain services generally provided by universal service providers should be 
made accessible to other operators providing similar services, in order to 
promote effective competition, and/or protect all users by ensuring the 
overall quality of the postal service. Where several universal service 
providers with regional postal networks exist, Member States should also 
assess and, where necessary, ensure their interoperability in order to 
prevent impediments to the prompt transport of postal items.252 
For more than a century, public postal operators have dealt with cross border 
interoperability issues in the Universal Postal Union. The Third Postal Directive, 
however, presents additional challenges which will require supervision by NRAs. NRAs 
should require postal operators within a single Member State to cooperate by, for 
example, marking postal items in a specified manner so that the addressee knows who 
to contact in case of delay or damage. New issues are implied at the Community level, 
as well. If, for example, a Frenchman receives a letter or parcel from a German woman 
in the future, he will not be able to assume that the items was dispatched from Germany 
using the Deutsche Post. Indeed, the Third Postal Directive raises the possibility of 
postal operators providing universal services in several Member States. Hence, NRAs 
may need to adopt a harmonised approach towards interoperability in order to facilitate 
a smoothly functioning universal service by multi-state operators.  
                                                
251 Directive 97/67/EC, Recital 36 (emphasis added). 
252 Directive 2008/6/EC, Recital 34 (emphasis added). 
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Table  5-5 Interoperability in a multi-operator environment 
Type of provision Member States Number Percent of LP market 
Exchange of US items DE, SE, UK 3 44.7% 
Identification of postal carriers DK, FR, LT, MT, UK 5 41.9% 
Complaint procedures DK, FR, LT, LV, UK 5 42.0% 
User inquiries LT 1 0.1% 
Return to sender DK, ES, SE, UK 4 32.7% 
 
To date, relatively few Member States have considered the problems of interoperability, 
although there are several notable exceptions. The UK NRA, Postcomm, has reviewed 
the problems of interoperability carefully and developed two sets of operating 
procedures that must be followed by all postal operators in order to protect the integrity 
of postal items and facilitate the handling of misdirected mail in a multi-operator 
environment.253 Germany and Sweden, among others, have also considered many of 
the issues posed by interoperability. Several other NRAs (CY, DK, IT, LV, MT, IS, NO) 
are reportedly working on or planning studies on the issues posed by interoperability.  
Table  5-5 summarises the extent to which NRAs currently address issues of 
interoperability. Three NRAs (DE, SE, UK) have developed procedures to ensure that 
postal operators will exchange postal items seamlessly throughout the national territory. 
Five NRAs (DK, FR, LT, MT, UK) have adopted procedures that ensure the addressee 
of a postal item can identify all of the postal operators that handled the item. Five NRAs 
(DK, FR, LT, LV, UK) ensure that the addressee of a postal item can clearly identify to 
whom complaints should be addressed. The Latvian NRA requires the postal operators 
to cooperate in handling customer inquiries. At least four NRAs (DK, ES, SE, UK) 
ensure that postal items that cannot be delivered to an addressee can be returned to 
the sender promptly and without undue burden on any postal operator. 
By the same token, a multi-operator environment implies that the NRA should not 
impose legal obligations on postal service providers — such as access and delivery 
requirements, quality of service and price regulation, and accounting controls — in a 
manner distorts competition among operators. To do so, it may be necessary to restate 
the universal service obligation in a manner that is less related to the operations of a 
specific USP. Similarly, where the NRA imposes a financial burden on a postal service 
provider, it must fully compensate that operator for the net cost of that burden, on the 
one hand, and take care not to overcompensate the postal service provider, on the 
other. To date, however, it appears that few NRAs have considered the implications of 
                                                
253 See Postcomm, ‘Postal Code of Practice for Common Operational Procedures: A Decision Document‘ 
(Aug. 2005); ‘Protecting the Integrity of Mail – A Code of Practice: A Decision Document ‘ (Aug. 2005). 
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multi-operator environment for the manner in which the universal service obligation is 
specified or financed.254 
Relatively few Member States have fully considered the implications of interoperability 
and a multi-operator environment. However, several NRAs (notably, FR DE, SE, and 
UK) have made important strides, especially in issues related to interoperability. Several 
other NRAs are reportedly working on or planning studies on issues posed by 
interoperability and the multi-operator environment.  
                                                
254 Questionnaire 231-35 asked, ‘Has the NRA or government considered carefully the legal and practical 
problems presented by the application of the elements of postal regulation — including access and 
delivery requirements, quality of service and price regulation, and accounting controls — in an market 
in which multiple postal operators are considered as "providers of universal services" due to multiple 
designations, public procurement, and/or reliance on market forces?’. No NRA was able to cite a 
study that truly deals with these issues, and only 3 or 4 NRAs (CY, DK, IS, and perhaps NO) indicated 
that such studies were being planned. 
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5.5 Revised relationship between postal and competition regulation 
In the original Postal Directive, the requirement to establish NRAs was motivated in part 
by a determination ‘to ensure undistorted competition in the non-reserved sector'.255 
The directive declared that Member States could vest NRAs with authority to enforce 
the competition rules in the postal sector. The Second Postal Directive explicitly 
required NRAs to restrain ‘cross-subsidisation of universal services outside the 
reserved sector out of revenues from services in the reserved sector’ except in limited 
circumstances. 
The Third Postal Directive modifies the relationship between postal regulation and 
competition regulation. In the revised directive, competition and market forces play a 
larger role in governing the postal sector. Successful implementation of the Third Postal 
Directive, therefore, depends in part on ensuring fair and effective competition in the 
postal market where feasible. Accordingly, Article 22(1) of the Third Postal Directive 
includes a new requirement for ‘consultation and cooperation’ between the NRA and the 
national competition authority (NCA). The Third Postal Directive also eliminated the 
requirement that NRAs monitor anti-competitive cross subsidy, and instead left to 
Member States to decide how to assign this responsibility.256  
                                                
255 Directive 97/67/EC, Recital 19. 
256 Directive 2008/6/EC, Recital 40, declares, ‘In view of the national specificities involved in the 
regulation of the conditions under which the incumbent universal service provider must operate in a 
fully competitive environment, it is appropriate to leave Member States the freedom to decide how 
best to monitor cross-subsidies’. 
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5.5.1 Consultation and coordination between NRA and NCA 
In order to ascertain the current allocation of enforcement authority over the competition 
rules and the current level of cooperation between the NRA and NCA, this survey asked 
each authority four questions:  
• Which agency has primary authority for ensuring that postal operators comply 
with the competition rules?  
• Are the agencies obliged to share information about their respective activities? 
• Do the two agencies consult regularly?  
• Has the NCA been consulted about the transition to full market opening?  
The contrasting answers of NRAs and NCAs are presented in Table  5-6. For example, 
the first column reports the NRA’s answer to the threshold question of whether the NRA 
is the primary authority for enforcement of the competition rules in the postal sector. 
The second column reports the NCA’s responses to the same question.  
In this table, answers in each pair of columns should match if the NRA and NCA have 
been cooperating with one another. In addition, one would expect that the answers in 
columns 3 through 6 would be ‘yes’; that is, both the NRA and the NCA should indicate 
that there is obligation to share information about postal cases that raise competitive 
issues and that there is regular consultation between the two agencies. The last two 
columns may reflect a level of cooperation that exceeds this basic minimum. Given the 
competitive issues raised during liberalisation of some Member States (notably Sweden 
in the 1990s), it seems reasonable to expect that NRAs and NCAs should consult about 
potential barriers to entry and how to ameliorate them well in advance of the full market 
opening required by the Third Postal Directive. 
Overall, it appears that the NCA bears primary responsibility for enforcing the 
competition rules in the postal sector. Twenty-one NRAs, representing 77 percent of the 
EU/EEA postal market, take this position. In three of the four Member States in which 
the NRA claimed to have lead authority to enforce the competition rules, the NCA 
declared that, on the contrary, it was the primary enforcer of the competition rules (DE, 
LU PL).257 In one country (LT), each of the two authorities reported that the other would 
be responsible. In at least two Member States (EE, SK), the NRA and NCA both take 
                                                
257 In Spain, the fourth country mentioned above, the NRA also claimed primary authority to enforce 
competition law in the postal sector. There is no response from the Spanish NCA in the table, but 
given the fact that the Spanish competition authority has taken several decisions in postal cases, it 
seems likely that the NCA’s view in Spain, too, would clash with the NRA’s perception of having 
primary authority for applying competition law. 
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the lead in enforcing the competition rules.258 In 10 Member States (BE, CY, DE, FI, 
HU, LT, PT, SK, UK, IS) the NRA indicated that it retained secondary authority to 
enforce the competition rules.259 In total, it appears that the NRA has a lead or 
secondary role in enforcing the competition rules in 14 Member States (BE, CY, DE, 
EE, EL, FI, HU, LT, LV, PL, PT, SK, UK, IS) representing 53 percent of the EU/EEA 
postal market. 



























AT NCA  No  No  No  
BE NCA NCA Yes No Yes Yes  No 
BG NCA Other  Yes  Yes  Yes 
CY NCA NCA Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
CZ NCA Both  No No No No No 
DE NRA NCA Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
DK NCA NCA No No No No Yes ?? 
EE Both  Yes      
EL NRA  Yes  Yes    
ES NCA NCA  Yes    No 
FI NCA NCA No No No No No No 
FR NCA NCA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
HU NCA NCA Yes Yes No No No Yes 
IE NCA NCA Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
IT NCA NCA No Yes No Yes No No 
LT NCA NRA Yes ?? Yes No Yes ?? 
LU NRA NCA No Yes No No ?? No 
LV Both NCA No No No No  No 
MT Other Other Yes Yes Yes Yes  No 
NL NCA NCA Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
PL NRA NCA Yes Yes No No No Yes 
PT NCA  Yes  No  No  
RO NCA Both Yes Yes Yes No No No 
SE NCA NCA No No Yes No  No 
SI NCA NCA Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
SK Both Other No No No No No Yes 
UK NCA NCA Yes   Yes   
IS NCA NCA Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
NO NCA  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Note ‘FMO’ refers to the full market opening required by Directive 2008/6/EC. 
 
                                                
258 In Estonia, the NCA also acts as the NRA for the postal and other sectors, i.e. NRA and NCA are the 
same institution. 
259 Questionnaire 201-67. 
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NRAs and NCAs seem to share information and consult to a fair degree. In some 
Member States (DK, FI, LV, SE, SK), however, it appears that there is no obligation for 
these agencies to share information, while the situation in others is unclear (AT, BE, 
CY, CZ, IE, IT, LU). Regular consultations appear to occur in about one-half of Member 
States although in only 11 Member States (BE, CY, DE, FR, IE, MT, NL, PL, RO, SI, IS) 
is there a definite affirmation of regular consultation from both the NRA and NCA. 
We further asked both the NRA and the NCA to describe briefly the types of expertise 
gained from cooperation with the other agency.260 Agencies were rarely able to identify 
specific expertise that NRAs required from NCAs. An exception was the Hungarian 
NRA which referred to the NCA’s expertise in defining relevant markets and analysing 
levels of competition. Similarly, the Latvian NRA noted that the NCA proposed 
measures for compliance with the competition rules. The French NCA noted that it was 
specifically consulted by the NRA in a case involving discounts for bulk mail clients. It 
must be noted, as well, that special circumstances may limit the need for NRAs to rely 
upon NCA expertise. For example, the Irish NRA pointed out that it had little need for 
NCA expertise because its staff included former staff of the NCA. Looking at the 
possible flow of expertise in the other direction, both agencies recognised that NCAs 
may usefully draw upon NRAs for information about the postal markets and accounts.  
We also asked NCAs whether, in their view, it would be feasible to rely upon 
enforcement of the competition rules alone to protect the public interest in the postal 
sector. Most of the NCAs who answered this question declared that sector regulation 
was needed in addition to enforcement of the competition rules, citing, for example, the 
market dominance of the incumbent (ES, IE, SE, IS), the need to protect universal 
service (BE, HU, IT, LU, MT), or the existence of remaining barriers to entry (FI). On the 
other hand, the German NCA observed that the NCA would be sufficient to protect the 
public interest ‘if the regulatory regime has established functioning markets’. 261 
Currently, NRAs and NCAs share information and consult to a moderate degree. In 
many Member States, however, it appears that there is no obligation for these agencies 
to consult or coordinate their activities. Regular consultations appear to occur in about 
one-third to one-half of Member States. Most NCAs declared that sector regulation is 
needed in addition to enforcement of the competition rules, citing, for example, the 
market dominance of the incumbent and the need to protect universal service. 
 
                                                
260 Questionnaire 201-71, 201-72, 401-13, 401-14. 
261 Questionnaire 401-68, 401-69. 
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Case history  5-3: Cooperation between OPTA and NMa (Netherlands) 
In the Netherlands, both the independent Post and Telecommunications Authority (OPTA) and 
the Dutch competition authority (Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, NMa) bear responsibility 
for ensuring workable competition in the electronic communications and postal sector. OPTA is 
in charge of the implementation of legislation and regulation as laid down in the 
Telecommunications Act, the Postal Act or in European law. NMa is authorised to implement 
and enforce general competition law.  
In order to structure the exercise of concurrent powers of decision-making and establish 
consistent policy rules for cases, OPTA and NMa concluded a Cooperation Protocol signed on 
19 December 2000. The Protocol determines allocation and referral of tasks, processing in 
case of concurrent powers, urgent measures, interpretation and application of terms, advice on 
the applicability of competition law, exchange of information, and granting of mutual support. 
The most relevant provisions pertain to the allocation of tasks and the right to take action 
against the abuse of a dominant market position. In case an application for action is solely 
submitted to one authority, the other authority is notified. If an application would be better 
processed by the other authority because of the effectiveness of its legal instruments and/or 
efficiency considerations, the application must be referred to that authority. The authority 
addressed first has to discontinue the proceeding. The same procedure applies if one authority 
lacks competence. Where an application is submitted to both OPTA and NMa, the authorities 
must consult each other and coordinate proceedings. 
If action by OPTA ensures that abuse of a dominant market position is brought to an end, it has 
the right of pre-emption. In case OPTA takes action and agrees on the application of 
competition terms (written consent; compliance with guidelines, previous decisions or court 
rulings), NMa is not entitled to apply relevant provisions of the Competition Act. But if OPTA 
abstains from taking action or its powers turn out to be insufficient, NMa can apply these 
provisions while OPTA has the right to raise objections. Furthermore, cases of major mutual 
importance can be prepared together by a joint processing team. 
Resort to urgent measures requires prior consultation of the other authority. Consultation or 
agreement on general guidelines is also envisioned with respect to the interpretation of legal 
terms. OPTA can request the advice of NMa on the applicability of competition law as well. The 
authorities provide each other with all necessary information about companies, important 
matters and developments, and conduct pointing at an abuse of a dominant market position. On 
request, OPTA and NMa are obliged to support each other in all affairs. In addition, the 
Chairman of the Commission of OPTA and the Director General of NMa meet at least quarterly. 
According to OPTA and NMa, intensive cooperation has evolved in the electronic 
communications sector and works encouragingly. With regard to postal markets, assessment is 
difficult as opportunities for cooperation have been rare so far. However, officials of the two 
authorities reported to meet and discuss the situation of the postal market regularly. 
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Case history  5-4: Allocation of competences between NRAs and NCAs in the 
electronic communications sector 
In theory, there are three possible models for the respective roles of the antitrust and sectoral 
authorities in the electronic communications sector:262 
In Model 1, the NCA is the sole authority in charge of the application of competition law and 
sector-specific regulation in the electronic communications sector and there is no NRA (for 
economic regulation). This model is adopted in New Zealand and Australia for several reasons: 
the predominance of the culture of antitrust, the possibilities of economies of scope and 
coordination of instruments and the advantages of a ‘one-stop shop’. However, this model does 
not eliminate the risk of incoherence between antitrust and regulatory decisions as the 
coordination between the departments in charge of the antitrust and sector-specific regulation is 
often weak. Moreover, there is a risk that the other non-economic objectives are set aside in 
regulatory decisions, or conversely, that competition law is diluted by such objectives. 
In Model 2, the NRA applies sector-specific regulation, and concurrently with the NCA, 
competition law in the electronic communications sector.263 This model is applied in the United 
Kingdom264 and in Greece. The advantages of this model are: (i) allowing for more flexible and 
cohesive regulation as the NRA may apply sector-specific regulation or competition law; (ii) 
efficiencies and reduction in time delays; (iii) facilitating the transition from sector-specific 
regulation to competition law; and (iv) increasing the bargaining power of the NRA. The 
disadvantages may include: (i) risk of the development of a sector specific antitrust that would 
not be consistent with the antitrust law applied in the other sector of the economy; (ii) risk of 
regulatory capture of the NRA; (iii) lack of expertise to apply antitrust law; and (iv) risk that 
either sector-specific rules should be applied instead of competition rules or vice versa. 
In Model 3, the NCA is exclusively in charge of antitrust law and the NRA is exclusively in 
charge of the sector-specific regulation. This model is applied in most of the EU Member 
States. The advantages of this approach are that: (i) each agency works within its area of 
expertise and the provision of incentives within government agencies is often facilitated by 
focused missions; (ii) each agency has certain powers, which may provide certain benefits 
depending on the case at hand (e.g. competition authorities tend to have broader powers to 
gather information than do sector-specific regulators); and (iii) checks and balances as well as 
benchmarking between the two agencies may mitigate both the risks and costs of regulatory 
mistakes and regulatory capture. However, there may be disadvantages: the greater are the 
number and specialisation of regulatory agencies, the greater is the potential for regulatory 
complexity, duplication of procedures, conflicting decisions, and encouragement of forum 
shopping, which would increase regulatory costs and delays. 
Each of the models has advantages and drawbacks and the optimal choice depends on 
economic circumstances (e.g. the current level of competition) and the pre-existing legal 
framework within the respective countries. In practice, it is important that: the competences of 
the NRA and the NCA are clearly defined; a priority rule is established when there are 
overlapping competences (such as a priority in favour of the sectoral regulator); and that any 
conflict between NCA and NRA should be directly settled by an appeal Court (which should be 
the same for the NRA and the NCA).  
                                                
262 On the matter, see different reports of international bodies: International Competition Network (2004), 
Working Group on Antitrust Enforcement in Regulated Sectors, Report to the Third Annual 
Conference in Seoul, International Competition Network (2005), Working Group on Antitrust 
Enforcement in Regulated Sectors, Report to the Fourth Annual Conference in Bonn, International 
Competition Network (2006), Working Group on Telecommunications Services, Report to the Fifth 
Annual Conference in Cape Town, available at: http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/ 
index.php/en/library, OECD (1999), Relationship between Regulators and Competition Authorities, 
DAFFE/CLP(99)8; UNCTAD (2006), ‘Best practices for defining respective competences and settling 
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Case history  5-5: Coordination between NRAs and NCAs in the electronic 
communications sector 
Appropriate coordination between NRAs and NCAs is required because overlapping 
jurisdictions may lead to inter-agency turf battles, regulatory duplication, inefficient use of 
resources and increased costs, additional requirements and complexities due to both multiple 
and different standards of review being imposed on firms, potential delay in closing the 
transaction, potential lack of transparency, risk of inconsistent decisions, risk of regulatory 
gaming by market participants, and overall uncertainty in the market.265 
In the electronic communications sector, such coordination is required by EU law. 
First, the principles of effet utile and proportionality requires that electronic communications 
regulation is applied efficiently and in a manner that does not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of the regulation. 
Second, Article 3(5) of the Framework Directive 2002/21 provides generally that ‘(…) Member 
States shall ensure, where appropriate, consultation and cooperation between (National 
regulatory) authorities, and between those authorities and national authorities entrusted with the 
implementation of competition law and national authorities entrusted with the implementation of 
consumer law, on matters of common interest (…)’. More specifically regarding the market 
analysis required to determine whether one or more operators has significant market power (in 
effect a dominant position) susceptible to ex ante regulation, Article 16(1) of the Framework 
Directive states that ‘national regulatory authorities shall carry out an analysis of the relevant 
markets, taking the utmost account of the (Commission) guidelines. Member States shall 
ensure that this analysis is carried out, where appropriate, in collaboration with the national 
competition authorities’. 
This coordination may be achieved by agreements and protocols between NRA and NCA, 
which are of three categories:266 First, delimitation of jurisdiction mechanisms such as case 
                                                                                                                                             
of cases, which involve joint action by competition authorities and regulatory bodies’, TD/B/COM.2 
/CLP/44/Rev.2. See also in the academic literature: Barros P.P. and Hoernig S.H. (2004), Sectoral 
Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is best?, CEPR Discussion Paper 
4541; Choné Ph. (2006), ‘Droit de la concurrence et régulation sectorielle. Entre ex ante et ex post’, in 
Frison-Roche M.A. (ed.), Droit et économie de la regulation: Vol. 4: Les engagements dans les 
systèmes de régulation, Presses de Sciences Po et Dalloz, 49-73 ; Larouche P. (2005), ‘Co-ordination 
of European and Member State Regulatory Policy: Horizontal, Vertical and Transversal Aspects’, in 
Geradin D., Munoz R., Petit N. (eds), Regulatory Authorities in the EC: A New Paradigm for European 
Governance, E. Elgar, 164-179 ; Petit N. (2005), ‘The Proliferation of National Regulatory Authorities 
alongside Competition Authorities: A Source of Jurisdictional Confusion’, in Geradin D., Munoz R., 
Petit N. (eds), Regulatory Authorities in the EC: A New Paradigm for European Governance, E. Elgar, 
180-212. 
263 A variant of this model is when the NCA is exclusively in charge of antitrust law, and the NRA and the 
NCA apply concurrently the sector-specific regulation. This model is followed in Belgium where part of 
the sector-specific regulation (the SMP regime) is applied by the Belgian Institute for Post and 
Telecommunications, whereas other part of the sector-specific regulation (dispute resolution) is 
applied by the Competition Council. 
264 See Ofcom Guidelines of July 2004 for handling of competition complaints, and complaints and 
disputes about breaches of conditions imposed under the EU Directives. See also the Office of Fair 
Trading Guidelines of December 2004 on Concurrent application to regulated industries. 
265 However, Barros and Hoernig (2004) show that it is more efficient that both authorities decide a case 
independently than jointly for three reasons. First, with independent decisions, the probability that 
cases are solved is highest, even though each authority may give less attention to the case than it 
was alone. Second, independent decisions are less vulnerable to lobbying. Third, it is also less likely 
that no authority feels responsible for a given case. 
266 Those categories are taken from (ICN:2006:28). 
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allocation, or division of task (for instance the NCA deals with market definition and dominance 
assessment and the NRA deals with remedies). Second, organised cooperation mechanisms 
such as request of binding or non binding opinion by the authority in charge of the case to the 
other authority (as it is the case in France).267 Third, informal and soft techniques of 
cooperation such as exchange of information. In most of the Member States, the NCAs are now 
systematically consulted on market analysis (as required by the electronic communications 
framework).  
 
5.5.2 Model for relations between postal and competition regulation 
The section proposes a diagrammatic model for considering relations between postal 
regulation and competition regulation under the Third Postal Directive. Figure  5-1 relies 
on two key regulatory concepts, one drawn from the Postal Directive and the other from 
the competition rules: the scope of the universal service obligation and the presence or 
absence of postal operators with significant market power. In this figure, the postal 
sector is divided into four quadrants. Quadrants A and B represent postal services 
ensured and regulated as universal services in accordance with the national universal 
service obligation. Quadrants C and D represent other, non-universal postal services. 
Services in Quadrants A and C are provided by postal operator with significant market 
power, mostly likely, but not necessarily, the public postal operator or its successor. 
Quadrants B and D are provided under conditions of effective competition. 
Quadrant A is divided into two parts. The solid red (dark) triangle represents universal 
services which are ensured by means of designation of one or more USPs and/or by 
public procurement of postal services. In the diagram, the red triangle covers only a 
portion of quadrant A and none of quadrant B because, in chapter 6, we suggest that 
the best practice in implementing the Third Postal Directive will be to rely upon market 
forces as much as possible.268 In the (red) striped portion of quadrant A, the universal 
service is ensured by reliance on market forces, that is, by relying on the commercial 
                                                                                                                                             
267 See also OPTA/NMa Cooperation Protocol of 24 June 2004. 
268 See section 6.3.3., below. 
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self-interest of the postal service providers. Note that it is not necessary to have 
effective competition — i.e., to be in quadrant B — to rely upon market forces. A 
Member State may rely on market forces to ensure universal service even if the postal 
service provider has significant market power.269  






















The proper size of the solid red triangle — the scope of services ensured by designation 
or public procurement — is one of the key policy issues posed by the Third Postal 
Directive. In principle, the size of the red triangle could vary substantially depending on 
the legal framework adopted by the Member State and specific market conditions in the 
Member State. The size of the red triangle may be reduced to zero (complete reliance 
on market forces) or expanded to include all of quadrants A and B (complete reliance 
on designation and/or public procurement to ensure the entire universal service).  
The diagram also implies a general relationship between the roles of the NRA and the 
NCA. Quadrant A is shown in red to suggest that, in principle, the NRA should have 
primary jurisdiction over universal services provided by a postal operator with significant 
market power. Quadrant D is shown in blue to suggest that, again in principle, the NCA 
should have primary jurisdiction over postal services with are outside the scope of the 
                                                
269 The German NRA currently relies upon market forces to ensure universal service even though 
Deutsche Post has a market dominant position in much of the universal services market. See section 
5.2.1, above. 
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USO and produced under conditions of effective competition. Quadrants B and C are 
cross hatched in red and blue to suggest that roles of the NRA and NCA may overlap. 
The Third Postal Directive allows Member States discretion in specifying the 
relationship between the NRA and NCA in quadrants B and C. The NCA could take the 
lead in enforcing the competition rules or even have exclusive authority to do so in one 
or both quadrants. Alternatively, the NRA could be the primary enforcer in one or both 
quadrants.  
We propose that relationships between postal regulation and competition regulation 
may be clarified by focusing on the overlapping sets of postal services defined by (i) the 
universal service obligation or lack of a USO, (ii) existence of significant market power 
or effective competition, and (iii) the use or non-use of designation or public 
procurement to ensure universal service. 
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5.6 Definition of the universal service obligation 
In the Third Postal Directive, the Community definition of the universal service obligation 
is unchanged from the Second Postal Directive. Nonetheless, the Third Postal Directive 
modifies the commercial and financial context of the universal service obligation by 
introducing full market opening, giving Member States greater flexibility in determining 
the efficient and appropriate mechanism for ensuring universal service, and revising the 
means for financing the net cost of universal service, if any. Moreover, the commercial 
context for the universal service obligation has been altered by dramatic changes in 
postal markets since the original Postal Directive was adopted in 1997. Under Article 5 
of Postal Directive Member States are required to ensure that the definition of universal 
service evolves in response to ‘the technical, economic and social environment and to 
the needs of users’. Taking these circumstances into account, Member States may 
consider it appropriate to reexamine the requirements of the universal service obligation 
in the course of transposing Directive 2008/6/EC.  
As described in preceding chapters, the Postal Directive allows Member States 
discretion in defining the universal service obligation. The range of services ensured as 
universal services must include basic letter post and basic parcel post, but does not 
necessarily require inclusion of more specialised services such as bulk letters, direct 
mail, periodicals (e.g., newspapers and magazines), non-priority letter post, and bulk 
parcels.270 Once the range of universal service is defined, Member States have 
relatively less discretion over the manner in which universal services are regulated. For 
each universal service, a Member State is obliged to ensure certain regulatory 
standards are maintained such as service to each address five days per week, 
reasonable access, cost-oriented prices, quality of service standards, etc.271 
                                                
270 NRAs do not agree on which services the Postal Directive requires Member States to ensure as 
postal services, and there is, in fact, a substantial variation among Member States. See section 2.3, 
above.  
271 See sections 3.3 and 3.7, above. 
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5.6.1 Demand for universal postal service in the future 
Since Article 5 requires Member States to ensure that the universal service obligation 
evolves in response to the needs of users, our survey posed the following question: 
‘Has the NRA or government prepared a study or report on the needs of senders and 
addressees for specific types and levels of universal postal services that takes into 
account expected changes in technology, the effects of full market opening, and other 
future considerations?’ Eleven NRAs (BE, DE, EL, FR, HU, IE, LT, MT, PT, SE, UK) 
representing an impressive 70 percent of the EU/EEA letter post market, reported that 
they have carried out studies of the needs of users in the last two years. In most cases 
(DE, FR, HU, IE, MT, PT, SE, UK), views of users were specifically solicited. Two NRAs 
(SE, UK) conduct annual surveys of the needs of users. On the other hand, almost all of 
the remaining NRAs (16) stated that no survey of users’ needs had been conducted.272  
Eleven NRAs (BE, DK, HU, IT, LT, LV, PL, SI, SK, IS, NO) reported that their Member 
States are considering new legislation on the scope of the USO. It may be seen, 
however, there is almost no overlap between this list of countries and those which have 
systematically studied users’ needs. Moreover, the changes in the definition of the USO 
foreseen by these Member States seem to be relatively minor.273 
Eleven NRAs, accounting for 70 percent of the EU/EEA letter post market, appear to be 
actively seeking to identify the needs of users, a necessary step in a reasoned review of 
the need for universal services in the future. Other NRAs do not, however, appear to 
have plans for doing so. Member States that are considering changes in the definition of 
the universal service obligation do not seem to be relying upon analyses of the needs of 
users. 
                                                
272 Questionnaire 121-1 to 121-4. The Italian NRA is preparing a public consultation on implementation of 
the Third Postal Directive but did not indicate the extent to which this consultation will analyse the 
future needs of users. 
273 Questionnaire 131-11 to 131-13. Several NRAs indicated, however, that they did not know what 
changes in the USO might be forthcoming so the text may understate future revisions. 
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5.6.2 Effects of uniform rate requirements 
The uniform rate requirement has been central to postal policy in many Member States. 
A ‘uniform rate requirement’ is a legal measure that requires that a universal service to 
be provided at rates that do not vary with the distance a postal item is transported. 
Uniform rate requirements were widely cited by opponents of liberalisation as creating 
opportunities for ’cream skimming’ that would threaten the financial viability of USPs in 
a liberalised market. The original Postal Directive permitted, but did not require, 
Member States to adopt uniform rate requirements for universal services. While several 
Member States do not require uniform rates for any universal services, most do so for at 
least some services.274  
The Third Postal Directive limits use of uniform rate requirements. In general, uniform 
rates are limited to single-piece items and certain services specially related to the 
general public interest. Recital 38 of the Directive 2008/6/EC explained the new rule 
and its rationale as follows: 
In a fully competitive environment, it is important, both for the financial 
equilibrium of the universal service as well as for limiting market distortions, 
that the principle that prices reflect normal commercial conditions and costs 
is only departed from in order to protect public interests. This objective 
should be achieved by continuing to allow Member States to maintain 
uniform tariffs for single piece tariff mail, the service most frequently used by 
consumers, including small and medium-sized enterprises. Member States 
may also maintain uniform tariffs for some other mail items, such as, for 
example, newspapers and books, to protect general public interests, such 
as access to culture, ensuring participation in a democratic society (freedom 
of press) or regional and social cohesion. 
It appears that Member States with uniform rate requirements will need to reconsider 
their scope in transposing the Third Postal Directive. In Member States that currently 
maintain uniform rate requirements for bulk mail products, an abrupt end to these 
requirements might disrupt existing service patterns. For the future, if a Member State 
plans to continue uniform rate obligations with respect to single-piece postal items or 
other public service mail, it may be prudent to analyse the effects on the universal 
service provider. A uniform rate requirement could make it difficult for a universal 
service provider to respond to prices of new entrants after full market opening.  
                                                
274 See section 3.7.3, above. 
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AT        
BE Yes  No  Yes   
BG Yes    Yes  No 
CY Yes  No     
CZ No    No   
DE No    No   
DK Yes  No  Yes No  
EE Yes  No No Yes No  
EL Yes  No  Yes   
ES Yes 56.20 Yes No Yes 66.08 No No 
FI Yes 100 No  No No  
FR Yes # Yes No Yes # Yes  
HU No 47.5 No  No No  
IE No    No   
IT Yes 40 Yes  Yes 50 No  
LT Yes 47 No  Yes No Yes 
LU Yes  No  Yes No  
LV Yes  No  Yes No  
MT Yes  No No Yes   
NL        
PL Yes  No  Yes No  
PT Yes 36 No   55.6   
RO Yes 39.80 No  Yes 56.74 No  
SE Yes # #  Yes #   
SI Yes 30 No  Yes 40   
SK No 45 No  No 48 No  
UK Yes 45 Yes  Yes 50 Yes  
IS Yes    No   
NO Yes  No  No   
Note: “#” indicates confidential data. 
 
To estimate the economic effects of a uniform rate requirement, it is necessary to know 
the costs of delivery and transportation for different postal items. The distortion caused 
by a uniform rate requirement, if any, is due to the fact that the USP is required to 
charge a uniform rate for services whose underlying costs vary by so much that the 
USP would normally charge different rates if it could do so. For the USP, charging 
different rates to different mailers — especially retail customers — is also costly, so the 
USP will not charge different rates for small variations in cost or for customers with high 
transaction costs. To evaluate the effect of a uniform rate requirement, the NRA needs 
to analyse the relevant cost differences and estimate the schedule of rates that the UPS 
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would likely charge if unconstrained by the uniform rate requirement. What the USP 
looses, on a net basis, by being forced to maintain the uniform rate is the net cost of the 
uniform rate requirement. 
Table  5-7 summarises the current state of analysis of uniform rate policies in the 
Member States. Twenty-two Member States require uniform rates for letter post items. 
In those Member States which require a uniform rate, 11 NRAs (ES, FR, HU, IT, LT, 
PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, UK), accounting for almost 60 percent of the EU/EEA market, 
appear able to estimate the cost of delivery as a percentage of the total cost of 
universal services.275 More significantly, however, only 4 NRAs (ES, FR, IT, UK) have 
studied, or are studying, how the cost of delivery per postal item varies in different areas 
of the nation.276 No NRA appears able to estimate whether uniform rates for single-
piece letter post would persist without a uniform rate requirement. No NRA in a Member 
State with a reserved area is able to predict how much pressure the end of the reserved 
area will put on the uniform rate requirement.277 On the other hand, it should be noted 
that at least five Member States (CZ, DE, HU, IE, SK) do not require a uniform rate for 
letter post. For such Member States, the effects of the Third Postal Directive will likely 
be muted, although an increase in competition will nonetheless put additional pressure 
on the incumbent’s rate schedule. 
Seventeen Member States require uniform rates for single piece parcel services.278 In 
Member States which require a uniform rate for single-piece parcels, 7 NRAs are able 
to estimate the cost of transportation and delivery as a percentage of the total cost of 
service. Only two NRAs (FR, UK) have analysed how the cost of transportation and 
delivery vary according to length of transport and specific delivery costs in different 
areas. No NRA can project the retail parcel prices that would likely result without the 
uniform rate requirement.279 Again, however, it should be noted that at least 8 Member 
States (CZ, DE, FI, HU, IE, SK, IS, NO) do not require uniform rates for single-piece 
parcels. 
For Member States which have, or plan to have, uniform rate requirements, the Third 
Postal Directive will require elimination of the uniform rate requirements for most bulk 
mail and subject the uniform rate requirements for single-piece letters and parcels and 
                                                
275 Not counting Finland, whose estimate of 100 percent appears improbable. 
276 Total does not include data requested to be kept confidential. 
277 Questionnaire 121-8 asked, ‘For letter post services for which a uniform rate is required by law, if any, 
has the government (or NRA) determined the retail price level or levels that would likely arise in a 
competitive market in the absence of a requirement to maintain uniform rates -- i.e., after considering 
such factors as variations in the cost of delivery, administrative costs, public acceptance, etc.?’ Only 
the NRA in the UK, whether is no reserved, reported that it could estimate the effects of removing the 
uniform rate requirement. 
278 Three Member States (BE, EE, ES) appear to require uniform rates for bulk parcel services as well. 
Questionnaire 211-76. 
279 Questionnaire 121-14. 
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certain public interest items to the pressures of competition. Only the largest NRAs, 
notably in France and the UK, seem to be developing the analytical tools necessary to 
evaluate the implications of maintaining uniform rate requirements in a liberalised, multi-
operator environment. On the other hand, several Member States have no uniform rate 
requirement for either letter post or parcel post. It thus appears that most Member 
States with uniform rate requirements may need to consider more carefully the 
implications of the Third Postal Directive for these provisions.  
5.6.3 Elements of universal service and/or groups at risk (if any) 
Under the Second Postal Directive, Member States typically sidestepped any need to 
identify specific elements of universal service that would not be provided in the absence 
of a universal service obligation. Instead, Member States designated a single postal 
operator — the public postal operator or its successor — as the sole universal service 
provider for the entire national territory and established a reserved area to benefit the 
USP. They assumed, without quantitative analysis,280 that monopoly rents from the 
reserved area compensated the USP for the net cost of providing universal service. 
Under the Third Postal Directive, a more analytical approach will be required. The Third 
Postal Directive does not permit continuation of a reserved area. Instead it authorises 
two alternative mechanisms for supporting universal service if necessary. A Member 
State may designate a postal operator as a universal service provider and provide 
compensation for the net cost, if any, of the universal service obligation imposed. 
Alternatively, the Member State may contract with a postal operator to provide a 
universal service using public procurement procedures. If the Member State makes use 
of a designated USP, Annex 1 of the new directive requires that, before providing 
financial support for universal services, the NRA must identify elements of universal 
service and/or groups of users that may lack universal service in the absence of 
regulatory intervention. A similar analysis would seem necessary in advance of public 
procurement since the terms of a contract would require such data. In either case, 
                                                
280 See section 3.4.1, above. 
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therefore, it will be necessary for the NRA to identify the specific universal services, if 
any, for which payment is being provided. 
In setting out how compensation for a designated USP is to be calculated, Annex 1 
says, inter alia, 
The net cost of universal service obligations is to be calculated, as the 
difference between the net cost for a designated universal service provider 
of operating with the universal service obligations and the same postal 
service provider operating without the universal service obligations. . . . 
Due attention is to be given to correctly assessing the costs that any 
designated universal service provider would have chosen to avoid, had 
there been no universal service obligation. . . .  
The calculation is to be based upon the costs attributable to: 
(i) elements of the identified services which can only be provided at a loss 
or provided under cost conditions falling outside normal commercial 
standards. . . .; 
(ii) specific users or groups of users who, taking into account the cost of 
providing the specified service, the revenue generated and any uniform 
prices imposed by the Member State, can only be served at a loss or 
under cost conditions falling outside normal commercial standards.  
This category includes those users or groups of users that would not be 
served by a commercial operator that did not have an obligation to provide 
universal service. [emphasis added] 
In essence, Annex 1 requires a NRA to undertake a ‘what if’ analysis. If there were no 
universal service obligation — i.e., no government guarantee that a specified minimum 
level of postal service will be provided — then what elements of the identified services 
or groups of users would not be adequately served if the designated USP could choose 
for itself what services to offer?  
To assess whether NRAs are prepared for a ‘what if’ analysis, the survey asked, ‘Has 
the NRA studied the market sufficiently to have a considered view on how this service 
would be provided without regulatory controls?’281 In this question, ‘this service’ 
referred to each of seven main categories of universal service used in this study: basic 
letter post, bulk letters, direct mail, periodicals (newspapers, etc.), non-priority letter 
                                                
281 Questionnaire 211-10, 211-22, 211-34, 211-46, 211-58, 211-70, 211-82. 
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post, basic parcel post, and bulk parcels.282 Six NRAs (BE, IE, IT, PL, NO, UK), 
representing about one-third percent of the total EU/EEA letter post market, indicated 
they could offer a ‘considered view’ with respect to at least one service category. The 
best informed NRAs were those of Belgium and Norway, which could offer a considered 
view for 6 of the 7 postal service markets. The NRAs of Ireland, Poland, and the UK felt 
they could offer a considered view with respect to four markets each; while the Italian 
NRA declared it could address 3 markets. 
We then asked two questions to try to clarify the NRA’s understanding of the changes 
that would occur without a USO. First, would the overall service level go up or down? 
That is, would the market prefer faster postal service at higher prices or slower service 
at reduced prices? Second, how much variation in services and prices would develop 
across the national territory? Would some areas receive significantly diminished service 
or higher prices? How big would these areas be compared to the entire market? It 
should be kept in mind that NRAs were referring to relaxing the USO in effect in their 
Member States and not necessarily the minimum USO required by the Postal Directive. 
As noted above, it may be argued that the Postal Directive does not require Member 
States to include bulk mail services within the scope of their national USOs.283 
Only two NRAs (IE, NO) addressed these questions generally. With respect to overall 
price/quality trade off, NRAs in Belgium, Ireland, and Norway thought that mailers of 
bulk letters and direct mail (BE, IE only) would prefer a slower service for a reduced 
price. The Norwegian NRA also thought that a slower, cheaper basic letter post service 
would be preferred by mailers. Both the Irish and Norwegian NRAs thought that basic 
parcel post would remain about the same. Neither foresaw a significant increase in the 
variation of prices or services offered in different areas nor changes in other categories 
of service. The Italian NRA did not provide specific estimates of changes in service level 
or variability but noted generally that ‘universal service affordability couldn't be assured’ 
and there could be ‘reduced quality level and lower accessibility to universal service in 
the remote areas’.  
A few other NRAs offered observations although unwilling to commit to a ‘considered 
view’. The Swedish NRA thought that basic letter post prices might increase. The 
French NRA observed that, while there is a demand for fast, uniformly priced letter post 
service throughout the national territory, publishers of newspapers and magazines 
could have difficulty paying higher postage rates. The Icelandic NRA reported that less 
than 5 percent of addresses could experience significantly less or no delivery. The 
Spanish NRA believed that between 15 and 25 percent of addresses could experience 
significantly less or no delivery. 
                                                
282 See section 2.2, above. 
283 See section 2.3, above. 
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Most NRAs do not have well-developed views on which services the USP would choose 
to avoid in the absence of a USO. However, those few NRAs that have considered the 
effects of the USO seem to believe that mailers of bulk letters and direct mail, at least, 
would prefer a somewhat less expensive and less rapid service. With the exception of 
Spain, no NRA believes that elimination of the USO would result in large variations in 
prices or services.  
5.6.4 Evaluation of net cost of universal service (if any) 
The net cost of universal service depends on the extent to which government 
guarantees a supply of postal services that is either more extensive or higher quality 
than would be voluntarily provided by postal operators stimulated by market forces. If 
postal operators willingly provide the minimum range of services of specified quality 
defined by the national universal service obligation, then the net cost of universal 
service is zero. The net cost of universal service could be more than zero in either of 
two cases:  
1. the minimum level of universal service required by the Postal Directive is more 
extensive or higher quality than would be voluntarily provided by postal 
operators (a ‘Postal Directive-driven USO net cost’); or  
2. the Member State establishes a universal service obligation that is more 
extensive or higher quality than required by the Postal Directive and more 
extensive or higher quality that would be voluntarily provided by postal operators 
(a ‘Member State-driven USO net cost’). 
Whether or not it is appropriate for a Member State government to analyse the net cost 
of universal service in advance of transposing the Postal Directive seems to depend 
how its definition of the USO fits into this categorisation. If a Member State government 
believes that its national USO will entail little or no net cost, then there seems little need 
to analyse the cost of universal service in advance of an actual lapse of universal 
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service or demand for compensation by a postal operator.284 If a Member State 
government has set the USO at the minimum level permitted by the Postal Directive but 
believes that this will still require a substantial net cost, then it may be prudent for 
government to estimate how much its future liabilities will be. Finally, if a government 
wishes to set its USO substantially above the minimum level required by the Postal 
Directive, then it would seem desirable for the Member State to investigate the net cost 
of universal service. If a proposed national USO then appears excessively expensive, 
government may wish to adjust the definition of the USO accordingly.285  
Two NRAs (EE, ES) report that studies of the net cost of the universal service are 
planned for later in 2009. Three NRAs (BG, FR, IT) plan studies in 2010; 3 more NRAs 
(LT, LU, PL) foresee studies in 2011 or later. 
Annex 1 of the Third Postal Directive prescribes how the net cost of a specific USO 
definition is to be calculated. To date, 5 NRAs (BE, ES, SE, UK, NO), accounting for 
about one third of the EU/EEA postal market, report that they have prepared an 
estimate of the net cost of universal service.286 Only two of these NRAs provided 
estimates of the net cost of universal service as a percentage of the total cost of 
providing universal service: Spain, 17 percent (in 2006) and Norway, 9 percent.287 Two 
NRAs (UK, NO) confirmed that their calculations were consistent with Annex 1. The 
Spanish NRA, however, noted that its analysis did not identify costs that a designated 
USP would have chosen to avoid had there been no USO.288 Since this is the essence 
of the what-if analysis required by the Third Postal Directive, the meaning of the 
Spanish figure is uncertain. The British and Swedish NRAs appear to believe that there 
would be no net cost of the USO, although the British NRA’s conclusion may depend 
upon Royal Mail becoming more efficient.289 
                                                
284 At least one NRA, the German NRA, would seem to have a solid basis for assuming the net cost of 
universal service is close to zero. Germany has a liberalised market and relies upon market forces for 
the supply of universal services. No postal operator is compelled by law to provide universal services 
involuntarily, and they are presumably not doing so at a loss (taking all factors into account). 
285 Public policy considerations will not demand the same level of detail as calculation of the 
compensation due to a universal service provider for specific services rendered. Nonetheless, policy 
makers cannot disregard costs entirely. They will need some estimate of the costs implied by 
alternative definition of the universal service obligation. 
286 Questionnaire 121-17. 
287 Questionnaire 121-23. 
288 Questionnaire 121-19. 
289 See Postcomm, ‘Second Submission by Postcomm, the Industry Regulator’ (May 15, 2008) at 27. 
Postcomm declares, ‘Postcomm considers that the only way that Royal Mail can deliver an internally 
financed universal service is through a significant transformation which would result in radically 
reduced costs and increased efficiency and innovation’. Postcomm did not answer this portion of 
survey, and it is unclear whether Postcomm’s conclusion is based on the same criteria for net cost as 
set out in Annex 1 of the Third Postal Directive. See also, Postcomm, Letter from Nigel Stapleton, 
Chairman, Postcomm, to Richard Hooper, Chair, Independent Review of the Postal Service Sector, 
dated 15 May 2009, Annex, Answer to Q27. Mr. Stapleton wrote, ‘It is very difficult to identify elements 
of the universal service that would not be provided by the market because they are “economically 
unviable”. For example, the reason that a universal service product currently makes a “loss” may be 
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Only a handful of NRAs have yet considered the net cost of the universal service 
obligation for their Member States. While the appropriateness of estimating the net cost 
of the USO varies from Member State to Member State, it would appear prudent for at 
least some Member States (those with ‘high quality’ or extensive USO definitions) to 
consider more carefully the cost of universal service before finalizing their USO 
definitions under the Third Postal Directive. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
due to Royal Mail’s inefficiency in providing that product(s) or poor marketing of the product'.  In 
answer to Questionnaire 123-21, the Swedish NRA indicated that it assumed there is no significant 
net cost resulting from the universal service obligation. 
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6 Best Regulatory Practices 
What is 'best practice' in the regulation of postal markets? In this study, best practices 
are considered to be practices that will provide a sound basis for the evolution of postal 
regulation and ensure effective opening of postal markets. ’Best practice’ is a forward-
looking concept, not an evaluation of current implementation. From this perspective, this 
chapter seeks to identify a set of best practices that is derived from the preceding 
survey of postal regulation in the Member States and supplemented by consideration of 
postal regulation outside the Community and the regulation of other sectors in the 
Community. This chapter addresses the following topics: 
• an objective definition of ‘best practice’;  
• best practices in the establishment and operation of NRAs; 
• best practices in striking the balance between the universal service obligation 
and full market opening; 
• best practices related to ensuring universal service; 
• best practices related to ensuring full market opening; and  
• best practices related to user protection. 
264 Role of Regulators in a More Competitive Postal Market  
 Chapter 6: Best Regulatory Practices 
6.1 Definition of 'best practice' 
6.1.1 Compliance with the Third Postal Directive  
In seeking a reasonably objective approach towards defining ‘best practice’, we begin 
with the premise that best practice must be consistent with the letter and spirit of the 
Third Postal Directive. While some observers might argue that the Third Postal Directive 
could be improved in one way or another, one person's improvement often is another's 
setback. The Third Postal Directive is, in effect, the Community's overall determination 
of what is best practice for postal regulation for the foreseeable future. Where 
substantive provisions of the directive are clear and consistent, therefore, identification 
of best practice is straightforward.  
Where the directive allows discretion in interpretation or implementation, we have tried 
to identify practices which are most likely to accomplish the objectives of the directive. 
In our view, there are three main policy objectives that may be gleaned from the Third 
Postal Directive. Two overarching objectives are to ensure provision of a sustainable 
universal postal service and to open markets for postal services to fair and undistorted 
competition. The third objective is to ensure appropriate protections for users of all 
postal services, a response to the shift from a single government service provider to a 
full range of public, quasi-public, and private service providers. These three objectives 
animate almost all of the provisions of the Third Postal Directive.290 
Since these objectives pull in different directions to some degree, none can be 
considered absolute. Each must be interpreted in light of the others. For example, the 
market opening required by the directive cannot be read to override the need to ensure 
the minimum levels of universal service required by the directive. Similarly, the universal 
service obligation required by the directive cannot be implemented in a manner that 
effectively thwarts market opening. User protection must inform implementation of both. 
The Postal Directive is necessarily a document that combines and reflects the views of 
many parties. No fragment can be read in isolation and interpreted to override the broad 
purposes of the whole.291  
                                                
290 To these three, one could reasonably add collection of market statistics as a fourth independent 
objective. Article 22a(1)(b), added in the Third Postal Directive, specifically obliges all postal service 
providers to provide the NRA with appropriate statistics. Collection of statistics is not otherwise 
mentioned in the Third Postal Directive, however. In the following discussion we shall assume a 
consensus that the NRA should collect appropriate market statistics without singling out collection of 
statistics as fourth objective of the Third Postal Directive. 
291  As a further aide in interpreting the directive, we have consulted the preparatory documents of the 
Commission, the Council, and the Parliament. 
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6.1.2 Other factors relevant to best practice 
Where consistent with the text and objectives of the Third Postal Directive, our 
approach towards best practices has been influenced by three other considerations: 
(i) continuing changes in the marketplace for postal services; (ii) economic analysis of 
postal markets; and (iii) Community norms with respect to appropriate administrative 
procedure. 
First, we believe that an assessment of best practice should take into account the 
fundamental changes in postal markets that have taken place over the last few years 
and that will surely continue into the foreseeable future.292 The volume of letters 
transmitted by post — what the Postal Green Paper called 'the fundamental imperative' 
of universal postal service293 — has recently declined substantially in several Member 
States. In the most economically developed Member States, it appears inevitable that 
the volume of letters will continue to decline as invoices and statements of account are 
increasingly committed to electronic communications, including Internet sites, email, 
and text messaging. In these Member States, daily newspapers are also in decline as 
broadband access spreads and television stations multiply. Direct mail has a brighter 
future, but only relatively so. Direct mail will be heavily affected by the Internet. 
Catalogues, for example, will be employed less as comprehensive lists of products and 
more as inducements to check the seller's Internet site. Overall, it is possible that in the 
most economically developed Member States total postal volume will fall significantly 
over the next ten years and virtually certain that direct mail will become a larger 
percentage of total mail volume. In other Member States, the progress of postal markets 
will vary. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that postal markets in other parts of the 
Community will ever develop into the voluminous universal postal systems that 
characterised the most economically developed Member States in the 1980s.  
This is not to suggest that postal services will be less than vital to the economic and 
social cohesion of the Community of the future, only that the role of postal services will 
be different. Direct mail — both addressed and unaddressed — plays an important role 
in a modern economy and will likely continue to do so for the foreseeable future. With 
improved data processing, advertising campaigns by mail are becoming more targeted 
and effective. Technological advances have led to an increase in the economic and 
social role of parcel and express services over the last two decades, and this trend 
seems likely continue. 
Second, an evaluation of best practice should take into account the extensive economic 
analysis of postal markets that has been developed over the last two decades. While 
                                                
292  As Directive 2008/6/EC, Recital 14 notes, “There are a number of drivers of change within the postal 
sector, notably demand and changing user needs, organisational change, automation and the 
introduction of new technologies, substitution by electronic means of communication and the opening 
of the market’. 
293 Postal Green Paper, p. 186. 
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some of this analysis remains controversial, a consensus has emerged on numerous 
points (e.g., analysis of the costs of production, segmentation and trends in demand, 
implications of public policies such as uniform national tariffs). Today we benefit from a 
better understanding of postal economics than was available when the original Postal 
Directive was drafted. Best practice should not ignore this scholarship. 
Third, best practice should conform to Community norms with respect to good 
administrative procedure. These norms may be found in such documents as European 
Ombudsman, The European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour (2001) (based on 
a resolution of the European Parliament); the Final Report of the Mandelkern Group on 
Better Regulation (2001) (study on good administrative procedure in response to the 
Lisbon Strategy); and the OECD 'Reference Checklist for Regulatory Decision-making' 
(1995) (widely accepted summary of good administrative practice). While the Third 
Postal Directive itself repeatedly requires procedures that are transparent, non-
discriminatory, or proportional, general Community norms also provide a broader 
context for 'best' practice with respect to implementing all aspects of the Directive.294 
Finally, it should be noted that the following discussion of best practices refers to the 
manner in which postal markets are regulated in the Member States and not only to the 
activities of the designated 'national regulatory authority'. In many cases, regulatory 
policy is determined by institutions other than the NRA. 
                                                
294 For a discussion of sound regulatory principles and how they could be better applied in the regulation 
of postal markets, see WIK-Consult, The Evolution of the Regulatory Model for European Postal 
Services (2005) (a study prepared for DG Internal Market of the European Commission). 
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6.2 Establishment and operation of postal NRAs 
6.2.1 Allocation of regulatory authority 
Best practice: Primary regulatory authority should be appropriately allocated among four 
separate institutions: (1) a ministry that determines public policy for the postal sector; 
(2) a ministry or agency that exercises the ownership rights of the government in the 
public postal operator, if any; (3) an independent regulator of the postal sector; and 
(4) a national competition authority. In particular, the NRA should be entrusted with all 
tasks which, according to the directive or good administrative practice, should be 
discharged transparently, non-discriminatorily, objectively, and proportionately 
Explanation of best practice: In the original Postal Directive, Article 22 required Member 
States to establish an independent NRA that is ‘legally separate from and operationally 
independent of’ postal operators. The Third Postal Directive further provides that the 
functions of the NRA ‘shall have as particular task ensuring compliance with the 
obligations arising from this Directive, in particular by establishing monitoring and 
regulatory procedures to ensure the provision of the universal service’. What the 
directive intends, clearly, is that certain types of regulatory decisions should be 
committed to an agency which is organised in a way that fosters independence, 
impartiality, and technical expertise.  
But which regulatory decisions? In implementing the Postal Directive, all Member States 
have drawn a distinction between ‘ensuring compliance’ — the task of the NRA — and 
defining the public policies that govern the postal sector. Defining basic public policy is 
the function of the legislator, and the legislator may, in turn, delegate authority to define 
specific policies to the Council of Ministers or to a minister whose portfolio includes the 
postal sector, i.e., the ‘postal minister’.295  
While the dividing line between defining public policy and the tasks which should be 
entrusted to the NRA is necessarily fuzzy, the institutional independence which the 
Postal Directive requires for the NRA implies that the NRA should be entrusted with 
tasks which, according to the directive or good administrative practice, should be 
discharged transparently, non-discriminatorily, objectively, and proportionately. Under 
the Third Postal Directive, these tasks appear to include, inter alia, application of 
authorisation procedures, identification of elements of universal service and/or groups 
of users which would not be appropriately served by market forces, administration of 
designation and/or procurement procedures where needed to sustain universal service, 
calculation of the net cost of universal service (if any), supervision of the accounts of 
                                                
295  See section 3.1.3, above. 
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universal service providers, regulation of prices of universal services, and setting and 
monitoring quality of service standards. Best practice should therefore allocate authority 
between the NRA and other governmental agencies or the legislator accordingly.296 
Where a Member State retains ownership or control of a public postal operator, the 
Third Postal Directive further requires ‘effective structural separation of the regulatory 
functions from activities associated with ownership or control’. This provision mandates 
separation between those who make the rules which govern the postal market and 
those who control one of the main actors in the market. Otherwise, the impartiality of the 
regulatory framework will be cast in doubt, and markets may become distorted. 
Accordingly, a Member State must provide structural separation between the ministry or 
agency that exercises ownership rights in the public postal operator and all of those that 
exercise regulatory functions over the postal sector, including the postal ministry no less 
than the national regulatory authority. 
Finally, by embracing full market opening, the Third Postal Directive places greater 
reliance on enforcement of the competition rules. While the Third Postal Directive 
provides that the NRA may be charged with responsibility for enforcing the competition 
rules, this survey suggests that the NCA (national competition authority) has an 
important role to play. The consensus in the Community is that the NCA and NRA have 
different strengths and that they should be charged with working together to ensure 
application of the competition rules in portions of the postal sector. NRAs are better 
equipped to gather and analyse information about operations and trends in the postal 
sector. NCAs, however, are likely to have a better appreciation of the policies 
underlying the competition rules and how those rules can be most effectively applied to 
markets generally. While best practice thus supports active cooperation between NRAs 
and NCAs, this survey does not indicate any obvious preference between vesting 
primary authority for enforcing the competition rules in the NRA, the NCA, or both 
concurrently.  
Several Member States have allocated authority between the postal ministry and the 
NRA in a manner that allows the NRA to address most tasks which should be 
discharged transparently, non-discriminatorily, objectively, and proportionately. The 
leading example is the United Kingdom. U.K. postal law establishes definite policy 
objectives ranked by priority — an unusually legislative clarification — and vests the 
                                                
296  Almost all Member States have committed the functions of the postal NRA to an independent agency 
with jurisdiction over several network industries, usually including electronic communications. See 
section 3.2.1, above. While perhaps not implied by the Postal Directive, we believe that this is a sound 
practice in light of rapid change in the postal sector. The regulator of the postal sector should have a 
broad understanding of the technological changes affecting the postal sector and the regulatory 
techniques being developed to cope with technological change in other, related sectors. Moreover, the 
future of the postal regulator is no clearer than the future of the postal sector itself. The postal NRA 
should not become so specialised that it develops a vested interest in continuation of a particular 
pattern of postal services.  
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NRA, Postcomm, with ample authority to accomplish these objectives in an impartial 
and objective manner. As a result, where the Postal Directive presents issues which are 
best implemented by an expert and impartial body, authority to address these issues in 
the UK has generally been allocated to Postcomm. These issues include an evaluation 
of the scope of the reserved area necessary to sustain universal service, establishing 
the level of prices justified by costs, determining the appropriate level and detail of 
quality of service standards, development of fair authorisation procedures, and 
identifying the steps necessary to promote interoperability and multi-operator 
environment. Other Member States which have delegated to the NRA substantial 
authority to resolve key elements of postal regulation objectively and impartially include 
Cyprus, Romania, and Sweden.297 
With respect to separation of regulatory and ownership authority, the ideal solution is 
privatisation of ownership. In this respect, the best practice is the complete privatisation 
exemplified by the Netherlands and Malta. Substantial privatisation — as in Denmark, 
Germany, and Italy — must likewise be considered good practice because government 
must then take into account the interests of private owners as well as its own. For 
Member States which are unwilling to divest ownership of their public postal operators, 
the Hungarian approach of creating a special authority for the management of 
government enterprises merits serious consideration. The Hungarian law is 
conceptually similar to the approach used with success in New Zealand to manage 
‘state owned enterprises’.298  
Finally, with respect to implementation of the competition rules, the best practice seems 
to be to retain specific roles for both the NRA and NCA. Each agency approaches the 
need for application of the competition rules in the postal sector from a different 
perspective. By having 'two pairs of eyes' watching for potentially anti-competitive 
activities, risks to effective competition would appear to be diminished. As noted above, 
the NRA has a lead or secondary role in enforcing the competition rules in 13 Member 
States (BE, CY, DE, EL, FI, HU, LT, LV, PL, PT, SK, UK, IS).299 On the other hand, in 
11 Member States (AT, CZ, DK, ES, FR, IE, MT, NL, RO, SE, NO), it appears that the 
NRA has no formal role in applying the competition rules in the postal sector.300 In 6 of 
these Member States, however, NRAs have a role in practice as both authorities are 
obliged to share information, and report that they effectively consult each other (FR, IE, 
MT, NL, RO, NO). 
                                                
297  See section 3.1.3, above. 
298  See section 3.1.4, above. 
299 EE has not been added to this list. In Estonia, the NCA and the NRA are the same institution. 
300 See section 5.5.1, above. Best practices with respect to the respective roles of the NRA and NCA and 
coordination between the agencies are addressed in section 6.2.7, below. 
270 Role of Regulators in a More Competitive Postal Market  
 Chapter 6: Best Regulatory Practices 
Examples of best practice:  
(i) Allocation of regulatory authority to NRA: United Kingdom, Cyprus, Romania.  
(ii) Separation of policy making and ownership: Netherlands, Malta, Hungary, 
New Zealand.  
(iii) Allocation of authority to enforce competition rules between NRA and NCA: 
the 13 Member States (named above) that have vested appropriate authority 
in both agencies. 
Practices of concern:  
(i) Allocation of regulatory authority to NRA: Member States which have failed 
to establish a truly independent NRA present the most serious concerns (see 
next section). Even where an independent NRA has been established, 
Member States may delegate so much authority to political agencies that 
there is a significant risk of substantial political influence in the 
implementation of postal policy. See, for example, the delegation of 
administrative authority to the postal ministry in the Netherlands or the 
delegation of substantial policy authority to the council of ministers (e.g., DE, 
ES, HU, LV) or to a single minister (e.g., EL, ES, FR, IT, NO). 
(ii) Separation of policy making and ownership: Member States where the postal 
minister both determines postal policy and exercises substantial proprietary 
control over a government-owned postal operator such as by appointing the 
board of directors (IE, LT, PL, RO, SE, SK, UK, IS, NO). 
(iii) Allocation of authority to enforce competition rules between NRA and NCA: 
Member States which have not given the NRA any role, even a secondary 
role, in implementing the competition rules in the postal sector, or ensured 
consultation among the two authorities (AT, CZ, DK, ES, SE) may not be 
implementing the competition rules as effectively as possible. 
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6.2.2 Independence of NRA 
Best practice: The NRA should be a structurally independent and impartial agency with 
jurisdiction over multiple network industries. 
Explanation of best practice: Directive 2008/6/EC emphasised that the independence of 
the NRA must be sufficient to ensure the impartiality of its decisions.301 While true 
impartiality of judgement depends upon the integrity of the judges, institutional 
arrangements which can foster independence are well known since independence is 
also required for other state agencies such as courts. Chapter 3 reviewed a number of 
features of institutional independence, such as the establishment of a multi-person 
committee to head the NRA, appointment of NRA heads by an agency wholly 
independent of the USP, fixed terms for NRA heads who cannot be dismissed except 
for misconduct or incapacity, qualifications for NRA heads and restrictions on post-NRA 
employment with regulated entities, freedom from review or reversal by the postal 
minister, financing of the NRA that is independent from the postal ministry, and so 
forth.302 Institutional arrangements promoting the independence of the French ARCEP 
appear to be especially strong. Institutional arrangements in several other Member 
States appear well considered (AT, BG, CY, CZ, HU, IE, LU, LV, PL, PT, RO, SI, UK). 
The organisation and procedures of the NRA in the United States also deserve 
consideration. 
Examples of best practice: France (with good practices in several other Member 
States). 
Practices of concern: Italy and Spain have not yet established an independent 
regulator. Relative to other Member States, Sweden and Norway have not introduced 
the same level of institutional protections for the independence of the NRA. Most 
Member States can improve the institutional independence of the NRA in some 
respects. 
                                                
301  Directive 2008/6, Recital 47 (’In accordance with the principle of separation of regulatory and 
operational functions, Member States should guarantee the independence of the national regulatory 
authorities, thereby ensuring the impartiality of their decisions’). 
302  See section 3.2.2, above. 
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6.2.3 Resources of the NRA 
Best practice: The NRA requires adequate resources to perform the tasks assigned to it 
in a competent and efficient manner. For a NRA in a medium-sized national or smaller 
postal market, the average minimum level of resources needed for the basic tasks of 
postal regulation appears to be about 9 to 10 full-time persons, including regulators 
(heads of NRA), qualified legal and economic professionals, and support staff. In 
addition, for such NRAs, effective regulation will very likely require (1) a reasonable 
budget for studies by outside consultants and (2) efficient application of analytical 
techniques developed by the largest NRAs. NRAs in larger postal markets or with 
broader responsibilities (e.g., enforcement of competition rules or review of user 
complaints) will require appropriately greater resources.  
Explanation of best practice: The level of resources required to perform adequately the 
basic regulatory tasks required of the NRA — accounting controls, price regulation, 
quality of service monitoring, administration of authorisations, oversight of access to 
and delivery of universal services, ensuring fair access to the postal infrastructure, 
collection of statistics — will depend upon several factors. Are the regulated postal 
service providers expert in regulatory tasks and cooperative? Is the universal service 
obligation defined broadly or narrowly? To what extent can the postal staff of the NRA 
draw upon the expertise of other staff within the NRA, the work of other NRAs (through 
a cooperative mechanism303), or the work of outside consultants? Are there particular 
obstacles to market opening that must be addressed? Moreover, additional resources 
will be required if the NRA is expected to do additional tasks such as adjudication of 
user complaints, enforcement of the competition rules, or development of basic policies. 
While accepting that appropriate levels of resources will vary by Member State, chapter 
3 developed rough estimates for average level of resources per NRA that appeared 
necessary to sustain effective regulation of the postal services markets.304 This 
discussion highlighted the importance of a reasonable expenditure per employee as 
well as the total level of expenditure. For all except the six largest national postal 
markets, the minimum annual budget needed for postal regulation was estimated to be, 
on average, about €1.2 million for a staff of about 9 to 10 persons (including appropriate 
economic and legal experts) and reasonable allowance for consultants. This estimate 
was derived from the level of resources — both total budget and budget per employee 
— expended by a range of seemingly effective NRAs and the conclusion that all 
national postal markets except the very largest present a fairly similar range of 
regulatory issues. For the six largest national postal markets (DE, ES, FR, IT, NL, UK), 
the minimum annual budget was estimated to be, on average, about €6.7 million for a 
                                                
303  See chapter 7, below. 
304  See section 3.2.1, above. 
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staff of about 40 persons (including appropriate economic and legal experts) and 
reasonable allowance for consultants. This estimate was based on an average of the 
resources expended by the British and French regulators.  
In sum, these estimates imply that the Member States need to increase expenditures 
for postal regulation by about 75 percent overall. It should be emphasised that these 
figures represent order-of-magnitude estimates and that the specific level of resources 
provided a NRA does not necessarily guarantee, or preclude, effective regulation. 
Nonetheless, the bottom line is that almost all Member States need to review the level 
of resources provided the NRA . 
Examples of best practice: Large national postal markets: United Kingdom. Other 
Member States: Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden. 
Practices of concern: Several NRAs (DE, ES, NL, AT, EE, FI, RO, CY, LT, LV) did not 
provide figures for the budget and staff devoted to postal regulation. This lack of internal 
regulatory accounting may indicate insufficient focus on the issue of appropriate 
resources. Based on available data (taking into account both total resources and 
resources per employee), the resources available to the following NRAs seem to raise 
questions of adequacy. In the largest national postal markets: Italy and the Netherlands. 
In the other Member States, in particular: Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Poland, and Iceland.  
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6.2.4 NRA authority to gather information and enforce its orders 
Best practice: The NRA should be authorised to collect from postal service providers 
such information as it considers necessary to ensure conformity with the Postal 
Directive and should be granted adequate means to enforce its orders, including 
authority to impose substantial fines, if necessary. 
Explanation of best practice: In order to ensure compliance with the obligations of the 
Postal Directive, the NRA needs access to necessary information and authority to 
enforce its decisions.305 As Article 22a of the Third Postal Directive makes clear, 
necessary information includes the information necessary to ensure compliance with 
the Postal Directive, in a form and to the level of detail required by the NRA, and data 
for clearly defined statistical purposes. Adequate means of enforcement would appear 
to include authority to levy significant fines (say, at least €100,000) both for corrective 
and penal purposes. Additional means of enforcement, such as authority to seek judicial 
orders, may be useful as well but do not appear sufficient standing alone.  
Based upon this survey, it appears that several Member States (e.g., CY, DE, EL, PT, 
SK, UK) equip their NRAs with substantial information gathering and enforcement 
authority, but that the majority of Member States may need to reconsider the sufficiency 
of such authority. 
Examples of best practice: Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Portugal, Slovakia, and United 
Kingdom.  
Practices of concern: Some NRAs (AT, CZ, FR, IT, NL) indicated that they lacked 
adequate information to ensure compliance with Postal Directive. Two NRAs (AT, LU) 
specifically stated that they could not establish the level of detail required in information 
requests and deadlines for submission, while other NRAs failed to confirm that they had 
such authority.  
                                                
305 See section 6.2.3, above. 
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6.2.5 Procedures of the NRA 
Best practices: In judicial-type proceedings, the NRA should comply with Community 
norms of good administrative practice such as found in the European Code of Good 
Administrative Behaviour. 
Explanation of best practice: The norms of good administrative procedure are well 
known. For example, regulators should give affected parties an opportunity to comment 
on proposed actions; treat all parties equally and non-discriminatorily; provide parties 
with access to information necessary to make informed comments; restrict the rights of 
citizens as little as possible; provide a written justification for any decision taken; post 
laws and decisions on the Internet; and prepare an annual report on regulatory steps 
taken.  
Best practice requires a formal and transparent commitment to good administrative 
procedures and actual practice in abiding by them. Member States should ensure that 
NRAs should have adequate authority to implement good administrative practices and 
do so in fact. Almost two-thirds of NRAs report substantial compliance with norms of 
good administrative behaviour (including, in particular, BE, CY, CZ, EL, FI, FR, HU, IE, 
LT, MT, NL, PL, PT, UK, NO).306  
Examples of best practice: NRAs in numerous Member States appear to comply with 
basic standards of good administrative behaviour. 
Practices of concern: It appears several NRAs do not give affected parties an 
opportunity to comment on proposed actions (CZ, EE, IT, LU, LV, IS); do not ensure 
that parties in a legal proceeding have access to information and documents necessary 
to effective participation (BE, IE, IT, LU, LV, RO, SI, IS); or are not required to provide a 
written justification for decisions that indicates the relevant facts and legal basis (IT, LU, 
RO, IS).  
                                                
306  See section 3.2.5, above. 
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6.2.6 Public consultation by the NRA 
Best practice: In policy-type proceedings, the NRA should use open public consultations 
to thoroughly investigate and evaluate the effects of major proposed regulatory actions 
on affected parties, including postal operators, employees, users, and the general 
public. 
Explanation of best practice: The three postal directives repeatedly refer to the need to 
align postal policy with the actual needs of operators, employees, and users. For 
example, Recital 12 of Directive 97/67/EC emphasises that universal service must 
remain ‘adaptable to the needs of users’. Similarly, Recital 16 of Directive 2008/6/EC 
requires that ‘social considerations should be taken into due account when preparing 
the opening up of the postal market'.  
Public consultations on major regulatory actions can and should go beyond basic 
procedural fairness to affected parties. NRAs need to consult affected parties at the 
earliest stages of a proposed change in policy and thereafter at appropriate stages in 
the decision making process. During this procedure, NRAs need to present clearly the 
options under consideration and their consequences. The public record should be 
supplemented by expert reports and public surveys where appropriate. The views of all 
parties should be posted on the Internet so that all parties have an opportunity to 
comment on the information presented. To the extent consistent with protection of 
sensitive commercial information or personal privacy, the entire process of decision 
making should be transparent.  
The UK NRA, Postcomm, deserves particular mention for its efforts to solicit input from 
affect parties at an early stage of decision making and its frequent retention of outside 
consultants to present comprehensive discussions of issues under review. Two 
additional Member States which have especially effective records of public consultation 
are Ireland (e.g. public consultation on complaints and dispute resolution guidelines) 
and France (e.g. public consultation of rules for cost allocation). 
Examples of best practices: United Kingdom, Ireland, France. 
Practices of concern: NRAs that fail to keep the public informed about postal regulation 
by posting on the Internet copies of postal laws and regulations (LU, NL), decisions 
taken by the NRA (AT, DE, DK, EE, EL, PL, SI, SK), or annual reports of regulatory 
activities (DK, ES, FI, HU, IT, LU, LV, NO).  
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6.2.7 Consultation between NRA and NCA 
Best practice: The NRA and NCA should consult on a regular basis, and each agency 
should require a written opinion of the other before acting in a matter that affects the 
application of competition rules to the postal sector. NRAs should provide NCAs with 
detailed sector information to facilitate enforcement of the competition rules. 
Explanation of best practice: Consultation and cooperation between the NRA and NCA 
is specifically required by Article 22 of the Third Postal Directive. Member States have 
approached this task with varying degrees of formality.307 In France and Germany, in 
particular, cooperation and consultation appear to be regular and active. 
Examples of best practices: France and Germany. 
Practices of concern: Member States where there is no obligation for the NRA and NCA 
to share information (e.g., DK, FI, LV, SE, SK) or where there are no regular 
consultations between the two agencies (about two-thirds of Member States). 
 
                                                
307  See section 5.5.1, above. 
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6.3 Striking a balance between the universal service obligation and full 
market opening 
This section seeks to define standards for best practice with respect to issues that 
necessarily strike a balance between the two primary objectives of ensuring a basic 
standard of universal service, on the one hand, and facilitating full market opening, on 
the other. This section includes standards for basic accounting regulation, which should 
be applied in a consistent manner to advance both of the primary objectives of the Third 
Postal Directive. 
6.3.1 Range of services within the USO 
Best practice: The range of services included within the universal service obligation 
(USO) should be limited to the minimum range that is (i) demonstrably required to 
protect the general public interest and (ii) consistent with the minimum level of universal 
service required by the Postal Directive.  
Explanation of best practice: Recital 11 of the original Postal Directive emphasised that 
its objective was ‘to guarantee at Community level a universal postal service 
encompassing a minimum range of services of specified quality’.308 In its proposal for 
what became Directive 2008/6/EC, the Commission examined the possibility of 
amending the directive to limit the range of services included in the USO.309 The 
Commission recognised that some Member States had already limited the USO to ‘a 
basic, regulated affordable postal service for non-bulk mail users (typically consumers 
and SMEs)’310 and noted that such an approach is ‘compatible with the concept of least 
                                                
308  Directive 97/67/EC, Recital 11 (emphasis added). 
309  See European Commission, ‘Impact Assessment’, COM(2006) 594, SEC(2006) 1291, pp. 6-7, 11-12, 
24-25, 35-36, 40-41. 
310  Ibid., p. 12. 
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market distortion’.311 The Commission further observed that limiting the range of 
services included within the USO would result in  
‘Progressively reduced cross subsidy between businesses and households 
— users of products and services would increasingly pay for the products 
and services they use on to more efficient provision of bulk mail. Reduced 
likelihood of requiring alternate financing mechanisms’.  
In contrast, the Commission noted that by allowing Member States to adopt a broader 
definition of the USO, the Second Postal Directive risked ‘over specified price and 
service obligations [which] could result in inefficient market intervention and the need for 
complex supervision/regulation at the Member State level’.312 In this manner, the 
Commission has identified the palpable public benefits of a ‘plain vanilla’ definition of 
the USO.  
In the end, however, the Commission decided not to propose a revision of the Postal 
Directive that would limit the range of products that may be included in the USO. The 
Commission explained its reasons as follows: 
although a more focussed universal scope of universal service for 
consumers and SMEs (a 'consumer/SME safety net' concept) has an 
intuitive 'better regulation' attractiveness in the longer term, and would result 
in regulation in submarkets only where it is most obviously still required, 
because competition is likely to develop at different rates across the EU, 
such an approach cannot be proposed now to apply to all EU Member 
States. Member States already retain the flexibility to apply this approach – 
subject to the basic minimum service scope as currently defined in the 
Directive.313 
Although the Commission did not support a change in the USO definition for the 
Community as a whole, its analysis points the way to best practice in defining the range 
of services to be included within the USO. While the Third Postal Directive continues to 
give Member States broad discretion in defining the USO, the best practice is clearly to 
limit the range of services to the minimum range of services that is demonstrably 
required to protect the general public interest in universal services, while still respecting 
the minimum USO mandated by the Directive.  
In addition to the multiple benefits cited by the Commission — least market distortion, 
increased efficiency, reduced cross subsidy, lower financial burden on government, 
                                                
311  Ibid. p. 13. 
312  Ibid., p. 35. 
313  Ibid., pp. 40-41 (emphasis added) 
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reduced need for detailed regulatory controls — another major benefit is maximum 
commercial flexibility for the national universal service provider. To survive in a period of 
rapidly changing market conditions, national USPs will need to adjust their commercial 
operations quickly and continually. Under the Postal Directive, a Member State is 
obliged to impose a series of regulatory controls on each postal service that is ensured 
and regulated as a ‘universal service’.314 To allow national USPs maximum flexibility to 
adjust to changing circumstances, restraints associated with inclusion within the USO 
should be limited to as few postal services as possible, consistent with the Directive and 
public need.315 
Under this approach, it is apparent that, where appropriate, an explicit limitation of the 
USO to basic letter post and basic parcel post services constitutes ‘best practice’. The 
Netherlands has adopted such a definition of the USO.316 At the same time, however, 
our suggested standard of best practice does not rule out extending the USO to include 
some bulk or non-priority services where demonstrably required to serve the general 
public interest. A good example of such an extension is provided by the carefully 
reasoned decision of the British NRA to include limited bulk mail services in its USO.317 
Examples of best practice: Netherlands, United Kingdom. 
Practices of concern: Extending the universal service obligation to markets that are 
effectively competitive creates a substantial risk of distorting competition. This issue 
appears to arise in at least some Member States where the NRA the reports effective 
competition in a significant portion of the national territory for a postal service that within 
the USO such as direct mail (IT, IS), periodicals (DE, EE, FR), basic parcel post (CZ, 
DE, DK, FI, IE, LT, IS), and bulk parcels (DK).318 
                                                
314  See section 2.3, above. 
315  Exclusion of some or all bulk mail services from the universal service does not imply that these 
services should not be regulated at all, however. See section 2.5, above. 
316  See section 2.3, above. 
317  UK Postcomm, ‘The Universal Service for Bulk Mailers: A Decision Document’ (June 2005). In 2008, 
Postcomm indicated that it considers that from 2010 it may be appropriate for the remaining bulk mail 
products to be removed from the scope of the universal service. Postcomm, The Independent Review 
of the Postal Services Sector: Second Submission by Postcomm (May 2008), p. 72. 
318  Questionnaire 122-19, 122-31, 122-43, 122-79. 
 Role of Regulators in a More Competitive Postal Market 281 
 Chapter 6: Best Regulatory Practices 
6.3.2 Uniform rate requirements 
Best practice: In general, Member States should not require uniform tariffs for universal 
services unless they are (i) clearly consistent with the Third Postal Directive and 
(ii) required by a demonstrated and substantial need to protect general public interests. 
Explanation of best practice: The Third Postal Directive permits Member States to 
impose uniform tariff requirements on ‘services provided at single piece tariff and to 
other postal items’. Recital 38 of Directive 2008/6/EC indicates that Member States may 
impose uniform tariffs ‘to protect general public interests, such as access to culture, 
ensuring participation in a democratic society (freedom of press) or regional and social 
cohesion’.319  
In light of the overall objectives of the Third Directive and changing market conditions, 
we believe that the best practice is for Member States to introduce uniform tariff 
requirements sparingly and only when truly required by a clearly demonstrated general 
public interest. At the outset, it should be recognised that a uniform tariff requirement for 
single-piece letter post items and small parcels is likely unnecessary. Experience 
suggests that universal service providers will maintain uniform national tariffs even if not 
required to do so (e.g., in Germany and Ireland). At the same time, if a universal service 
provider has a sound commercial reason for introducing a lower tariff — for example, to 
meet the prices of a new entrant — prohibiting such a competitive response could be 
damaging to the postal service provider. A uniform tariff requirement is not easily 
reconciled with full market opening and the financial equilibrium of the incumbent.320  
At the same time, potential environment issues posed by a uniform tariff requirement 
should be given increased weight in light of heightened climatic concerns. Postal 
operators should not be required to provide long distance transportation for postal items 
without charge when unnecessary transportation is not only inefficient but injurious to 
the environment. With modern technology, many types of publications and other 
documents can be printed in locations near addressees rather than physically 
transported. Parcels can be stockpiled in distribution centres rather than transported 
one by one. Only if tariffs for postal services include appropriate costs for transportation 
will mailers receive the correct pricing signals so that they can avoid unnecessary use 
of transportation services.  
                                                
319  See sections 3.7.3 and 5.6.2, above. 
320  A uniform tariff requirement cannot be imposed on an effectively competitive market because profit-
seeking postal operators will limit their services to areas where the uniform tariff covers costs and not 
serve the other areas. 
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Then, too, the social benefits of uniform tariff requirements have declined as telephone 
and email communications have improved. The risk of ‘communications isolation’ is far 
less than in the days before ubiquitous mobile phones and email. 
In sum, the balance of public interests supporting the uniform tariff requirement is 
shifting. In light of this changing balance of interests, the best practice appears to be 
avoid uniform tariff requirements for universal services unless they are clearly required 
by a demonstrated and substantial need to protect general public interests. In this 
respect, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, and Slovakia must be considered as best practice 
because they do not require uniform tariffs for any postal services.  
Examples of best practice: Germany, Hungary, Ireland, and Slovakia. 
Practices of concern: Member States which require uniform rates for unreserved bulk 
commercial postal services such as bulk letters (BE, DK, EL, ES, FR, LT, LU, PT, RO, 
SI, IS), direct mail (BE, CY, DK, EL, ES, FR, IT, MT, PT, IS), and bulk parcels (BE, EE, 
ES, UK). 
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6.3.3 Reliance on market forces to ensure universal service where feasible 
Best practice: Universal service should be ensured by relying upon market forces where 
the Member State may, with a high degree of confidence, rely upon postal operators 
motivated by normal commercial considerations to provide universal services which will 
meet or exceed the USO set by the Member State. 
Explanation of best practice: Pursuant to the principles of proportionality and least 
market distortion, a Member State should not introduce regulatory constraints greater 
than necessary to ensure a specific universal service obligation.321 While the Third 
Postal Directive offers three mechanisms for ensuring universal service — market 
forces, designation of USPs, and public procurement — reliance upon market forces 
involves the least regulatory intervention. Therefore, in implementing the Third Postal 
Directive, the best practice would be to ensure universal service by reliance on market 
forces except where market forces cannot be reasonably relied upon. 
It should be noted that reliance on market forces is not the same as reliance on 
effectively competitive markets. Even in markets served by a postal operator with a 
market dominant position, a Member State may be justified in relying upon the postal 
operator’s commercial interests to ensure provision of universal services. The scope of 
universal services which may be potentially ensured by reliance on market forces 
seems similar to the scope of services which are described in Annex I as services which 
a postal service provider would choose to provide voluntarily.322 In both circumstances, 
the essential question is: What services will the postal service provider supply motivated 
by its own self-interest? 
Reliance on market forces does not imply a surrender of public policy objectives to the 
uncertainties of market operations. The NRA could, for example, add a condition to 
authorisations that requires all postal service providers to give the NRA six months 
notice before reducing service below the minimum level of service required by the USO 
in any neighbourhood.323  
The German postal law offers an especially clear example of how to ensure universal 
service by reliance upon market forces. In Germany, the NRA is not authorised to take 
steps to ensure universal service unless universal service is ‘not being appropriately or 
adequately provided or where there is reason to believe that such will be the case’.324 If 
                                                
321  Directive 2008/6/EC, Recital 23. See the discussion of this recital and its implications for ensuring 
universal service in section 4.3.1, above. 
322  That is, in the words of Annex I of the Third Postal Directive, postal services which are not services 
that ‘any designated universal service provider would have chosen to avoid, had there been no 
universal service obligation’. Third Postal Directive, Annex I, Part B. 
323  The German Post Law § 56 requires six-months notice by Deutsche Post before beginning less-than-
USO level services.  
324  German Post Law § 12(1). 
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such circumstances arise, the German NRA is obliged to ensure universal service by 
designating a postal operator to provide the additional service needed in the unserved 
or underserved area. If the designated postal service provider incurs a net cost of such 
service, it can recover the net costs from the NRA. If the NRA considers the designated 
postal service provider to be inefficient, the NRA may contract with another postal 
service provider to provide the service.  
The German postal law exemplifies one approach towards ensuring universal service in 
a manner consistent with the Third Postal Directive. As an alternative to the German 
approach, one could imagine a systematic effort by the NRA to identify elements of 
universal service and/or groups of users for which there it is a significant risk that the 
minimum level of USO services will not be provided. 
Example of best practice: Germany. 
Practices of concern: In a Member State in which only a small portion of the population 
faces a significant risk of a lack of universal service by the operation of market 
forces,325 it seems inconsistent with the objectives of the Third Postal Directive to 
designate one operator to provide all universal services. Instead, the USO should be 
entrusted to market forces as far as feasible, and designations should be used only for 
such areas or elements of universal service that would not be served otherwise. 
Preliminarily, only two NRAs (CY, RO) stated that none of the national territory could be 
provided universal services by relying on market forces.  
                                                
325  Section 5.2.1, above, recounts NRAs’ estimates of the scope of services that would not be provided 
by market forces in the absence of the universal service obligation. 
 Role of Regulators in a More Competitive Postal Market 285 
 Chapter 6: Best Regulatory Practices 
6.3.4 Designation and public procurement to ensure universal service 
Best practice: Where necessary to ensure provision of universal services meeting the 
requirements of the national USO, designation and public procurement procedures 
should be introduced and administered by the NRA in a manner that is transparent, 
non-discriminatory, fairly compensatory (where appropriate), and consistent with the 
principles of proportionality and least market distortion. 
Explanation of best practice: Guidelines for the implementation of designation and 
public procurement procedures are set out in Recital 23 of Directive 2008/6/EC.326  
Best practice in the use of designation procedures is amplified in Article 4 of the Third 
Postal Directive. Article 4 requires Member States to entrust designations based upon 
on the principles of transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality.327 Article 7(3) 
permits Member States to compensate designated USPs for the net cost of the 
universal services required by designation if the net cost constitutes an ‘unfair financial 
burden’. Annex I prescribes how the net cost of universal service, if any, is to be 
calculated. Although Article 7(3) does not require Member States to compensate a 
designated USP for an unfair financial burden, the principle of non-discrimination 
suggests that best practice should include fair compensation. 
Best practice in the use of public procurement procedures to ensure universal service 
is, as set out in Article 7(2), established in the ‘Utilities Directive’. That directive requires 
the Member State to treat all economic operators equally and transparently.328 Fairness 
is implicit in the voluntary nature of the arrangement. While proportionality and least 
market distortion may not be inherent in public procurement procedures, best practice 
(as well the principles regulating state aid) would seem to imply that a Member State 
should not contract for unnecessary services or for services that would be provided 
under normal market conditions. 
In both procedures, best practice would seem to imply that the Member State should 
strike a principled balance between the scope of procured or designated services and 
the capabilities of the potential providers of universal services. If there are several 
postal operators in area A and only one postal operator in area B, then best practice 
                                                
326  See section 5.2.1, above. 
327  See section 5.2.2, above. See also, e.g., Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation, Final Report 
(2001), p. 9 (‘Any regulation must strike a balance between the advantages that it provides and the 
constraints it imposes. The various instruments of regulation (primary and secondary regulation, 
framework Directives, co-regulation etc.) enable the public authorities to take action in different ways, 
depending on the aims they wish to achieve. It is the responsibility of the Member States and the 
Commission, when selecting from the regulatory instruments available to them, to identify those which 
are most proportionate to the aims they wish to achieve’). 
328  Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating 
the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services 
sectors, OJ L34, 30 Apr 2004, p. 1 (as amended), Article 10. 
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would support two separate procurement and/or designation procedures, provided that 
the difficulties of ensuring universal service between areas A and B do not overcome 
the benefits to two procedures. Smaller, more targeted contracts and designations tend 
to support the objective of full market opening while more comprehensive contracts and 
designations tend to simplify and homogenise the resulting universal service. A 
reasoned consideration of such factors would seem inherent in the principle of 
proportionality. 
All Member States except Germany appear to use the nationwide designation 
procedure implicitly encouraged by Article 4 of the Second Postal Directive. As noted in 
the previous section, the German postal law automatically provides for proportionate 
use of procurement or designation procedures, even though the German NRA has not 
considered it necessary to use these procedures to date. Sweden offers an example of 
limited use of procurement procedures to ensure certain universal services. 
Example of best practice: Germany. 
Practices of concern: Appointment by designation of a single postal operator as the 
USP for the entire national territory by a procedure that is not transparent, non-
discriminatory, fair, and consistent with the principles of proportionality and least market 
distortion.329 Except for Germany few, if any, Member States have adopted appropriate 
procedures for the designation of USPs.330  
                                                
329 The longer the period of designation, the greater the distortion in market opening. For example, in 
France a draft postal law to transpose the Third Postal Directive reportedly proposes to designate La 
Poste as the sole USP for a period of 15 years. 
330 See section 5.2.2, above. 
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6.3.5 Separation of designation and authorisation procedures 
Best practice: If specific obligations to ensure universal service are imposed on 
universal service providers designated under Article 4, they should be imposed in 
designation procedures and not as conditions attached to authorisations. 
Explanation of best practice: As described in chapter 3, Article 9(2) of the Third Postal 
Directive effectively provides that an authorisation to provide postal services within the 
universal service area — whether in the form of either an individual licence or a general 
authorisation — may be potentially subject to one of two sets of conditions. One set of 
conditions is applicable to all authorisations. Another, more restrictive, set of conditions 
may be applied only to authorisations granted to postal service providers that have 
been designated as universal service providers pursuant to Article 4.331 The 
procedures required to grant an authorisation encumbered by restrictive USO-related 
obligations are therefore likely to be more elaborate and time-consuming than the 
procedures required to grant normal authorisations that are not so encumbered.  
At the same time, Article 4(2) of the Third Postal Directive implies the need for some 
type of ’designation procedure’. Specifically, Article 4(2) requires that Member States 
entrust the designation in a manner that is transparent, non-discriminatory, and 
proportionate and that takes into account certain social and policy factors.332 To 
implement these provisions, NRAs will need to consider each designation on its merits. 
The simplest, least restrictive approach to these two procedures would seem to be to 
combine the procedures for designating a postal service provider as a universal service 
provider with the procedures for obliging the same postal service provider to abide by 
specific USO-related conditions which are inapplicable to other authorised postal 
service providers. In short, designation procedures should be separated from 
authorisation procedures. Designation should be treated in much the same way as a 
public procurement contract, with specific consideration of the particular needs that 
must be met and the conditions that must be imposed on a specific postal service 
provider. At the same time, authorisation procedures for all postal service providers who 
are not designated USPs may be kept very simple. 
The suggested approach reflects the fact that authorisation and designation (or public 
procurement) address different issues. Authorisation defines the conditions under which 
postal operators should be permitted to provide postal services. Designation (or public 
                                                
331  See section 3.5.1, above. 
332  Third Postal Directive, Article 4(2) requires that ‘Member States shall take measures to ensure that 
the conditions under which universal services are entrusted are based on the principles of 
transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality, thereby guaranteeing the continuity of the 
universal service provision, by taking into account the important role it plays in social and territorial 
cohesion’. 
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procurement) defines which postal operators, if any, should be required to provide 
universal services (and compensated for doing so, if necessary). Using authorisation 
procedures to impose a USO likely requires that all postal operators comply with the 
rigors of a regime of individual licences.333 This introduces an unnecessary risk that 
time-consuming and complex licensing procedures will hinder entry.  
Separation of designation and authorisation is already provided in some Member 
States. After first adopting standards for authorising postal operators, the Romanian 
NRA has initiated a second proceeding to determine which authorised postal operators 
should be designated as universal service provider(s). In Germany, the licensing 
procedure is so simple as to be almost equivalent to a general authorisation, and the 
NRA exercises separate, so far unused, authority to oblige a postal operator to provide 
universal service by means of designation or public procurement. Similarly, in New 
Zealand, authorisation and assignment of USO responsibilities are separate.334  
In implementing the Third Postal Directive, the best practice would seem to be to 
separate authorisation and designation procedures. There is no apparent reason why 
authorisation and designation should be combined and good reasons why they should 
not be. 
Examples of best practice: Germany and Romania. See also New Zealand. 
Practices of concern: Authorisation procedures which also impose universal service 
obligations (e.g., BE, EE, FI, HU, LT, SE, UK) create the risk of unnecessary complexity 
and delay in the authorisation of postal service providers who do not incur universal 
service obligations.  
                                                
333  By definition, an authorisation which ‘subjects that undertaking’s operations to specific obligations’ is 
an ‘individual licence’. Third Postal Directive, Article 2(14). As a result of the individual scrutiny 
associated with individual licences, a postal service provider is not entitled to start operation until it 
has received approval from the NRA. 
334  In New Zealand, the equivalent of authorisation is provided by simple registration with Ministry for 
Economic Development. The equivalent of designation is a separate contract between the 
government and NZ Post called a ‘Deed of Understanding’. 
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6.3.6 Authorisations for services within the universal service area 
Best practice: For services within the universal service area, authorisations should be 
introduced only if, and only to the extent, necessary to guarantee compliance with 
essential requirements, ensure provision of universal service, or implement other 
provisions of the Postal Directive. Where necessary, authorisations should be in the 
form of general authorisations applicable to all postal operators.  
Explanation of best practice: Under the principle of proportionality, authorisation 
procedures should not be introduced unless necessary to accomplish an identified 
public purpose. Article 9(2) of the Third Postal Directive states that authorisations 
procedures — i.e., an individual licence or general authorisation — should be 
introduced ‘to the extent necessary in order to guarantee compliance with the essential 
requirements and to ensure the provision of the universal service’. It is not obvious 
whether such considerations justify imposing authorisation procedures on postal service 
providers in all Member States.335 In this sense, the forbearance from authorisation 
procedures by some Member States (CZ, DK, NO) may be considered best practice. 
On the other hand, this survey has also highlighted several public purposes that may 
plausibly justify introduction of authorisation procedures, including (but not necessarily 
limited to) confidentiality of correspondence, user protection, administration of a 
compensation fund, and maintenance of industry statistics.336  
There seems to be no compelling reason why legitimate public purposes cannot be 
protected by authorisations cast in the form of a general authorisation rather than an 
individual licence. A general authorisation is likely to be simpler, quicker, and less 
expensive for a new market entrant than an individual licence. Given the principles of 
proportionality and least market distortion, it seems evident the best practice is to 
employ the general authorisation procedure in preference to the individual licence 
where the general authorisation is necessary and sufficient to safeguard the public 
interest. Given the principle of non-discrimination, it would appear to be best practice to 
require the same general authorisation of all postal service providers, including postal 
service providers who are further obliged to provide universal services by means of 
designation or public procurement.  
New Zealand offers an example of a very simple registration that applies to all postal 
service providers including New Zealand Post. The New Zealand procedure is 
especially simple because the postal statute, rather than the authorisation procedure, 
includes provisions that ensure confidentiality of correspondence and protect the 
interests of users. Within the Community, Ireland offers an example of a well 
                                                
335  See section 3.5.1, above. 
336  Ibid. 
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implemented general authorisation procedure for postal service providers, albeit 
excluding the universal service provider.  
Where a Member State finds it necessary to grant ‘specific rights’ or impose ‘specific 
obligations’ on an individual postal service provider in order to ensure the universal 
service, the authorisation is, by definition, an ‘individual licence’ rather than a ‘general 
authorisation’.337 In practice, however, even where a Member State has introduced 
individual licences, most operators are not given specific rights or subject to specific 
obligations. Most postal service providers receive a standard authorisation with a 
standard set of conditions. In such case, one might imagine the introduction of two 
authorisations, a general authorisation for most postal service providers and an 
individual licence for postal service providers who are designated universal service 
providers. However, since under the Third Postal Directive both the designation and the 
individual licence must be conferred by means of transparent, non-discriminatory, and 
proportional procedures, the simplest approach would be to combine the procedures 
that confer designation and grant the individual licence into a single designation 
procedure as suggested in the preceding section. 
Examples of best practice: Forbearance from authorisation procedures: Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Norway. General authorisations for universal service: New 
Zealand, Ireland. 
Practices of concern: Member States which have introduced individual licences for all 
services within the universal service area, thus creating new regulatory obstacles to the 
provision of services that were previously outside the reserved area and provided 
without regulatory control (BE, BG, CY, EE, EL, ES, HU, IT, LV, MT, PL, PT). This 
survey has not uncovered any reason to believe that such regulation of formerly 
liberalised markets has served the public interest. These authorisations deserve careful 
reconsideration. 
                                                
337  Third Postal Directive, Article 2(14). 
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6.3.7 Conditions on authorisations 
Best practice: Conditions on authorisations for services within or outside the universal 
service area should be introduced only if, and to the extent that, they are (i) strictly 
consistent with the types of conditions permitted by Article 9 of the Postal Directive or 
necessary to implement other provisions of the Postal Directive and (ii) consistent with 
the principles of proportionality and least market distortion, taking into account the 
multiple objectives of the Postal Directive. 
Explanation of best practice: Best practice, necessarily, limits the scope of conditions 
that may be attached to authorisations to those conditions which are permitted by the 
Third Postal Directive. Article 9 of the Third Postal Directive explicitly permits NRAs to 
attach only certain types of conditions to authorisations. In addition, it might be argued 
that other provisions of the Third Postal Directive implicitly justify conditions on 
authorisations. For example, since Article 19 requires NRAs to ensure the postal 
service providers implement minimum user protection measures, and Article 22a 
requires postal service providers to provide NRAs with appropriate statistical data, it 
might be considered justified to add conditions to authorisations to ensure compliance 
with user protection and statistical requirements adopted by the NRA. Without 
attempting to define the precise scope of conditions permitted by the Third Postal 
Directive,338 it is clear that, in principle, best practice rules out conditions that are not 
supported by the directive. This survey suggests that several NRAs will need to 
reconsider conditions on authorisations based on a careful reading of the Third Postal 
Directive.339 
In addition, best practice must conform to the principles of proportionality and least 
market distortion. These principles emanate not only from the Third Postal Directive but 
also from good administrative practice generally. In best practice, conditions which may 
be technically permitted by the directive should not be adopted if they inappropriately or 
unnecessarily conflict with other objectives of the directive. In this respect, conditions on 
authorisations must be weighed against the principles of proportionality and least 
market distortion with special care because conditions on authorisation are, in effect, 
restrictions on the right to compete. There is an inherent tension between conditions on 
authorisations and full market opening. Before any conditions can be attached to 
authorisations, therefore, best practice would require a reasoned balancing of the 
effects on universal service and full market opening and an analysis of whether similar 
ends may be accomplished by less distortive means. 
                                                
338  We do not seek to argue for or against such an interpretation of Articles 19 and 22a. While there is 
plausibility to the argument that conditions on authorisations may be grounded in Article 19 and 22a , 
there is also plausibility to the contrary position — i.e., that Articles 19 and 22a must be enforced by 
other regulatory means. 
339  See section 3.5.1 and 3.5.2, above. 
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Authorisation conditions which are intended to protect universal service by restricting 
competition with the incumbent universal service provider appear to be both 
inconsistent with the scope of permissible conditions and disproportionate to any 
legitimate purposes under the Third Postal Directive. Such conditions are normally 
justified as consistent with the second indent of the second paragraph of Article 9(2). In 
our view, revision of Article 7 in the Third Postal Directive renders this justification 
untenable. By prohibiting a reserved area, the revised Article 7 effectively limits Member 
States to two types of measures that can be used to ensure adequate compensation for 
the incumbent USP: (i) public procurement under Article 7(2) and (ii) designation and 
compensation under Articles 4(2), 7(3), and Annex I. Any other reading of Article 9(2) 
would render meaningless the termination of the reserved area by Article 7(1). 
Moreover, even if such conditions to protect the USP were technically permitted by the 
second indent of the second paragraph of Article 9(2), they would be inconsistent with 
the principles of proportionality and least market distortions since — as the experience 
of several Member States demonstrates — the directive provides other, less distortive 
means for ensuring universal service. 
Several Member States offer good examples of authorisations without undue conditions 
on authorisations. In Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, universal service is 
ensured without a reserved area and without restrictive conditions on authorisations. 
Examples of best practice: Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom.  
Practices of concern: Authorisation conditions which are intended to protect universal 
service by restricting competition are of particular concern, such as found in Finland, 
Estonia, and proposed in Belgium. Also of concern are conditions which exceed the 
scope of conditions permitted by the Postal Directive such as conditions relating to 
financial guarantees (CY, HU) and technical expertise (BE, DE, FR, HU, PT). 
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6.3.8 Scope of regulated accounts  
Best practice: In general, the NRA should ensure that postal operators that provide 
universal services with significant market power maintain cost and revenue product 
accounts for (i) each universal service or other postal service provided pursuant to a 
designation or public procurement contract and (ii) each non-universal service that is 
produced jointly with a service covered by (i). 
Explanation of best practice: Appropriate regulation of accounts is necessary to 
implement both of the primary objectives of the Third Postal Directive: ensuring the 
universal service obligation and facilitating full market opening.  
For universal services, the legal requirement to maintain regulated product accounts is 
clear, although it is less clear who it should apply to. In the Third Postal Directive, Article 
14(2) requires ‘universal service providers’ to maintain product accounts for each 
universal service.340 In the Second Postal Directive, the phrase ‘the universal service 
providers’ apparently refers only to postal operators designated as USPs pursuant to 
Article 4. In the Third Postal Directive, however, Article 4 has been modified to permit 
Member States to ensure universal service by reliance on market forces or public 
procurement as well as by designation. Thus, universal service may be provided by 
several different postal operators.341 As a practical matter, it seems unnecessary to 
regulate the accounts of a postal operator that provides some universal services without 
significant market power in any universal service market. For example, a small parcel 
company might contribute to the ‘market forces’ that a Member State relies upon to 
ensure universal parcel post services. Yet for a small non-dominant postal service 
provider providing a portion of the universal parcel services, it seems to us that the NRA 
may reasonably rely upon the threat of competition to ensure that quality of service is 
adequate and that prices are cost-oriented and otherwise consistent with Article 12. 
Moreover, a small postal operator without significant market power is very unlikely to 
seek compensation for the provision of universal services.342 Since regulated accounts 
for ‘universal service providers’ operating in a competitive market without significant 
market power are unnecessary to allow the NRA to control prices or calculate 
                                                
340  Third Postal Directive, Article 14(2): ‘The universal service provider(s) shall keep separate accounts 
within their internal accounting systems in order to clearly distinguish between each of the services 
and products which are part of the universal service and those which are not’. 
341  See section 2.5, above. 
342  Only postal operators that have been designated as USPs or granted public procurement contracts 
will be eligible for compensation. Neither designation nor procurement should involve postal services 
which are produced in an effectively competitive market. 
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compensation, the principle of proportionality implies that the accounts of such postal 
service providers should not be controlled unnecessarily.343 
For non-universal postal services, there is also a need for regulated product accounts in 
certain, limited circumstances. In the Third Postal Directive, new paragraph (3)(b)(iv) of 
Article 14 explicitly requires NRAs to monitor how ‘universal service providers’ allocate 
common costs to non-universal services as well universal services.344 Hence, regulated 
product accounts for non-universal services are appropriate where a postal service 
provider jointly produces both universal and non-universal services — that is, incurs 
‘common costs’ through the use of the same facilities, vehicles, and personnel to 
produce both types of services. An example would be a public postal operator that 
provides a universal letter post service (with a significant market power) and also uses 
the same facilities to compete in a competitive, non-universal service market for 
distribution of unaddressed advertising items.345  
Where the postal service provider has significant market power in the provision of 
universal services, there is a risk that the postal service provider will overcharge users 
of universal services and use the additional revenues to underwrite unfairly low prices 
for non-universal services. Such a practice would both burden the universal service and 
distort competition in non-universal services. Indeed, even without such cross subsidy, 
a market dominant position in a universal service could help a postal service provider to 
maintain a market dominant position in a related, non-universal service if there are joint 
economies of scale.346 In either case, the presence of a postal service provider with a 
market dominant position in universal services could create a significant risk of 
distortions in markets for other jointly produced products. The only practical means of 
effectively monitoring potentially abusive or anti-competitive behaviour is to require a 
complete set of regulated product accounts for all jointly produced products, universal 
and non-universal.347  
                                                
343  Even a small postal service provider without significant market power would need to maintain 
regulated accounts if it sought compensation under a designation, but the control of such accounts 
could plausibly be limited to the services for which compensation is sought. 
344  Third Postal Directive, Article 14(3)(b)(iv). See section 3.6.2, above. On the other hand, in section 
6.3.9, below, we suggest an approach to implementing paragraph (b)(iv) that should not be too 
burdensome to regulated USPs. 
345  Similarly, bulk mail services are not considered universal services in some Member States, and bulk 
mail services is almost necessarily produced jointly with non-bulk services. 
346  For example, economies of scale in basic letter post services might give rise to economies of scale in 
bulk letter services which lie outside the USO. 
347  See, e.g., European Commission, 'Proposal For a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Amending Directive 97/67/EC Concerning the Full Accomplishment of the Internal Market of 
Community Postal Services', COM(2006) 594 (2006), p. 7 (‘In a fully competitive environment, 
Member States must conduct the delicate exercise of providing sufficient freedom to universal service 
providers to adapt to competition and at the same time, ensure adequate monitoring of the behaviour 
of the likely dominant operator in order to safeguard effective competition [emphasis added]’). 
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A good example of the need to consider competitive issues as well as universal service 
issues in defining the scope of regulated accounts is provided by Postcomm’s (the UK 
NRA’s) review of regulation of bulk mail services. After a considered analysis, 
Postcomm concluded that about three quarters of the bulk mail services of Royal Mail 
(the UK USP) should be considered non-universal services. Nonetheless, Postcomm 
concluded that continued regulation of accounts and prices was required because of 
‘the absence of genuine alternatives’.348 In its most recent price control procedure, 
Postcomm explicitly considered the basis for maintaining price controls over non-
universal service products: 
Postcomm does not believe that it would be appropriate to limit the price 
control to universal service products. Postcomm has assessed the 
development of competition for all products irrespective of whether or not 
they are universal service products, to determine the coverage of the price 
control. Competitive pressures for some products not included within the 
universal service may be insufficient to protect customers.349 
Example of best practice: United Kingdom 
Practices of concern: Nine NRAs (CY, DK, IT, LV, NL, RO, SI, IS, NO) report that they 
have conducted no review of the allocation of common costs to non-universal services..  
                                                
348  UK Postcomm, ‘The Universal Service for Bulk Mailers: A Decision Document’, p. ii, paragraph S.8 
(June 2005) ('Only around one quarter of Royal Mail’s bulk mail volumes will be conveyed by services 
now to be regarded as universal services. This represents a major step towards deregulation and the 
removal of regulatory constraints on Royal Mail. However, in the absence of genuine alternatives, 
especially for small businesses, Postcomm does not consider it appropriate to deregulate any further 
for the time being and is proposing some transitional restraints’). Then, too, in some Member States, 
the NRA’s role in facilitating competition implies a need for accounting controls for joint products. See, 
e.g., German Post Law §§ 20(2), 25.  
349  Postcomm, ‘2006 Royal Mail Price and Service Quality Review: Initial Proposals’ (Jun. 2005), pp. 40-
41. 
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6.3.9 Allocation of costs according to Article 14  
Best practice: Where the accounts of a postal operator are regulated, the NRA should 
ensure that the direct and common costs associated with production of universal 
services are allocated to product accounts in a manner that is clear, economically valid, 
and consistent with Article 14. 
Explanation of best practice: Article 14 provides a conceptual framework for allocating 
the costs of universal service products. Cost allocation is central to the role of the NRA 
in the regulatory framework established by the Third Postal Directive. Hence, best 
practice requires NRAs develop a clear, consistent, economically valid approach 
towards the implementation of this framework.  
What this means in practice is less easy to express. In general, cost allocation is the 
least well developed aspect of postal regulation in the Community.350 So far, the most 
sophisticated analysis of Article 14 appears to be that of the French NRA, ARCEP. In 
addition, based on information received in this survey, it appears that several NRAs are 
taking plausible first steps to control accounts in accordance with the guidelines of 
Article 14, including the NRAs of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Portugal, and Poland. 
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350  See sections 3.6.2 and 3.6.3, above. 
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Nonetheless, no NRA seems to have developed an approach towards the cost 
allocation requirements of Article 14 that is fully consistent with the objectives of the 
Third Postal Directive. Indeed, there seems to be no common view among NRAs as to 
what the accounting categories established by Article 14 refer to. For example, NRAs 
have interpreted the term ‘direct costs’ in Article 14(3)(a) to refer a category of costs as 
small as 0.7 percent of total costs and as large as 90 percent of total costs. It is 
apparent that these NRAs are interpreting Article 14 in fundamentally different ways. 
Given this lack of consensus on what Article 14 requires, we cannot suggest an overall 
‘best practice’ in the Community. We will, however, offer some suggestions regarding 
the implementation of Article 14 based on our review of accounting practices in the 
United States. 
• In general, among postal economists, the analysis of costs carried out by the 
United States Postal Rate Commission prior to the 2006 is generally regarded 
as ‘best practice’.351 The US accounting techniques are exceptionally well 
documented and transparent and, after three decades of litigation, reasonably 
well accepted by all parties. 
• Fundamental differences in the accounting concepts embedded in the US postal 
law obscure its relevance to EU postal law. Nonetheless, the pre-2006 
regulatory approach in the US suggests a possible approach towards 
implementation of Article 14 in the EU. 
• According to the US approach, only a very small percentage of total costs (less 
than 1 percent) can be directly assigned to individual universal service products. 
This group of ‘product specific’ costs might be considered equivalent to the EU 
category defined by Article 14(3)(a). 
• According to the US approach, about 62 percent of total costs are ‘attributable 
costs’ that can assigned to universal service products based on volume 
variability and other cost drivers. This group of costs might be considered 
equivalent to the EU category defined by Article 14(3)(b)(i).  
• According to the US approach, about 38 percent of total costs are ‘institutional 
costs’ that are allocated to universal service products based upon statutory 
                                                
351  In the United States, the 2006 Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act substantially replaced the 
Postal Regulatory Commission’s regulation of the prices of universal service products provided under 
conditions of market dominance with price caps set by statute. Although the underlying accounting 
techniques have changed little, accounting controls have become less transparent and distorted by 
the requirements of the statutory price cap system. 
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principles and policies. This group of costs might be considered equivalent to the 
EU categories defined by Articles 14(3)(b)(ii) and (b)(iii).352  
• Basic economic analysis makes clear that most of what the US calls ‘institutional 
costs’ must be treated in the EU as (b)(ii) costs rather than (b)(iii) costs because 
to do otherwise — and thus to assign such costs to products based on a general 
allocator specified in (b)(iii) — would be to sharply reduce the total supply of 
postal services and jeopardise the financial equilibrium of USPs, especially in 
rapidly changing postal markets. Such an outcome would be directly contrary to 
the objectives of the Postal Directive. No NRA has interpreted (b)(iii) to include 
all of what are called ‘institutional costs’ in the US. NRAs therefore need to 
develop reasoned techniques for regulating the allocation of what the US 
regulator calls ‘institutional costs’ using the tools and standards set out in 
(b)(ii).353  
• New paragraph (b)(iv), added in the Third Postal Directive, requires NRAs to 
ensure (i) that the common costs incurred in the joint production of universal and 
non-universal services are allocated ‘appropriately’ and (ii) that the same ‘cost 
drivers’ must be applied to both universal services and non-universal 
services.354 Paragraph (b)(iv) thus sets out two requirements for allocation of 
costs to competitive products. First, there is a requirement to use the same ‘cost 
drivers’. This provision may require NRAs to ensure that methodology of 
allocating (b)(i) common costs — i.e., common costs assigned by direct analysis 
or ‘cost drivers’ — is also applied to non-universal services individually. Second, 
there is a requirement that common costs overall must be allocated 
‘appropriately’. This provision may require NRAs to determine an ‘appropriate’ 
allocation for (b)(ii) and (b)(iii) common costs to non-universal services 
collectively.  
Under such an interpretation, it seems to us that Article 14 may be implemented in a 
manner that takes advantage of best practices developed in the United States and 
results in economically reasonable allocation of costs that is well adapted to advancing 
the objectives of the Third Postal Directive. 
Regardless of whether these suggestions are considered meritorious, NRAs in the 
Community need to adopt a more harmonised approach towards implementation of 
                                                
352  Such an approach assumes that the ‘indirect linkage’ envisioned in Article 14(3)(b)(ii) may be 
interpreted to allow consideration of demand factors and public interest factors as well as cost factors. 
353  This appears to be the approach being pursued by the ARCEP in allocating the fixed cost of delivery. 
Where the allocation of the fixed cost of delivery depends on the number of weekly deliveries required 
for a certain services, this could be interpreted as ‘indirect linkage’ in the meaning of b(ii). 
354  Third Postal Directive, Article 14(3)(b)(iv) states: ‘common costs, which are necessary for the 
provision of both universal services and non-universal services, shall be allocated appropriately; the 
same cost drivers must be applied to both universal services and non-universal services’. 
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Article 14. If Article 14 is interpreted in completely different ways by different NRAs, 
then its value as a Community standard is negated. Moreover, more harmonised 
implementation will allow NRAs to benefit from each other’s analyses. In addition, NRAs 
need to verify periodically the reliability of the data collection systems underlying cost 
accounts. 
Example of best practice: United States (prior to 2006). 
Practices of concern: No NRA seems to have developed an approach towards the cost 
allocation requirements of Article 14 that is fully consistent with the objectives of the 
Third Postal Directive. 
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6.3.10 Verification and transparency of accounting regulation 
Best practice: The NRA should ensure that  
(i) cost accounting practices of USPs are verified at least annually by either the 
NRA or by a competent independent body retained by the NRA;  
(ii) a statement verifying the compliance of USPs with Article 14 is published at 
least annually;  
(iii) a summary of the regulated product accounts of universal services provided 
by any postal operator with significant market power is published at least 
annually (taking into account the need for adequate protection of 
commercially sensitive information); and  
(iv) a full explanation of methodology used in cost accounting is published at 
least annually.  
Explanation of best practice: Best practice should provide transparency of regulation as 
much as possible. Items (i) and (ii) are specifically required by the Postal Directive and 
therefore must be considered elements of best practice. Items (iii) and (iv) are provided 
by some NRAs and, seemingly, could be provided by all.355 
Examples of best practice: Norway (the only Member States that ensures all four 
measures of transparency). The UK provides a good example of publication of 
summaries of regulatory accounts. France offers an example of a particularly 
transparent methodology for cost allocation. 
Practices of concern: Of particular concern, because they are required by the Postal 
Directive, are (i) a lack of any outside review of the USP's accounts (CY, EE, IS) or 
review by an auditor retained by the USP and thus not wholly independent of the USP 
(EL, FR, IE, IT, MT, NL, RO) and (ii) failure of NRAs to issue an annual statement 
verifying the USP's compliance with Article 14 (AT, BE, CY, DE, DK, EL, ES, HU, IE, IT, 
LU, LV, MT, RO, UK). Also of concern, because of the desirability of transparency, are 
a NRA's (iii) failure to publish a summary of regulatory accounts for the information of 
the public (AT, BE, CZ, DE, EE, EL, ES, FR, HU, IE, IT, LU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, 
SI, SK, UK) or (iv) the system of cost allocation (AT, CY, DE, EE, ES, HU, IT, LT, LU, 
MT, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, UK, IS). 
                                                
355  See section 3.6.5, above. 
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6.4 Ensuring the universal service 
6.4.1 Standards for access, affordability, and quality of service 
Best practice: Standards for access, affordability, and quality of service should reflect 
the minimum level of service that is (i) objectively required to protect the evolving public 
need for universal services and (ii) consistent with the minimum level of universal 
service required by the Directive. 
Explanation of best practice: In the Third Postal Directive, Articles 3, 12, and 16 require 
Member States to set standards for access to, affordability of, and quality of service of 
universal services. The directive allows Member States substantial discretion in what 
those standards should be.356 How that discretion should be exercised in best practice 
is guided by the directive as a whole. Article 5 declares that the definition of the 
universal service obligation must ‘evolve in response to the technical, economic and 
social environment and to the needs of users’. At the same time, the definition of the 
universal service obligation must support as fully as possible the objectives of full 
market opening and user protection.  
In light of such considerations, the best practice is for Member States to set standards 
for access, affordability, and quality of service at the minimum level that objectively 
reflects the actual needs of users. These needs may evolve over time. If, for example, 
expanding use of email reduces the need of rapid delivery of letters, then the quality of 
service standards should be relaxed. If postal agencies prove to be satisfactory 
replacements for post offices, then USPs should be permitted to switch from post 
offices to postal agencies. On the other hand, if isolated or technologically 
unsophisticated communities have a greater need for postal services than other 
communities — perhaps greater than would be sustained by market forces — then this 
circumstance, too, must be reflected in the definition of the universal service obligation. 
To ascertain the evolving needs of users, NRAs must consult with users periodically 
and seek to determine their true needs, not only their preferences which may be 
affected by the fact the users do not always pay directly for the postal services they 
consume.  
This survey indicates that Sweden and United Kingdom are especially vigilant in 
reviewing the needs of users by means of annual surveys. Several other NRAs (BE, 
                                                
356  See sections 3.3.2, 3.3.5, and 3.7.2, above. Discretion with the respect to quality of service standards 
is less open-ended than with respect to access and affordability because quality of service standards 
must be consistent with quality of service standards for intra-Community cross-border mail set in 
Annex II of the Third Postal Directive. See the next section. 
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DE, FR, EL, HU, IE, LT, MT, PT) have also recently conducted reviews of users’ 
needs.357 
Examples of best practice: Sweden and United Kingdom. 
Practices of concern: Sixteen NRAs (BG, CY, CZ, DK, EE, ES, FI, IT, LU, LV, PL, RO, 
SI, SK, IS, NO) report that the government has not undertaken a study of users' needs 
for universal services.358 
6.4.2 Exceptions to the delivery frequency and quality of service of universal 
services 
Best practice: Exceptions to the scope of universal service should be interpreted with 
respect to overall conditions prevalent in the Community and not only with respect to 
the conditions within a single Member State. 
Explanation of best practice: The Third Postal Directive, like earlier versions, allows 
Member States to introduce exceptions in standards for delivery frequency and quality 
of universal services. Article 3 requires Member States to ensure universal service five 
days per week ‘save in circumstances or geographical conditions deemed exceptional’. 
Similarly, Article 18 provides that Member States may adopt exemptions from 
Community quality of service standards ‘where exceptional situations relating to 
infrastructure or geography so require’.359 Recital 20 of Directive 2008/6/EC 
emphasised that in continuing the USO standards set in the original Postal Directive, 
                                                
357  See section 5.6.2, above. 
358 Questionnaire 121-1 ('Has the NRA or government prepared a study or report on the needs of 
senders and addressees for specific types and levels of universal postal services that takes into 
account expected changes in technology, the effects of full market opening, and other future 
considerations?'). 
359  Technically, the exceptions provision in Article 18 creates an exemption from the standards for intra-
Community cross border of the fastest standard category established in Annex II of the Third Postal 
Directive. Article 17 requires a Member State to establish ‘quality standards for national mail and shall 
ensure that they are compatible with those laid down for intra-Community cross-border services’. An 
exception from intra-Community standards thus creates an exception from national standards as well. 
 Role of Regulators in a More Competitive Postal Market 303 
 Chapter 6: Best Regulatory Practices 
the new directive was ‘taking into account that Member States may adapt some specific 
service features to accommodate local demand by making use of the flexibility provided 
for in Directive 97/67/EC’.  
Nonetheless, this survey suggests that Member States have made little use of these 
exceptions provisions. Member States, with the sole exception of Greece, have limited 
deviations from the 5-day delivery standard to less than 1 percent of the population in 
each Member State.360 One explanation for the rare use of the exceptions may be that 
operators in most Member States provide daily nationwide service on commercial 
grounds and have not requested such exceptions from NRAs. Another possible 
explanation for this limited application of the exceptions provisions may be that these 
provisions are interpreted by reference to national postal markets rather than the 
Community postal market. If so, such an interpretation implies that compliance with the 
Postal Directive is more onerous for some Member States than others. In some 
Member States substantial portions of the postal market differ fundamentally from the 
postal markets in the Community as a whole. For example, consider Romania. The 
postal volume per capita in Romania is about 30 items per year, about 15 percent of the 
postal volume in the EU/EEA market as a whole and 36 percent less than the Member 
State with the lowest postal volume per capita in 1992 when the Postal Green Paper 
was published.361 Most of Romania’s population and economic activity is concentrated 
in the capital so that mail volumes in the rural areas are likely well below the Romanian 
average. In our survey, the Romanian NRA was one of only two NRAs that declared 
that none of the national territory would be provided satisfactory universal service by 
market forces.362 Under such circumstances, it appears unreasonable to apply the 
exceptions clause to the Romanian postal market in same way as to, say, the Dutch 
postal market, where the annual postal volume is 342 postal items per capita in a very 
densely populated, relatively small territory. Even in Member States with high postal 
volumes such as Sweden (346 postal items per capita) and Norway (362 postal items 
per capita), extraordinary geographic conditions may mean that an inflexible application 
of Community-wide quality of service standards could compel the USP to provide air 
transportation that would be considered excessive in other Member States.363  
The most reasonable approach to such anomalies seems to be to interpret the 
exceptions provisions in Articles 3 and 18 to refer to conditions that are extraordinary by 
reference to the postal market in the Community as a whole rather than by reference to 
                                                
360  See section 3.3.3, above. 
361  Postal Green Paper, Annex 2, p. 273. 
362  Questionnaire 123-11. See section 4.4.1, above. 
363  For example, Norway Post must contract for its own air transportation to the northern parts of the 
country in order to meet national quality of service standards influenced at least in part by the Postal 
Directive. If overnight service is not truly needed by the public interest in Norway, then it would be 
more efficient and environmentally friendly for Norway Post to make use of commercial air 
transportation which is scheduled to meet the needs of passengers rather than the mail. 
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the postal market in each national territory. This appears to be the position of Greece. 
Greece is the only Member State which, by referring to average conditions in the 
Community as a whole, claims that a significant portion of this universal service (7 
percent) presents exceptional circumstances or geographical conditions.364 Without 
addressing the merits of the particular circumstances in Greece, we believe that best 
practice should follow the economically sensible principle advocated by Greece in 
applying the exceptions provisions of the Postal Directive. 
Example of best practice: Greece. 
Practices of concern: Member States which, from a merely formal adherence to the 
Postal Directive, require extension of universal services to isolated or remote portions of 
the Community at a cost that is unreasonably high and not objectively justified (there is 
insufficient data to identify specific examples). 
6.4.3 Price control of universal services provided by market dominant postal 
service providers 
Best practice: In general, prices for universal services provided by postal operators with 
significant market power should be regulated by the NRA using forward-looking 
procedures (ex ante review, price caps) to ensure conformance with Article 12. 
Forward-looking procedures should normally be employed with respect to services 
provided by postal service providers where they benefit from designation or public 
procurement procedures. Where universal services are provided under conditions of 
effective competition, the NRA should normally rely upon the competitive market to 
ensure compliance with Article 12. 
Explanation of best practice: Most, but not all, NRAs regulate the rates of universal 
services to ensure compliance with Article 12.365 Most, but not all, use forward-looking 
price control regulation (ex ante review or price caps) for services provided by a postal 
                                                
364  See section 3.3.3, above. 
365 See section 3.7.2, above. 
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operator with significant market power.366 We believe this is the best practice. By 
definition, universal services are especially important for society. Ex post price controls 
may be insufficient to deter a market dominant postal operator from collecting excessive 
rates for a sustained period, and effective redress for overcharged users may be 
practically impossible. For the postal operator, ex post review creates a risk that rates 
already collected may be deemed illegal.  
Significant market power is usually determined by the presence or absence of effective 
competition.367 However, it seems reasonable to presume significant market power 
whenever a postal service provider provides services under a designation or public 
procurement because the fact of designation or public procurement creates significant 
benefits (such as exemption form VAT, eligibility for compensation, etc.). 
While either ex ante review or price caps appear effective, an amendment to Article 12 
in the Third Postal Directive may create a preference for price caps in some 
circumstances. The revised Article 12 states that price regulation should ‘give incentives 
for an efficient universal service provision’. Compared to ex ante regulation, price caps 
can create additional incentives for efficiency if the owners of a postal service provider 
can keep the increased profits that result from increased efficiency. Since private 
shareholders of a postal service provider can keep the profits of increased efficiency, 
price caps may stimulate greater efficiency in a privatised or partially privatised postal 
service provider. A similar stimulus for efficiency might be felt by a government owned 
postal service provider if the government agency responsible for exercising ownership 
rights gets appropriate bureaucratic credit for profits earned.  
Where universal services are provided under conditions of effective competition, the 
best practice would appear to be to rely upon competition to ensure that prices are 
affordable, cost-oriented, non-discriminatory, efficient, and otherwise compliant with 
Article 12. Member States may also wish to provide for ex post review of prices for 
universal services offered under conditions of effective competition — for example, to 
ensure absence of illegal discrimination — by either the NRA or NCA. In general, 
however, we believe that, in light to the goal of the Third Postal Directive to move 
towards full market opening, the verdict of an effectively competitive market should be 
presumed consistent with the price standards of the Directive, at least absent contrary 
evidence. 
The principle that the method of price regulation should be adjusted according to 
whether or not the product is provided by a postal service provider with significant 
                                                
366  See section 3.7.4, above. 
367  The Commission undertakes a similar analysis of the actual competitiveness of postal markets in 
determining the scope of Utilities Directive, Directive 2004/17/EC. See, e.g., Decision of 19 December 
2008 exempting certain services in the postal sector in Sweden from the application of Directive 
2004/17/EC, OJ L 19, 23 Jan 2009, p. 50. 
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market power (and not whether the product is a universal service) is evident in the 
evolution of regulatory practices of several countries.368 The British NRA, Postcomm, 
has limited price control to products which do not face substantial competition.369 For 
non-competitive postal products, Postcomm has adopted a price cap regime in which 
rates for ‘captive’ users are regulated more tightly than for ‘non-captive’ users (where 
there is potential for competition).370 Similarly, as noted above,371 the German law 
prescribes price caps to control non-bulk letter post rates of postal service providers 
with a market dominant position; other rates are controlled by ex post review if 
necessary. In Sweden, the NRA has established a price cap for letter post items 
weighing up to 500 grams and otherwise reviews rates of universal service ex post. In 
the United States, the 2006 postal reform law divides all postal products into two 
categories, ‘market dominant’ and ‘competitive’. Market dominant products are subject 
to price cap controls while the prices of competitive products are required (i) to cover 
long term marginal costs of each individual product and (ii) to cover a reasonable 
portion of common costs on a collective basis.372 
Examples of best practice: United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden.  
Practices of concern: Six NRAs (BE, DK, FI, HU, LU, NL) apparently do not base price 
regulation on costs.  
                                                
368  See section 5.5.2, above, for a discussion of the relationships between postal regulation and 
competition regulation. 
369  Five factors are evaluated in order to decide whether a product is competitive or not: (i) barriers to 
entry; (ii) scale and nature of competition; (iii) customer awareness and behaviour; (iv) behaviour of 
Royal Mail; and (v) other factors. Postcomm, ‘Royal Mail Price and Service Quality Review: Final 
Proposals for Consultation’ (Dec. 2005) at pp. 9-13. 
370  This concept is explained in Postcomm, ‘2006 Royal Mail Price and Service Quality Review: Initial 
Proposals’ (Jun. 2005), pp. 73-76. 
371  See section 3.7.4, above. 
372  United States Code, Title 39, sections 3621-23, 3631-33 (2006). Although the 2006 U.S. postal act 
reasonably adjusts the methods of price regulation of the degree of competitiveness, the act also 
defines price caps that are too inflexible to list the U.S. as a best practice. 
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6.4.4 Delivery of inbound cross border postal items 
Best practice: Where cross border postal items are collected and forwarded as part of 
the universal service in a Member State, the NRA in the destination Member State 
should ensure that providers of postal services with significant market power comply 
with Article 13 and otherwise provide incoming postal items with similar services at 
similar prices compared to the services offered by that operator for similar domestic 
postal items. 
Explanation of best practice: To protect the ‘cross border provision of universal service’, 
Article 13 requires NRAs to ‘encourage’ USPs to follow pricing principles similar to, but 
not as detailed as, those set out in Article 12 for national universal services. In 
particular, Article 13, like Article 12, provides that terminal dues (i.e., charges for 
delivery of incoming cross border postal items) should be transparent, non-
discriminatory, and cost-based. Article 5 states flatly the Member States shall ensure 
that the universal service shall ‘offer an identical service to users under comparable 
conditions’. Since these principles are endorsed by the Postal Directive, best practice 
implies that practices should be not only encouraged but implemented.  
The suggested best practice standard is limited to postal items that meet two tests. 
First, the postal items must be treated as universal service items in the originating 
Member State.373 Second, the postal items must be delivered by a postal operator with 
significant market power in the destination Member State. For such items, it is 
suggested that objectives of Article 13 must be met in fact and that discrimination 
between cross border and domestic mail ended. In effect, each NRA should ensure that 
a provider of postal services with significant market power in its Member State will 
honour the universal service obligation of other Member States. Where postal items are 
delivered by postal operators participating in an effectively competitive market in the 
destination Member State, the principles of proportionality and least market distortion 
imply that the NRA should rely upon the competitive market to supply inbound delivery 
services. Nonetheless, the NRA and NCA should remain vigilant against lapses in the 
effectiveness of the competitive market and violations of the competition rules. 
The Irish NRA, ComReg, is one of the very few NRAs to attempt to implement Article 
13. In 2003, ComReg notified the national USP that its terminal dues agreements 
                                                
373  The suggested best practice does not apply to postal items which are not considered universal service 
items in the originating Member State because this section, like Articles 5 and 13, is focused on 
ensuring universal service. See section 5.5.6, below, for a brief discussion of other international postal 
practices. 
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appeared to be inconsistent with statutory requirements that charges should be cost-
based.374 ComReg is currently following up this notice. 
Example of best practice: Ireland.  
Practices of concern: There are several sources of unreasonable price and service 
discrimination in the provision of intra-Community cross border postal services. First, 
because some national USPs (ES, NL, PT, UK) do not participate in REIMS III, national 
USPs charge different rates for delivery of similar cross border mail depending on the 
originating Member State. Second, where REIMS III rates are not aligned with domestic 
postage, national USPs charge different rates for similar mail depending on whether the 
mail is domestic or cross border in origin. Third, because third party access 
requirements are difficult to meet, participants in REIMS III generally charge different 
rates for similar mail depending on whether it is tendered by a national USP or a private 
operator.375 Fourth, because some national USPs, in concert with the Universal Postal 
Union, have agreed to hinder the ability of national USPs to open offices outside their 
national territories, some national USPs charge different rates for delivery of similar mail 
depending on whether the mail is dispatched by a national USP from an office in its 
national territory or dispatched by the same national USP from an office outside of its 
national territory. Fifth, some national USPs delay the delivery of cross border mail or 
refuse to deliver cross border mail in an effort to enforce such discriminatory terminal 
dues arrangements. Sixth, because the REIMS III terminal dues agreement is non-
public, the rates for the delivery of cross border universal service products are not 
transparent; while the terminal dues rates of the Universal Postal Union (UPU) are 
transparent, they are not cost based.376  
                                                
374  See ComReg, ‘Terminal Dues Agreements – Compliance with Regulation 10(1) of S.I. 616 of 2002’ 
(23 Oct 2003). 
375  Since REIMS III rates are non-public, the extent of such discrimination cannot be evaluated. 
376  See sections 3.4.3 and 3.7.7, above. 
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6.4.5 Financing of the net cost of universal service (if any) 
Best practice: After transposition of the Third Postal Directive, Member States should 
ensure that methods of financing the net cost of universal service, if any, conform to the 
principles of proportionality and least market distortion and, in any case, create no 
greater market distortions than existed prior to transposition. 
Explanation of best practice: Under the Second Postal Directive, Member States were 
authorised to fund the net cost of universal service, if any, using revenues generated 
from two sources: a reserved area and a compensation fund. The bottom line was that 
some users of public or private postal operators paid a little more than they otherwise 
would have and some users paid less. Under the Third Postal Directive, a specific 
definition of the ‘net cost of universal service’ has been introduced and options for 
financing the net cost of universal service, if any, have changed.  
So far, there has been little analysis of the need for these new financing methods377 or 
their potential for market distortions. At the outset, it appears likely that the most 
efficient, least distortive means of financing the USO is by payment from the general 
government budget.378 If further analysis confirms these conclusions, then best practice 
will be to finance the net cost of universal service, if any, by means of public funds. 
If compensation funds are used, it appears that the degree of market distortion varies 
significantly depending on the specific measures adopted.379 Since the overall objective 
of the Third Postal Directive is to move in the direction of full market opening and 
greater reliance on market forces while ensuring universal service, in defining new 
methods for financing the net cost (if any) of the USO, NRAs should undertake a 
reasoned examination of alternatives and structure the compensation fund in a manner 
that conforms to the principle of least market distortion. As a reasonable safeguard, 
NRAs should ensure that new methods of financing universal service do not cause 
greater market distortions than existed prior to transposition of the Third Postal 
Directive.  
So far, the leading example of a reasoned and objective approach towards financing the 
net cost of universal service is Norway. As noted in section 3.3.5 above, Norwegian law 
provides that the government will pay Norway Post an amount that represents the net 
                                                
377  See section 5.6.3, above. 
378  For two recent analyses, see Claire Borsenberger, Helmuth Cremer, Philippe De Donder, Denis 
Joram and Bernard Roy, ‘Funding the Cost of Universal Service in a Liberalized Postal Sector’ and 
Christian Jaag and Urs Trinkner, ‘Would the Real Net Cost of Universal Service Provision Please 
Stand Up? A Calibrated Approach to Universal Service Costing and Financing?’. Both papers were 
presented at the 17th Conference on Postal and Delivery Economics, May 27–30, 2009, Bordeaux, 
France. Updated versions may be obtained from the authors at http://www.idei.fr/ and 
http://www.swiss-economics.ch, respectively. 
379  Ibid. 
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loss incurred for universal services after deducting the value of the postal monopoly. 
The calculation is transparent and the funds are paid from public funds.380 To date, 
there is no example of a well considered compensation fund to finance universal postal 
service.381 
Example of best practice: Norway.  
Practices of concern: Member States which have granted the USP financial support for 
universal services — either in the form of a reserved area (all Member States except 
DE, EE, FI, NL, SE, UK) or payment of funds (ES, IT) — without ensuring that the value 
of the support provided does not exceed the net cost of universal services provided. 
                                                
380  See section 3.3.5, above.  
381  See section 3.5.4, above. 
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6.5 Ensuring full market opening for postal services 
6.5.1 Phasing out of the reserved area 
Best practice: Member States that must end the reserved area by the end of 2012 
should phase out the reserved area in a manner calculated to provide an orderly 
transition to full market opening while preparing the public postal operator for 
competition. 
Explanation of best practice: The Third Postal Directive requires 10 EU Member States 
(AT, BE, BG, DK, ES, FR, IE, IT, PT, SI) to end the reserved area by 31 December 
2010 and the remaining 11 EU Member States (CY, CZ, EL, HU, LT, LU, LV, MT, PL, 
RO, SK) to end the reserved area by 31 December 2012.382 
Experience in other industrialised countries indicates that ending the reserved area 
requires substantial adjustments by the public postal operator and postal market. While 
beneficial in the long run, short term effects can be difficult. Among industrialised 
countries which have ended the reserved area, most have introduced a multi-year 
transition period to prepare the public postal operator, its employees, and other 
participants in the postal market. During this period, the public postal operator is subject 
to increasing levels of competition while retaining some of its former legal protections as 
a safety net. The objective is to improve the ability of the public postal operator to 
manage in a fully competitive market.  
For the 11 Member States which have until the end of 2012 to end the reserved 
area,383 best practice would seem to be to develop specific plans for phasing out the 
reserved area in an orderly manner. These plans should include an evaluation of the 
possible costs and benefits to ending the reserved area before the end of 2012 since 
there is no a priori reason to believe that 31 December 2012 is the most appropriate 
date for all Member States. 
To date, the most carefully considered plan for phasing out the postal monopoly is the 
plan adopted in 2002 by the UK NRA, Postcomm. After extensive public consultation 
and comprehensive analyses by outside consultants, Postcomm adopted a transition 
plan that sought to emulate the process by which competition would naturally erode the 
reserved area while, at the same time, controlling the pace of that process.384 A 
                                                
382  The deadline for the 3 EEA Member States (IS, LI, NO) will be determined by the EEA Joint 
Committee. See section 2.1, above. 
383  For Member States which must liberalise by the end of 2010, it is probably too late to introduce an 
effective transition period. 
384  Postcomm, ‘Promoting Effective Competition in UK Postal Services: A Decision Document’ (May 
2002). 
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different approach was adopted by Germany. The German postal law emphasised free 
entry into value-added services closely akin to traditional postal services.385 Although 
several countries have moved towards liberalisation by introducing declining price and 
weight limits for the postal monopoly, these measures do not appear to provide an 
effective transition since they do not permit significant competition until the last price 
and weight steps are opened to competition. 
Examples of best practice: United Kingdom, Germany. 
Practices of concern: None of the 11 Member States (CY, CZ, EL, HU, LT, LU, LV, MT, 
PL, RO, SK) which have until 31 December 2012 to transpose the Third Postal Directive 
have developed a plan for an orderly phase out of the reserved area. 
6.5.2 Planning for application of competition rules to protect full market opening 
Best practice: In preparation for full market opening, the NRA and NCA should 
cooperatively develop a plan to monitor and control activities which are inconsistent with 
the competition rules. 
Explanation of best practice: As liberalisation develops, it may be expected that some 
incumbent postal operators or their governments will seek to maintain the status quo by 
measures which are questionable under the competition rules. Similarly, at the 
international level, the Universal Postal Union has generally reacted to the gradual 
development of a multi-operator environment by trying to protect incumbent postal 
operators. Unless NRAs and NCAs plan in advance to monitor and deal with such 
activities effectively, they may be ill prepared to facilitate the full market opening 
                                                
385  The German practice of granting licenses to providers of value-added services has lead to entry by a 
very substantial number of licensed postal operators. In the first years following partial liberalisation in 
1998, most of these operators provided delivery services locally because they could only meet the 
service standards of their licence (e.g. guaranteed overnight delivery) on a local basis. In fact, many 
entrants were spin-offs of local publishers that had previously primarily provided morning delivery of 
newspapers. See Oelmann, M. (2007): Regulatorische Marktzutrittsbedingungen und ihre 
Auswirkungen auf den Wettbewerb: Erfahrungen aus ausgewählten Briefmärkten Europas. WIK 
discussion paper no. 291, Bad Honnef, p. 70f. 
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required by the Postal Directive. The slow reaction of the Swedish NCA in support of 
liberalisation in the1990s provides a clear cautionary example.  
Examples of best practice: None. 
Practices of concern: There is so far little evidence that NRAs and NCAs are jointly 
considering the transitional problems that may be posed by full market opening. Given 
the imminence of full market opening in the postal sector and difficulties encountered in 
liberalising public monopolies generally, appropriate preparations are now urgently 
required from national authorities as well as the Commission. 
6.5.3 Access to national postal infrastructure 
Best practice: Where necessary to protect the interests of users or to promote effective 
competition, the NRA should ensure that, in accordance with Article 11a, transparent 
and non-discriminatory access is provided for all postal service providers to elements of 
the postal infrastructure. 
Explanation of best practice: Opening of access to the national postal infrastructure is a 
best practice because it is explicitly mandated by the Third Postal Directive. The 
directive generally requires Member States to ensure transparent, non-discriminatory 
access to elements of the postal infrastructure or services provided within the scope of 
the universal service whenever necessary to protect the interests of users and/or to 
promote effective competition. Six elements of postal infrastructure are listed as 
examples: postcodes, address database, post office boxes, delivery boxes, change of 
address database, and redirection and return services. 
As described above, several Member States have already acted to ensure that 
important elements of the postal infrastructure are available to all postal service 
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providers. Three Member States have ensured access to all six elements of the postal 
infrastructure listed in Article 11a: Estonia, France, Sweden.386 
Examples of best practice: Estonia, France, Sweden. 
Practices of concern: Failure to grant access to the postal infrastructure appears to be 
particularly unjustified in cases in which Member States (AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, ES, FI, 
HU, IT, LT, LU, LV, NL, PL, SI, SK, IS, NO) force wasteful deliveries to incorrect or 
invalid addresses by denying private operators access to the database of valid 
addresses and in cases in which Member States (AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DK, EL, ES, FI, 
LU, LV, PL, SI, SK, UK, IS, NO) distort competition and inconvenience users by not 
allowing private operators to deliver to post office boxes for a reasonable fee. 
6.5.4 Access to elements of the international postal infrastructure 
Best practice: Where necessary to protect the interests of users or to promote effective 
competition, the NRA should ensure that, in accordance with Article 11a, transparent 
and non-discriminatory access is provided for all postal service providers to elements of 
the international postal infrastructure and services provided within the scope of the 
international universal service, including standardised operating documents and their 
electronic equivalents, standardised codes such as IMPC codes, and other elements of 
the international postal infrastructure. 
Explanation of best practice: As discussed above, the Universal Postal Union has 
hindered both public and private postal service providers in efforts to compete at the 
cross border level by restricting access to standardised operating documents and their 
electronic equivalents and to standardised codes such as IMPC (international mail 
processing centre) codes.387 Such practices are analogous to a national USP refusing 
to grant access to post office boxes or clustered delivery box in order to hinder entry 
into the domestic postal sector. In both cases, ‘elements of postal infrastructure or 
                                                
386  See section 5.4.1, above. 
387  See section 3.4.3, above. 
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services provided within the scope of the universal service’ are reserved to incumbent 
postal operators to thwart potential competitors. Realisation of the multi-operator 
environment envisioned by the Third Postal Directive depends in part on transparent 
and non-discriminatory access to the international as well as the national postal 
infrastructure. Under the directive, it is the task of NRAs to determine the conditions 
under which postal operators should have access to elements of the postal 
infrastructure which are, for technical or legal reasons, limited in supply. Given UPU 
restrictions on the number and the use of UPU documentation and IMPC codes, it 
appears that NRAs should regulate access to elements of the international postal 
infrastructure in order to facilitate full market opening and protect the rights of users  
Examples of best practice: None.  
Practices of concern: Application of Article 11a — not yet in effect in most Member 
States — to the international postal infrastructure has not yet been considered by any 
NRA. 
6.5.5 Valued-added tax 
Best practice: Member States should apply value-added tax to public and private postal 
services in a manner that creates the least market distortion while conforming to the 
requirements of Community law. 
Explanation of best practice: As the Commission has recognised, unequal application of 
the value-added tax (VAT) to public and private postal operators creates significant 
market distortions that will inhibit full market opening.388 From the perspective of the 
Third Postal Directive, there are no counter-balancing considerations. Neither 
maintenance of universal postal service nor effective user protection requires 
discriminatory application of VAT laws. Therefore, the best practice must be to apply 
VAT laws equally to all postal operators. 
                                                
388  See section 3.4.2, above. 
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The recent decision by the European Court of Justice in TNT Post UK clarifies the 
requirements of Community law on VAT and public postal services. In light of this 
decision, it appears that Member States need to 
• ensure that postal service providers that provide services within the universal 
service area operate under equal legal regimes (i.e., without designation or 
public procurement) to the maximum extent possible; and  
• where provision of services within the universal service area under equal legal 
regimes cannot be achieved, ensure that application of unequal legal regimes 
(i.e., with designation or public procurement) is administered in a manner that is, 
to the maximum extent possible, objective, transparent, and non-discriminatory.  
Alternatively, of course, the Council and Parliament could amend Community law to 
provide equal application of the VAT. 
Six NRAs (FI, LV, SE, SI, IS, NO) report that the VAT regime in their Member State 
applies equally to all postal service providers.389 
Examples of best practice: Finland, Latvia, Sweden, Slovenia, Iceland, Norway.  
Practices of concern: There are two areas of particular concern. The first issue is the 
effect of differential application of VAT laws on letter post markets. If a market dominant 
postal operator in a letter post market is exempt from VAT and other postal operators 
are not, full market opening may be thwarted because preferential treatment under the 
VAT law reinforces economies of scale and other natural barriers to entry in this market 
segment. The second issue is the effect of differential application of VAT laws in fully 
competitive markets such as bulk postal services (in some Member States) and express 
services. Here unequal application of the VAT law appears to be especially unjustifiable 
as a matter of public policy.  
                                                
389  See section 3.4.2. Sweden’s VAT rules for the postal sector predate its entry into the European Union. 
Whether its VAT law is compatible with Community law is now under review by the Commission. 
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6.5.6 Customs laws 
Best practice: Member States should apply customs laws as equally as possible to all 
postal service providers under comparable conditions consistent with the requirements 
of Community and international law. 
Explanation of best practice: An undistorted market in the carriage of cross border 
postal items will not be possible unless customs laws are applied identically to all postal 
service providers under comparable conditions. Traditionally, the Universal Postal 
Convention has provided for simplified customs procedures for postal items transmitted 
by postal administrations and limitations on their liability under national customs 
laws.390  
As discussed in chapter 3,391 international and Community provisions appear to allow 
Member States discretion to apply customs laws in an equal, or substantially equal, 
manner to all postal service providers under comparable conditions. From this survey, it 
appears that several Member States (DE, DK, ES, LU, LV, NO, SE) limit UPU customs 
privileges to postal items transmitted in the universal service. Other Member States 
provide UPU customs treatment to all items transmitted by the national universal 
service provider, a substantially more anti-competitive approach. 
Community rules for the clearance of customs treatment of postal items will be 
considered by the Commission in the development of regulations implementing the 
Modernised Customs Code in 2013. However, in light of the introduction of a liberalised 
postal market in 2011 (in most of the EU), it may be appropriate for the Commission to 
reconsider this portion of its current customs regulations in advance of 2013. In this 
respect it may be noted that in 2006 the United States adopted a statute which provides 
for equal application of customs and other import and export laws to all ‘competitive 
products’ of the U.S. Postal Service and similar products conveyed by private 
companies.392 While the United States has yet to implement this statute in practice, it 
provides a basis for a possible joint EU-US approach to eliminating market distortions 
due to customs law. In the end, to achieve equalised customs treatment it may be 
necessary to develop two channels for customs control, a channel for non-commercial 
postal items and a channel for commercial postal items. 
                                                
390  Article 18 of the Universal Postal Convention (2004) says merely that, “The postal administrations of 
the countries of origin and destination shall be authorised to submit items to customs control, 
according to the legislation of those countries.” Nonetheless, Regulation RL 152, adopted by the 
UPU’s Postal Operations Council, sets out simplified documentation for use by postal administrations. 
Article 22(3) declares, “Postal administrations shall accept no liability for customs declarations in 
whatever form these are made or for decisions taken by the Customs on examination of items 
submitted to customs control”. 
391 See section 3.4,3, above. 
392 Title 39, United States Code, section 407(e)(2) (2006). See section 3.4.3, case-history 3-9.  
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Examples of best practice: United States (in law only). Good practices include Member 
States (DE, DK, ES, LU, LV, NO, SE) which limit unequal customs treatment to postal 
items conveyed in the universal service. 
Practices of concern: Member States (BE, BG, CZ, EE, FR, HU, IE, RO, SK, IS) which 
extend simplified customs treatment to postal items conveyed by the national universal 
service provider outside of the universal service, for example, in bulk parcel and 
express services. 
6.5.7 Facilitation of multi-operator environment 
Best practice: The NRA should review the issues posed by a multi-operator postal 
market and ensure that, compatible with full market opening, postal operators cooperate 
to ensure maintenance of universal service and protection of the rights of users. 
Explanation of best practice: Recital 34 of Directive 2008/6/EC requires Member States 
to ensure interoperability between postal service providers where necessary. Best 
practice, therefore, implies that NRA should specifically address how postal operators in 
a multi-operator environment will work together to address issues such as the exchange 
of universal service items, identification of postal carriers, complaint procedures, user 
inquiries, and return-to-sender services.  
As described above, the UK NRA, Postcomm, in particular, has made a careful study of 
the problems of interoperability and developed a model set of requirements for all postal 
service providers to facilitate interoperability. The NRAs of Denmark, France, Lithuania, 
Sweden have also actively addressed elements of interoperability.393 
                                                
393  See section 5.4.2, above. 
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Examples of best practice: United Kingdom. Good practices: Denmark, France, 
Lithuania, Sweden. 
Practices of concern: At least 10 NRAs (BE, CY, CZ, EE, FI, HU, IT, SI, SK, IS) report 
no provision for any of the five elements of interoperability reviewed in this survey 
(exchange of universal service items, identification of postal carriers, complaint 
procedures, user inquiries, return to sender) and no plan for studying interoperability in 
the future. 
6.5.8 Review of application of laws generally for barriers to entry and market 
distortions 
Best practice: In order to facilitate full market opening, the NRA should systematically 
and transparently review all potential legal and operational barriers to entry and market 
distortions and take appropriate actions or recommend appropriate actions to 
government. 
Explanation of best practice: In most Member States, the reserved area is only one of 
many measures embedded in the laws which may favour or disfavour the incumbent 
national USP in competition with other postal operators. Given its expertise in the 
operation of postal markets, the NRA is well placed to undertake a systematic 
evaluation of such issues. 
In the United Kingdom, the NRA, Postcomm, undertook a model of such a review in 
2006.394 Another example is provided by a study by the US Federal Trade Commission 
in 2007 that examined the application of non-postal laws to the U.S. Postal Service and 
                                                
394  See Postcomm, ‘Competitive Market Review: Tackling Barriers to Entry In Postal Services Final 
Decisions and Recommendations’ (April 2006). 
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competing private companies.395 The US study was ordered by Congress in the 2006 
postal reform act.  
Examples of best practice: United Kingdom, United States. 
Practices of concern: Except for the UK, very few Member States appear to have 
undertaken a systematic study of how to provide for the equal application of laws to all 
postal operators under similar circumstances. 
                                                
395  See Federal Trade Commission, ‘Accounting for Laws That Apply Differently to the United States 
Postal Service and its Private Competitors’ (Dec. 2007). 
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6.6 Protecting the rights of users 
6.6.1 Transparency of prices and quality of service of universal services 
Best practice: The NRA should ensure that information on prices, conditions of access, 
and the quality of universal services is published frequently and in a timely manner, 
consistent with appropriate protection of commercially sensitive information and 
promotion of full market opening. 
Explanation of best practice: Article 6 of the Third Postal Directive requires that users 
are ‘regularly given sufficiently detailed and up-to-date information by the universal 
service provider(s) regarding the particular features of the universal service offered, with 
special reference to the general conditions of access to these services as well as to 
prices and quality standard levels’. Article 12 requires that prices of universal services 
are transparent. Article 16 requires NRAs to publish the results of performance 
monitoring at least once a year.  
Given the Directive’s repeated calls for transparency, it is evident that best practice 
includes ensuring that users have access to complete and up-to-date information about 
universal services. At the same time, NRAs, however, must be mindful of the need to 
foster full market opening. In an effectively competitive market, too much transparency 
can inhibit vigorous competition. Thus, in order to protect users, particular focus should 
be placed on universal services offered by a postal service provider with significant 
market power.  
All Member States report that they ensure the transparency of basic universal 
services.396 Only a minority of NRAs (BE, BG, FR, IE, PT, SE, IS) report that 
transparency for bulk letters and direct mail services is required by law and verified in 
practice.397 Similarly, a minority of NRAs (ES, IE, IT, LV, PL) report that quality of 
service is monitored by the NRA directly or by an independent body contracted by the 
NRA.398 Based on this survey, the Irish NRA appears to be the most vigilant in ensuring 
the transparency of user information. 
Examples of best practice: Ireland. 
Practices of concern: Several NRAs reported that bulk postal services are deemed to 
be universal services, but that rate transparency is not required as a matter of law 
and/or transparency is not verified in practice for, in particular: bulk letters (DK, EL, HU, 
                                                
396  See section 3.7.1. 
397  See section 3.7.5. 
398  See section 3.3.4. 
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IT, LV, SK, UK), direct mail (EL, IT, MT, SK, UK), and bulk parcels (DK, HU, UK). Most 
NRAs (BE, CZ, DK, EE, FI, FR, HU, LT, LU, MT, NL, RO, SE, SI, SK, UK, IS, NO) rely 
upon consultants to the USP to monitor quality of service performance, an arrangement 
that seems to fall short of the ideal expressed in the Postal Directive ('external bodies 
having no links with the universal service providers'). Moreover, 9 NRAs (DE, FI, IT, LU, 
LV, PL, RO, SI, SK) report that quality of service is not monitored at least annually for 
all universal services. 
6.6.2 Handling of user complaints 
Best practice: Member States should ensure that the NRA or other competent national 
authority is empowered to provide users appropriate redress where universal service is 
not provided, and the NRA or other competent national authority should actively ensure 
that the rights of users are effectively protected. 
Explanation of best practice: Article 19 of the Third Postal Directive requires Member 
States to ensure that users have transparent, simple and inexpensive procedures for 
complaint and that USPs issue an annual report on the handling of such complaints. 
Best practice, by definition, requires active monitoring of these requirements. In 
addition, however, it seems clear that best practice should also include an annual report 
by the NRA or other ‘competent national authority’ which is authorised to review 
complaints handled unsatisfactorily by the USP. Then, too, if the user’s complaint is 
justified, the competent national authority should be empowered to provide the user 
meaningful relief in the form of monetary damages or initiation of appropriate services. 
Based on these criteria, it appears that at least four Member States, Ireland, Lithuania, 
Poland, and the United Kingdom are currently providing active protection of users.399 
                                                
399  See sections 3.8.1 to 3.8.3, above. 
 Role of Regulators in a More Competitive Postal Market 323 
 Chapter 6: Best Regulatory Practices 
Examples of best practice: Ireland, Lithuania, Poland, and the United Kingdom. 
Practices of concern: Three Member States (LU, NL, RO) appear to lack any 
mechanisms for user protection. In at least 8 Member States (CY, CZ, DE, DK, FI, NL, 
PT, RO), it appears that the NRA does not approve the USP's procedures for protecting 
users of universal services. While most Member States authorise a 'competent national 
authority' to review the handling of user complaints by the USP, few such authorities 
have the power to award monetary damages to user or order the USP to provide 
omitted services where justified. In at least 5 Member States (DE, EL, FI, IS, NO), the 
NRA reports that the USP does not publish an annual report on user protection as 
required by the Postal Directive. 
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7 Cooperation Among NRAs 
The preceding analysis of postal regulatory practices in the Member States makes clear 
that closer cooperation among national postal regulators would facilitate more efficient, 
effective, and uniform implementation of the Third Postal Directive. Article 22(2) of the 
directive specifically calls for enhanced cooperation among NRAs: 
The national regulatory authorities shall work in close collaboration and shall 
provide mutual assistance in order to facilitate the application of this 
Directive within the appropriate existing bodies. 
Directive 2008/6/EC explained the goal of improved cooperation as follows:  
National regulatory authorities should, where necessary, cooperate with 
other regulatory bodies of Member States and with the Commission in 
carrying out their tasks under Directive 97/67/EC. This would promote the 
development of the internal market for postal services and help to ensure 
the consistent application, in all Member States, of the provisions laid down 
by the Directive, in particular in areas where national law implementing 
Community law gives national regulatory authorities considerable 
discretionary powers in the application of the relevant rules.400 
The recital notes that this cooperation could take place, inter alia, within the Postal 
Directive Committee401 or within a group comprising European regulators. 
This chapter examines possibilities for enhanced cooperation among postal NRAs and 
recommends steps to achieve this end. In particular, this chapter considers: 
• current administrative cooperation in the postal sector; 
• cooperation among national regulators in other EU sectors (competition 
authorities, electronic communications, energy, and railways); and 
• recommendations for enhanced cooperation. 
                                                
400  Directive 2008/6/EC, Recital 50. 
401  The Postal Directive Committee is a committee assisting the Commission in the implementation of the 
Postal Directive. It is established by Article 21 of the Postal Directive. 
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7.1 Current status of administrative cooperation in the postal sector 
At present in the postal sector — unlike in other regulated industries such as electronic 
communications, energy and railways sectors — there is no organisation dedicated to 
facilitating cooperation among Community postal regulators. However, Community 
NRAs are able to cooperate to a limited extent through two bodies with more general 
missions:  
• the Postal Directive Committee, and  
• CERP, the European Committee for Postal Regulation, a committee of CEPT, 
the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations.  
Neither body is composed of NRAs or specially focused on regulatory issues. Both are 
committees of Member States. NRAs occasionally represent their Member States at 
these bodies depending on the agenda agreed by Member States.  
In addition, some postal NRAs consult with each other bilaterally, but irregularly and 
without any formal arrangement or procedure. In particular, some NRAs from the EU-15 
Member States have assisted NRAs in Member States that joined the EU in 2004 and 
2007 in ‘twinning projects’ funded by the Community with the objective of facilitating 
knowledge transfer. 
A multilateral group of NRAs has also been discussed, but so far without effect. 
Between 2002 and 2005, the NRAs from Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the 
UK informally discussed creation of an ‘independent postal regulators group’ (IPRG). 
These plans never materialised. More recently, this idea has resurfaced in talks among 
some NRAs, possibly as a organisation attached to the Independent Regulators Group 
(IRG) in the electronic communications sector. Such an arrangement might have 
practical benefits since 22 of the 27 EU postal regulators are also responsible for 
electronic communications and already members of the IRG, so the new organisation 
could build upon established contacts. However, the outcome of these discussions 
appears uncertain at present.  
This section describes the current status of NRA cooperation via the Postal Directive 
Committee and CERP, and assesses whether these organisations are adequate to 
meet the needs of NRAs and the requirements of the Third Postal Directive for greater 
cooperation.  
 Role of Regulators in a More Competitive Postal Market 327 
 Chapter 7: Cooperation Among NRAs 
7.1.1 Postal Directive committee 
The Postal Directive Committee is classified as a ‘Regulatory Procedure with Scrutiny 
Committee’ under Decision 1999/468/EC.402 The primary purpose of this committee is 
to solicit the Member States’ views on draft proposals prepared by the Commission.  
By its nature, the Postal Directive Committee is a body of Member State governments, 
not NRAs. The whole committee meets twice per year, and the Commission has 
convened several additional meetings of ‘working groups’ since 2007. Since some 
Member States are sometimes represented by NRAs, the committee to some extent 
facilitates interaction between regulators. Nonetheless, the Postal Directive Committee 
is insufficient to sustain substantial cooperation among NRAs for two reasons. First, 
intensive practical cooperation requires smaller, less formal working groups to be 
effective. In particular, for technical details of postal regulation (e.g. detailed challenges 
arising from the implementation of accounting separation), smaller expert groups would 
seem more adequate to develop recommendations for regulatory practice. Second, 
since members of the committee are Member States, there can be no assurance that 
NRAs will meet and cooperate at the committee independent of their governments (the 
ministries responsible for the postal sector).  
The key purpose of the Postal Directive Committee is to solicit the Member States’ 
views on draft measures prepared by the Commission. The Postal Directive Committee 
does not facilitate – and does not aim at facilitating – extensive and effective 
cooperation of European NRAs.  
                                                
402  See Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission, OJ L184, 17 Jul 1999, p. 23; Regulation 
1882/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 September 2003 adapting to Council 
Decision 1999/468/EC the provisions relating to committees which assist the Commission in the 
exercise of its implementing powers laid down in instruments subject to the procedure referred to in 
Article 251 of the EC Treaty, OJ L 284, 31 Oct 2003, p. 1; and Council Decision of 17 July 2006 
amending Decision 1999/468/EC laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers 
conferred on the Commission, OJ L200 p. 11. 
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7.1.2 CERP 
CERP, the European Committee for Postal Regulation was created in 1992 as a 
committee within CEPT, the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications 
Administrations. Forty-eight countries are members of CEPT and thus members of 
CERP.403 Member countries include all 27 EU Member States and 3 EEA countries. As 
a practical matter, work within CERP is carried out almost exclusively by the Member 
States of the EU/EEA and Switzerland.  
CEPT was established in 1959 by the postal and telecommunications administrations of 
19 European countries. Membership increased rapidly in the following years as virtually 
all Western European countries joined the conference. The organisation's activities 
include cooperation on commercial, operational, regulatory, and technical 
standardisation issues. When postal and telecommunications operations were 
separated from regulatory functions in 1992, the postal and telecommunications 
operators established separate organisations: PostEurop and ETNO (European 
Telecommunications Network Operators' Association). CEPT thus became a body of 
policy makers and regulators. At the same time, Central and Eastern European 
Countries joined CEPT, increasing membership to 48 countries.  
Since the 1990s, the overall objectives of CEPT have included: (i) establishing a 
discussion forum and providing mutual assistance among members with regard to the 
settlement of sovereign/regulatory issues; (ii)  influencing the goals and priorities in the 
field of European post and telecommunications through common positions; 
(iii) strengthening and fostering more intensive cooperation with Eastern and Central 
European countries; (iv) promoting and facilitating relations between European 
regulators; (v) influencing, through common positions, developments within the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and Universal Postal Union (UPU) in 
accordance with European goals.404 The specific objectives of CERP in the postal 
sector are to (i) examine postal regulatory affairs; (ii) assess influence of international 
regulatory policies in member countries; (iii) establish and maintain contacts with EU 
institutions and other relevant bodies and associations concerned with postal regulation; 
(iv) develop common approaches to postal regulatory issues; and (v) develop proposals 
where appropriate.405 In the postal sector, CEPT has the status of a restricted union of 
                                                
403 The current 48 CEPT member countries are: Albania, Andorra, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the Vatican. 
404 See www.cept.org (‘About CEPT)’.  
405 See CERP Rules of Procedure of 2005 (Preamble).  
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the UPU, and discussion of UPU policies has traditionally been an important subject of 
CERP’s work. 
The top level body of CERP is the plenary. Plenary sessions are held twice annually, in 
spring and in fall. Between plenaries, work is carried out in working groups that usually 
convene twice per year and project teams that at least as often. Working groups 
present the results of their work to the plenary. Each project team is subordinated to 
one working group. Project teams present reports to the two working groups 
(Application and Policy) in a first step. If the reports are adopted by the working groups, 
they may then be presented to the CERP plenary.  
Internal organisation is carried out by the chairman, assisted by a steering committee 
composed of the chairmen of CERP and all working groups and project teams. There is 
no permanent secretariat. As a practical matter, a secretariat is provided by the 
chairman.  
There are no procedural rules that require high-level participation of member countries 
at the CERP plenary. It appears that only a small minority of member countries are 
represented by ultimate decision-makers (i.e. by ministers/state secretaries for 
governments or by heads of NRAs) at CERP plenary meetings.406 For the past ten 
years, CERP has been chaired by officials of NRAs, but in no case was this official the 
head of the NRA. 
Positions adopted by the CERP plenary are not binding on member countries. 
According to CERP’s rules of procedures, the CERP plenary can adopt three types of 
decisions. ‘Decisions’ and ‘recommendations’ may relate to domestic regulatory 
practices or policies and aim at harmonizing regulatory practice. Member countries 
must report to CERP about the implementation of any ‘decisions’. ‘Recommendations’ 
merely encourage a certain practice. Finally, ‘common positions’ relate to the activities 
of the UPU and the European Union. According to the rules of procedures, the plenary 
shall ‘reach consensus whenever possible’. Absent consensus, propositions can be 
adopted by simple majority.  
It appears that the instrument of ‘decisions’ has not been used in recent years. Detailed 
information on the numbers of recommendations or common positions adopted by 
CERP is unavailable. It appears that recent plenary sessions have merely adopted the 
reports prepared by project teams but that formal ‘recommendations’ and ‘common 
positions’ have hardly been used at all. Consequently, the effect of CERP on domestic 
regulatory practices seems to have been very little. However, the reports of CERP 
project teams provide some transparency and disseminate information about practices 
                                                
406 Assessments by WIK-Consult, based on interviews and review of attendance lists. 
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in each member country, and the meetings provide a forum for ministries and NRAs to 
establish contacts and discuss postal policy informally.  
Even though much of the work in project teams is carried out by NRA officials, the 
formal members of CERP are countries, not NRAs. At plenary sessions, some member 
countries are represented by ministry officials responsible for the postal sector, while 
others are represented by NRA representatives. Delegations of several member 
countries — in particular the larger ones — include representatives of both ministry and 
NRA. In recent years, and in those member countries where independent NRAs exist, 
there seems to be a trend towards more active participation by NRAs at CERP working 
groups and project teams and less active participation by ministries.407  
In 2008, the structure of CERP working groups was modernised in an attempt to 
separate the work on policy and UPU matters, on the hand, and regulatory issues, on 
the other hand. The change also aimed at simplifying the organisational structure and 
referring more work to smaller project teams. With this change the number of working 
groups was reduced to two. The current two working groups are called ‘Policy’ and 
‘Application’. At present there are nine project teams: (i) policy, (ii) NRAs; (iii) financing 
of USO; (iv) universal service; (v) market supervision; (vi) statistics; (vii) consumer 
issues; (viii) cost accounting; and (ix) sustainable development. 
While CERP is formally an organisation of governments, it appears that NRAs — rather 
than ministries — are increasingly taking part in the work of CERP. This underlines the 
need for cooperation among NRAs, and indicates that NRAs have an interest in such 
cooperation. According to estimates made by CERP representatives, the meetings of 
the working group ‘Application’ and meetings of related project teams are almost 
exclusively attended by NRA representatives. Meetings of the working group ‘Policy’ 
and meetings of related project teams are typically attended by either NRA or ministry 
representatives (different participation from different countries).  
The European Commission and the secretariat of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) have an advisory status at CERP. The European Commission is invited, and 
usually participates, in all CERP meetings (plenary, working group, and project team 
meetings). 
The Postal Directive explicitly calls for ‘close collaboration and mutual assistance 
among NRAs in facilitating application of the directive’ (Article 22), and this study 
identifies a need for enhanced cooperation among NRAs (see section  7.3 below). The 
following paragraphs discuss whether CERP provides an adequate forum for this 
cooperation.  
                                                
407 This assessment was provided by several CERP representatives interviewed by the authors.  
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At present CERP is the primary forum for cooperation among NRAs. Traditionally 
however, CERP has been an organisation of postal administrations and, later, of 
governments. The fact that NRAs are increasingly using this forum to meet with each 
other clearly indicates that NRAs have an interest in cooperation.  
As a means of facilitating effective cooperation among NRAs, however, there are 
several shortcomings to CERP:  
• First, CERP is not a organisation of NRAs, but of governments. While in practice 
many NRAs represent their member countries in some meetings, this 
organisation does ensure that NRAs can carry out their work and discuss their 
regulatory policies independently of governments. This conflicts with the 
requirement of the Postal Directive that NRAs must be independent of Member 
States’ activities that are associated with their governments’ ownership in public 
postal operators.408  
• Second, while CERP provides a useful discussion forum for NRAs, the work of 
CERP does not appear to have any significant impact on decisions taken by 
NRAs domestically.  
• Third, there is a lack of regular high-level representation in CERP meetings. In 
our view, this lack of high-level representation explains why CERP’s work does 
not have a significant impact of regulatory practice in the Member States at 
present.  
• Fourth, CERP’s membership extends far beyond the Community and the EEA. 
Consequently, not all CERP members share the same tasks in implementing the 
Postal Directive.  
• Fifth, CERP does not appear to effectively allow for cooperation between NRAs 
on the one hand, and the Commission on the other hand. From a Community 
perspective, it appears desirable that the Commission should have a more 
formal mechanism for soliciting advice on specific questions and thus enlisting 
the expert knowledge of NRAs. 
In light of these shortcomings, CERP appears insufficient to facilitate cooperation 
among NRAs on matters related to the implementation of the Postal Directive. CERP 
has traditionally had a distinct role as a inter-governmental organisation. Facilitating the 
specific type of cooperation called for by the Postal Directive never was the primary 
purpose or ambition of this organisation.  
                                                
408 See Article 22(2), Postal Directive.  
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The Third Postal Directive requires close collaboration and mutual assistance among 
Community NRAs in facilitating application of the directive. CERP is an inter-
governmental organisation that allows government officials from inside and outside the 
European Union to exchange views and cooperate on postal policy matters. While 
CERP is a useful forum for such purposes, it is not dedicated to either the requirements 
of the European Union or the tasks of postal regulators. We conclude that CERP is not 
an adequate organisation to facilitate the specific type of NRA cooperation that the 
Third Postal Directive requires.  
 Role of Regulators in a More Competitive Postal Market 333 
 Chapter 7: Cooperation Among NRAs 
7.2 Practice in other EU sectors 
This section presents the practice of cooperation among competition and regulatory 
authorities in other network sectors, such as electronic communications, energy and 
railways. Relevant topics are setting-up and members of the institution, cooperation with 
other institutions, objectives and activities of the bodies, as well as organisational and 
procedural issues. In addition, the section discusses concepts and recent developments 
towards EU regulatory bodies and agencies in the electronic communications (BEREC) 
and energy (ACER) sectors. 
7.2.1 Competition authorities 
7.2.1.1 European Competition Authorities (ECA) 
Due to an initiative of the Dutch Competition Authority (Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit, NMa), the European Competition Authorities (ECA) was 
established in Amsterdam in April 2001. It is an informal association of competition 
authorities in Member States of the European Union, the European Commission, the 
EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, and the EFTA Surveillance 
Authority. 
The ECA serves as a discussion forum with the objective to refine mutual working 
relationship, and to promote efficient application and enforcement of European 
competition rules and national laws. For this purpose, heads of the competition 
authorities meet twice a year to debate relevant topics. Additionally, a continuous 
exchange of information and expertise takes place. There is no permanent 
organisational structure or dedicated budget.  
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Several working groups were created to elaborate documents of non-binding nature: 
• The Multi-jurisdictional Mergers Working Group pursues the target of improving 
cooperation and information exchange in multiple merger filings (‘Procedures 
Guide’). It also clarified the procedure of referring merger cases not having 
Community dimension to the Commission for examination. 
• The Leniency Programmes Working Group sets out joint principles regarding 
leniency schemes to uncover and prosecute cartel agreements. 
• The Air Traffic Working Group was founded to pull up collaboration of the 
authorities (notifications, proceedings, decisions) and to promote sector-specific 
competitiveness (mergers and strategic alliances, loyalty programmes, slot 
trading, code-sharing agreements). 
• The Financial Services Working Group examines possible competition issues in 
retail banking and payment systems markets. 
7.2.1.2 European Competition Network (ECN) 
Existence of the European Competition Network (ECN) rests on the main principles of 
articles 11 and 12 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002, 
together with the ‘Joint Statement of the Council and the Commission on the 
Functioning of the Network of Competition Authorities’, as well as on the detailed 
provisions of the ‘Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition 
Authorities’. The ECN became fully operational as from 1 May 2004 when the Council 
Regulation had to be applied. It is made up of the competition authorities designated by 
the 27 Member States of the European Union, and the DG for Competition of the 
European Commission. The ECN and the ECA operate in parallel, but no formalised 
links exist between the networks. 
The ECN was established as a forum for discussion and cooperation of the competition 
authorities in cases where articles 81 and 82 of the EC treaty are relevant. In view of 
ensuring an efficient division of work under a system of parallel competences, and an 
effective and consistent application and enforcement of EC competition rules, the 
Commission and national competition authorities agree on working arrangements and 
cooperation methods, and develop a framework for obligatory and optional information 
mechanisms.409 Therefore, they act jointly in the following ways: 
                                                
409  See also Reichelt, D. (2005): To What Extent does the Cooperation Within the European Competition 
Network Protect the Rights of Undertakings?, in: Common Market Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 3 (June 
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• Mutual information about new proceedings; 
• Allocation of new cases:410 indicative time limit of up to three months; 
assignment of responsibility to one authority – or in exceptional cases to several 
authorities or to the Commission – taking into account criteria as for example 
reception of a complaint or start of a procedure, affected markets, and abilities of 
authorities (principle of the best-placed authority); coordination of parallel action; 
re-allocation of cases within a period of two months; guarantee of transparency 
and predictability; 
• Announcement of enforcement decisions in due time; 
• Coordination of investigations: initiation of proceedings by the Commission with 
national authorities acting or not acting on the case; parallel opening of 
proceedings; transmission of copies of important documents from the 
Commission to national competition authorities; information before or shortly 
after taking investigative measures; information of the Commission and other 
competition authorities about decisions concerning rejection of complaints, 
suspension or termination of proceedings, termination of an infringement, 
acceptance of commitments and withdrawal of benefits; decision taking with 
several authorities involved; 
• Mutual assistance in investigations; 
• Internal exchange and use of any matter of fact or law in evidence, provision of 
all information (documents, statements, digital information) in an easily 
accessible way, as well as determination of rules for gathering, transmission, 
disclosure and use of information;411 
• Pooling of experience and identification of best practices; 
• Clarification of other issues of common interest. 
The ECN is no autonomous institution and does not have a legal personality. It has 
neither any stand-alone competence, nor does it have authority or rights over its 
members. Cooperation of competition authorities takes place on the basis of equality, 
independence and solidarity. As decision-making relies on consensus building, no 
voting rules apply. 
                                                                                                                                             
2005), pp. 745-782, here: 748 ff.; and Smits, R. (2005): The European Competition Network: Selected 
Aspects, in: Legal Issues of Economic Integration, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 175-192, here: 176 ff. 
410  See Smits, R. (2005: 179 f.); and also Schwab, A. and Steinle, Ch. (2008): Pitfalls of the European 
Competition Network – Why Better Protection of Leniency Applicants and Legal Regulation of Case 
Allocation is Needed, in: European Competition Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 9, pp. 523-531. 
411  See Smits, R. (2005: 180 ff.). 
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Concerning the organisational structure, an Advisory Committee was instituted to 
function as a forum where representatives of the national competition authorities 
discuss individual cases and general aspects of competition law, and develop common 
approaches. It is consulted prior to decisions of the Commission (finding and 
termination of infringements, interim measures, commitments, finding of inapplicability, 
fines, withdrawal in individual cases) or of national authorities (important cases on 
request), as well as on certain draft Commission regulations, notices and guidelines. 
Besides, working groups of experts in specific sectors (telecommunications, media, IT, 
energy, motor vehicles, railways, banking, securities, insurance, professional services, 
pharmaceuticals, health care, environment, food, abuse of dominant positions) were 
installed to deal with general and sector-specific issues of competition policy and law. 
7.2.2 Electronic communications 
7.2.2.1 Independent Regulators Group (IRG) and European Regulators Group (ERG) 
The network of European telecommunications regulators is organised in two groups: the 
Independent Regulators Group (IRG) and the European Regulators Group for electronic 
communications networks and services (ERG). 
With regard to full liberalisation of telecommunications markets and implementation of 
the revised ONP (‘open network provision’) framework, the IRG was established in 
Paris in 1997 as an informal group of the NRAs. In October 2007, statutes for founding 
the IRG as a not-for-profit association under Belgian law were signed. Members of the 
IRG are the 27 EU Member States, the four EFTA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
Norway, Switzerland), and the three EU candidate countries (Croatia, Macedonia, 
Turkey). Membership contribution to the IRG amounts to 20.000 € (to finance 
secretariat, website and intranet). 
In connection with the adoption of the regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services, the ERG was set up on 30 July 2002 with the 
Commission Decision 2002/627/EC of 29 July 2002 – amended by the Commission 
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Decisions 2004/641/EC of 14 September 2004 and 2007/804/EC of 6 December 2007 – 
as an advisory group to the Commission. Membership is limited to telecommunications 
regulatory authorities in EU Member States and the Commission. All EFTA and EU 
candidate countries are observers to the ERG. 
The ERG and IRG aim at contributing to a consistent and harmonised implementation 
and application of regulatory provisions in all Member States, at an identification of 
appropriate regulatory instruments, and at the development and consolidation of the 
internal market. Hence, the groups 
• Back cooperation and coordination among NRAs as well as between authorities 
and the Commission; in particular, consultation is required with regard to article 
7 of Directive 2002/21/EC of 7 March 2002 (Framework Directive); 
• Provide advice and technical assistance based on relevant experience and 
knowledge to members and to the Commission; 
• Exchange information, points of view, expertise and best practice based on 
benchmarking among its members; 
• Discuss on current and future regulatory challenges; 
• Consult with market participants, end-users, consumers, European institutions, 
and other regulatory networks, and deliver inputs to consultations of the 
Commission. 
The ERG formulates legally non-binding common positions on fundamental attitudes on 
regulatory issues concerning harmonisation. Eligible priority areas are reviewed and 
updated regularly, and draft common positions are published for public consultation 
before they are finalised. Members commit themselves to follow common positions in 
adopting regulatory decisions. Since 2007, implementation of common positions by 
NRAs is monitored and compared, and reports of compliance of application are 
published. The ERG makes available reports on selected regulatory aspects and has 
also started to develop case studies of regulatory best practice with respect to 
remedies. Opinions (on demand of the Commission), responses (as part of a 
consultation) and statements of the ERG express points of view on regulatory issues; 
they may be requested by the Commission to prepare legal positions, for instance 
recommendations. The IRG implements its coordinating tasks of regulatory practice on 
a voluntary basis by devising ‘Principles of Implementation and Best Practice (PIB)’ 
members promise to adhere to in their decisions; application is monitored, too. It also 
issues statements and benchmarks. 
ERG and IRG prepare a common work programme for each calendar year regarding 
regulatory issues of the preceding year. For that purpose, they have to formulate a draft 
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version, publish it for consultation and hold public hearings, insert the feedback, and 
finalise the work programme. In addition, at the end of a year the groups send a 
common annual report of the activities and the outcome of the work programme to the 
Commission, the European Parliament and the Council. Reports are also made 
available to the public on the ERG and IRG websites. 
Regarding their bodies, ERG and IRG are composed of the heads of the NRAs or their 
representatives. As the head of both groups, the chairperson of the ERG/IRG is elected 
annually from among its members. He/she is supported by an informal ‘Troika’, 
consisting of the present as well as of the past and future chair (vice-chairpersons). An 
IRG board of directors (members of the „Troika’ and two additional heads of NRAs, all 
appointed for a period of one year) assists the chair in his/her duties. Meetings of the 
IRG board are held at least four times per year. To decide, four directors must be 
present or represented. In general, decisions are taken by consensus by present 
members (or in urgent cases by the chair following a vote with the two vice-
chairpersons). The board proposes the budget to the general assembly, submits the 
work programme to the general assembly, proposes to exclude members, supervises 
the secretariat, monitors legal actions, and represents the association externally. 
Plenary sessions of the ERG and IRG are held at least quarterly. At ERG meetings one 
delegate per EU Member State and the Commission are present. Representatives of 
other EEA countries and EU candidate countries can participate as observers; other 
experts and observers may be invited to attend the meetings. If issues are of 
confidential nature, presence at the meetings is to be restricted to members of the ERG. 
The chairperson convenes the meetings of the ERG in agreement with the Commission. 
Rules of procedure have to be adopted by consensus or in absence of consensus by a 
two-thirds majority vote (one vote per Member State). Commission representatives are 
not entitled to vote but rules are subject to approval by the Commission. Results of the 
plenary sessions are made public. 
Sessions of the IRG general assembly are pioneered by the Contact Network (efforts to 
resolve differences of opinion, preparation of papers, agenda setting). The heads of the 
NRAs or their deputies represent the countries. Two-thirds of the members must be 
present to decide. External experts and observers may attend the meetings. The 
general assembly takes all decisions to fulfil the objectives of the IRG. Besides, it 
adopts and amends rules of procedure, amends the statutes, agrees to all official 
documents, approves the budget and the annual accounts, adopts financial rules, 
appoints and dismisses the chairperson, other members of the board of directors and 
the members of the secretariat, sets up working groups, admits and excludes Member 
States, and dissolves the IRG. Decision-making is based on consensus. If no 
consensus is achieved, decisions are made by the greater of a two-thirds majority of 
members present or represented, or a simple majority of the votes of all members (one 
vote per Member State). Sessions of the ERG and IRG are held ‘back-to-back’. 
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Detailed work of the ERG/IRG is carried out in common dedicated working groups or 
project teams that deal with:  
• Framework Review,  
• Significant Market Power,  
• International Roaming,  
• Remedies & Benchmark,  
• Mobile and Fixed Termination Rates,  
• Next Generation Networks,  
• Convergence,  
• End User.  
The project teams, which are headed by a chairperson, prepare specific deliverables for 
issues in question. The Commission is allowed to attend all meetings. Additionally, 
there are three supporting teams, a Task Force on Termination Rates and electronic 
contact groups of experts. 
The Commission had to provide an ERG secretariat but the post of the general 
Secretary has been vacant since 2006. The IRG secretariat worked under the 
responsibility of the chairperson and the board of directors, and was accountable to the 
general assembly. In 2007, a permanent secretariat was established at the Commission 
in Brussels, replacing and enhancing functions of the previous ERG and IRG 
secretariats. The secretariat consists of three national experts (one senior member, two 
junior members), who manage day-to-day assignments, and support activities of the 
chair as well as measures improving efficiency and cooperation among members. It 
also coordinates project teams, and monitors the fulfilment of the work programme. 
7.2.2.2 A further stage: Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications 
(BEREC) 
On 13 November 2007, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Regulation 
establishing the European Electronic Communications Market Authority (EECMA). 
Following the opinions of the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of Regions, the European Parliament at its first reading deviated from this 
model and opted for a Body of European Regulators in Telecoms (BERT). On 5 
November 2008, the Commission presented an amended proposal still favouring 
EECMA. However, the Council in its common position of 16 February 2009 developed 
the concept of a Group of European Regulators in Telecoms (GERT), once again 
differing significantly from the Commission proposal and the opinion of the European 
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Parliament. GERT should not have been established as an agency with legal 
personality, but as an independent advisory group without a board and resources from 
the general budget of the European Union. As a result of a compromise negotiated with 
the Council, the European Parliament adopted several amendments to the common 
position at second reading on 6 May 2009. According to this compromise, the new 
institution will be named Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications 
(BEREC). The creation of BEREC is part of the legislative package for electronic 
communications and is currently negotiated between Parliament and the Council (as of 
end June 2009). 
The reasons stated by the Commission for the necessity to create a new authority (e.g. 
agency, body or group) and for the replacement of ERG are as follows: to contribute to 
the development of the internal market by ensuring a consistent application of the 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications markets; to improve 
existing structures and functioning of the ERG in order to intensify cooperation and 
coordination among NRAs; to upgrade competences, and to state powers, functioning 
and relations with Community institutions more precisely; and to enhance 
independence, transparency and efficiency in decision-making. 
BEREC shall operate as a body of the sector-specific regulators of the 27 EU Member 
States, but will neither have the status of an agency nor legal personality. NRAs from 
EEA countries and EU candidate countries will have observer status. 
BEREC shall have the following tasks: 
• It will have to promote cooperation among NRAs as well as between authorities 
and the Commission. 
• Based on its expertise, BEREC will advise the European Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission (but not the market players), debate issues with and deliver 
opinions to these institutions, and assist them in relations with third parties. 
• It will support NRAs in executing market analyses and disseminate regulatory 
best practice among them. 
• Beyond that, BEREC shall have the competence to deliver opinions on draft 
decisions, recommendations and guidelines (definition and identification of 
relevant markets, designation of operators with significant market power, 
imposition of remedies, notifications, harmonisation measures, cross-border 
disputes, taking of exceptional measures by NRAs, draft measures relating to 
numbering, rules and requirements for providers of cross-border business 
services). 
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• BEREC will monitor the electronic communications sector, and publish annual 
reports on sector-specific developments. 
• Other specific tasks may be assigned to BEREC by the Commission. 
Before adopting opinions, recommendations, guidelines, best practice or reports, 
BEREC shall consult national competition authorities and interested parties. 
Furthermore, it will adopt an annual work programme and publish an annual report of its 
activities. The Commission will have to prepare an evaluation report on BEREC, 
assessing the results achieved and its working methods. 
The organisational structure of BEREC shall comprise a board of regulators, the office 
and expert working groups: 
The board of regulators shall be composed of the heads or high-level representatives of 
the NRAs, with one member per Member State; the Commission will have an observer 
status. The chairperson and the vice-chairpersons representing BEREC externally will 
be elected among its members; the term of office will be one year. Plenary meetings 
shall occur at least four times a year, but extraordinary meetings may also be 
convened. The Commission shall be invited, and experts from EEA countries can 
participate as observers. The board of regulators will fulfil the tasks of BEREC and take 
all decisions. Moreover, it will approve voluntary financial contributions, and adopt the 
annual work programme and the annual report on BEREC’s activities. It shall act by a 
two-thirds majority of members, with each member having one vote. 
On initiative of the European Parliament, the office will function as a Community body 
with legal personality. It shall provide administrative and professional support services 
to BEREC, assist the chair in preparation of the work of the board of regulators, collect 
and transmit information to NRAs, disseminate regulatory best practices, and set up 
expert working groups. The office will consist of a management committee and an 
administrative manager: 
• The Management Committee will be composed of heads or high-level 
representatives of NRAs, with each member having one vote. It will appoint the 
Administrative Manager, provide guidance on his tasks, prepare the preliminary 
draft budget and draw up the final budget, and be responsible for staffing. 
• The administrative manager will head the office; referring to this, he/she shall be 
accountable to the management committee. He/she will supervise the 
implementation of the annual work programme; assist with the preparation of the 
agendas of other bodies, as well as with the draft work programme and the 
annual report on activities; participate in the work of the board of regulators and 
the management committee; and implement the budget. 
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Revenues and resources of the office will be financed in part from the budget of the 
European Union, and from contributions from the member NRAs on a voluntary basis. 
Revenues shall balance expenditures composed of staff, administrative, infrastructure 
and operational expenses. 
7.2.3 Energy 
7.2.3.1 Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) 
The Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) was voluntarily formed as an 
informal platform in March 2000 with a Memorandum of Understanding signed by ten 
national energy regulatory authorities. In June 2003, regulators decided to constitute a 
not-for-profit association under Belgian law and adopted its statutes which were 
consolidated on 19 November 2008. Present members are the designated NRAs or 
their senior representatives in the 27 EU Member States plus the EFTA countries 
Iceland and Norway. The membership fee depends on the weighted voting in the EU 
Council. 
CEER strives for the promotion, monitoring and enforcement of the internal energy 
market. To serve this purpose, it 
• Reviews the implementation and application of legislation; proposes guidelines, 
recommendations and best practice; and observes and assesses the evolution 
of energy markets and of global trends in energy regulation; 
• Provides a framework for discussion of regulatory issues, as well as for 
exchange of experience and expert views; establishes expert knowledge and 
analyses; contributes to advancement of research; and promotes training of 
staff; 
• Improves cooperation, information exchange and assistance among national 
regulators; 
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• Advises and assists European institutions on regulatory issues, and responds to 
mandates given by European institutions; 
• Serves for collaboration between national regulators and the Commission (DG 
for Energy and Transport, DG for Competition, DG for Research) and with 
national competition authorities; 
• Shares regulatory experience with similar associations in North America 
(NARUC), Central and Eastern Europe (ERRA), and safeguards membership in 
the International Energy Regulation Network (IERN); and 
• Consults market participants, consumers and operators. 
Essential documents of CEER are non-binding decisions and conclusions of the general 
assembly meetings. In tandem with ERGEG, annual national monitoring reports on the 
level of compliance with existing legislation and guidelines (national reporting), as well 
as reports and position papers on specific subjects are authored. Furthermore, CEER 
publishes an annual work programme at the beginning of the year (together with 
ERGEG since 2007); submits an annual report on the national regulators’ activities 
during the previous year (joint with ERGEG since 2006), which is sent to all members, 
the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council; and fact sheets and an 
online newsletter are offered to the public. 
The organisational structure comprises a board of directors, a general assembly, the 
working groups, and a secretariat: 
The board of directors consists of a president and five vice presidents who are elected 
for a renewable term of five years. To deliberate and decide, at least three directors 
must be present or represented. Decisions are taken by simple majority, whereat the 
president or the appointed vice president has a casting vote. Working group members 
have the right to participate in meetings as observers without a right to vote. For legal 
actions above 20.000 euro, the board needs prior consent of the general assembly. 
Beyond, it proposes the budget to the general assembly, submits annual accounts, 
proposes to exclude members, organises general assembly meetings, supervises the 
secretariat, keeps the register of members, and represents the association externally. 
The general assembly comprises one representative of all members (head of NRA). 
The representative of the Commission participates in certain debates without voting 
rights. Sessions are held at least four times a year, and may be convened by the 
president or the board of directors, who also set the agenda. Meetings are chaired by 
the president; his/her voting right is linked to the membership. 
The general assembly takes all decisions to fulfil the objectives of the CEER, with 
respect to publications and communications of views and of strategic or long-term 
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importance, and any other decision assigned to it by law or its statutes. Moreover, it 
establishes internal rules of association, amends the statutes, gives prior consent to 
certain acts of the board of directors, endorses position papers and official documents, 
approves the budget and the annual accounts, determines contributions of members 
(corresponding to weights of votes), elects and dismisses the president, the vice 
presidents and the secretary, admits and excludes members, and winds up and 
liquidates the CEER. 
Working and decision-making in the general assembly is based on consensus. If no 
consensus is reached, decision is carried by a qualified two-thirds majority (weighted 
votes as for the EU Council); dissenting opinions are identified and reported. Decisions 
concerning CEER purposes also require majority of EU members. Amendments of 
statutes require a two-thirds majority (change of statutes on purposes requires 
unanimity), with each member having one vote. Decisions on winding up CEER or its 
liquidation involve presence of two thirds of members at the first meeting and four-fifths 
majority, with each member having one vote. 
In order to study specific subjects on market integration and cooperation, CEER and 
ERGEG have installed eight common working groups (Energy Package, Financial 
Services, Regional Initiatives, Electricity, Gas, Customer, International Strategy, Energy 
Community), composed of technical experts from NRAs. They may be supported by 
task forces in charge of specific issues. Working groups have to report to the board of 
directors, the general assembly and the ERGEG plenary, and to publish their findings. 
The Commission is entitled to attend all their meetings. 
CEER and ERGEG share a secretariat, which is provided by the Commission. It works 
under the responsibility of the board of directors. It is headed by a secretary, who is 
appointed by the general assembly on proposal by the president, exercises delegated 
powers and executes tasks assigned by the board of directors. The secretariat prepares 
and maintains the minutes of the meetings, and assists the general assembly, the board 
of directors and the expert groups. 
Travel and subsistence expenses incurred by members, observers and experts are 
reimbursed by the Commission. 
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7.2.3.2 European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) 
Additionally to the CEER, the Commission with its Decision 2003/796/EC of 
11 November 2003 set up the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas 
(ERGEG).412 ERGEG took duties on 14 November 2003 with the entry into force of the 
decision. Members are the heads (or their representatives) of the NRAs in the 27 EU 
Member States and the Commission. National regulators of some candidate countries 
(Croatia, Turkey) and of the EEA countries Iceland and Norway have observer status. 
ERGEG has similar objectives as CEER and the purpose of promoting the consolidation 
of the internal energy market, and of guaranteeing the consistent application of 
legislative provisions of the directives and regulations in Member States. It is entrusted 
with the following tasks: 
• In its priority role as advisory group ERGEG counsels and assists the 
Commission, in particular with regard to the preparation of draft implementing 
measures. 
• It facilitates consultation, cooperation and coordination among regulatory 
authorities in Member States, and between them and the Commission. 
• ERGEG consults with market participants, consumers and end-users by means 
of written consultations, public hearings, organisation of conferences and 
workshops for stakeholders and interested parties, and inclusion of the 
European electricity and gas forums. The Florence Forum (since 1998), the 
Madrid Forum (since 1999) and the London Forum (since 2008) are held once 
or twice per year, and also serve the purpose of providing advice and 
exchanging information. 
Outputs of ERGEG’s work, which is coordinated with CEER but executed 
independently, are legally non-binding plenary decisions, the ‘Guidelines of Good 
Practice’ and policy recommendations to the Commission. Annual national monitoring 
reports, reports and position papers on specific subjects, work programmes, annual 
reports, as well as fact sheets and online newsletters are published together with 
CEER. 
The head of ERGEG is the chairperson elected rotationally among the members, and 
simultaneously serves as the chairperson of CEER. Plenary meetings are held 
quarterly. The Commission is present at debates with a designated high-level 
representative, but is not empowered to vote, and to legally, technically or functionally 
                                                
412  See also Herzmann, K. (2005): Zur Kooperation der Energieregulierungsbehörden in Europa – Ein 
Überblick und Vergleich mit dem Telekommunikationssektor, in: Zeitschrift für Neues Energierecht 
(ZNER), Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 216-220. 
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supervise ERGEG. Representatives of other EEA countries and EU candidate countries 
are eligible to participate. Other experts and observers can be invited. Plenary sessions 
are held ‘back-to-back’ to the CEER general assembly. Decision-making is based on a 
qualified two-thirds majority (weighted votes as for the EU Council) if no consensus was 
achieved. Rules of procedure have to be adopted by consensus or in absence of 
consensus by a two-thirds majority vote (one vote per Member State), but are subject to 
approval of the Commission. Working groups and the secretariat are operated joint with 
CEER. 
7.2.3.3 Future prospect: Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) 
Even though the work of ERGEG is highly respected, ERGEG itself and sector 
stakeholders recognise that voluntary cooperation among NRAs should take place 
within a Community structure with clear competences and the power to adopt individual 
regulatory decisions in specific cases. Therefore, on 19 September 2007, the 
Commission adopted a proposal for a Regulation establishing an Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). Following the opinions of the Committee of 
Regions, of the European Economic and Social Committee and of the European 
Parliament at first reading, the Council adopted its common position on 9 January 2009. 
Subsequently, a compromise was negotiated between Parliament and the Council on 
the package of energy market legislation. This compromise, and thus the decision for 
creating ACER was adopted by Parliament at second reading on 22 April 2009 and by 
the Council on 25 June 2009..  
ACER will become a Community body with legal personality. Members will be the 
27 EU-Member States, but participation shall be open to third countries. It will have the 
purpose to assist the NRAs in exercising at Community level the regulatory tasks 
performed in Member States, and to enhance coordination of proceedings, in order to 
contribute towards the proper functioning of the internal markets. 
Upon request or on its own initiative, ACER shall or may issue opinions and 
recommendations to transmission system operators, regulatory authorities, the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. Concerning the European 
Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO), ACER will provide opinions to 
the Commission on draft statutes, list of members and draft rules of procedure of the 
ENTSOs; monitor and analyse execution of tasks of the ENTSOs (implementation of 
ENTSO network codes and Commission framework guidelines, submission of draft 
network development plans and draft annual work programmes); provide opinions to the 
ENTSOs on network codes, draft network development plans and draft annual work 
programmes; provide reasoned opinions and recommendations if work programmes 
and network plans do not comply with basic principles and legal provisions; submit and 
review draft framework guidelines; transfer network codes, or prepare and submit draft 
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network codes to the Commission; and monitor implementation of network codes, 
network development plans and regional cooperation of operators. 
ACER will also be entitled to take individual decisions in specific cases: 
• Regarding NRAs, ACER will adopt decisions on technical issues; make 
recommendations to assist authorities and market players on good practice; 
promote cooperation among regulatory authorities at Community, national and 
regional level; provide opinions at request of NRAs or the Commission on 
compliance of decisions taken by NRAs with relevant legal provisions; inform the 
Commission about defaulting of opinions by NRAs; and issue opinions in case of 
difficulties of NRA with the application of the guidelines. 
• With respect to cross-border infrastructure, ACER shall have competence to 
decide only if NRAs have not reached an agreement within six months or if 
NRAs have requested intervention. Within six months, it will decide on terms 
and conditions for access to and operational security of networks (capacity 
allocation, revenue sharing, levy of charges). 
• ACER will have some additional tasks, e.g. deciding on exemptions; providing 
opinions on decisions of NRAs on certifications; tasks not involving decision 
making powers. 
In carrying out its tasks, particularly with regard to framework guidelines and network 
codes, ACER will have to consult with market participants, transmission system 
operators, consumers, end-users and, where relevant, competition authorities. The 
Agency shall inform the public and interested parties; make public agendas, documents 
and minutes of consultations and meetings of its bodies; monitor energy markets (retail 
prices, network access, consumers’ rights); and publish an annual monitoring report. 
The Commission will have to prepare an evaluation report on ACER, assessing the 
results achieved and its working methods. 
Regarding the organisational structure, ACER will be composed of a board of 
regulators, a director, an administrative board and a board of appeal. All bodies will be 
obliged to act independently, impartially and objectively vis-à-vis producers, network 
operators, consumers, other national authorities or the Commission: 
• The board of regulators shall consist of one senior representative (and one 
alternate) from each NRA and one non-voting representative of the Commission. 
It will elect a chairman and a vice-chairman from among its members and act by 
a two-thirds majority of its members present, with each member having one 
vote. The board’s tasks will cover: delivering opinions to the director on all 
opinions, recommendations and decisions considered for adoption; providing 
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guidance to the director in execution of his/her tasks; delivering opinions to the 
administrative board on the appointment or removal of the director; and 
approving the work programme. Secretariat services will be provided by the 
Agency. 
• The director shall manage and represent ACER. He/she will prepare and 
participate in the work of the administrative board; adopt and publish opinions, 
recommendations and decisions; prepare and implement the annual work 
programme; draw up a preliminary draft budget and implement it; and prepare 
the draft annual report. The Commission will assess the performance of the 
director, and the European Parliament and the Council may ask the director to 
submit a report on the performance of his/her duties. 
• The administrative board shall be composed of nine members and their 
alternates, appointed by the Commission (two), the European Parliament (two) 
and the Council (five). It will appoint a chairman and a vice-chairman from 
among its members. The administrative board shall meet at least twice a year in 
ordinary sessions, on initiative of its chairman, as well as on request of its 
members or the Commission. The chairman of the board of regulators and the 
director will join, without the right to vote. Observers may be invited, and 
members may be assisted by advisers or experts. Decisions shall be adopted by 
a two-thirds majority of the members present, with each member having one 
vote. The administrative board will appoint and remove the director and the 
members of the board of appeal, appoint the members of the board of 
regulators, adopt the work programme, adopt and revise a multi-annual 
programme, exercise budgetary powers and decide on other sources of funding, 
exercise disciplinary authority over the director, draw up the staff policy, and 
adopt and publish the annual report on ACER’s activities. 
• The board of appeal shall consist of six members (and alternates) from NRAs, 
competition authorities or other institutions with relevant experience. It will 
designate a chairman. Decisions shall be adopted at least by a two-thirds 
majority. Appeals against these decisions may be lodged by any natural or legal 
person addressed or concerned. In general, appeals will not have a suspensory 
effect. The board of appeal shall decide upon the appeal within two months. It 
will exercise any power of ACER or remit the case to the competent body of the 
Agency. Decisions of the board of appeal or the agency, or proceedings for 
failure to act may be brought before the Court of First Instance or the Court of 
Justice. 
Revenues of ACER will be funded from the general budget of the European Union, fees 
paid to the agency for decisions on exemptions, voluntary contributions from Member 
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States or their NRAs, and other funding. Revenues shall balance expenditure 
composed of staff, administrative, infrastructure, and operational expenses. 
7.2.4 Railways 
Article 31 of the Directive 2001/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 February 2001 stipulates that national rail regulatory bodies shall exchange 
information about their work, and on decision-making principles and practice to 
coordinate the principles of regulatory intervention. The Commission is obliged to 
support the national regulators to fulfil this assignment.  
Legislative provisions had already been implemented at the end of the 1990s with the 
creation of the Task Force Rail Regulatory Bodies and the Working Group Rail 
Regulatory Bodies, following an initiative of the Commission. Members of the working 
group are the rail regulatory authorities in EU Member States, and in EFTA countries 
with a rail network (Norway, Switzerland), as well as the Commission (DG for Energy 
and Transport, DG for Competition). Representatives of NRAs in all EU Member States 
and in other third countries are eligible to participate in the meetings of the Task Force. 
A Commission Decision concerning objectives, activities, membership and organisation 
of the working group is planned to be adopted at the end of 2009. 
Task force and working group are convened quarterly by the Commission. Meetings of 
the task force are held in Brussels, meetings of the working group take place in 
Brussels and in different Member States alternately. Task force sessions serve for the 
preparation of draft agendas for the working group assemblies. Round-table 
discussions of the working group unite one or more delegates of each regulatory 
authority (participation by one representative is reimbursed by the Commission), the 
Commission and stakeholders (companies, associations, other representations of 
interest). Sessions are chaired by the Commission. Meetings centre on a mutual 
exchange of expertise and experiences on aspects of topical interest as well as on 
decision-making maxims and practice of regulators, pertaining first and foremost to 
international rail transport. Finding best practices for harmonised regulatory approaches 
is of first priority. Results of the meetings are recorded in minutes. The working group 
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intends to pass legally non-binding recommendations as from the end of 2009 or the 
beginning of 2010. 
In 2003, European ministers of transport also inaugurated the „International Group for 
Improving the Quality of Rail Transport in the North-South Corridor’ (IQ-C) comprising 
delegates of NRAs in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland. 
Representatives of railway companies and interested third-parties are invited to join the 
meetings. The IQ-C serves the purpose to detect barriers to market entry and 
competition. It surveys the allocation of train paths, reports alleged discriminatory 
behaviour, and interprets undefined legal terms with the intention to find a common 
approach and to propose improvements to the Commission. 
7.2.5 Conclusions from cooperation in other sectors 
Cooperation among NRAs in the electronic communications and in the energy sector 
can be characterised as a two-tier approach of a voluntary not-for-profit association of 
regulators (IRG, CEER) and a group set up by the Commission (ERG, ERGEG). 
Members are the EU Member States. The Commission is a member of the ERG and 
ERGEG, and these two bodies are charged explicitly with advising the Commission. 
Some or all EFTA and candidate countries are members (to the voluntary associations 
IRG and CEER) or have observer status (at the mandatory organisations ERG and 
ERGEG). 
The main objective of all organisations discussed in this chapter is facilitate discussion 
on best regulatory practice and harmonise regulation where appropriate, and promote 
the development of an internal market within the Community. This is accomplished by 
observing implementation and application of legislation as well as the evolution of the 
market, recommending new legal actions, advising and assisting members and 
European institutions, promoting discussion and exchange of experience, improving 
cooperation among regulators and between them and the Commission, and consulting 
other stakeholders. Decisions, common positions, conclusions, opinions, statements, 
guidelines and/or recommendations of the groups are legally non-binding, but 
implementation is monitored. Besides, they publish reports and position papers on 
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specific subjects, annual work programmes and annual reports on the regulators’ 
activities. 
In the energy and electronic communications sectors, the voluntary organisations IRG 
and CEER clearly consider themselves as bodies of independent regulators. At the 
outset, they have consciously limited memberships in the two organisations to 
independent NRAs, and have not accepted ministries. Indeed, limiting membership to 
agencies independent of policy makers is seen as a critical success factor by both 
organisations. The Commission’s advisory groups ERG and ERGEG are likewise 
limited to independent agencies. 
The organisational structure of the groups typically consists of  
• A board (with a president / a chair and deputies) responsible for management 
(budget, submission of work programme, supervision of secretariat) and external 
representation;  
• A plenary/general assembly, inter alia adopting decisions to fulfil the objectives 
and regarding personnel, admitting and excluding Member States, amending 
statutes, and approving the budget, for which detailed voting rules apply 
(consensus or qualified majority; representatives of the Commission are present 
but do not have voting rights);  
• Working groups composed of experts analysing specific subjects; and a 
secretariat. 
According to political progress made in the first half of 2009, ERG and ERGEG will be 
replaced by two new institutions. BEREC will operate as a body of the NRAs 
responsible for the regulation of the electronic communications markets. BEREC will not 
have the status of an agency, and will thus be an ‘extended ERG’. Its competences will 
broadly resemble ERG’s responsibilities but the tasks of the Board of Regulators and 
the new office (secretariat) will be defined more clearly. By contrast, an EU agency will 
be established for the energy sector: ACER. In addition to the current assignments of 
ERGEG’, ACER will be responsible for monitoring network operators, provide opinions 
to them, prepare and submit framework guidelines and network codes, and take binding 
decisions with respect to cross-border issues. The organisational structure will consist 
of a board of regulators, a director, an administrative board and a board of appeal. 
Cooperation among regulators in the railway sector lags behind the accomplishments in 
the other network sectors as far it concerns competences, activities and organisation, 
but developments point in the same direction as for the electronic communications and 
energy sectors.  
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Coordination of competition authorities is somewhat different, but does also encompass 
an informal (ECA) and a formal (ECN) version. The ECA is primarily a discussion forum 
for debating issues, and exchanging information and expertise, but without any 
organisational structure except for the working groups. Under a Council regulation, the 
ECN has a clear legal mandate, and maintains working arrangements and cooperation 
mechanisms with separate responsibilities (allocation of cases, announcement of 
decisions, coordination of investigations, mutual assistance, exchange of matters of fact 
or law), but has no stand-alone legal personality and competence. 
In the energy and electronic communications sectors, associations of independent 
regulators have been created since the late 1990ies: IRG and CEER. In both sectors, 
the Commission has created formal advisory groups that work closely with the former 
organisations: ERG and ERGEG. This institutional setting has facilitated extensive 
exchange of ideas and best practices among NRA. This cooperation is widely regarded 
to have resulted in improved regulatory performance, and greater transparency.  
A trend towards more harmonisation was initiated by the Commission proposing EU 
regulatory agencies for both sectors. In the energy sector, there is wide consensus 
about the need for such agencies and the agency, ACER, is expected to be established 
soon. In the electronic communications market, there was more controversy about the 
creation of an agency, and a political compromise was achieved recently to create a 
body of regulators with extended competences (BEREC) rather than an EU agency. 
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7.3 Recommendations for enhanced cooperation 
This section discusses the need for enhanced cooperation among NRAs, the benefits 
that may be expected from such cooperation, and regulatory tasks arising from the 
Third Postal Directive which better cooperation can usefully address. 
7.3.1 The need for enhanced cooperation  
This survey of current NRA practices strongly supports the need for enhanced 
cooperation among NRAs. Three primary factors lead to this conclusion. 
First, postal NRAs — like NRAs in other regulated industries — are charged with a 
number of highly technical tasks that require extensive technical expertise. Many 
regulatory challenges are similar in all Member States, and NRAs can learn best 
practices from each other. Consequently, cooperation can help improve the quality of 
regulation and make better use of the finite resources in the Community available for 
postal regulation. Indeed, CERP has recognised the need for NRAs to cooperate in 
promulgating best practices.413 In light of the limited resources of some Community 
NRAs, the potential benefit of more cost-effective regulation is a major advantage.414  
To this end, a primary task for a new organisation of NRAs would be to define best 
practices on technical issues. In the electronic communications and energy sectors, 
                                                
413 ‘Successful implementation of the third postal directive will require continued and pro-active 
cooperation between NRAs to identify and establish best practice. However the signs are that the 
current methods of cooperation need to be reviewed to improve the sharing of information and to 
make the implementation of the directive a reality'. Report of CERP Working Group Policy Issues: 
Project team - National Regulatory Authorities, Phase Three report (2008), p. 2. Report available at 
www.cept-cerp.org/cerp/pdf%5CReport%20NRA%20Phase%20III.pdf 
414 Cost-effective regulation can mean either that better regulation is achieved with the same resources, 
or that same results can be achieved with less resources. At present, it appears very unlikely that 
cooperation would allow many member States to economise on the resources spent on postal 
regulation. As chapter 3 of this report finds, many NRAs are currently not implementing all provisions 
of the Postal Directive effectively. In this situation, cooperation rather appears a way to help NRAs to 
improve regulation, and address the new challenges of the Third Postal Directive, while limiting the 
additional resources needed for this project. 
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such benefits of cooperation have motivated NRAs to create voluntary organisations 
(IRG and CEER, see sections  7.2.2.1 and  7.2.3.1 above). In the postal sector, NRAs 
have not formed a similar voluntary organisation to date. One reason may be that 
Member States have pursued postal liberalisation at different speeds. While Sweden 
was the first Member State to fully liberalise in 1993, 10 Member States have 
negotiated a two-year exemption in the Third Postal Directive because they did not feel 
ready to liberalise by the end of 2010. Consequently, the challenges of postal NRAs 
differed among Member States. However, common interests are emerging since the 
Third Postal Directive has set a definite date for full liberalisation in all Member States.  
Second, cooperation among NRAs will help to ensure consistent application of the 
Postal Directive and harmonise regulatory practice, where appropriate, among different 
Member States. While there will likely not be ‘one-size-fits-all’ regulatory approaches 
that are appropriate for all Member States, there are clear benefits of harmonisation. 
Many postal operators today provide services in different Member States,415 and 
different regulatory frameworks increase complexity for these operators. Harmonisation 
of regulatory practice thus can contribute to the development of an internal market for 
postal services and provide benefits for consumers in the whole Community. 
As NRAs are primarily responsible for national markets, they do not necessarily have a 
strong interest in harmonisation. Therefore, the Commission should be able to propose 
subjects for the organisation of NRAs to address. In other words, the Commission 
should be able to seek advice from NRAs on possible areas of harmonisation. Indeed, 
the expertise of the NRAs appears indispensable in order to achieve progress towards 
a more harmonised good practice. In other sectors, the Commission has sought advice 
from NRAs by creating formal advisory groups (ERG and ERGEG). These models are 
widely considered successful by NRAs. They have created considerable transparency 
about regulatory practices and fostered continuing improvement of regulatory practice.  
Third, cooperation of NRAs is needed in order to ensure effective monitoring and, 
where appropriate, regulation of cross border mail. This need is most obvious for any 
regulation needed to ensure interoperability among postal operators. For example, 
some Member States find it necessary to require domestic operators to identify the 
postal carrier on each mail piece, so customers know who has handled the item and to 
whom to complain if need be. In this case, it seems clear that the NRA has the same 
objective for all items handled in the country including incoming cross-border. To avoid 
that cross-border operators face inconsistent rules on carrier identification in the country 
of origin and destination, consultation of NRAs appears useful. Similarly, the treatment 
of undeliverable mail which must be returned to the sender requires cooperation among 
                                                
415 For example, TNT and Deutsche Post have operations in several other member States, and Norway 
Post’s subsidiary Bring operates in Denmark and Sweden.  
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postal operators and possibly raises questions about remuneration for this service. 
Where cross border mail is concerned, the allocation of regulatory competence is 
unclear. In this area, an organisation of NRAs could help develop rules for allocation of 
cases or complaints. Moreover, the Commission has direct authority over quality of 
service targets for cross border mail and has traditionally reviewed terminal dues 
agreements (REIMS).416 Given the close relation of these subjects to domestic quality 
of services measurement, and domestic price control, the Commission may benefit from 
advice by NRAs in this area. 
In order to facilitate harmonisation of regulatory practice for cross border mail, 
cooperation between NRAs and the Commission will be needed in addition to 
cooperation among NRAs. Creation of an advisory group of NRAs appears as the best 
way to address this need. In some other regulated sectors, EU agencies have been 
created to facilitate Community-level regulation because cross-border services cannot 
be regulated by national authorities effectively. An example is the establishment of 
ACER in the energy sector, or EASA, the European Aviation Safety Agency. In the 
postal sector, it is not obvious that cross border aspects of regulation are as important 
as in, for example, the energy sector. It appears that most of these cross border 
aspects of regulation could be addressed through cooperation between NRAs and the 
Commission (in the body recommended in section 7.3.3. below). Therefore, we do not 
see strong reasons for creating a EU agency for the postal sector at present, i.e. before 
the opportunities of enhanced cooperation among NRAs have been explored in 
practice. 
                                                
416 See discussion of Commission Decision of 23 October 2003, Case 38.170 (REIMS II renotification) in 
chapter 4. 
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7.3.2 Areas for cooperation among NRAs  
With respect to the implementation of the original Postal Directive, this report has 
identified substantial variation among Member States and serious shortcomings in 
several Member States (see chapter 3). In addition, there are early indications (judging 
from draft laws in some Member States) that the Third Postal Directive may not be 
implemented as effectively in all Member States (see chapter 6). If NRAs in the postal 
sector had cooperated more effectively in implementing the original Postal Directive, it 
seems that many problems might have been avoided, and the recent progress in 
regulatory practice in some Member States might have been achieved earlier. 
Given this experience, more substantive coordination between NRAs and the 
Commission is indispensable in order to achieve effective implementation of the Third 
Postal Directive. In particular, cooperation among NRAs and coordination between 
NRAs and the Commission will help to improve regulatory performance with regards to 
three objectives:  
• First, cooperation will allow NRAs to assist each other and foster best practices. 
Cooperation appears most needed for complex technical issues (see list below) 
and emerging challenges related to implementation of the Third Postal Directive 
or changes in the market.  
• Second, cooperation will lead to more harmonised regulatory practice and thus 
promote the development of an internal market. This seems most important for 
areas where current regulatory practice varies substantially (without clear cause) 
or where certain provisions of the Postal Directive appear to be interpreted very 
differently by Member States and there is a lack of a common understanding.  
• Third, a body of NRAs could facilitate coordination, and improvement, of the 
regulation of cross border mail and advise the Commission in this area.417 
These functions are needed where the responsibility for regulating cross border 
mail is not allocated clearly or coordination between national authorities and the 
Commission is necessary.  
The following paragraphs list a number of specific areas where the results of this study 
suggest that enhanced cooperation among NRAs could improve overall regulatory 
practice. We suggest that these subjects should be considered for the work programme 
of the European Regulators Group for Postal Services that this study recommends to 
establish (see section  7.3.3 below).  
                                                
417 At present, as this report finds, cross border aspects of postal regulation are hardly addressed at all 
by regulatory in many Member States, see section 3.4.4 above.  
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1. Separation of accounts. This study finds that implementation of the accounting 
separation required by the Postal Directive remains a work in progress (see section 3.6 
above). Overall, the range in accounting practices suggests that NRAs have adopted 
substantially different approaches to implementing the Directive. Our survey of NRAs 
confirms that the overall level of satisfaction with the separation of costs presented by 
regulatory accounts is only moderate.418 With cooperation, NRAs should be able to 
develop a common understanding of the requirements of the Postal Directive on 
accounting separation and establish best practices for implementing these provisions 
more effectively.  
2. Allocation of cost. At present, many NRAs do not appear able to allocate costs 
according to the four broad categories prescribed by the Directive (although there some 
notable exceptions). There is clearly a lack of transparency about principles used for 
cost allocation in the Member States, and only a few Member States have published 
cost allocation rules.419 To this end, CERP’s recommendations of best practice for cost 
accounting appear to have had little effect so far.420 As the survey conducted for this 
study reveals, NRAs’ overall level of satisfaction with the cost allocation data available 
to them is only moderate (see section 3.6 above). Under the Postal Directive, NRAs in 
all Member States are charged with reviewing the cost allocation of universal service 
providers, and this task raises very complex technical questions. Therefore, cooperation 
of NRAs with the objective of effectively establishing best practices appears highly 
desirable.  
3. Price regulation. Price regulation in Member States varies substantially with respect 
to the scope of services regulated, the methods used to regulate prices, standards used 
to determine whether prices are cost-oriented, and competence for regulating prices 
(NRA or ministry). Even though different circumstances in the Member State (e.g. with 
respect to the degree of competition) may justify different approaches, establishment of 
best practices would appear very useful in this area.  
4. Regulation of terminal dues and other aspects of cross-border mail. International 
postal markets continue to be distorted by a number of practices unique to international 
                                                
418 This finding confirms a results of a CERP report on cost accounting practices in 2006. This report had 
stated the ‘the use of cost accounting rules differs from country to country and the situation nowadays 
is far from being a common approach’. CERP, Working Group Economics, PT Cost Accounting and 
Price Control Systems, Report ‘Cost Accounting and Price Control’ (2006), p. 1. Report available at 
www.cept-cerp.org/cerp/pdf%5Creport%20cost-price.pdf 
419 The cost allocation rules published by French ARCEP following public consultation give the most 
prominent example of such rules. See ARCEP : Décision n° 2008-0165 relative aux règles de 
comptabilisation. Available at http://www.arcep.fr/uploads/tx_gsavis/08-0165.pdf 
420 CERP had originally published best practice for cost allocation in 2002, updated in 2004 and 2009. 
See CERP (2002): ‘Recommendation on best Practices for Cost Accounting Rules’, CERP (2004): 
‘Recommendation on best Practices for Cost Accounting Rules II’, and CERP (2009): 
‘Recommendation on best Practices for Cost Accounting Rules III’. All reports available at 
http://www.cept-cerp.org/cerp/144.html  
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postal affairs (restrictions on remail and ETOEs, restrictive use of IMPC carrier 
identification codes, and special customs rules for some operators). It appears the 
NRAs have generally not implemented the provisions on terminal dues set out in the 
Postal Directive (Article 13). With respect to monitoring and regulating cross border 
mail, cooperation between NRAs and the Commission and coordination between NRAs 
appears warranted to ensure effective implementation of the Postal Directive. 
5. Calculation of net costs of universal service. Annex I was added by the Third Postal 
Directive in 2008 and provides a framework for calculating the net cost, if any, of 
universal service. This framework raises complex technical issues, most importantly 
with regards to the identification of services or customers that would not be served if 
there were no USO. There are no established best practices for these calculations — 
that take account of the directive’s annex — to date, but it is clear that such net cost 
calculations, or review of net cost calculations by NRAs, will turn out to be complex and 
controversial exercises. Therefore, cooperation of NRAs and the establishment of best 
practices could offer significant benefits in this area. 
6. Financing of universal service. Net costs of the USO, if any, are financed today 
primarily through cross-subsidies from the reserved area. With the end of reserved 
areas, other sources of financing may become necessary, and the Postal Directive 
provides for two methods of financing: public funds or a compensation fund. 
Cooperation of NRAs offers the opportunity to discuss domestic experiences in this 
regard and establish best practices. 
7. Access to postal infrastructure. The Third Postal Directive requires Member Sates to 
ensure, where appropriate, transparent and non-discriminatory access to certain 
elements of postal infrastructure such as postcode systems, address databases, post 
office boxes, delivery boxes, information on change of address, re-direction service, or 
return to sender service. Only in a minority of Member States, NRAs have implemented 
such procedures to date. Cooperation would offer the opportunity for NRAs to develop 
appropriate approaches to this subject, and could thus contribute to the cost-
effectiveness of regulation.  
8. Interoperability. To date, few NRAS have considered the problems of interoperability 
in a multi-operator market (with three notable exceptions). In this area, cooperation of 
NRAs could be a way to ensure cost-effective development of regulatory practices. 
Moreover, problems of interoperability arise very similarly for cross border mail. For 
example, identification of postal carriers appears equally important for domestic and 
incoming cross border mail, and rules for customer complaints or return to sender 
procedures should likewise not be limited to domestic mail. In this regards, coordination 
among NRAs and harmonised practices appear highly desirable.  
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9. Scope and methods for measuring quality of service. While virtually all Member 
States set and monitor quality of service for basic letter postal service, there is 
substantial variation as regards the measurement of quality of service for other 
products. Cooperation could facilitate an approach towards the necessary scope of 
performance measurement. At the same time, this could help to limit measurement to 
those areas where measurement is strictly necessary and thus help limit resources 
needed for this exercise. Moreover, NRAs may be able to give advice to the 
Commission on the regulation of quality of service for cross-border mail based on their 
domestic experience. 
10. Market statistics. Many NRAs, though not all, are regularly preparing reports on the 
development of postal markets in their Member States. On a Community level, the 
Commission, too, regularly reports on market development in its application reports. At 
present, transparency and accuracy of market statistics are diminished by a lack of 
common understanding about key vocabulary. For example, the interpretation of terms 
like ‘correspondence’, ‘letter’, ‘universal service items’, and ‘direct mail’ appears to differ 
between Member States. In order to monitor market development in the Community 
more effectively, the establishment of a common understanding of those terms would 
appear useful. A body of NRAs could be well placed to facilitate such a common 
understanding. 
11. Authorisation procedures. To facilitate development of regional postal service 
providers serving multiple national markets, it would be desirable for NRAs to develop 
simplified and more uniform authorisation procedures.  
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7.3.3 An advisory group of postal regulators 
The review of models from other industries reveals that cooperation of NRAs can take 
three forms:  
• First, voluntary organisations of NRAs have been created in some sectors to 
facilitate exchange and discussion of best practices in regulation. In the postal 
sector, NRAs have, perhaps unfortunately, not formed a similar voluntary 
organisation of NRAs since the adoption of the First Postal Directive in 1997. 
Even though creation of such an organisation has been discussed among postal 
regulators occasionally, it is not clear that these current efforts will be more 
successful than similar attempts in the past.  
• The second model for cooperation among NRAs is an advisory group to be 
created by the Commission. We have identified a clear need for enhanced 
cooperation among NRAs (in section  7.3, above) and for coordination between 
NRAs and the Commission on regulatory issues related to cross border mail. 
Therefore, we recommend that the commission should establish such an 
advisory group.  
• A third model would be the creation of an EU agency with its own competences 
for Community-level regulation that would cooperate with NRAs. This option was 
pursued by the Commission in sectors where there is a clear need for 
Community-level regulation of cross-border services, and experience with 
cooperation among NRAs through advisory groups has shown that this did not 
address these cross-border issues sufficiently. In the postal sector, the cross 
border aspects of regulation appear less important than, for example the energy 
sector or in aviation safety. Therefore, we recommend that existing problems in 
the regulation of cross border mail should be addressed through enhanced 
cooperation among NRAs, and between NRAs and the Commission, in an 
advisory group. At this stage, we do not recommend creation of an EU agency 
for the postal sector. 
The following paragraphs specify our detailed recommendations for the creation of an 
independent advisory group of regulators for the postal sector. An advisory group can 
be established by a formal decision of the Commission.421 As a short reference for this 
proposed organisation, we use the name ‘European Regulators Group for Postal 
Services’, or ‘ERGP’. 
                                                
421 Similar decisions were taken to create the ERG (Decision 2002/247/EC amended by 2004/641 and 
2007/804) and the ERGEG (Decision 2003/796/EC). 
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• We recommend that such a decision should be taken as soon as possible, with 
the objective that the ERGP could take up operations by the end of 2010, the 
date of full liberalisation prescribed by the Postal Directive. 
• The ERGP should be composed of the heads of the independent NRAs of all 
Member States or their representatives and a representative of the Commission. 
For practical reasons, we recommend only one independent NRA from each 
Member State should be admitted to the organisation.422 It appears very 
important to ensure that NRAs are represented by their heads because lack of 
high-level representation is a key shortcoming of current NRA cooperation in 
CERP and in light of the experience in the energy and electronic 
communications markets.  
• The group could be extended to NRAs of the EEA and possibly candidate 
countries. These NRAs could have an observer status. More generally, the 
ERGP should be able to invite other experts and observers to its meetings, as 
may be appropriate.  
• The aims of the ERGP should be stated clearly in a Commission decision 
establishing the group. We recommend that these objectives should include 
(i) to advise and assist the Commission in promoting the development of an 
internal market for postal services, and in preparing draft implementing 
measures and (ii) to facilitate consultation, coordination and cooperation of 
national regulatory authorities, contributing to a consistent application of the 
Postal Directive. 
• The ERGP should have a right to determine the subjects on which it will advise 
the Commission. In addition, the Commission should be able to request expert 
advice and recommendations from ERGP on specific subjects. We recommend 
that the Commission should provide a secretariat for the group. 
• The ERGP should be transparent about its work and should consult with market 
participants and users. To ensure transparency, the ERGP should, at a 
minimum, publish its work programme, recommendations, and prepare annual 
reports on its activity.  
                                                
422 The Postal Directive allows for the possibility to designate several NRAs in one Member State. In 
practice, however, there clearly is one ‘primary NRA’ even in the few countries where different 
organisations share regulatory functions and limitation of the ERGP to one NRA per Member State 
should thus not be problematic. The ERG in the electronic communications sector uses a similar 
notion of a ‘primary NRA’ (‘the independent national regulatory authority established in each Member 
State with primary responsibility for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the market’). 
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• The Group shall elect a chairperson from among its members and adopt its own 
rules of procedures in order to organise the work, e.g. by establishing expert 
working groups. The rules of procedure should ideally be adopted by 
consensus, or in absence of consensus, by at least two thirds of all member 
NRAs.  
We recommend that postal NRAs should cooperate more closely with each other and 
with the Commission. There are three important reasons why enhanced cooperation 
among NRAs would be beneficial: First, cooperation would allow NRAs to further 
develop regulatory practice and implement the Postal Directive more effectively through 
mutual assistance and by establishing best practices. Cooperation is needed most for 
complex technical questions such as control of accounting separation and the 
appropriate measures for regulating a multi-operators market. Second, cooperation 
would lead to more harmonised regulatory practice and thus promote the development 
of an internal market. Third, a body of NRAs could facilitate coordination of the 
regulation of cross border mail and advise the Commission in this area.  
To facilitate cooperation among NRAs, we recommend that the Commission should 
establish an advisory group of independent regulators for the postal sector. This group 
could be called ERGP, European Regulators Group for Postal Services.  
More substantive coordination between NRAs and the Commission appears 
indispensable in order to achieve effective implementation of the Third Postal Directive. 
Important areas where NRAs should coordinate relate either to subjects that are 
technically complex — and therefore mutual assistance is warranted to improve overall 
knowledge and performance — or to regulation of cross border mail. In particular, we 
recommend the ERGP should facilitate coordination in the following areas: separation 
of accounts, allocation of cost, price regulation, regulation of terminal dues and other 
aspects of cross-border mail, calculation of net costs of universal service, financing of 
universal service, access to postal infrastructure, interoperability, scope and methods 
for measuring quality of service, market statistics, and authorisation procedures.  
 
 Role of Regulators in a More Competitive Postal Market 363 
 Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations 
8 Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter sets out overall conclusions and recommendations. In this chapter, we 
summarise and prioritise the foregoing analyses into the nine high level issues that are, 
in our view, the most critical or urgent tasks for the Commission, Member States, and 
national regulatory authorities to address in order to ensure efficient regulation of postal 
markets in the competitive postal market embraced by the Third Postal Directive. Six 
tasks pertain to the substance of regulation. Three tasks address institutional 
arrangements. The chapter concludes with final observations on the evolution of the 
role of postal regulators and postal markets. 
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8.1 Key regulatory tasks 
To implement the Third Postal Directive effectively, we believe that the Commission, 
Member States, and NRAs must focus first on the following six overarching regulatory 
tasks. 
1) NRAs must develop accurate and appropriate regulatory accounts for postal services 
jointly produced by a postal service provider that possesses significant market power in 
the provision of universal postal services. 
While the Third Postal Directive sets many specific tasks for the national regulatory 
authority, one of the most important is the development of regulatory accounts that 
accurately reveal the costs of postal products without undercutting the ability of 
regulated postal operators to manage their businesses in liberalised markets. 
Appropriate regulatory accounts are needed for many purposes under the Third Postal 
Directive: 
• to ensure that prices of universal services are cost-oriented, non-discriminatory, 
and, at least where produced by a postal service provider with significant market 
power, not abusive; 
• to ensure that, at least where a postal operator has significant market power in 
the provision of some universal services, prices of jointly produced competitive 
products are not unfairly underpriced; and 
• to inform evaluations of the net costs of the universal service obligation, if any. 
• to evaluate the effect of legal privileges in the operation of postal services (e.g., 
VAT exemptions, special customs treatment, etc.). 
Development of regulatory accounts is the most technically challenging of the specific 
tasks set by the Postal Directive. It is also the task that is least well implemented by 
NRAs as a group so far. Today only a handful of NRAs appear to have made definite 
progress towards implementation of Article 14. The role of accounting needs to receive 
greater emphasis because of its unique challenges and key role in the successful 
implementation of the directive. 
2) Member States and NRAs must periodically evaluate and adapt the best postal 
regulatory practices developed by other industrialised countries. 
This study indicates that, in the realm of postal regulation, no country or regulator has a 
monopoly on the supply of sound ideas and good practices. A wide range of countries 
and regulators have developed approaches that are worthy of consideration by all. At 
the same time, few Member States and regulators have developed a process for 
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regularly evaluating and adapting the best practices of other countries. Such a process 
should be incorporated into the regulatory approaches of all Member States. 
3) Member States and national regulatory authorities must develop a new view of their 
role as regulators of the postal services market, one that is both broader and more 
limited. 
In the Third Postal Directive, three policy instruments — universal service obligation, full 
market opening, user protection — are closely interrelated. Full market opening will 
increase the quality and variety of postal services. Universal service will be ensured 
through transparent and proportionate reliance on market forces supplemented by 
designation of universal service providers and/or by public procurement of necessary 
services. Growing specialisation and cooperation among postal operators — already 
evident in the market place — will increase the need for a user protection regime that 
covers all postal service providers. Key elements of the national (and international) 
postal infrastructure will be made available to all operators ‘whenever necessary to 
protect the interest of users and/or to promote effective competition’.423 
Postal regulators must broaden their focus accordingly. The scope of regulatory 
controls must be sufficient to allow the regulator to accomplish the three interdependent 
objectives of the Third Postal Directive: universal service, full market opening, and user 
protection. The scope of regulatory controls can no longer be equated with the scope of 
the universal service obligation (if it ever was). From regulating specific indices of 
universal service, national regulatory authorities must turn their attention to protecting 
and promoting — and only where necessary and proportionate, controlling — the 
operations of the broader postal services market. As the Third Postal Directive declares, 
in pursuing this enlarged mission, national regulatory authorities will need to work 
closely with national competition authorities to anticipate and resist any barriers to entry 
that could arise after the end of the reserved area. And they will need to coordinate with 
national consumer protection authorities to ensure users' rights are appropriately 
safeguarded. 
In adopting a broader regulatory focus, however, we believe that national regulatory 
authorities will also need to develop a reasoned doctrine of ‘forbearance’, that is, non-
use of regulatory controls even though they are authorised. While the Third Postal 
Directive calls for a broader set of regulatory controls over postal markets, it also 
continues the evolution of Community postal policy towards greater reliance, where 
feasible, on market forces and effective competition. There is a tension between these 
trends. A market shaped by a regulator is not a market that relies on market forces or 
effective competition. The solution is for postal regulators, like regulators in other 
                                                
423 Third Postal Directive, Article 11a. 
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sectors, to develop reasoned criteria that identify circumstances in which regulatory 
controls should not be exerted even though they may be available. 
4) Member States and NRAs must develop analyses and procedures that will allow 
them — in a manner that is transparent, non-discriminatory, fair, and consistent with the 
principles of proportionality and least market distortion — to ensure universal service by 
reliance upon market forces where feasible and appropriate and to employ designation 
procedures or public procurement to supplement market forces where necessary to 
supplement market forces.  
As discussed in chapter 6,424 in accordance with the Third Postal Directive and the 
principles of sound administrative practice, Member States should rely upon market 
forces — i.e., the commercial self-interest of postal service providers — to ensure 
universal service where it is feasible and appropriate to do so. Where it is not feasible 
and appropriate to rely on market forces, Member States should introduce designation 
procedures and/or public procurement contracts. Each decision with respect to ensuring 
universal service should be taken in a manner that is transparent, non-discriminatory, 
fair, and consistent with the principles of proportionality and least market distortion. 
From this study, it is apparent that most Member States and NRAs — with the notable 
exception of Germany — have not developed the analyses and procedures needed to 
translate this three-pronged approach towards ensuring universal service into practice. 
Greater reliance upon market forces and a more reasoned use of designation and 
public procurement hold great promise for stimulating a more flexible, adaptive, and 
efficient Community postal sector. Member States and NRAs should address 
implementation of this element of the Third Postal Directive as a matter of priority. 
5) Member States and NRAs must develop the analyses and procedures necessary to 
ensure that the scope of the universal service obligation is aligned with the changing 
needs of users and the evolving technical, economic, and social environment of the 
postal services market. 
Where postal markets are open to competition and universal services are ensured in 
the first instance by the commercial self-interest of postal service providers (‘market 
forces’), the function of the universal service obligation must be — as provided in the 
original Postal Directive425 — to establish a floor for service quality. If the voluntary 
offerings of postal service providers fall below this floor, then government must step in, 
by designation or public procurement, with the money and authority required to bring 
service quality up to this minimum level. The level of this service floor must, as stated in 
                                                
424 See section 6.3.3 and 6.3.4, above. 
425 See Directive 97/67/EC, Recital 11: ‘a universal postal service encompassing a minimum range of 
services of specified quality to be provided in all Member States at an affordable price for the benefit 
of all users, irrespective of their geographical location in the Community’. 
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Article 5 of the Postal Directive, ‘evolve in response to the technical, economic and 
social environment and to the needs of users’.  
To implement this principle, NRAs must know what users need and have authority to 
fine tune the definition of the universal service obligation. A well considered process of 
adjustment appears especially necessary in the present period of rapid and 
fundamental changes in postal markets. For the foreseeable future, the needs of users 
and the capabilities of postal service providers may be expected to develop significantly 
under the pressure of increased competition and developing information and 
transportation technologies. As a necessary first step, NRAs must regularly evaluate the 
current and future needs of users. Then they must be given sufficient authority by 
Member States to adjust the universal service definition in an impartial and objective 
manner. While some NRAs have systematically investigated the needs of users and 
introduced corresponding revisions in the definition of the universal service obligation, 
most NRAs do not yet have the capacity or authority to do so.  
6) The Commission, Member States, NRAs must ensure that postal and non-postal 
laws do not create barriers to entry that are inconsistent with the requirements or 
objectives of the Third Postal Directive. 
The Third Postal Directive is a plan for modernising the Community’s postal sector and 
allowing it to adapt to the rapidly changing circumstances of the early twenty-first 
century. A core element of this plan is creation of an open, undistorted Community 
market for postal services. Under the Third Postal Directive, competition and potential 
competition are — where feasible and effective — the primary means for ensuring a 
modern, efficient universal postal service adapted to the needs of the Community and 
for protecting the rights of users of postal services. 
The transition to workable competition in the postal sector will not be easy. Economies 
of scale and scope, traditional patterns of behaviour, declining use of letters, and the 
present unfavourable economic environment all conspire to create considerable natural 
obstacles for any new entrant. If competition and market forces are to assume the roles 
envisioned in the Third Postal Directive, it is imperative that Member States eliminate all 
legal measures that might reinforce these natural obstacles to new entry and prevent 
new legal barriers from being introduced. 
Some of these existing or potential legal barriers to entry may be grounded in postal 
laws. For example, authorisation requirements or conditions that go beyond what is 
strictly necessary to protect a basic universal postal service and hinder genuine 
competition must be considered incompatible with successful implementation of the 
Third Postal Directive. ‘Gold-plated’ definitions of the universal service obligation — 
which can only be fulfilled by the incumbent public postal operator — must be resisted 
unless there is clear evidence of a public need for such extensive standards of universal 
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service. Terminal dues and other regulations of the international postal service must be 
revised so that they are competitively neutral. If the reserved area is not prohibited 
outright, the Member States must reduce the reserved area to the absolute minimum 
required to sustain universal service after taking into account the support for universal 
service provided, or potentially available, from public funds or other compensation 
programs. 
Similarly, non-postal laws must be carefully reviewed to ensure that they apply equally 
to all postal service providers under similar circumstances. In particular, ‘full market 
opening’ will require Member States to address anti-competitive effects stemming from 
value-added taxes and customs laws that apply differently to a designated universal 
provider and to other providers of postal services. Preferences with respect to the 
placement of place public collection boxes, the operation of vehicles, or other legal 
privileges should be eliminated. Sector-specific labour laws must be considered 
inconsistent with the Third Postal Directive if they are designed to impair new entrants 
by imposing on the entire sector the inflexible working conditions adopted by public 
postal operators. 
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8.2 Key institutional reforms 
Effective and appropriate regulation of postal markets depends upon effective and 
appropriate governmental institutions. As Member States prepare to implement the 
Third Postal Directive, it is timely, indeed necessary, for the Member States to 
reconsider, and where appropriate, reform the institutional arrangements for regulation 
of the postal market. To this end, we believe that Member States and the Commission 
should focus on three key institutional issues. 
1) Member States must allocate responsibility for the regulation of postal services 
among separate institutions in a manner that ensures objective and impartial policies 
and regulation. 
The first step in developing an effective institutional framework for regulation of postal 
services is an appropriate definition of the roles of the agencies involved. As discussed 
in chapter 6,426 in order to promote impartial and objective regulation of the postal 
sector, regulatory authority should be appropriately allocated among four separate 
institutions: (1) a ministry that determines public policy for the postal sector; (2) a 
ministry or agency that exercises the ownership rights of the government in the public 
postal operator, if any; (3) an independent regulator of the postal sector; and (4) a 
national competition authority. In most cases, institutional separation is explicitly 
required by the Third Postal Directive. Specific provisions that will ensure institutional 
separation are well understood and exemplified in the laws of many Member States. 
We believe, therefore, that Member States should reconsider the manner in which 
regulatory authority is allocated among government agencies in light of the experience 
in regulating postal markets to date, the best practices found in other industrialised 
countries, and the specific requirements of the Third Postal Directive. Where needed, 
institutional reform should be a high priority for the Member States and the Commission. 
2) Member States must specifically reconsider the role, resources, and independence of 
the national regulatory authority in light of the Third Postal Directive. 
In particular, it is necessary and appropriate to reconsider the establishment of national 
regulatory authority in light of the Third Postal Directive. In mid-1990s, the idea of an 
independent regulator of the postal market was a relatively novel concept in many 
Member States. As the Postal Directive has evolved over the last decade, the role of 
the postal regulatory authority has come into clearer focus. Amendments to the Postal 
Directive have increased reliance on the impartiality and expertise of the regulator as 
the guarantor of universal service, enforcer of fair competition, and protector of users’ 
rights.  
                                                
426 See section 6.2.1, above. 
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In reviewing the institutional arrangements for the NRA, Member States need to 
consider authority, independence, and resources. The authority of the NRA should 
encompass all tasks which, according to the Postal Directive or good administrative 
practice, should be discharged transparently, non-discriminatorily, objectively, and 
proportionately. Enforcement powers should be adequate to ensure the effectiveness of 
regulatory decisions. Institutional arrangements should foster the independence of NRA 
from both public postal operators and political direction. Key features of institutional 
independence include procedures for appointment and dismissal of NRA heads, 
freedom from review or reversal by the postal minister, and procedures for approval of 
NRA budgets. At the same time, Member States must ensure that NRAs have adequate 
financial resources, skilled personnel, and access to external consultants. Currently, 
only about one third of NRAs appear to have sufficient authority and resources to do 
their jobs. 
3) To implement the Third Postal Directive effectively, the Commission and national 
postal regulators need to develop an efficient mechanism for consultation and 
coordination. 
As described in chapter 7, effective implementation of the Third Postal Directive will 
depend upon more substantive coordination between NRAs and the Commission. 
Enhanced coordination would allow NRAs to improve regulatory practices through 
mutual assistance and promulgation of best practices, especially with respect to the 
most technically challenging aspects of postal regulation (e.g., regulation of accounts, 
facilitation of a multi-operator market). Better coordination will also create a more 
harmonised regulatory environment for Community postal services and thus promote 
development of an internal market. In particular, enhanced cooperation should improve 
regulation of cross border services. To achieve better coordination among postal 
regulators, the Commission should establish an advisory group of independent postal 
regulators — a 'European Regulators Group for Postal Services (ERGP)' — as soon as 
possible. An ERGP should be functioning well before the end of 2010, the date of full 
liberalisation prescribed by the Postal Directive. 
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8.3 Evolution of the role of regulators in perspective 
For twenty years, the dominant theme in the European postal sector has been change. 
The economic, technological, and social context of postal services has shifted 
dramatically. The regulatory framework has evolved in response. The Postal Directive 
has been amended twice. Member States have revised primary and secondary postal 
legislation repeatedly. Postal administrations have been reorganised as normal 
corporations owned by government and then, in several cases, sold partly or wholly to 
private owners.  
To date it has been usual to view these shifting legal requirements from the perspective 
of the postal operators. How will the universal service providers adapt to liberalisation? 
Can they maintain a sound financial equilibrium? Will they be able to maintain their 
universal postal services? This perspective reflects in part the heavy reliance which the 
original Postal Directive placed upon designation of universal service providers as the 
preferred mechanism for ensuring universal service, albeit stimulated by first steps 
towards liberalisation. 
This study makes clear that evolution of the market and the regulatory framework will 
now require a parallel and equally fundamental evolution in the role of postal regulators. 
With implementation of the Third Postal Directive, the Community will complete a 
fifteen-year phase out of the reserved area as the primary means of ensuring and 
financing universal postal service. In line with broader Community programs codified in 
the Lisbon Strategy of 2000 and its progeny, the Community is placing increased 
emphasis on full market opening and user protection as additional instruments which — 
with the universal service obligation — will help to foster social cohesion, secure the 
rights of users, and enable a single European market in postal services. The public 
postal operator, if any, is evolving — and must evolve — into a normal commercial 
actor, leaving the NRA as the primary instrument for administering government policy in 
postal markets. 
In the wake of the Third Postal Directive, national regulatory authorities will need to 
address a range of new policy issues associated with liberalisation and a multi-operator 
environment. In many respects, national regulatory authorities in all Member States 
must now move down the path travelled the UK regulator, Postcomm, as it sought to 
implement the liberalisation engendered by the Postal Services Act 2000. In other 
respects, implementation of the Third Postal Directive, will present national regulatory 
authorities with regulatory approaches and options first set out in the German Post Law 
of 1997. For the most part, with some notable exceptions, it seems to us that 
Community regulators — postal, competition, and other — have barely begun to 
consider the new regulatory challenges posed by the Third Postal Directive. On the 
other hand, regulators are not starting from scratch either. They can draw on and adapt 
from a broad spectrum of best practices, innovated by a surprisingly diverse cast of 
Member States and other countries. 
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In the United Kingdom, an independent policy review commission chaired by Richard 
Hooper recently concluded that it would be impossible to sustain universal postal 
service with existing policies and the current organisation of Royal Mail. In a report 
entitled ‘modernise or decline’, the Hooper Commission recommended immediate and 
fundamental changes in both Royal Mail and the national regulatory authority. To those 
who would prefer to continue the status quo, the Commission declared bluntly, ‘the 
status quo is untenable’.427 
Peering further into future, we believe that the policy choice is even more stark than 
portrayed by the Hooper Commission. It seems evident that the full implications of the 
Information Revolution for society are still unfolding. Some of today’s most powerful and 
ubiquitous manifestations of the Information Revolution were barely imaginable in 1997. 
In sum, these technological advances present the postal sector with only two options: 
reform or obsolescence.  
The Third Postal Directive offers the Community and Member States an enlightened 
way forward, but it is not the end of postal history. The role of postal services in society 
will continue to grow as the friction of distance declines. At the same time, the nature of 
postal services will continue to change fundamentally. In the not-too-distant future, it 
appears possible, even probable, that the Community will need to examine again some 
of foundations of the Postal Directive, including the content and scope of universal 
service and appropriate functions of regulatory controls. Although we doubt that full 
market opening and user protection will be abandoned, adjustments may become 
necessary in light of more experience in the functioning of liberalised postal markets.  
In our view, implementation the Third Postal Directive should proceed with this longer 
term perspective in mind. To preserve the best of the long tradition of national postal 
systems into the future, Member States will need to implement the Third Postal 
Directive not with reluctance and half-measures but with an appreciation that the Third 
Postal Directive is a necessary step is an extended effort to adapt postal markets to the 
— still unknowable — demands of the twenty-first century society. In the early 
nineteenth century, a British politician pleaded with opponents who sought to preserve a 
governing system that could no longer be preserved in words that seem apt here as 
well: 
Turn where we may — within, around — the voice of great events is 
proclaiming to us, ‘Reform, that you may preserve’.428 
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